Introduction

The June 2016 referendum vote in the United Kingdom to leave the European Union was both the result of a perfect storm and a long time in the making. On the one hand, many events had to occur in the lead-up to the vote for it to end with this particular outcome. These included Cameron’s decision in January 2013 to call a referendum if his party were to win the next general election, the unexpected victory of the Conservatives in the May 2015 election, and the coincidence of the vote with a continent-wide refugee and migration crisis while the aftershocks of the euro crisis had still not been fully digested. On the other hand, from the very beginning of its membership in the European Community in 1973, the United Kingdom has featured as an awkward and reluctant partner while a uniquely Euroskeptic tabloid press has been systematically critical of anything coming out of “Brussels.” The reasons why 52 percent of the United Kingdom electorate voted “leave” were therefore complex and multifaceted. The pro-leave coalition constituted of strange bedfellows, including people who yearned for Britain’s imperial greatness and favored low regulation and free trade as well as voters who wanted to put a halt to the country’s openness to immigration and hoped leaving the European Union would allow the UK government to protect British industry and jobs. Prime Minister David Cameron’s resignation the day after the vote and succession by Theresa May, who made implementing Brexit the main goal of her new government, have set in motion various dynamics. They will have far-reaching consequences for British politics, and the constitutional balance between England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Brexit has rekindled fears in Ireland of a return to “the troubles” in Ulster that had been put to rest by the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. It also brought back the thorny issue of Scottish independence. Furthermore, the referendum result has laid bare divisions that cut across political party lines, and exposed deep societal cleavages between young and old, North and South, urban and rural areas, educated elites and less educated citizens, and the winners and losers of globalization. Brexit is also part of larger phenomena in European and world politics. It is only one symptom of a deeper malaise in European integration, in addition to intractable problems regarding Eurozone reform in the North, migration in the South, security in the East, and the backsliding of liberal democracy in the center. Finally, Brexit is also a peculiarly British (or English) expression of rising populism and anti-elite politics that have swept the globe since 2016.

General Overviews

Given the fact that Brexit is a relatively recent event, only a few general overviews on its many aspects and consequences, either as edited volumes or as special journal issues, have been published thus far. Diamond, et al. 2018 constitutes the most important reference work that deals with both the sources and implications of Brexit published to date. Ramiro Trotiño, et al. 2018 takes a very long-term view, outlining Brexit in broader historical terms. Meanwhile, Fabbrini 2017 analyzes the legal and political implications of Brexit. Wincott 2015 draws on classical social science insights and provides a short and comprehensive general overview of the main Brexit debates, as it concludes one of the first special journal issues on the topic. Bulmer and Quaglia 2018 brings together scholars of British politics and European integration in a special journal issue that examines both the politics and economics of Brexit. Outhwaite 2017 studies the sociological responses to Brexit, including its causes, its politics, and its prospects for and after Brexit. Finally, Oliver 2018 is the first textbook analysis of Brexit, which puts the vote in historical context, and looks at the implications of the vote and negotiations for the future both of the United Kingdom and of European integration.


This special issue brings together scholars from various disciplines in an effort to try to investigate the implications of Brexit for the European Union and the United Kingdom by placing their assessment in the context of the long-term evolution of UK-EU relations. The collection also aims to draw lessons from Brexit, relating its findings to debates within the literature on EU policymaking, comparative politics, and political economy. The special issue includes contributions on regulatory alignment, financial services, migration, EU differentiation, the prospects of a renewal of the Franco-German engine of European integration, Euroskepticism, and the political implications of “taking back control.”


This edited volume gives a general overview of what social science knows about Brexit so far. Instead of focusing on one aspect of Brexit, it covers a wide range of topics relating to both the internal and the external implications of Brexit. The volume thereby provides an insightful overview of the background, content, and potential implications of the Brexit referendum.
Prior to Brexit

In the lead-up to the referendum, a few articles were published that dealt with the run-up to Brexit. Throughout the entire process, starting with David Cameron’s January 2013 speech at Bloomberg in London, followed by the surprise victory of the Conservative Party during the UK general elections in May 2015 and its manifesto pledge to organize an in-out referendum on EU membership, continuing with the renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership, and ending with the referendum campaign, the outcome was never predetermined. The articles published prior to Brexit mainly looked at the likelihood of the United Kingdom actually voting “leave,” the politics of the Conservative Party’s stance toward Europe, and the potential consequences for the United Kingdom in case of an exit from the European Union. Matthijs 2013 is one of the first articles taking the prospect of a “Brexit” seriously, warning that David Cameron’s speech in January 2013 may have set in motion dynamics that would inexorably lead to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union and pointing out the damage a British exit would do to the UK economy and its standing in the world, as well as to European integration. Lynch 2015 explains the party-political rationale behind Cameron’s referendum call, while Smith 2016 compares Cameron’s renegotiation efforts in 2015 with Harold Wilson’s in 1975. Glencross 2015 argues that a referendum on EU membership is unlikely to settle the Europe question in the United Kingdom and could tear the Conservative Party apart. In a similar vein, Oliver 2015 maintains that the proponents of a referendum inflated expectations, as the vote would be nothing but a single step in a much longer process to stabilize EU-UK relations. Whitman 2016 sees the referendum as a break in Britain’s diplomatic strategy vis-à-vis the European Union, which had been consistent thus far in strengthening Britain’s role in European security, increasing its global impact through the European Union, and providing maximum trade and investment opportunities to British enterprises through European economic liberalization.


One year before the Brexit referendum was actually held, this article discusses the merits of holding such a referendum in the first place. It argues that leaving the European Union would be a complex and arduous process, while a vote for “remain” would likely destabilize the Conservative Party.

This article explains why David Cameron promised to hold an EU referendum. It argues that domestic party-political divisions as well as a changed relationship with the European Union after the Eurozone crisis led him to make this promise. The article then assesses whether a referendum would be able to address the questions surrounding the UK-EU relationship and intraparty divisions.

