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2006 Student Research Trip to Haiti

Haiti: Understanding Conflict

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Introduction

This report is the result of a research trip of The Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Conflict Management Studies, organized by Professor I. William Zartman with sixteen students completing master's degrees in conflict management, international relations, international development, international economics, and Latin American studies. The students also come from diverse professional and cultural backgrounds, and draw upon varied experience and travel. They interviewed Washington representatives of organizations working on Haiti, both government and NGOs, traveled to Port-au-Prince, Haiti, on 9-15 January 2006 to meet and interview high-level officials, presidential candidates, journalists, activists, students, and other civil society members (see Appendices A and B), and returned to Washington to write a joint report on selected aspects of the Haitian situation as an endemic conflict, seeking to identify both its sources and appropriate remedies.

The objective of the research and interviews was to gain a better understanding of the nature and sources of conflict in Haiti, the role of various local actors, the role of the international community, and the way the conflict can be managed in the short and medium term. Each student participant chose a particular angle of focus, within the four broad categories of Economics, Society and Security, Governance and Security, and Civil Society. The remedies to the current and ongoing conflict in Haiti have frequently been identified; they include short-term fixes and long-term structural reforms. Some of these are included in the following analyses because they have to be and because they stand out as necessary—even if difficult—elements in any effective reform. Others are new, less frequently emphasized, or presented with a new twist. What is important in all is their common characteristic of urgency and importance in dealing with a situation that has every possibility of lasting and worsening if the newly elected administration and the international community, working together in cooperation and sensitivity, do not take firm and specific measures to put Haiti (back) on its feet. The Haitians are a proud, creative, hardworking, resilient people. They deserve no less.

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I. Economics

Section 1

Joseph Taves

Environmental degradation and its effect on the economy and political stability

The February 2006 Haitian elections mark the 11th time in 20 years that power has changed hands in the troubled Caribbean republic. Eight men held the presidency over this period, yet none proved able to unify the country behind his leadership. Instead, each left the country more polarized than he had found it. The underlying question is not *who* should govern Haiti, but rather, *how* should the country be governed?

An effective governing strategy in Haiti must address the roots of the endemic conflict. Drug trafficking, kidnappings, and coups d'état are symptoms too often misinterpreted as fundamental causes of this conflict. Even the country's crushing poverty, while undoubtedly a contributing factor to political tensions, is more accurately viewed as a consequence of deeper problems in Haiti. The most fundamental of these problems is Haiti's severe environmental degradation, a driving force behind the country's enduring political conflict and even behind the security problems that plague Port-au-Prince today. Environmental decay is not the only problem behind Haiti's conflict, but rather is the most important of many fundamental causes. Corrupt governance, nonexistent rule of law, weak civil society institutions and other issues also play a significant role. However, ecological destruction threatens Haiti's stability far more than any of these other concerns.

The Root of Conflict

Environmental Scarcities

Environmental decay in Haiti has two sources: population pressure and the lack of alternative fuels. Rural population pressure in Haiti is the highest in the Western Hemisphere. It has the hemisphere's second highest population density, the highest percentage of total population living in rural areas, and the fifth highest population growth rate. These pressures impel peasants to clear more forested land for farming and push them onto steeply sloped terrains that are especially vulnerable to erosion.

Peasants further deplete the forests to satisfy their demand for fuel. Poor road infrastructure, import levies, and high petroleum prices make fuels such as propane gas prohibitively expensive, forcing most peasants to rely exclusively on wood and charcoal for their energy needs. Today wood and charcoal account for 85% of Haiti's total energy consumption. As a result of population pressures and dependence on wood and charcoal, Haiti retains only 1% of its original forest cover.

Such widespread deforestation has severe consequences. Erosion eats away at unprotected slopes, washing fertile soils away and exposing large areas of bare rock. The loss of

these soils causes a steady decline in Haitian agricultural productivity, already the least productive in the hemisphere, further impoverishing farmers and leading to food shortages, malnutrition and even starvation. The soil runoff pollutes rivers, rendering their waters unsafe to drink. The silt problem is so acute that the streets of Port-au-Prince require regular bulldozing to clear the streets of mud build up from soil runoff during the rainy season. Worse, deforestation reduces the retention capacity of watersheds, causing catastrophic flooding in heavy rains, drying of rivers and severe water shortages throughout the country.

These forest, agricultural land and water scarcities wreak havoc on the lives of rural peasants. Experts estimate a human being requires a minimum of a half-hectare of cultivable land and 1,500 cubic meters of clean water per year to remain healthy. In Haiti, erosion and population growth have reduced the amount of cultivable land per person to only 2/5 of a hectare for every Haitian citizen. Water resources have been stretched to a ratio of 1,530 cubic meters per person per year. As the population grows and erosion and watershed destruction further deplete land and water resources, Haiti approaches a potential environmental Armageddon.

Rural to Urban Migration and Overpopulation


As agricultural productivity declines with the depletion of forest, land and water resources, Haitian peasants grow less healthy and poorer. These problems are so severe that today almost 80 percent of the rural population lives in abject poverty, and the rural life expectancy at birth is under 50 years. Such deplorable conditions in the countryside feed an accelerating flow of peasants into urban areas, especially Port-au-Prince. Peasants leave both to flee rural misery and to gain access to what they perceive as the city's more abundant health and education facilities and better employment opportunities. From 1994-2000, Haiti's urban populations grew 3 times faster than rural populations, despite higher fertility rates in rural areas. In fact, urban growth in Haiti is almost double the rate for the rest of Latin America.

The swelling size of Port-au-Prince and its surrounding urban areas has led to massive overcrowding in the city's slums. Cité Soleil, the largest slum in Port-au-Prince, saw explosive growth in the last 15 years and now contains a population of over 250,000 with a population density of 25,000 people/km². The city's water, road and electricity infrastructures, already crumbling after years of neglect by the Duvalier governments, were altogether incapable of providing services to these new residents. These migrants often endured food, fuel and water scarcities more extreme than they had known in the countryside. For many, life in Port-au-Prince was no better than the rural life they escaped.

The close quarters of Cité Soleil, however, provided fertile ground for the formation of protest movements. Slums brought together marginalized people from around the country, and the daily shortages of food, fuel and water inevitably built a reservoir of resentment. Nascent political movements, formed in the waning years of the Baby Doc regime, provided an outlet for these tensions, eventually coalescing behind the *Lavalas* party of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. *Lavalas* challenged the long tradition of rule by and for a small group of elites, leading to a tense struggle for power between the urban "haves" and "have nots." This struggle is the core of the Haitian conflict that has raged since 1986.

The resulting political turmoil is overwhelmingly focused in Port-au-Prince. Most of the fight for shares takes place among urban residents, and security, drug trafficking and kidnappings – the most visible aspects of the conflict – are confined to Port-au-Prince and its surrounding urban areas. Consequently, the Haitian government focuses most of its resources toward development projects in the capital. However, almost 70% of Haitians live in rural areas, and rural migration to Port-au-Prince is the primary fuel behind the fire of this conflict.

Treating the urban symptoms rather than the rural disease has failed to promote stability in Haiti. The best way to alleviate problems in Port-au-Prince is to focus on improving living standards in rural areas. The government must immediately implement a rural development strategy that addresses the root of political turmoil in Haiti: environmental degradation.



Ideas for Rural Development

The following is not intended to be a comprehensive rural development strategy, but is presented as elements of a wider strategy, which would foster rural development and thus ecological rejuvenation in Haiti.

Rural Population Density Reduction

Rural population densities must be reduced in order to alleviate the pressure put on environmental resources. This can be accomplished by reducing the population growth rate and by increasing rural outmigration.

Achieving the former requires an aggressive family planning strategy in the countryside. While such a policy might be challenged by moral or cultural sensitivities, a failure to slow birth rates will result in widespread starvation and deadly water shortages in rural areas as per capita

resources fall below minimum health standards. Haiti does not have time to wait for economic or educational development to foster lower birth rates; the problem is urgent and necessitates a radical departure from current policies which have failed to impact rural population growth to date. Various small-scale family planning projects in Haiti have shown that significant reductions in fertility rates are possible even without concurrent economic or educational development. Haiti should implement similar projects on a national level. Such projects are also highly cost effective and mesh well with anti-AIDS and gender development initiatives, aspects which should attract funding by international development agencies. Even so, Haiti's population is overwhelmingly young, meaning that successes in family planning may take years to slow rural population growth to sustainable levels.