This article evaluates the logic behind Cameron’s promise in January 2013 to put the United Kingdom’s EU membership up for a national referendum and weighs the pros and cons of leaving the European Union for the United Kingdom’s political economy and foreign policy, concluding that even “flirting” with exit is folly.

Written during the debate on whether or not to hold a referendum, this article argues that proponents of the referendum have inflated expectations of what a referendum could provide. A referendum would only be a single step in a long process of bringing stability into the UK-EU relationship. It will not be able to address many of the underlying, complex questions of the United Kingdom’s skepticism toward the European Union.

This article directly compares David Cameron’s attempt to renegotiate the United Kingdom’s terms of membership prior to the 2016 referendum with similar efforts by Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson in 1975. The author argues that there were significant differences between the two renegotiations and referendums. These include that the stakes in 2016 were much higher and the challenges greater, as the European Union had become much more multifaceted and institutionalized.

Just prior to the Brexit referendum, this article provides an account of the United Kingdom’s strategy vis-à-vis the European Union to date, with an emphasis on security concerns and the United Kingdom’s international influence. The author argues that the United Kingdom’s strategy has been consistent since its accession to the European Union, but that the EU referendum is now challenging this traditional strategy.

Brexit and British Politics

The biggest effect of Brexit is arguably its impact on British politics and the dynamics at Westminster and Whitehall. Evans and Menon 2017 is the first major book on Brexit that delves deeply into the causes of the vote to leave, as well as its lasting consequences for British politics. All other existing academic references thus far are journal articles which deal with specific aspects of Brexit and British politics. Gamble 2018 sketches the domestic political context that led to the Brexit vote, the cross-party fault lines it laid bare, and the likely impact of the vote on UK political development. Heppell, et al. 2017 tests whether the voting positions of the Conservative Party’s Members of Parliament (MPs) correlated with social, political, or ideological variables, while Moore 2018 conducts a similar exercise using logistic regression analysis to look at vote-seeking, office-seeking, or policy preferences. Lynch and Whitaker 2018 assesses the impact of the vote on the Conservative Party, while Hayton 2017 examines David Cameron’s ideological legacy. Allen 2018 discusses Theresa May’s political inheritance from Cameron while also analyzing her leadership style. Heath and Goodwin 2017 conducts an aggregate-level analysis of the 2017 general election, in which Brexit was the main issue, and concludes that Brexit resulted in the return of the two-party system, while Chalmers 2017 depicts Brexit as reinforcing executive dominance in British politics, rather than heralding the promised return of parliamentary authority.

As a direct result of Brexit, Theresa May emerged as the United Kingdom’s new prime minister. This article discusses her political inheritance and dissects her leadership style and ability in the politics of Brexit.

This article explores the effect Brexit is having on democracy in Britain. It argues that since Whitehall will be the most central player in reforming EU-derived law, the legislative function of Parliament is currently being weakened.

This is the first book on Brexit that really attempts to analyze both its causes and its lasting consequences for British politics. The authors identify long-term dissatisfaction with the European Union as well as a gradual breakdown between parties and voters as Brexit’s primary causes. They also elaborate on the long-term consequences of Brexit on British politics, warning that if politicians do not deliver on their many Brexit promises, the strength of British democracy will further erode.


In this article, the author describes the impact Brexit has already had on UK politics, and its likely long-term consequences. According to him, these include fragility of the union with calls for Scottish independence and tensions along the Irish border, possible changes in the constitution and policy processes, the at least temporary return of the two-party system, long-term economic cost, and a possible weakening of Western defense.


This article assesses David Cameron’s ideological impact on British Conservative politics. It analyzes his effect on three contentious areas: European integration; the future of the Union of English, Welsh, Scots, and Northern Irish after Brexit; and the division between social liberals and communitarian traditionalists. Argues that while David Cameron had some successes, he ultimately failed to modernize British conservatism.


Although the Conservative Party is now leading the Brexit efforts, it remains deeply divided over the issue, partly because a majority of current Conservative MPs supported Remain. This article explores the current divisions and the ways in which Conservative politicians can express dissent and influence Brexit policy, such as amending Brexit legislation.


This article identifies the voting positions of the Conservative Party’s MPs during the Brexit referendum. It then tests whether these voting positions were correlated with social, political, and ideological variables, finding statistically significant relationships between voting positions and the type of university education MPs had received, their job background, experience as a minister, and, most importantly, ideological leanings.


Using logistic regression analysis, this article analyzes the motivation behind Conservative Party parliamentarians’ positions on Brexit. It finds that vote-seeking, policy preferences, and office-seeking all played a role, but that vote-seeking weighed less heavily than the other factors.

Brexit and Devolution

An often-overlooked aspect of the Brexit vote is its geographical diversity. While majorities in both England (53.4 leave versus 46.6 percent remain) and Wales (52.5 leave versus 47.5 percent remain) voted to leave the European Union, the opposite was true in Scotland (62 remain versus 38 percent leave) and Northern Ireland (55.8 remain versus 44.2 percent leave). This outcome, and the subsequent decision by Theresa May to take the whole of the United Kingdom out of the European Union while not giving any of the United Kingdom’s nations a veto, has serious consequences for the Union and its constitutional balance. Gormley-Heenan and Aughey 2017 looks at the effects of Brexit on Northern Ireland, focusing on issues of identity and party politics. Both McHarg and Mitchell 2017 and McEwen 2018 examine the Brexit vote’s effects on Scotland and find the existing political mechanisms that devolution has created to be completely inadequate for dealing with the situation.

This article looks at the distinct effect Brexit has on Northern Ireland. It argues that there has been a shift in Northern Irish self-understanding caused by the Brexit referendum and analyzes its simultaneous impact on identity, politics, and the constitution in Northern Ireland.


The clear majority with which Scotland voted for Remain poses new challenges to devolution within the United Kingdom. This article addresses these by explaining the nature of Scottish support for Remain, highlighting how the national as well as the Scottish government have reacted to the competing Brexit preferences, and elaborating on the impact Brexit has on British devolution.


Given the fact that neither Northern Ireland nor Scotland voted to leave the European Union, this article focuses on the constitutional consequences of a territorially divided Brexit vote. The main argument is that the current reliance on political mechanisms to give devolution constitutional significance is completely inadequate in a post-Brexit world.

**Brexit’s Constitutional Legitimacy**

One of the key debates in political science is whether popular referenda on important constitutional questions are inherently legitimate, especially in a parliamentary system like the United Kingdom, where the ultimate authority in political decision-making lies with the House of Commons. Unsurprisingly, social scientists strongly disagree on this issue. Bellamy 2018 argues that there was nothing inherently illegitimate about the EU referendum and finds most arguments that question the legitimacy of Brexit to be flawed. For him, the only way Brexit could be legitimately overturned is through Parliament. Eleftheriadis 2017 questions whether the only legitimate course after the referendum is to actually leave the European Union, since the exact form Brexit would take was not on the ballot. Matthews 2017 for her part finds that Brexit has laid bare a constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom, with the country being ill-equipped to deal with the very different results in its four nations. Weale 2017 argues that, rather than endorsing Brexit now that the votes have been cast, democrats who believe in Brexit’s harmful consequences have a continued duty to express their opposition. Shaw 2017 makes the case for a more nuanced approach to questions of democratic consent in a union with multiple “demoi,” while Copus 2018 observes a continuing gap between political elites, who are trying everything to delay and frustrate the Brexit process, and the United Kingdom’s electorate, which took a clear decision to leave the European Union, wondering whether Brexit will transform the United Kingdom into a “post-democratic” polity.


This article contends that most arguments that call into question the legitimacy of the first Brexit referendum are fundamentally flawed. While it is now too late for a second referendum, the author argues that a normal parliamentary process might legitimately overturn the Brexit decision if “Bremorse” in the population becomes large enough, as reflected for example in a clear shift in public opinion, or a general election supports such a policy change.


This article focuses on elites’ reaction to Brexit. It argues that the British elite’s attempt to delay, undermine, and prevent Brexit shows their disregard for democratic decisions. It explores the ways in which elites try to delegitimize the voters’ clear decision to leave the European Union and discusses whether the United Kingdom will transform into a post-democratic polity.


This article questions the argument that the only legitimate course after the referendum is an actual withdrawal from the European Union, especially if this means a “hard” Brexit. The author contends that Westminster is still the supreme lawmaking body in the United Kingdom and that Parliament should therefore make future decisions regarding the exact nature and form of Brexit.


This article argues that the multiple constitutional challenges Brexit is posing are a symptom of a broader constitutional crisis in the United Kingdom after decades of incoherent reforms and myopia have weakened the United Kingdom’s constitutional foundations.
In this article, the author considers the issues of democracy, political community, and citizenship surrounding the Brexit referendum. In line with the principle of “demoi-cracy,” Shaw argues for a more nuanced approach to questions of democratic consent in multilevel polities like the United Kingdom.

Despite the Brexit vote, this author argues that it is democrats’ duty to continue to oppose Brexit if they believe that it will have harmful consequences for the country.

The Causes of the Brexit Vote

The bulk of scholarly attention has gone into determining the exact causes of the United Kingdom's unexpected vote to leave the European Union. Many have tried to parse out the individual motives of voters who decided that it was in their interest to leave the European Union. Overall, it is fair to say that the causes of Brexit are both overdetermined and complex. For some, it was fear of migration that drove the vote to “take back control.” For others, it was traditional concerns of national sovereignty. There were those on the left who saw the European Union as an excessively neoliberal construction that has limited government policies to intervene in the market and those on the right who believed that the European Union put an excessive regulatory burden on UK business. For many, it was the ultimate chance to “stick it” to the country’s governing political, financial, and academic elite, who overwhelmingly favored remain. One of the first books on the issue, Glencross 2016, identifies prevailing Euroskepticism, immigration, and political miscalculation as Brexit’s main causes. Menon and Salter 2016 also describes a combination of long-term and short-term factors that conspired to determine the outcome. Smith 2018 focuses on the more immediate tactics of David Cameron and the Conservative Party which brought about the outcome. Curtice 2017 looks at multiple levels of analysis to account for the vote’s outcome, including the ineffectiveness of the “remain” campaign in his explanation. Marsh 2018 examines the politics of truth, looking into the way in which misinformation and overt lies about the European Union both before and during the campaign shaped voters’ attitudes. While Richardson 2018 concedes that some of Brexit’s causes were domestic in nature, he also argues that the European Union itself is to blame as it has become out of touch with the desires of ordinary voters. Dennison and Geddes 2018 zeroes in on the role of EU membership and the future of migration policy post-Brexit. Owen and Walter 2017 examines the Brexit vote through an “open economy politics” (OEP) lens trying to understand individual preference formation and ways forward. Finally, Hozić and True 2017, seeing Brexit as a “scandal,” takes a gender perspective and focuses on the intersectional inequalities that contributed to the vote.


This article attempts to provide an explanation of Brexit by looking at multiple levels: it considers which attitudes drove voters to vote leave, arguing that national identity and increases of migration, as well as the Eurozone crisis, had a significant effect. Both instrumental and identity considerations were important. The article further traces the political events leading up to the referendum and their effects on the outcome.


This article moves beyond short-term public opinion accounts trying to explain Brexit. Instead, it focuses on Britain’s historic policy and political dynamics on migration, arguing that Brexeters were able to harness unresolved tensions in an environment characterized by the increased salience of immigration. The article also discusses the possible nature of post-Brexit immigration policy, concluding that it is most likely going to be less “Europeanized.”


This book identifies a long tradition of Euroskepticism, the salience of immigration, and multiple political miscalculations made by David Cameron as the three main causes of Brexit. It analyzes Euroskepticism after the 1975 membership referendum, David Cameron’s renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s position in the European Union, the dynamics of the Brexit campaign, and Brexit’s policy implications. It closes with a discussion of the political philosophy underlying Brexit.