Immediate reductions in rural population densities, however, can be achieved by promoting rural outmigration. Haiti should seek improved relations with the Dominican Republic (DR) to ensure that Haitian migrants can safely and legally seek work in the DR. Additionally, the government should promote development in urban areas other than Port-au-Prince to foster rural-urban migration without exacerbating overpopulation problems in the capital. The creation of free trade zones in these areas could attract foreign direct investment and spur job creation, creating a more welcoming urban environment for migrants than Port-au-Prince currently offers.

Alternative Fuels

The supply of wood and charcoal to feed energy demands in urban and rural areas represents the single greatest threat to Haiti's rapidly dwindling forest reserves. Haiti must work to diminish the demand that generates this supply through separate strategies in urban and rural areas.

First, the government should subsidize natural gas in urban zones. Transportation costs for cities are far lower than for rural areas, and many cities already have existing propane distribution infrastructures. The government should augment this infrastructure and subsidize the purchase of gas stoves for poorer Haitians. Finally, the state should tax wood and charcoal while subsidizing natural gas. This strategy would create dramatic improvements in urban air quality, help limit urban demand for wood and charcoal, and provide the government with additional revenue.

However, rural areas are too remote for cost-effective gas subsidization and lie beyond the state's reach for charcoal and wood taxation. Instead, the government should subsidize the purchase of solar cookers and more efficient wood stoves for rural inhabitants. While initially expensive, solar cookers can last for many years with proper maintenance and when averaged over the unit's lifetime, they are a far cheaper cooking tool than wood or charcoal stoves. For those who cannot afford a solar cooker, more efficient wood stoves would dramatically lower wood and charcoal input costs, require few changes to traditional cooking methods, and are very affordable. The combination of these urban and rural initiatives should significantly decrease national demand for wood and charcoal, making reforestation efforts sustainable in the long run.

Reforestation

Reforestation efforts in Haiti fight a losing battle against the constant pressures of population growth and energy demand. However, if the government implements projects to limit these factors, reforestation efforts should be more sustainable and cost effective for international donors. In addition to traditional reforestation projects, however, the Haitian government should pursue a policy which reorients Haitian agriculture toward coffee and fruit production, as proliferation of these tree crops would give Haitian peasants an economic stake in the reforestation of the countryside.

One promising idea has been presented by Rene Préal. The presidential candidate proposed a coffee development project which uses citrus trees to shade coffee plants. In addition to exporting coffee, farmers would be able to sell their citrus fruits to government sponsored juice factories, giving them multiple harvests and a more diversified income each year. Préal says a similar project in his hometown of Marmelade proved highly successful, indicating that the country's next government should consider implementing similar projects in other communities.

Agricultural Aid

To improve Haiti's worsening agricultural productivity, the government must aggressively expand irrigation projects and conduct nationwide cadastral studies to strengthen rural property rights. While these initiatives will be expensive, investment today in irrigation and property rights is the best way to rejuvenate agriculture, the lifeblood of more than 65% of the Haitian population. Successful reforestation efforts, especially those focused on important aquifers, will replenish Haiti's dry springs and provide new opportunities for the government or NGOs to build irrigation systems, thereby increasing the country's stock of cultivable land.

As cultivable lands increase, property rights must be strengthened to ensure that peasants work to preserve the fertility of their lands. Strengthened ownership rights, as Hernando de Soto has shown, give farmers improved access to credit and dramatically increase individual farmers' concern for the preservation of the soil. These newly strengthened rights, combined with the spreading of cultivable land through irrigation projects, will create hope in rural areas that the steady declines in agricultural productivity will be reversed.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of this analysis is to underscore the urgent need for a well-funded rural development strategy in Haiti to replenish the country's environmental resources. For too long, the Haitian government has focused on Port-au-Prince at the expense of the rest of the country. Today Haiti's politicians must recognize that this strategy has failed. Rural and urban problems are intimately linked through migration, and because well over half the population still lives in the countryside, a national development plan should dedicate most of its resources there.

Still, many questions remain. Can Haiti secure the funding necessary to implement the more expensive aspects of a rural development plan? Do politicians in Port-au-Prince have the political will to dramatically increase funding for the provinces? Will the international

community lose interest in Haiti once the security situation settles down? Unfortunately, the answers to these questions in the past have not been promising. Still, if Haiti accelerates its rural development efforts and the international community's attention does not wane, the country can reverse environmental decline, thereby uprooting the single most important factor behind the country's 20-year-old political conflict.

Employment opportunities

Overview of Haiti's Economic Situation

Haiti is the 2nd most densely populated nation in the Western hemisphere behind Barbados and is also the poorest nation, with estimates of 60-80% unemployment rates and 80% living in abject poverty. Haiti's GDP per capita in dollar terms is the lowest in Latin America, trailing Bolivia that is otherwise considered the poorest nation on the South American continent. Estimates of the country's GDP per capita ranges from \$467 to \$1,500 (adjusted for purchasing power parity). Its GDP has been declining steadily at an average of 2.1% since the early 1990s. The economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector, despite its high inefficiencies; about two thirds of the population depends on this sector. Besides the agricultural sector, the underground market is the main economic force but few reliable statistics exist.

Beside a short break under the Aristide government in the early 1990s, when Haiti's GDP rose by 4.2%, the economy has been trailing other underdeveloped nations in the Western Hemisphere with a steady decline since the mid-1980s. The political situation and subsequent economic sanctions, such as those after the military coup in September 2001, have further weighted heavily on the economy. Furthermore, the near absent rule of law, poor and further deteriorating infrastructure, combined with high levels of violence over time have further discouraged foreign investments in the country. The country's work force, estimated to be about 3.6 million out of a rapidly growing population of 8.5 million is highly unskilled. Yet, at times this has played to the country's advantage as the low wages have encouraged spurts of investments in sectors such as assembly and garment industries. Unfortunately, the overall structural and political problems in the country and heavy international competition from Asia and other Latin American countries have strongly undermined this comparative advantage in recent years.

Haiti's Recurring problems

Efforts by the international community to help Haiti stabilize and revive its political and economical environment have not been lacking. For example, recent efforts have been made through collaboration with the IMF including the Fund's Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance (EPCA) approved in January of 2005 to foster macroeconomic stability and revive economic growth. IMF also started the staff-monitored program in 1999 to monitor economic policy and performance, which helped narrow the government deficit at that time (note: program was suspended 2002/2003 and appear to exists on an unofficial basis). Furthermore, the World Bank pledged its first disbursement to Haiti since 1996, in 2005 which included \$73 million in credits and grants for technical and financial assistance to support economic governance reforms and emergency recovery assistance. In addition, IDB continues to work closely with the Haitian government. As of recent, IDB announced approval of eleven operations combining investments and policy-based loans and technical assistance for 2005-2006.

However, the international commitment has at times been erratic, short-term focused, and not always fully coordinated. For example, in 2003 suspended loan and disbursements totalled more than \$500 million in 2003. Initiatives to reform the economy and the structural problems within the government and other sectors show few signs of having materialized into improved infrastructure and employment opportunities. And oftentimes the various organizations operating in the country, from the major international organizations working with the Haitian government to organizations such as USAID and NGOs working on grass-root levels, do not always seem to have coordinated efforts, even struggling to find common ground and agree upon common objectives and fund allocations.

Furthermore, economic policies and restructurings also frequently receive resistance from the Haitians themselves, as the long-run objectives of restructuring oftentimes come at the expense of short-term loss of employment and international efforts are seen as interference in sovereign matters. Policies that intend to make the economy more efficient in the longer run are therefore frequently met by strong criticism by a population that desperately wishes to see increased employment opportunities. From the highly unemployed Haitians' perspective, the short-term survival is much more real than the prospects of long-term employment and with minimal confidence in the government's ability to revive the economy, the Haitians' perspective is justifiably near-sighed. Who can blame them? Three quarters of the population exist on \$2/day, many struggling to feed their families a meal per day, and the various governments over the past decades since the departure of Baby Doc have further derailed the already corrupted and inefficient economy. Severe trade deficits, lack of investments, rampant and severe corruption have all become trademarks of Haiti's defunct economy.

An obvious problem to anyone spending just a brief time in the country is the almost complete lack of any type of reliable infrastructure in both rural and urban areas. Although much money has been spent to develop the country's infrastructure over the years, the investments have often been interrupted and not comprehensive enough to cover large enough areas to be fully utilized by the population. Halted construction project stand half-completed and idle around the city of Port-au-Prince, money once spent now appears wasted. Another example is the relatively small portion of roads that have been built, but then often come to an abrupt end. From that point, the roads are nearly inaccessible and access to the developed roads is severely restricted, minimizing the benefit to the majority of the population that need but do not have access to markets and population centers. This of course causes significant restrictions on economic and social development. Farmers cannot easily reach markets to trade their crops, little exchange of products and trade can exist between communities and rural and urban areas, and communities have minimal access to basic services such as education and health care. Furthermore, little appears to have been done to ensure the maintenance of the country's infrastructure. Additionally, a strong sense of responsibility appears absent among the communities to maintain the minimal infrastructure that already exist. The idea that the government is solely responsible and yet incapable of maintaining the infrastructure leads to neglect and rapid deterioration. Employing locals to ensure the maintenance of the infrastructure on behalf of the community also provides jobs at local levels.

Lastly, the country must significantly develop its rural and urban economies. The country is today mainly dependent on the agricultural sector but yet relies to a great extent on

imports to feed its population. Today, the country has the potential but lack the means to supply large parts of the population, mainly in the urban areas, through its own crop. Again, weak infrastructure such as roads and water irrigation systems, minimal co-operations among farmers, ancient farming techniques, and outdated and inefficient land-ownership structures severely dampens the country's ability to effectively produce at its potential. Subsistent crop production must be replaced by more efficient production to feed the overall population and by cash crops such as coffee, sisal, sugar, and cocoa that can be exported. And in the urban areas, industries such as low wage textile and assembly sectors need to be revived. However, foreign investment is needed to make these changes, and to encourage such investments, the country needs to lay the foundation for it: the enforcement of rule of law, reliable judiciary system to protect property and to provide means to resolve disputes and enforce contracts, trusted financial institutions, and greater transparency of government. Such requirements take time to evolve but in intermediate term could be enforced in smaller scale in established free trade zone areas. Such areas would provide employment opportunities that overtime could be expanded to other parts of the country. Therefore, an integral part of developing the country's infrastructure must include a road map for how to engage and help communities themselves assume more responsibility for the maintenance of the infrastructure.

Immediate Employment Initiatives

Development cannot take place overnight, in Haiti or anywhere. Long term commitments to rebuild infrastructure on a national scale, establish institutions to encourage foreign investments and address areas of corruption and judiciary deficiencies will take time. However, several crucial and essential initiatives would provide short-term employment, lay the foundation for the long-term objectives of developing the country's economic sector and provide Haitians with hope about a brighter future. Three main areas for short-term employment opportunities include infrastructure development, urban development, and agricultural development.

1 – Infrastructure

First and foremost, the international community and the newly elected government must commit to significantly expanding the basic infrastructure, including roads, waste management, fresh water supply, and water irrigation in rural areas. This seems obvious but what is equally obvious in Haiti at present is the near complete absence of any infrastructure – despite claims by international community and the government that significant funding has been spent in this sector over the past decades. Part of the problem has previously been the shortage of funding to complete projects and that projects then are left unattended and incomplete. The international community must engage the local communities to partake in the development and maintenance of its infrastructure and commit long-term so that funding is maximized. In the long run, such commitment would be more cost-effective and provide Haiti with the right means to develop its economy. Today, half-completed infrastructural developments echo hollow and serve as a grim reminder about failed attempts to move the country forward. Millions of dollars have been spent but little return on investments is visible since the lack of infrastructure continues to impede improvements in overall living conditions and commercial activity. Key is to not only build the infrastructure, such as roads, but employing the locals both for the initial construction and future

maintenance – providing both means of income and hope that Haiti has the potential to revive itself into a self-sustaining country not dependent on the outside world for its survival.

Roads

For projects such as roads, the use of unskilled labour would be cheap, readily available, and communities would rapidly experience a sense of improvement. Such obvious signs of improvements in the near-term future are also crucial in establishing trust in the new government's ability to make real changes and lay the foundations for improved commercial exchange. Roads must also extend beyond the urban areas and ensure the rural areas' accessibility to various parts of the country. It is estimated that out of 4,160 km of roads in 1995-99 only 1,001 km were paved and that 85% of traffic takes place in and around capital. Yet, the majority of the population lives in rural areas and is the main-supplier of food to the urban population. For example, today the road from Port-au-Prince to one of the larger towns, Petite Goâve in the south takes hours because various sections connecting the two communities have no roads. With relative small investments, the major road connecting the capital to one of the close-by larger cities in the south could be established, creating the first linkage between the south's rural areas and the urban population in Port-au-Prince and would provide short-term and longer-term employment opportunities through construction and road maintenance and open up the region to improved opportunities of commercial exchange.

Waste management

Waste management is also of urgent need in the country, especially in the urban areas and slums around Port-au-Prince. Waste contaminates water sources, spreads disease and further contributes to a sense of the government's inability to provide for its population. Waste management stations could be established and locals could be employed both to clean up already contaminated areas and to enforce the proper use of designated waste mills and provide waste collection services. As many international organizations have pointed out, such initiative would also require a certain level of education since there is no sense of proper waste management among the general population. Trashcan usage might require instruction and enforcement before old behaviours of dumping trash wherever convenient will change. However, employment to provide such low-skill level of education and enforcement can be done by locals in the various communities. The use radio as a mean to educate the population in simple matters such as waste management would also allow communities to reach out to a large part of both the literate and illiterate population. Locals could be employed to spread the message to its own communities, creating a sense of involvement and empowerment in addition to employment opportunities. Receiving messages directly from community members would also minimize the rejection to such projects due to Haitians' deep sense of pride in not taking orders from others, including the international community. Today, several radio stations exist on a volunteer basis. In Port-au-Prince alone, over 40 radio stations exist and over 150 nationally. With small amounts of funding to pay wages and ensure non-partisan messages could help gather communities to partake in the improvement of their own living standards.

Fresh water supply

An essential condition for any population is access to fresh water, yet the availability of fresh water supply in Haiti is extremely poor. Port-au-Prince is built to service a population of about 250,000 but an estimated 2 – 3 million people live in and around the capital. In Petite Goâve, a system built in late 1920s to supply fresh water to 20,000 citizens is now the only such structure available to a population of almost 180,000. Similar situations exist across the country where communities are relying on outdated fresh water infrastructure to support many times more people than the system was originally built for. But successful fresh water supply projects have been successful in the past. For example, USAID's OTI division ran a successful water project in one of the urban slums that involved locals to secure and maintain the water supply. Once again, involving locals on a volunteer and paid basis provides not only jobs but also a stronger sense of responsibility for overall community development efforts and more of these types of projects ought to be implemented in both rural and urban areas.

2 – Urban Development

The key in developing urban areas, and in particular major slum areas such as Bel Air and Cité Soleil, is to provide alternatives to gangs and illegal activity. In gang strongholds such as Cité Soleil, short-term projects to engage community in common projects for a common cause could provide an important stepping-stone for future economic developments that now are extremely difficult to manage. Such initiatives are already in the works by organizations such as the USAID. USAID's OTI uses a strategy for establishing trust and open dialogue in areas such as Cité Soleil by engaging communities in projects such as building football fields. Although short term and limited in scope, they help identify non-gang, community leaders that could help engage the larger community within the slum for more significant projects such as developing basic infrastructure. Oftentimes, these projects are done on a volunteer basis, but with additional funding, these short-term projects could provide a source of income to locals that help in organizing, constructing and maintaining these projects. And importantly, these short-term projects must be followed up constantly and funding is needed to establish a basis for development post-emergency situation.

Bel Air

Bel Air is currently viewed as a successful example of the international community's ability to help stabilize a very violent and insecure slum area in the capital. MINUSTAH soldiers are considered to successfully have integrated with the community and established trust with the locals. In a relatively short time, crime and violent assaults have been minimized. However, no or limited economic development has taken place in the slum of Bel Air and the presence of international security forces is neither sustainable nor desirable. But should these forces leave without further development and employment opportunities, it is highly likely that the inhabitants of Bel Air once again would turn to illegal activity and violence to survive – and increased insecurity would make people more desperate and easy targets for gang member recruitment. Engaging the community and providing job opportunities through the funding of infrastructure projects as mentioned above must be combined with the encouragement of small-scale commercial opportunities. Micro financing of small businesses such as grocery stores, repair shops, medical supplies and other basic goods and services would provide alternative means for families to provide for their families.