This article provides a feminist account of Brexit, putting into question but also complementing some of the more mainstream analysis. The authors discuss the main agents of Brexit and provide a gender perspective on the intersectional inequalities that contributed to the Brexit vote. This lens, they argue, can also be used to investigate other phenomena, like “Trumpism.”

This article argues that anti-politics played a large role in the Brexit vote. It originated from successive government failures as well as the tendency of politicians to claim that they have simple answers to complex problems. Not only did anti-politics cause Brexit, the author believes Brexit itself is likely to exacerbate the trend of anti-politics, as it is unlikely to solve the problems politicians promised it would solve.


Shortly after the Brexit referendum, this article constitutes one of the first attempts to make sense of its results. The authors argue that in order to understand Brexit, one has to take short-term and long-term factors into account, including the lack of public support for the European Union, long-term inter- and intraparty tensions, and the referendum campaign. They also examine the multiple national divisions the Brexit vote exposed.


In this article, Owen and Walter argue that the UK vote to leave the European Union can partly be analyzed using the insights of traditional “Open Economy Politics” (OEP) approaches. They also highlight multiple puzzles that OEP approaches would have a hard time to explain, as well as offer a few ways forward for the discipline of international political economy to better explain similar events in the future.


While this article accepts that many domestic factors played into Brexit, it argues that the European Union itself is partly to blame. European elites have implemented much more far-reaching policies than national voters desired and have thereby become increasingly out of touch with the European people they claim to serve and represent.


Focusing on the more immediate roots of Brexit, this article explains David Cameron’s decision to call for a referendum, the reasons for his loss, and the undesired outcomes his actions have produced. It argues that Cameron lost his gamble due to a combination of ill-timing, poor judgment on his part, and a more effective Leave campaign.

Demographic Factors and Public Opinion

A few academic contributions have taken advantage of public opinion data, survey data, and survey experiments to examine the relationship between demographic factors and public opinion during the referendum. Hobolt 2016 uses campaign and survey data and uncovers that the winners and losers from globalization voted very differently; those voters who were among the group of globalization “losers” and those particularly concerned with immigration and multiculturalism were much more likely to vote leave. Goodwin and Heath 2016 uses aggregate-level and geographical data to find polarization along educational lines and much higher vote shares for leave among the so-called left-behind. Goodwin and Milazzo 2017 draws on survey data to determine that the rate of change in (rather than absolute levels of) local immigration was one of the main determinants of the strength of the leave vote. Finally, Henderson, et al. 2017 sees “Englishness” or English nationalism as one of the main public opinion drivers in determining the outcome of the referendum.


Using aggregate-level data, the authors provide an initial map of the Brexit vote’s geographical makeup. They find higher turnout in pro-leave areas, pro-leave attitudes that closely map UKIP support, and high levels of polarization along educational lines.


This article draws on survey data from the British Election Study to determine how immigration influenced public opinion on Brexit. It finds that increases in the rate of immigration, as well as sentiments regarding control of immigration, were key factors in determining Brexit support.

Since the decisive Leave majority in England determined the 2016 referendum result, this article explores the driving factors of Brexit support within England. The authors find that “Englishness” was a significant factor driving the Leave vote.


Campaign and survey data in this article show that the key driver of the Brexit vote was the divide between winners and losers of globalization. Less-educated, poorer, and older voters, as well as those concerned with immigration and multiculturalism, tended to show much stronger support for Brexit.

**Brexit’s Political Economy**

The vote to leave the European Union has deep roots in changes in the United Kingdom’s political economy that have taken place since it joined the European Community in 1973. It also has significant consequences for the future development of the United Kingdom’s political economy. The articles that focus on political economy and Brexit deal with the role of Britain’s financial sector, the winners and losers from economic change and deindustrialization, immigration, and neoliberal ideas. Thompson 2017 finds that the causes of Brexit were both inevitable from a historical point of view and also contingent on much going wrong in the short term. Watson 2018 also sees “the economy” and the rhetoric around it as playing a crucial role in the vote for Brexit, especially for those “let-down” voters who have seen their labor market conditions worsen over time. Gifford 2016 finds that the economic case for leaving the European Union had become established as part of Britain’s mainstream view, which had been opposed to joining the euro and defined its own economic dynamism in contrast to the multiple recent crises of the Eurozone. Bailey 2018 blames both Labour and Conservatives for sticking with neoliberal pathologies after the global financial crisis of 2008 and finds that neither party is seemingly rethinking or changing its economic strategy in response to Brexit. Finally, Coulter 2018 examines the role of EU immigration and skill formation in the United Kingdom and finds that the bifurcated nature of UK capitalism played a role in the vote to leave the European Union.


Focusing on the party-political strategies that ultimately led to Brexit, this article argues that both the Conservatives and the Labour Party followed contradictory pathologies during the period of neoliberal stagnation that began in 2008. These pathologies inadvertently contributed to the Brexit vote, and there are currently no signs of reflection or change within either party.


This article looks at the impact of EU labor mobility and the European Union’s skills and technology policies of Agenda 2020 on the UK labor market. Together with British policy and existing structural biases, it is argued, these exacerbated the bifurcated structure of capitalism in the United Kingdom. The cleavages thus worsened by European integration could therefore have contributed to the vote to leave the European Union.


This article also uses a political economy approach to explain the Brexit vote. The main contributing factor to the Leave vote, it argues, was the extent to which economic arguments for withdrawing from EU membership had become established as part of Britain’s mainstream political debate.


This article tries to reconcile accounts of Brexit as the result of political contingencies and of Brexit as the end of Britain’s EU membership, which has long seemed inevitable. It recognizes Brexit as both—politically contingent but also the result of long-term factors, including Britain’s political economy as a non-euro member that operates as the Eurozone’s financial center.