For example, vehicles in the city are scarce (about 37 vehicles per 1,000 people), yet abandoned vehicles can be found all over the city because means to transport broken-down vehicles to a repair shop barely exist. The opportunity for members in Bel Air and other parts of the city to open car repair shops to repair and reuse old vehicle parts would not only clean the streets of obstacles but also extend vehicles' life span and create low-skill employment opportunities with minimal investment requirements. Improved means of transportation, in combination with improved road conditions would also further enhance economic development as trade could be enhanced to other parts of town and people could seek employment in a greater geographic area. Commercial development in slum areas would also help legitimize slum communities outside the slum areas and open up commercial contacts with the broader city of Port-au-Prince. Today, people living in slum areas are considered 'bad' and they often encounter difficulties establishing themselves as valuable citizens outside their slum communities. Similar initiative could also be implemented in Cité Soleil once the area has reached the point of security that Bel Air is currently experiencing.

3 - Rural Development: Agriculture

Over two-thirds of the population lives in rural areas, relying mainly on agriculture to provide for their families and communities. About 700,000 small agricultural producers supply 60% of the food consumed in Haiti. But most of the crop is today for self-sustaining purposes and not for production of crops to feed the overall population. Many problems face the farmers. The farmers have no access to reliable infrastructure and lack access to markets. Haiti has an estimated total arable area of 555,000 ha. and about 125,000 ha. are suited to irrigation, yet only 75,000 ha. enjoy such systems. The interim government intended to irrigate around 40,000 ha. during its first 5-year term but due to lack of financing, only 5,600 ha. were irrigated in 2001 and little has been done since.

Furthermore, the country is experiencing severe problems of topsoil erosion due to deforestation. The landownership structure is outdated and does not support greater-scale production. And little cooperation among farmers to produce beyond self-sustainable purposes exists. In order for Haiti to revive its overall economy, increase living standards in rural areas, and create increased job opportunities and export revenue, the agricultural sector must be restructured. As earlier outlined, infrastructure is key to any type of development and to go from small family-size, self-sustainable farms to produce and supply food to the overall population the rural communities need roads and water-irrigation systems. Beside building access roads and water irrigation systems (which would provide further job opportunities as addressed earlier) each region must have access to market centers, land reform must take place, the deforestation problem must be addressed and improved means to grow crops must be introduced – all while creating employment opportunities in the process.

Establishment of market centers

It is important to acknowledge the severe difficulties for any small Haitian farmer to get its products to markets. Half the country's land is on slopes inclining at more than 40%. Even with the most efficient production techniques, the crops would be spoiled and wasted if the

farmer has no or limited access to commercial market places where the food can be sold and access produce can be processed and further distributed. Roads must provide the connecting link between farm-communities but commercial market points where both retail and wholesale of crops can be sold and processed are equally important. Today, many farmers travel for hours to near-by markets to sell their crops. At the end of the day, much of the unsold crops will be left behind because it will not stay fresh for long. But successful projects to develop commercial market centers to bring farmers together in greater scale and allow them to more efficiently sell their crops on retail and wholesale basis have been established in some regions. For example, a project involving 3,000 farmers in the town of Marmelade in the Artibonite region established seven commercial centers for farmers to trade their crops. At the end of the day, crops not sold and that would otherwise be spoiled, such as mangos, were sold on a wholesale basis to make mango juice. At the end of the day, the farmers walked away with more money and minimal waste, and the sale of mango juice provided an additional source of income and employment to people in the rural areas. Commercial market centers are therefore not only important source of additional income to farmers themselves but also create additional commercial opportunities that can multiply the commercial benefits to an entire rural region.

As part of the development of the agricultural sector, it is important to help farmers identify the most efficient means to produce its crops. The project mentioned above in Marmelade helped farmers grow mango trees to provide vital shade for their sun-sensitive coffee crops. As a result, the farmers have been able to sell both coffee and mango fruit at the centers with minimal additional investment, making mango juice production an important addition to the area's ability to generate revenue and employment. Additionally, there is a distinction between subsistence crops such as rice, maize, millet and beans and so-called cash crops that are important export products, such as coffee sisal, sugar, and cocoa. A first step would be to ensure that the country improves it means to provide subsistence crop for its overall population, but as the agricultural sector becomes more efficient, a major source of income and important part of the economic development is the export of so-called cash crop. Expanding the country's export link would not only benefit the farmers but would further create job opportunities in urban areas, especially in areas such as Port-au-Prince where the major port is located. Packaging, storage, shipping and other export-related services would provide further employment opportunities in longer-run. As part of developing Haiti's agricultural export sector, there must be a plan to ensure that Haiti does not become dependant on solely one cash crop, for example coffee, as such markets could prove volatile on a highly competitive international market. To encourage and educate farmers to diversify their crops would be of significant economic and social importance to avoid sudden economic downturns that could severely reverse any previous economic progress.

Land reform, Collaboration & Reforestation

Today the landownership structure is extremely outdated and inefficient. Small lots of land are sporadically divided among farmers, making mass production of corps difficult. Furthermore, there are much dispute among farmers of what land belongs to whom as ownership and title to land is vague and legal means to resolve disputes does not exist. Today, land titles cover an area greater than the entire land of Haiti. In order to effectively revive the agricultural sector, land reform must take place but can prove to be a difficult task. Therefore, educating

and employing locals to be in charge of solving disputes and help farmers organize themselves as unified communities would be of importance. Although the employment opportunity for the implementation and enforcement of new landownership structures in each community might be small, each of the many thousand communities across the country would benefit economically if landownership was restructured.

Interim Employment Initiatives:

1 – Reviving Haiti’s Manufacturing Industry through Free Trade Zones

Haiti’s relatively small industrial sector, only accounting for 7.6% of GDP in 2001 compared to 18% in beginning of 1980s has a competitive advantage in its low-cost labour force and could provide many long-term employment opportunities. However, in the interim stage of development, the lack of a respected and enforced rule of law, lack of transparency, complicated tax codes and tariff regulations, combined with poor infrastructure, and distrust in the long-term political stability in the country will discourage large-scale foreign investment. To circumvent this mistrust among investors while the country establishes a more favourable investment climate, the development of free trade zones, used successfully in countries such as Dominican Republic and also previously in Port-au-Prince (after 1991, 130 of 180 off-shore assembly plants were closed in free zones in the capital), could help develop smaller sections of the manufacturing industry. Efforts to establish such zones have already been attempted, such as in the Ouanaminthe region in northeast of Haiti, but not without delays. Smaller free trade zones, strategically located around the capital and other larger cities, would enjoy favourable commercial benefits. Furthermore, basic rule of law in these smaller zones would initially be easier to enforce than if implemented immediately nationwide. Also, a greater commitment to cooperation with the government on issues encouraging long-term investments would establish trust in the government’s commitment to the sector. Laws and regulations favoring commercial trade could be tested, and once established, could be expanded in the long-term to eventually apply to the entire country. Meanwhile, these free trade zones would provide interim employment opportunities and lay the foundation for a broader revival of Haiti’s manufacturing sector.

Longer-term Employment Initiatives

In a country plagued political instability, social and economic deterioration, and international emergency assistance consuming most of all foreign aid, the focus on short-term objectives has come at the expense of longer-term initiatives that can be sustained and ultimately help Haiti reach a stage of self-sustainability and independence. Lack of funding and/or suspended funding in response to political instability has also contributed to limited long-term developments initiatives. And surely, short-term plans are crucial to lay the foundations for future long-term economic revival and employment opportunities. However, long-term economic development plans must play a greater part of Haiti’s development plan or Haiti might find itself unprepared to capitalize on the opportunity once the country stabilizes. **Such initiatives that possess great long-term potential include the tourism sector and further privatization of inefficient state-owned enterprises while allowing free trade zones to expand nationwide and eventually attract large-scale foreign investment.**

1 – Tourism Sector

The potential for Haiti's amazing nature, Caribbean climate and friendly people to attract large numbers of tourism is exceptional. Haiti has previously been an attractive tourist destinations but the number of visitors fell sharply after the military coup in 1991, from an annual average of almost 150,000 to under 80,000. The latest numbers of hotel rooms available in mid-96 were only 800. However, reviving this sector will depend on the security situation in Port-au-Prince, the only entrance point into the country. Large parts of the rural areas are much safer and while the security situation is stabilized in the capital and initiatives to extend the infrastructure, including access roads, are implemented, much can be done to prepare the rural areas for a growing number of tourists. The interim government has been working on a plan to revive the tourist sector and with further funding, short-term opportunities to clean up and maintain the many miles of beautiful beaches along the coast line could be implemented while laying the foundation for longer-term employment opportunities in a sector with great potential. Projects to revive this sector could benefit from international expertise to ensure that any development plan incorporates a long-term plan of natural conservation and does not exploit the short-term opportunity of commercial success at the expense of the country's indispensable natural resources.

2 - Privatization, combined with a nationwide expansion of Free Trade Zones, FDI & Financial Institutions

The privatization of Haiti's natural flour mill, Minoterie d'Haiti, to a US-Haitian Consortium and a 65% equity share in the national cement company, Ciment d'Haiti, to a consortium of international and Haitian firms have allowed the government to maintain a stakeholder interest and a source of revenue while streamlining previously inefficient state-run operations. Furthermore, Conseil de Modernisation des Entreprises Publiques (CMEP) has been charged with drafting the legislation for privatized or part-privatized enterprises. As the country develops its industries and expands its export/import sector, it will also face increased competition in international markets. As such, privatizations of other inefficient and corrupt state-owned enterprises will be an important step to compete in the competitive global market. A first privatization object ought to be the port of Port-au-Prince, an essential hub for all export and import in the country. If run efficiently, in combinations with more favourable tariff regulations, its strategic location could re-establish the port as one of the largest ports in the Caribbean. At this stage, the experiment of free trade zones can be expanded and lay the foundation for larger-scale foreign direct investment while expanding the local financial markets.

Conclusion

The key to successfully reviving Haiti's economic development – while simultaneously addressing many of the country's structural problems that now stand in the way of any significant economic revival, such as widespread gang criminality, corruption, illegal trade, malfunctioning judiciary system and lack of transparency – lies in the availability of alternatives for Haitians to provide for their families and ensure access to the most basic needs. Most Haitians want peace, security, education and healthcare for their children, and employment to

provide for their families. Such alternatives to provide for their families depend on both short and long-term economic development that would all help sustain long-term stability in the country and address many of the underlying problems currently facing its people. Yet, economic development relies heavily on such structures and security to properly function and due to this interdependence, the parallel development of political and financial institutions, while addressing corruption and impunity and enforcing the rule of law and greater transparency in the government, combined with specific economic laws to facilitate the expansion of commerce, export and import, and foreign investments, is essential. In order for Haiti to successfully meet these intertwined challenges and provide Haitians with viable alternatives to reach financial independence to provide for their families, it needs long-term commitments and funding and strong collaboration between all parties.

The Haitian Diaspora and the Development of Haiti

The Situation

Recent Elections in Haiti embody and reflect the complexity of this long and convoluted conflict. Being the second oldest republic in the western hemisphere, the first black republic in the world, and the only successful slave revolt winning its independence from France, set Haiti on a difficult path to social, economic and political development. The first 100 years of independence were characterized by exclusion from the community of nations as a result of their status as a "black" republic. Adding to this burden, this new republic had to dig its way out of debt, which the French colonialists had imposed paying 250 million gold francs as the price of independence. Once the debt was paid off, the United States occupied the country from 1915 to 1934. Hence, the real birth of Haiti occurred in 1934. However, it remained under authoritarian and dictatorial rule until 1987, markedly under the Duvalier dictatorship from 1957-1987. Since 1987, Haiti has been in a state of "transition," only having one president that has carried out his term, Rene Préval from 1996-2000. In 1990 Aristide was elected president, but his term was usurped by a military coup d'état. Aristide was again elected president in 2000, to be later ousted from power in 2004. Since 2004, Haiti has seen the presence of UN peacekeeping forces, a myriad of international organizations, and great instability. Since the Aristide's departure, the country has been ruled by an interim government, which has now seen an end to this prolonged state with the re-election of Préval.

After Aristide's departure the Diaspora started taking an active stance in voicing their concern for the country. A group of Haitians professionals participated in a conference focusing on the problems of Haiti brainstorming ways to halt the decay of their country. From this meeting was born the Alliance of Overseas Haitians, a Diaspora organization with the mission of breaking down the legal barriers forbidding Haitians living abroad in aiding their country on the road to development. The goal of this organization was put to the test when Dumarsais Siméus, a very successful Haitian American businessman, chose to run for the Haitian presidency. The obstacle to Siméus, as well as to the Haitian Diaspora generally, was and continues to be the Haitian Constitution, which forbids those with dual citizenship to participate in the political process. The symbolism of Siméus running for president brought to the forefront the willingness and excitement of the Diaspora to help their country, beyond the \$1 billion sent yearly as remittances.

What is being done currently and why hasn't it worked?

Currently there are a myriad of international organizations, including the UN, USAID, IOM, the EU, various religious organizations and health organizations working in Haiti to help relieve some of the problems this country is facing, has faced and will face. While the work these organizations have done has had an immediate impact on the lives of Haitians, it has fallen short in identifying and solving the long-term problems. While much energy has been placed on

developing viable institutions to be the backbone of a functioning state, the in-depth answers to why these institutions have not worked and continue to be weak has not been addressed.

The conflict that exists in Haiti can be characterized in a myriad of ways: a conflict between have and have-nots, a class conflict, a struggle for the limited resources of the country, which in turn has caused a “blockage to development.” In trying to manage the conflict one must look at the developmental history of this republic. While bits and pieces of Haitian society have seen modernization, the country as a whole has not undergone this process. This is a problem that plagues much of the developing world in Africa as well as in Latin America. Different models of political, economic and social development have been tested throughout the world and implemented in Haiti. But none of these models have worked. Haiti has not been able to move on from the missed opportunity for modernization in the 19th century, when it was excluded from the community of nations and burdened with the great debt to France, and has therefore entered political, social and economic decay. There was, however, a new opportunity for modernization in 1934 after the American departure. To not miss this second opportunity for a societal passage to modernity, modernization was forced onto society, causing very destabilizing effects. (Modernization in many parts of the world has not produced stable circumstances.)

Contributing to this fragile state was the rapid urbanization of the country. While in the western world, industrialization was really the driving engine behind development, going from an agricultural economy to an industrial one, followed by waves of migration from rural areas to urban ones, Haiti has seen sudden urbanization with limited industrialization. Port-au-Prince was initially designed for a population of 260,000 and now has a population of 2 million, with those in rural areas continuing to move into the slums of the capital, seeking a better life. The politicization of urbanization, a natural consequence, has added further aggravated the situation. While those who live in the villages in the countryside have the natural protection of their community, when moving to urban areas these social protections tend to disappear. Hence, individuals organize and demand basic protections from the state, which can produce violence in the form of riots, etc. Mass media, as exhibited by the numerous radio stations in Haiti, also fuel the urbanization process. Urbanization is irreversible. People do not move from urban areas back to rural areas, especially when the rural areas have not seen any industrialization or modernization. This description fits Haiti very well: a traditional society that has been forced into modernity causing oceans of failure, and enclaves of modernization.

The Diaspora

While rapid urbanization causes instability, it also produces positive consequences: increasing literacy, expanded the education, increased political consciousness, and a growing middle class. Haiti’s educated middle class fled the country because of harsh political and economic conditions. The Haitian exodus really commenced in 1957 with the beginning of the dictatorship of Francois Duvalier. Poor families from rural areas also joined this exodus by raising enough money to send their children to foreign countries for a better life. The Duvalier dictatorship followed by Aristide’s reign continued to force many into exile to France, the United States and Canada, exacerbating the brain drain problem. This phenomenon explains the 2.5 million Haitians living in foreign countries. It is also very important to understanding the

development and conversely the decay of Haiti. The Haitian middle class is the Diaspora. Forced from their country with the signing of the Constitution in 1987, they have also been purposefully excluded from the political process. Being left out of the political process does not mean that the Diaspora has not been involved economically. The Diaspora sends approximately \$1 billion in remittances to Haiti each year, comprising approximately 20% Haiti's GDP (\$5.191 billion - official exchange rate). It can be argued that the Diaspora is actually preventing the ultimate economic collapse of the country.

Why the Diaspora?