Explaining why British voters were not persuaded by pro-Remain arguments about the British economy, the author argues that many have come to understand “the economy” as labor market conditions that have served them badly. These “let-down” voters feel abandoned by politicians, as the United Kingdom's economic restructuring has resulted in a more fragmented labor market and a substantial rise in the number of “working poor.”
Campaigns and the Media

The campaign leading up to the UK referendum on EU membership in June 2016 was hotly contested, cut across political party lines, and saw a crucial role for both traditional (written press, radio, and television) and online media, including multiple social media platforms. While the outcome has often been explained as a victory for the voice of “the people” versus the more sinister motives of an educated “elite,” it needs to be pointed out that both remain and leave campaigns were led by different sections of the same British elite. Schmidt 2017 focuses on the ideas, discourses, and narratives of the main political entrepreneurs in the referendum campaign and finds similarities with the campaign techniques used to help elect Donald Trump president of the United States in November 2016. Bucklee 2018 studies the language of Brexit, analyzing how public discourse structured the prior public debate in the United Kingdom. Copeland and Copsey 2017 analyzes the role of the printed press in the domestic debate on UK membership in the European Union since 1974. They see Euroskepticism dominate because of the lack of a viable pro-European faction that could have served as a counterweight. Goodwin, et al. 2018 presents the results of a survey experiment and finds that message framing in the referendum debate played a key role in determining outcomes, and that the remain campaign could have been a lot more effective. Startin 2015 explains enduring Euroskepticism in the United Kingdom with the hostile attitude of much of the tabloid press, which made it impossible for most British voters to think about the European Union in “neutral” terms. Finally, Usherwood and Wright 2017 examines both campaigns’ strategies on Twitter, with “Remain” more focused on economic issues while “Leave” doubled down on issues of identity and immigration.


Investigating the 2016 EU referendum in the United Kingdom, this book explores the ways in which “Leave” campaigners utilized language and used discourse more persuasively than their “Remain” counterparts. Drawing parallels with effective political discourse used worldwide, this book highlights the linguistic features of what the author sees as an increasingly “popular” style of political campaigning, as was also on display in the United States in 2016.


This article analyzes the role of the media in the domestic debate about the United Kingdom’s EU membership. Using newspaper articles published between 1974 and 2013, the study finds that Euroskepticism was caused by a long-term absence of any pro-European faction in the British polity that could have systematically defended the European Union in the national debate.


This article looks at message framing and its role in the campaign surrounding the 2016 referendum. Using a survey experiment, the authors find that the potential for campaign effects was high for the pro-EU frames, as the arguments for membership in the European Union were generally understated in the public debate.


Following a theoretical approach called “discursive institutionalism,” this article attempts to provide an explanation for the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the election of Donald Trump in the United States. Schmidt suggests a need to focus on the content of agents’ ideas, narratives, discursive dynamics, and communication techniques in order to effectively explain political phenomena in a so-called “post-truth” era.


This article looks at the tabloid press’s influence on the United Kingdom’s ambivalence and hostility toward the European Union, the rise of UKIP, and the tensions surrounding EU membership in the Conservative Party. It argues that UK citizens were unable to weigh the costs and benefits of EU membership in a referendum, because the tabloid press did not provide a “level playing field” in its EU coverage.


In this article, the authors carefully analyze the Twitter strategies of three main campaign groups during the Brexit referendum. While “Stronger IN” focused more on economic themes, the “Leave” groups concentrated on issues of politics and immigration. Both camps campaigned by bringing forth new issues, but also by capitalizing on errors made by the opposing side.
The Brexit Negotiations

After the initial shock of the referendum outcome, and the joint popular and academic efforts to understand its root causes, attention has shifted toward the process of the actual Brexit negotiations, including its timing, the triggering of Article 50 of the European Union’s Lisbon Treaty, the debate over “hard” versus “soft” Brexit, and the question of the United Kingdom’s future relationship with the European Union. From the beginning, it was clear that the UK government was inadequately prepared for the outcome of the referendum and that the vote to “leave” the European Union had not settled the debate over “what kind” of Brexit would be pursued. McGowan 2017 offers a chronological account of the United Kingdom’s preparations for Brexit as well as its evolving position in the negotiations and the actors involved. Oliver 2016, an article written prior to the triggering of Article 50, discusses how the negotiations are likely to evolve as well as identifying the key issues at stake. Vasilopoulou and Talving 2018 documents what British public opinion expects from the negotiations, showing divisions over the trade-off between control over immigration and access to the single market. König 2018 compares the process of negotiations over Brexit with the renegotiations in 1975 under Harold Wilson. Whyman 2018 assesses the likelihood of that hardest of all Brexits, i.e., Britain going over the cliff edge and crashing out of the European Union without a deal. Lavery 2017 focuses on the role of British business preferences in shaping the negotiation strategy of the United Kingdom, while Hunt and Minto 2017 focuses on regional differences and preferences in the negotiations, with special attention to the case of Wales.

This article focuses on the role of the UK regions in Brexit negotiations. It explores Wales’ preferences and engagement at the national and the EU level. When aiming to influence policy, the article argues, Wales has mostly focused on engagement at the national level. At the EU level, Welsh efforts mostly aim to raise awareness of region-specific interests in the Brexit process.

This article provides a comparison of the nature of interstate bargaining and national preferences in the two decisions on British EU membership: 1975 and 2016. It finds a shift away from intergovernmental bargaining toward a two-level game dynamic.

This article makes the case that business preferences play and will continue to play a large role in the Brexit negotiations, but also that businesses have agency in navigating Brexit. It discusses the previous business strategy of UK firms with regards to EU employment policy, the challenges Brexit now poses to this strategy, and the resulting politics of Brexit.

Chronological account of Britain’s preparation for Brexit, its evolving negotiation position, and the actors involved in shaping Brexit. The book starts with a chapter on the government’s lack of preparation prior to the referendum and ends with a chapter on the consequences of the 2017 general election. While the main focus is on British politics, the author also highlights the European Union’s responses and Northern Ireland’s special position in the negotiations.

This article argues that the declaration that “Brexit means Brexit” answers almost none of the central questions surrounding Brexit. Contending that Brexit will not constitute one event but a lengthy process with a multitude of potential outcomes, the article discusses the multilayered negotiations likely to result from the Brexit vote. It attempts to identify the main actors, key issues at stake, and potential outcomes.