As the blockage to development has been identified as a "modernization" problem that has plagued much of the developing world, the Diaspora as the Haitian middle class, can and must play a crucial role. The Diaspora, being a product of modernity, has the requisite skills, knowledge and experience to not only be involved but to be a guide to Haiti's development. The Diaspora totalling 25% of the Haitian world population can be the bridge between the have and the have-nots. Furthermore, familiarity with Haitian mentality and Haitian culture puts the Diaspora in a prime position as consultant to development. Moreover, the emotional attachment any Diaspora group feels towards their motherland is an added incentive for investment, in economic terms as well as social terms.

On the other side of the divide, those who remain in Haiti resent the Diaspora's wealth and often, the abandonment of their Haitian citizenship. They see the Diaspora as arrogant and claiming to "know better," fleeing tough conditions while those who stayed home made do.

Dumarsais Siméus

Dumarsais Siméus, son of illiterate farmers from Pont-Sonde, Haiti worked his way to the United States, receiving a degree in electrical engineering from Howard University and an MBA from the University of Chicago. After accomplishing his dream of heading his own multi-billion dollar business, making it the largest Haitian-owned and Black-owned business in the world, Siméus decided that he would take an active political role and try to lead Haiti on the path of successful and sustained development. Running for the Haitian presidency, defying the Haitian Constitution was a courageous move on the part of Siméus, as well as the Haitian Diaspora as a whole. For the first time, the Diaspora vocally spoke to their fellow countrymen, that not only were they ready and willing to be involved but they had the courage and the requisite skills to do so.

While Siméus was not allowed to run for the presidency, he is still concerned and involved in the politics of Haiti. He is currently advising the president-elect Préval on issues dealing with the Haitian Diaspora. However, Siméus still stresses that the biggest impediment to extensive Diaspora involvement is the Haitian Constitution. Beyond the political challenges to Diaspora involvement are economic and investment obstacles. The investment codes must be streamlined and updated. Furthermore, stable and strong institutions must be built to enable Diasporan economic and social investment. The government of Haiti must provide Diasporans the assurance of security when visiting the country.

Siméus suggests four ways the Diaspora can be involved in the development of Haiti:

1. Economic investment (contingent on constitutional reform, protecting the investments)
2. Retirement plans whereby the Diaspora can return to Haiti and be assured economic and personal security
3. Voluntary offers of skills and know-how
4. Political and economic participation (contingent on constitutional reform)

While Siméus sees the importance of having the Diaspora involved in Haiti, he also stresses the imperativeness of not having the Diaspora insert itself in current Haitian society. The Diaspora would not lead the country, but work together with fellow countrymen.

Other options for Diaspora involvement

The first 50-90 days of Préval's presidency will set the governmental tone to the openness of involvement. If Aristide is permitted to return, Préval may have difficulty fulfilling his mandate, and the Diaspora can possibly find itself in the same position as in 2003. Given the unstable nature of the near future, there are options that could augment Diaspora involvement in either situation.

The 2.5 million Haitians that live abroad are willing and eager buyers of goods that are found in Haiti. Hence there must be a commercialization strategy implementing distribution channels to offer these goods to Haitians abroad. Furthermore, Diaspora tourism can be a major income source for the country, provided the country is secure for Haitians to return. These two simple economic strategies can be implemented under the leadership of any regime, as long as those in power allow for it. Tourism, coupled with a commercialization strategy for Haitian goods, does not violate the Constitution, and does not necessitate Diasporan political involvement. It is a neutral place where Haiti and the Diaspora can begin working together.

While these economic development ideas are a starting point, the real change and sustainability of Haitian society will come when Diasporans are able to work with their fellow countrymen in the economic, social as well as the political arenas. While many in the Diaspora may be waiting to see where Préval may lead the country, the Diaspora should also be ready to work with international organizations already involved in the country. The involvement of Diasporans through the medium of international organizations will bring them closer to Haiti today, expose Haitian society to the modernity of the Diaspora, as well as aid these organizations in understanding Haitian culture and mentality.

Conclusion

The impediment to Haiti's development can be characterized as a struggle for natural resources between the rich and the poor, a class conflict, limited modernization, and a disappearing domestic middle class exacerbating the situation. The involvement of the Diaspora, and hence the reintegration of the middle class is imperative to any sustainable developmental strategy. Haitians abroad are ready, willing and excited in participating in the development of Haiti. Economic development, with investment opportunities is a solid starting ground for this

reintegration. While much emphasis has been put on reforming the Constitution, a crucial component of all aspects of political, social and economic life in Haiti, the Diaspora should also be ready to circumvent this process in the case of delays, and start working with international and non-governmental organizations. This would start to enable the social and political incorporation of the Diaspora in Haitian society, which should be the ultimate aim to provide for a stable future.

II. Society and Security

Section 4

Andrew Kamons

Gangs and Militias

Gang related insecurity lies at the heart of the current conflict situation in Haiti. The fragmentation of civil authority has led to widespread criminality that threatens the political, economic, and social order. In the past year, kidnappings within Port au Prince have become frequent. Violent crimes have rendered large areas of the city inaccessible by international organizations, and MINUSTAH forces have largely abandoned the Cit el Soleil slum even during daylight hours.

Problem Analysis

To understand the root causes of this phenomenon, it is important to distinguish among the different types of gang and paramilitary organizations that are active in the country. Criminal gangs take advantage of the weak and corrupt police force to extract rent from the citizens in the form of kidnap ransoms. International smugglers capitalize on the lack of a Coast Guard to use Haiti as a way station for drug trafficking between Colombia and the United States and for the transport of other contraband into and out of the country. Politically affiliated gangs, loosely divided into pro- and anti-Aristide factions, generate instability to further their objectives. Finally, paramilitary groups operate islands of autonomy throughout the country.

Because these groups often have complementary objectives, gangs frequently form alliances that may work toward several of these ends. Typically, gangs operate in small units of fewer than 20 men. Larger arrangements tend to be informal and temporary, and loyalties can fluctuate. One notable example is the case of the Cit el Soleil gang led by Thomas “Labanye” Robenson. Formerly a pro-Lavalas agitator, Labanye transferred support to business elites before being killed in a clash between gangs in 2004. Gang members are predominantly males and tend to be under 25 years of age. One interviewee reported that in some sections of Cit el Soleil gangs have driven out all the adults, and only children and youths remain. Gangs vary widely in terms of organization and capabilities, but together they represent the fragmentation of power in a state that has lost its monopoly on physical violence.

There are some gangs active in the countryside, particularly former members of the Haitian Army (FAd’H) disbanded by Aristide in 1995, and associates of the FRAPH, an anti-Lavalas paramilitary force which helped effect the ouster of Aristide in 2004. However, gang violence is still largely an urban phenomenon, centered around the slums of Port au Prince, which will be the focus of this report. Some hotspots such as Bel Air and La Saline have been stabilized, but to date, the size and density of Cit el Soleil have thwarted stabilization efforts, and gangs remain in control of that section of the city. National and international forces have abandoned patrols inside the slum and troops no longer leave their vehicles when in the area.

The spike in kidnappings and other gang-related violence in December demonstrate the likelihood that gangs will take advantage of future political uncertainty to pursue individual ends. Spoilers are likely to continue their agitation when elections are complete. Regardless of which

candidate assumes power, there will be politically motivated gangs representing opposition parties that will have an incentive to escalate their activities. These spoilers are certain to challenge efforts to keep order in the upcoming months.

If the gangs are to be defused and dismantled, there are several fundamental problems that Haitian people and the international community must address. Most important, access to weapons must be denied and current supplies eliminated. There was no systematic weapons retrieval following the disbanding of the FAd'H in 1995, and most of the small arms and ammunition is now thought to be in the hands of former officers or in the possession of criminal organizations. Large caches of weapons disappeared when Aristide left power in 2004, including assault rifles and automatic weapons. In addition, there have been reports of guns imported illegally from the United States. When international troops secured the country in 2003 following Aristide's departure, there was no attempt to institute a comprehensive disarmament program. Efforts focused primarily on the ex-FAd'H and met with only limited success. As a result of the widespread availability of weapons, national and even international security forces often find themselves outgunned when attempting to raid gang operations, and have been forced back in certain engagements. Access to weapons worsens the strain on security forces and increases the risk of collateral damage.

The widespread poverty also allow gangs to attract the manpower to sustain their operations. Young men living in the slums lack alternative means of financial support, and the incentive to participate in gang activity is high. As a Lavalas advisor noted, one needs a minimum of wellbeing in order to be virtuous. Employment of any sort is almost impossible to obtain for residents of the slums. Even paltry remunerations for criminal activities can encourage illegal behaviour if there are no alternatives available.

Similarly, communities benefit from the largess of gangs. It is estimated that there are only a few hundred "hardcore" gang members in Cité Soleil, out of a population of between 200,000 and 500,000 people. However, gangs distribute a portion of their gains from kidnap ransoms and other illegal activities to the neighborhoods, fostering support within the community for their continued existence. Coupled with their ability to threaten force, gangs have not been effectively checked by community opposition. In some cases, NGO's have successfully tied development assistance to community efforts at neighborhood policing, and these projects have been reported to help strengthen community cohesiveness in parts of Bel Air. However, these efforts are limited, and success depends heavily on the continued MINUSTAH presence.

Weak institutions and zero-sum politics also encourage gang activity. The deep rifts that developed during Aristide's tenure exacerbated the already pervasive winner-take-all attitude toward politics that has characterized several decades of Haitian governance. In such an environment, there are strong incentives to bolster political authority through personal militias, and with weak policing and readily accessible weapons, political affiliated gangs have steadily grown. The Duvaliers' *tonton macoutes* were the most notorious Haitian private security force, but Gen. Raul Cédras' *attachés* and Aristide's *chimères* follow the same model of parallel policing. Vestiges of each of these groups remain active in the country. When the interim government disbanded Aristide's palace guard, again there was no comprehensive process of

disarmament or reconciliation, and the dispersed *chimères* have been associated with gang activities in the slums.

Both the Haitian National Police and MINUSTAH have been sharply criticized by Haitians and by the international community as untrustworthy and ineffective. The HNP has been affected by politicization and corruption, a problem exacerbated during Aristide's second term and which has persisted since his departure, despite efforts to reform the force. Detractors of the MINUSTAH effort argue poor troop numbers and risk aversion undermine its ability to accomplish the mission. In general, areas secured by MINUSTAH or the HNP have not benefited from public works, short-term job creation, or humanitarian aid, measures needed to convince citizens that their interests are considered priorities. There has also been limited accountability for collateral damage, especially when caused by the HNP. These incidents provoke resentment and leave communities unwilling to collaborate with or confide in the security forces.

Finally, there is a general failure of the criminal justice system, which has frequently balked at prosecuting criminals while leaving many innocent offenders indefinitely incarcerated. MINUSTAH is authorized to make arrests but not to hold prisoners in custody. Gang members turned over to the civilian authorities are routinely able to buy acquittals or to bribe their way out of prison. There have also been several high profile arrests of Lavalas associates without adequate charges brought to bear.

Proposed Solutions

Solutions to the problem of gang violence and criminality in Haiti fall into two categories: those directly affecting security protocol and those addressing the environmental factors that encourage gang activities.

On the matter of security, the MINUSTAH mission must be redefined or reinterpreted. The current aversion to direct engagement has made completion of the mission impossible. If MINUSTAH continues to place a prize on the capture or killing of individual targets, then it must develop the capabilities to neutralize them in a manner that does not compromise the support of the community. A policy of caution should be supplemented by flexibility and a greater level of selective engagement.

MINUSTAH must also implement a suitable disarmament, demobilization, and reconciliation (DDR) program that removes weapons from the possession of gang leaders. To date, MINUSTAH has failed to accomplish its disarmament mission. A successful program must engage in meaningful dialogue with representatives of all militant groups, offering strong incentives for cooperation and strong punishments for non-compliance. The negotiation process will be difficult. The bulk of manufactured weapons are in the hands of senior leaders with whom it will be difficult to negotiate. This will require significant funding and resource allocation on the part of the UN. However, a systematic attempt at a DDR program is necessary before the gang problem can be effectively curbed.

Similarly, the HNP must continue to prove that it is capable and trustworthy if it is to combat gang violence. Corrupt and compromised officers must be culled from the force, and

recruitment efforts continued. In addition, police must be clearly uniformed and identified in order to increase accountability, create a clearer distinction between authorized and unauthorized armed forces, and deter the impersonation of officers by criminal elements. Many of these tasks require international assistance in the form of financial aid, technical advising, and improved equipment. Such expenditure represents an essential investment for future wealth generation, as stability is a necessary precursor to the regeneration of industry and foreign investment.

Finally, there needs to be a fair discussion of whether to reconstitute the Haitian Army and provide it with the authority to police internal matters. Although an army is mandated by the constitution, with no military threats facing the island, such a force would not serve the traditional role a military has of securing national defense for its citizens. Many politicians and civic leaders interviewed for this report have instead advocated rebuilding the army on the grounds that it is necessary for establishing internal order. However, none offered a clear plan to prevent the reinstated army from encroaching into politics, a consistent habit of the FAd'H in its previous incarnations. Moreover, efforts to build an army are likely to divert essential resources needed to train and equip the HNP and to create parallel and conflicting mandates of law enforcement. In addition, newly trained soldiers utilizing large calibre weapons and trained for battlefield conditions are likely to inflict a higher level of collateral damage than their police counterparts. Such actions could increase political polarization, damage the reputation of the government, and contribute to the fragmentation of Haitian society. Given these tangible concerns, it is irresponsible to justify an army in terms of national pride and symbolic significance. Such desires must take a backseat to concerns for the stability of the country.

More practical than a reinstated army would be the equipping of a section of the HNP with heavier capabilities, along the lines of the French Gendarmerie or the Spanish Guardia Civil. MINUSTAH forces lack the necessary local knowledge and language skills to navigate the slums, and they would benefit from the assistance of properly equipped HNP officers. However, while the HNP grapples with corruption and inappropriate behaviour, such joint incursions are not likely to be a priority for MINUSTAH. Based on interviews with those closest to the situation, it is more important to secure the loyalty, honesty, and competence of the HNP and to ensure that it has the adequate equipment for its police duties than to expand its military capabilities.

The HNP and MINUSTAH must also make a stronger effort to draw distinctions between gang leaders, gang supporters, and the general populace. The reported common policy of targeting wounded civilians for arrest is symptomatic of a more widespread phenomenon of mischaracterizing civilians as criminals. Anti-Lavalas elements have used their control of the media to effectively conflate slum gangs and Aristide supporters. Regardless of whether they have ties to militant groups, Lavalas loyalists purged from the government payroll have typically been labelled as *chimères* by the interim government and the HNP. This blanket discrimination makes it difficult to successfully work with community leaders to counter neighborhood gang violence. Additionally, the HNP should adopt a policy of safe passage and non-arrest of gunshot victims who seek medical assistance. It is more important to foster trust in the community than to detain and prosecute each suspected criminal, especially given the likelihood that the case will be mishandled in the criminal justice system.

While better policing can improve the immediate situation, any long-term efforts must incorporate community-based development efforts. Even in slums that have a transient population, strong community organizations do exist. The HNP and MINUSTAH must reach out to community leaders in order to build alliances that encourage cooperation and collaboration. Trust building is a necessary prerequisite for such partnering to be effective. One step in this direction would be to include an element of job-creation and humanitarian assistance in the role of MINUSTAH, either through direct efforts or through partnering with outreach groups. However the current MINUSTAH mandate draws a clear distinction between security and development projects. There is also an understandable reluctance on the part of development and humanitarian groups to partner with military or police forces, for fear of becoming soft targets or of ruining reputations. Until the security situation has improved and trust building has proceeded, such alliances are unlikely.

There are also immediate steps that the political community can take to address the problem of gang-related violence. All political leaders should strongly condemn gang activity. Some of the candidates were reluctant to speak out against violence in neighborhoods that they relied upon for political support. With the completion of the elections, there should be less incentive to politicize the security process. One important step is for leaders across the political spectrum to be more precise about distinguishing between hardcore gang members and those caught up in the gang influence, either working directly as foot soldiers or benefiting from public contributions.

Significant reforms to the justice system are also needed to enable the processing of those arrested. This can only be accomplished by depoliticizing the legal system and ensuring speedy and fair trials. It will require the vetting of the judiciary, non-partisan case review, and capacity building. The backlog of cases must be eliminated to allow the serious offenders to be tried and punished. Further, there must be independent oversight of the prisons to eliminate the frequency of paid escapes and inhumane accommodations. Arbitrary detentions and erratic enforcement of the law have undermined the legitimacy of the justice system and eroded confidence in the rule of law.