The authors examine what the British electorate expects from the ongoing Brexit negotiations. It finds divisions over membership in the customs union and the trade-off between controlling immigration and being part of the single market. Britons in general are in favor of allowing EU citizens to live and work in the United Kingdom, but do not want to share welfare benefits with them.

The United Kingdom is negotiating a transition deal out of fear that the UK economy will fall off a "cliff edge" after two years of negotiation. This article assesses how likely hitting this cliff edge really is and what the implications would be, arguing that a "cliff-edge" Brexit would not be detrimental and would even have certain benefits. However, to credibly and successfully implement a Brexit option with no deal, Britain would have to accelerate its current preparations.

**Brexit and its Effects on European Integration**

The advent of Brexit was a serious setback for European integration, as the decision of one large member state to leave the European Union altogether was the first time the process of EU integration went into reverse. While many academic observers were eager to point out that the United Kingdom has always been a "special case" and is unlikely to be followed by other members, its negative impact on the European Union's prestige has been significant. Though Brexit may well lead to a quickening of the pace of European integration among its remaining members, now no longer hampered by a British veto, most of the internal problems of the European Union were not made in Britain. Matthijs 2017 sees Brexit as a broader symptom of the desire of EU member states to "take back (domestic) control," be it over immigration, macroeconomic policy, or their own financial sector. Closa 2017 brings together political scientists and legal scholars looking at what exactly it means for a member state to withdraw from the European Union in comparison to secession of regions from sovereign states. Martill and Staiger 2018 set out to rethink the possible futures of the European Union in light of Brexit from various perspectives, including democracy, political economy, and legitimacy. Walouzet 2018 takes a revisionist view of the United Kingdom's role in European integration, questioning its commitment to free trade and its traditional caginess vis-à-vis Brussels. Using survey data, De Vries 2017 concludes that the Brexit vote has turned the rest of Europe more pro-EU given the unattractive alternatives on offer. Finally, Qorraj and Ajdarpašić 2016 assesses the effects of the United Kingdom's departure for the prospects of EU enlargement toward the Western Balkans.


Edited volume that brings together the work of political scientists and legal scholars. The book explores two related issues: the withdrawal of a member state from the European Union and territorial secession. It provides a legal, empirical, and normative analysis of Brexit as well as secessionist movements in Scotland, Catalonia, and beyond.


In this article, the author uses survey data and a survey experiment to determine whether the Brexit vote turned public opinion within Europe more or less in favor of European integration. The author finds that support for EU membership was higher after the referendum and argues that voters' perception of the alternatives to EU membership, as well as the actions of political entrepreneurs, are key determinants of public opinion formation.


This edited volume has an explicit focus on Brexit's implications for the European Union and its future. Instead of offering one united account of the likely future of the European Union, the book provides different perspectives from various disciplines and issue areas, ranging from political economy to democracy and legitimacy.


This article argues that Brexit is only one of many crises of European integration. The author believes the current crisis has its seeds in the establishment of the single market, the single currency, and the decision to enlarge the European Union to the East. From the mid-1980s onward, the European Union has been limiting the discretionary powers of national governments to respond to electorates' demands, especially in macroeconomic, financial, and migration policy.


In this article, the authors address two issues that arise for EU enlargement after Brexit. First, they note that the United Kingdom's support for the EU accession of the Western Balkans will be lost. Second, they observe that lengthy Brexit negotiations will shift the European Union's focus away from the accession process of the Western Balkans.


This article questions two commonly held beliefs about Britain's relationship with the European Union: its continued promotion of free trade and its traditional reticence toward European integration. It argues that the British attitude toward free trade has historically been mixed, with some protectionist episodes.
Brexit and European (Dis-)Integration

Brexit has forced scholars of EU integration to rethink existing theories. Some argue that the advent of Brexit means that we needed a whole new body of theories on European disintegration, while others argue that we can explain Brexit perfectly using existing theories. Jones 2018 builds on the original insights of Gunnar Myrdal to come up with a testable, empirically verifiable, and falsifiable theory of disintegration. Schimmelfennig 2018 uses post-functionalist explanations of EU integration to argue that Brexit constitutes a case of differentiated disintegration. Krotz and Schild 2018 sees three possible post-Brexit scenarios for European integration, though the authors believe that Franco-German cooperation remains the best way forward. Taggart and Szczerbiak 2018 draws on expert survey data to argue that the effect of Brexit on countries’ national party politics and their attitudes toward EU integration has been fairly limited.


As Brexit and other crises have motivated the emergence of theories of European disintegration, this article suggests an overarching framework under which to unite upcoming theories as well as a new research agenda, building on the seminal insights of Gunnar Myrdal.


With regard to the future of the European Union, three possible post-Brexit scenarios are examined in this article: German hegemony, the decline of the European project, and a strengthening of the Franco-German alliance driving EU integration. While the authors regard all scenarios as possible, they argue that the third is the most likely (and desirable) scenario to materialize.


Using a post-functionalist explanation of differentiated integration, this article argues that Brexit is a case of differentiated disintegration. It identifies the causes of Brexit at the supra-national (European Union) and the national levels. Furthermore, this article elaborates on the power dynamics of the Brexit negotiations, claiming that demanding disintegration puts the member state that acts as the instigator at a serious disadvantage.


Drawing on data from expert surveys and qualitative data, this article analyzes the effects recent European crises have had on political parties’ mobilization of Euroscepticism. It finds that while the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis have had strong effects in certain member countries, the effect of Brexit on other countries’ national party politics has so far remained very limited.

The Multiple Crises of European Integration

Many scholars have approached Brexit as just one of the many crises of European integration. The superb edited volume by Dinan, et al. 2017 gives an overview of the past decade of crises in European integration. Castells, et al. 2018 also looks at Europe’s multiple and overlapping crises, bringing together political scientists, economists, and sociologists. FitzGibbon, et al. 2017 sees Euroskepticism as a broader transnational phenomenon laying bare the growing gap between Europhile elites and a skeptical public and putting British Euroskepticism in a pan-European perspective. Grimmel and Giang 2017 see the crises of the European Union as a problem of lacking European solidarity. Solidarity, they argue, holds the key to getting out of the European Union’s current predicament. Chopin and Lequesne 2016 describes differentiation, or “multiple speeds” in the European Union’s integration process, as a double-edged sword, with Brexit being described as the result of a broader conflict that had been brewing between euro ins and outs. Taking stock of Europe’s economic challenges, Hodson 2017 sees the uncertainty Brexit creates as one of the European Union’s current main problems, while Miller 2017 believes that the European Union needs to adapt its founding rationale to a new reality. Finally, De Angelis 2017 argues that the European Union needs to address economic and social grievances if it wants to continue to thrive in the future.


This edited volume looks at the multiple, overlapping crises Europe is facing in the early 21st century. The authors, who include economists, political scientists, and sociologists, fear for the survival of the European Union. They argue that the current crises are a product of design flaws of the European Union, which stem from the political process of its creation. Chapter 17 explicitly addresses the causes and consequences of Brexit.

In this article, the authors discuss the relationship between EU differentiation and the debate on the distribution of competences across various levels of government. It identifies three distinct groups of EU member states, which have developed different practices vis-à-vis the centralization of power at the EU level. Brexit, it is argued, is part of a broader conflict of how to organize the relationship between the Eurozone and non-Eurozone members.


This article argues that in the face of multiple crises, the European Union needs to reflect on which flaws in the European integration process actually led to these crises. The author offers the diagnosis that the roots of dissatisfaction with the European Union stem from its social and economic policies and presents multiple scenarios for the European Union’s future development.


This edited volume treats Brexit as one part of a more multilayered crisis of the European Union. The crisis, it is argued, goes beyond Brexit, the Eurozone crisis, and increased migration flows. The book gives an outline of the different challenges the European Union faces and discusses their likely impact on the future of the European Union.


Edited volume that explores the rise of a transnational Euroskepticism and the growing gap between Europhile elites and a skeptical public. Case studies include public opinion, political parties, the media, civil society, and the European Parliament. The volume argues that Euroskepticism should not be treated as a phenomenon of national party politics alone and thereby helps put British Euroskepticism into a pan-European perspective.


Edited volume that discusses the central role of solidarity in European integration. It provides an interdisciplinary perspective, with contributions from scholars of political science, law, sociology, and philosophy. Based on cases such as Brexit, the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and separatist movements, it argues that European solidarity is in crisis and that solidarity is the key to resolving the European Union’s current problems.


This article takes stock of new economic challenges that the European Union and the Eurozone in particular are facing. These include the uncertainty created by Brexit. The author argues that although Brexit means the departure of a member that has been putting the brakes on further integration, more pressing issues need to be resolved before Eurozone reform can be tackled.


This article argues that in times of multiple crises, including that of rising populism and Brexit, the European Union needs to adapt its founding rationale to a new reality.

**Brexit and the Single Market**

Brexit also has a knock-on effect on the working of the EU single market. While the debate about whether the United Kingdom should (or indeed can) leave the single market remains far from settled, most observers assume that control over immigration will make single market membership incompatible with “taking back control.” It is not clear whether the United Kingdom will actually end up leaving the single market, nor do we know whether it can do so without inflicting major economic damage to its own economy. If Brexit does mean the end of single market membership for the United Kingdom, this has major consequences for citizenship rights, financial services, and intra-EU migration patterns. Armstrong 2018 assesses the prospects of regulatory alignment and divergence after Brexit. Kostakopoulou 2018 examines the various templates for citizenship post-Brexit and the European Union’s duty to protect EU citizens’ rights. Howarth and Quaglia...
2017 and Howarth and Quaglia 2018 look at the effect of Brexit on the financial services industry and the consequences for the EU single financial market.

Farrand 2017 focuses on intellectual property (IP) rights.


One key question regarding Brexit is the future of current EU regulation in force across the United Kingdom. This article explores the possible future direction of British regulation and argues that whether there will be regulatory alignment or divergence will depend on a multitude of factors, including dynamics outside of the European Union's influence on the United Kingdom.


This article discusses the consequences Brexit might have on IP law and policy. At the EU level, efforts in this area might come to a halt, since the United Kingdom has been a main driver of further integration. For the United Kingdom, Brexit could mean a loss of influence over its own laws and over international IP norms.


This article broadly explores Brexit's consequences for the development of the EU single financial market and the United Kingdom's financial industry. It argues that Britain has historically had a significant impact on European financial market regulation, rendering it more open and market friendly. The City has been unsuccessful in mobilizing support for continued full access to European financial markets and all possible post-Brexit scenarios appear worse than the status quo.


The authors of this article examine the future of European financial market integration. They find strong evidence for a neo-mercantilist battle among EU member states trying to attract UK financial services. In contrast, they find only limited evidence for the effect of transnational financial networks advocating for broad financial market access for the United Kingdom.


This article discusses the potential consequences of Brexit for EU citizens in the United Kingdom and UK citizens living in EU member states, assuming a European Economic Area (EEA) model is not chosen during the negotiations. The author proposes an "EU protected citizen" status as the best solution for the citizenship question.

**Brexit, International Relations, and Security**

Next to France, the United Kingdom was the European Union’s main player in international relations and security, with its sizeable military with global reach as well as its permanent seat and veto power at the UN Security Council. Losing the United Kingdom therefore decreases the European Union’s ability to act on the global stage, which could significantly diminish its role in the world. But leaving the European Union also means diminished prestige for the United Kingdom, whose special relationship with the United States always depended on its ability to influence EU decision-making. Farrand 2017 looks at the potential impact of Brexit on US-EU and US-UK relationships. Wilson 2017 observes the similarities between the forces that led to Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, but concludes that the United Kingdom is likely to become a less vital diplomatic partner to the United States post-Brexit. Rees 2017 contrasts various theories of international relations to conclude that the United States may have accidentally contributed to Brexit by treating the European Union as a security concern rather than a simple partner. Oliver 2017 explains how Brexit could lead to shifting perceptions of Europe in the United States, Russia, and China. Blagden 2017, as well as examining the causes of Brexit, makes a number of—mostly negative—predictions about potential Brexit outcomes from a security point of view. Dee and Smith 2017 highlights both the challenges and opportunities for the United Kingdom at the UN Security Council that follow from its decision to leave the European Union. Finally, LaVere 2016 looks at the United Kingdom’s defense capabilities post-Brexit and argues that it should focus on its relationship with the United States if it wants to continue to play an outsized role in global affairs.


Next to identifying a number of likely factors that caused Brexit, this article makes predictions about plausible Brexit outcomes from a security point of view. It argues that Britain might be facing the fragmentation of the United Kingdom and its collective defense effort, a less benign regional security environment, and a
diminished capacity for national security policymaking.


Unlike many other accounts, this article provides a positive outlook on the consequences of Brexit: it argues that European armaments cooperation may actually improve after the United Kingdom leaves the European Union.


At the United Nations, Great Britain has benefited greatly from its EU membership. This article highlights the challenges and opportunities Brexit therefore poses for the United Kingdom’s future influence as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and the overall effectiveness of its diplomacy at the United Nations. It is argued that to maintain its influence, a post-Brexit United Kingdom needs to continue to take EU positions into account.


This article highlights deficiencies in the United Kingdom’s defense capabilities and makes concrete suggestions on how to address these deficiencies, especially post-Brexit. It is argued that Britain should focus on its special relationship with the United States if it wants to continue playing a disproportional large role on the world stage.


In this article, the author argues that the European Union and the United Kingdom need to pay attention to external perceptions of Europe, as these matter for their security. He therefore looks at how Brexit could change the way in which other countries, especially the United States, Russia, and China, perceive Europe.


Just prior to the referendum, this article discusses the potential consequences Brexit might have for the United States’ relationship with the European Union and the United Kingdom. It argues that while transatlantic relationships are unlikely to break down due to Brexit, Britain risks becoming an “awkward inbetweener,” increasingly dependent on the US-EU relationship.


This article argues that the United States’ attitude toward the European Union as a security actor is much more complex than a simple partnership. Contrasting international relations theories are invoked to explore how the United States accidentally contributed to the Brexit result by acting as if the European Union were a security issue for the United States.


In this article, the author argues that despite the similarities of the Brexit campaign and Donald Trump’s general election campaign in the United States, the United Kingdom might become a less vital diplomatic partner for the United States after exiting the European Union.

**Brexit as Part of Larger Trend of Populism and Antiglobalism**

The year 2016 was rife with populist revolts in the advanced industrial world. As they occurred shortly after one another and at the heart of the two financial centers of the Anglo-Saxon world, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump constitute the two key events of these revolts. Many authors therefore see Brexit as just one national expression of a broader trend of anti-elite populist politics, both on the left and on the right, and as part of a more general backlash against the vicissitudes of globalized markets and the damage they have wrecked in vulnerable sections of society and the economy. Inglehart and Norris 2017 sees Brexit as yet another symptom of the “silent revolution in reverse,” where cultural changes are perceived as inimical to native populations, while the timing can be explained by the negative economic consequences of the global financial crisis. Steenbergen and Siczek 2017 investigates how individuals’ risk propensity relates to the
likelihood that they will support right-wing populist parties. Hopkin 2017 observes how Karl Polanyi ironically met his populist match in Nigel Farage during the Brexit campaign and how anti-system politics is the result of the decline in ideological competition between the major centrist democratic parties. Blyth and Matthijs 2017 question whether established theories of international political economy (IPE) can explain phenomena such as Trump and Brexit by purely relying on exogenous shocks. Their article calls on shifting the focus away from micro foundations of voters' individual preferences to broader macro effects and tries to explain that changes in macroeconomic regimes are endogenous. Farrell and Newman 2017 apply their “new interdependence approach” (NIA) to the case of Brexit, seeing UKIP as part of a broader transnational “nationalist international” movement. Vines and Marsh 2017 defines Brexit as the result of the increased importance of “anti-politics,” while Ramswell 2017 finds striking parallels between the Brexit and Trump campaigns, as both were characterized by divisive battles marked by often overt racism and xenophobia.


This article suggests that a radical rethinking of IPE is needed, as it failed to adequately explain not only the Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump in the United States, but also the 2008 financial crisis. The authors suggest shifting IPE’s focus away from micro-foundations toward macroeconomic regimes, getting beyond “exogenous” shocks and toward an “endogenous” account of stability and crisis in IPE.


This article asks scholars to move away from standard political economy models, which treat globalization as an exogenous shock. Using their “new interdependence approach” (NIA), they instead suggest that globalization alters the political issue space and changes political actors’ institutional opportunities. They conclude that the current age of interdependence therefore requires a new research agenda for electoral politics.


In this article, Hopkin presents Brexit as part of a new anti-system politics. The author argues that this anti-system politics has resulted from a decline in ideological competition in democracies, increasing upheavals stemming from global free market capitalism, and most mainstream politicians’ chronic inability to address the root causes of these upheavals.


Treating Brexit, France’s National Front, and the election of Donald Trump as examples, the authors explore the reasons for rising support of xenophobic parties in the Western world. They argue that support for populist parties embodies a backlash against cultural change and that economic insecurity, together with large inflows of migrants and refugees, can explain the timing of the recent increase in support for right-wing populists.


This article compares Brexit with the 2016 US presidential election and finds striking parallels between the campaigns. It argues that both cases were characterized by racism and xenophobia, and that in both cases, initial endeavors to represent the will of the people turned into vicious and divisive battles.


This article uses survey data from the United Kingdom to investigate how individuals’ risk propensity relates to the support for right-wing populist parties and the rejection of globalization. It finds that although risk-seekers are not very persuaded by antiglobalization arguments, they are more likely to support right-wing populism.


The authors explore the increased importance of “anti-politics” of which Brexit and the election of Donald Trump are examples. They define “anti-politics,” explain its causes, and discuss what potential solutions could look like, using Brexit as their primary case study.