A long-term solution to gang violence entails sustainable economic development and political reconciliation. Land reform that gives squatters on government land private ownership of their properties will strengthen the coherence of community organizations, which have the ability to govern gang presence at a local level. Initial enthusiasm for a plan to formalize squatter land ownership submitted by Hernando De Soto's Institute for Liberty and Democracy has dissipated, and the project remains stalled in the initial stages of implementation. Because gangs have thrived with the fracture of the political system, successful reconciliation efforts will also have an indirect effect on the security situation. The seeds of such efforts have been planted in such projects as the National Dialogue, but the process is still early in development.

Like most of Haiti's problems, the challenge of gang-related violence will not be overcome with facile solutions. Success requires addressing each of these areas of concern, and it calls for patience, determination, and the willingness to devote substantial resources to the effort.

Drugs

A war of globalisation, Haiti's drug trade is as much a by-product of the modern age as it is the consequence of US intervention in Latin America under the Reagan administration, displacing the flow of cocaine traffic into the Caribbean. Haiti's predatory state and geographic attributes also offer inducements and opportunities for drug related criminal activity.

This paper will argue that these and other variables contribute to a causal relationship between drug trafficking and Haiti's ongoing conflict. A variety of actions must be undertaken to address this imbalance: continued support for state building through measures to address security and rule of law promotion, enhanced border control and drug demand control in end markets.

1- Drugs and Conflict: A causal link

"Frankly the smartest thing the drug traffickers can do is continue paying for chaos in Columbia because out of chaos comes continued freedom of movement for clandestine criminal groups. Every line snorted in North America and Europe, every \$10 for a dime bag of drugs, produces anguish for someone in this benighted country. Tax havens, secrecy jurisdictions and money laundering schemes make it worthwhile for everyone involved."

Haiti, Columbia, Afghanistan. The countries that Baker's quote could refer to are numerous. By definition the drugs trade must operate outside the scope of legality, thriving in conditions of insecurity and conflict where the traditional Weberian functions of the state have been undermined and impunity reigns. In other words, chaos keeps the drugs trade in business. Thus it is by no coincidence that chaos comes to typify the domestic conditions of countries where illegal activities take hold. Organised crime has become both a cause and effect of state failure- and in Haiti's case- a variable which continues to perpetuate its domestic conflict through a variety of mechanisms.

Incapacitating the state

While crime and corruption were widespread under the Duvalier regime in Haiti, Baby Doc's departure in 1986- allegedly the result of a Colombian funded coup- and the elections of 87' exposed a progressively withering state to external manipulation. The breakdown of government institutions gave the Colombians the opportunity to move in on Haiti and take control of contraband activities outside of the traditional purview of Haiti's overbearing rulers, the Duvaliers. Crime went private. Legitimate businesses were purchased for front organisations, key military officials continued to be paid off and more security actors at all levels of government were recruited as the level of trafficking rose. The state was openly disincentivised from taking any action to prevent what was quickly becoming a cash cow valued at over \$200m a year in payoffs. And despite ensuing regime changes, the Columbians' coup was to capture the state of Haiti while leaving its military and political elite to squabble over its leadership. The 91 coup over Aristide provided traffickers with an additional windfall, the prize from this particular conflict being the Port Authority.

Democratic elections in 1991 and Aristide's forceful replanting as President in 1994 by the US was really no more than a signalling mechanism for international donors that the state was really going to take a stand on drugs. To an outsider the situation looked promising- Aristide's dissolution of the army and those involved with narcotics law enforcement and intelligence appeared to wipe out many of the most corrupt actors who had been involved with the cartels. Drugs protocols, such as the 1988 UN charter, were signed and cooperative counter narcotics activities funded by the US through the Drug Enforcement Agency were continued. This included the establishment of a national coast guard (1996), an anti-corruption campaign and further HNP-DEA collaboration on a joint task force under Préval's leadership. Yet while, sizable seizures under these initiatives seemed to signal progress to outsiders, the state was still operating very much in the interests of the traffickers, implying that notable heists large enough to make international news were simply 'give a ways' designed to placate the international community.

The extent to which any of Haiti's leaders ever had the will or ability to fight the drugs trade is questionable. All mounted notable campaigns, but as in the case of Aristide, these actions only served to consolidate their own positions. For example, Aristide's dismissal of the army helped to temporarily dissolve the Duvalierist threat that had once removed him from power and transferred the gains from the drugs trade to his cronies. US officials long suspected Lavalas officials of taking bribes from traffickers, a view backed up by former Aristide associates, like sentenced drug trafficker Beaudoin "Jacques" Ketant, allegedly godfather to Aristide's son who accused Aristide of turning Haiti into a narco-state, "*The man is a drug lord. He controlled the drug world in Haiti*" (Times Online 2004). Fleeing from Aristide's return in 2002, chief of police and anti corruption campaigner Mario Andresol noted his frustration "*People involved in drug trafficking are working with Aristide. If you arrest one of them, the whole country is shaken because you've arrested the president's man. "people I have arrested for drug trafficking and crime were promoted in the police department."* (Wall Street Journal 2005).

The political impasse which led to Préval being unable to pass anti-drug legislation also demonstrates the extent to which drug interests were lodged at the heart of government. Anti-crime rhetoric was noticeably absent in Préval's presidential campaign running up to the February elections, where he gained extremely high proportions of the vote in gang ensconced areas of the urban slum villages associated with organised crime. The former President also wantonly hired individuals with links into the drugs trade as part of his security apparatus while in office during the 90's, including 2004 coup leader Guy Philippe, who was later ousted from the Government over allegations of coup plotting with other police chiefs. (Commentators suggest that it had more to do with his refusal to cut in key government figures on some of his deals with traffickers). US diplomats including Ambassador Tim Carney also believe that drug money helped to fund the 2006 elections. Thus what is left of Haiti's state was, is and will continue to play hostage to the interests of traffickers and thus an ongoing source of conflict, a cause and consequence of state failure and a prize to be won.

Promoting and funding violence

“Life in the capital of Port au Prince is characterised by constant fear of organised crime, urban gangs, police violence, sniper attacks on civilian and UN targets and kidnappings. Since the riots of 30 September 2004, over 600 people have been killed, including some 40 police officers. The Haitian National Police (HNP) are under tremendous pressure from urban gangs in poor neighbourhoods.”

As the ICG report notes, a deterioration in security since the 2004 riots has led to widespread criminality and violence, more so in urban than rural areas where battles for territorial control are more widespread. Among some of the more obvious instances of violent acts paid for by the drug trade is the Philippe coup of 2004, which is widely credited with being a drug-financed operation. And with drug money flowing in to fund the February 2006 elections, commentators have argued that spoilers from or funded by traffickers were *behind most of the current wave of violence*, helping to delay the elections four times. These actors come from both traditional organised crime groups such as cartels, that are small elite criminal groups, and more diffuse, larger criminal networks characterised by gangs. The World Bank project on the economics of civil war, crime and violence supports the proposition that the risk of civil war and thus conflict is most sensitive to instances where there is ease of financing and low wage demands of rebels, both in play in Haiti.

The drug trade and open forms of criminality also put in place cultural norms that support the proliferation of violence in communities over the long term. NGOs such as the Institute for Community Peace have observed that communities who are to witness violence in their local environment believe that this contributes to long-term trends in violence and a break down in traditional values. While this is more acute in some of Haiti’s urban areas where there are more frequent manifestations of violence, criminality pervades across the entire island, particularly given that most to the drugs trade takes advantage of a lapse in security in rural areas where drop offs are made.

Economic stagnation

A third mechanism through which the drug trade has fed conflict in Haiti is by retarding economic growth and destabilising the economy. While there is obviously merit to the argument that negative correlations between illicit drug production and economic development can be a reaction to deterioration in economic conditions, Haiti’s recent economic performance has been weakest over the past 18 years when trafficking has been at its peak, with poor but positive economic growth between 1967-85 of 2.5% slumping to negative growth of – 1.04% in the post Duvalier era, between 1986-97. Efforts to restore macroeconomic stability have also been undermined by criminal interests influencing rational decision-making. Moreover, crime discourages economic activity. Illegitimate business interests crowd out legitimate investment and competition, creating high entry barriers as well as generating additional burdens to variable costs in the form of security. The formal embargo placed on Haiti by the United States following the 1991 coup also isolated the economy and prevented it from doing business with its largest trading partner.

Macroeconomic theory also tells us how important education is to economic growth. Trafficking's high opportunity costs in terms of income for the Western Hemisphere's poorest country disincentivises children (and young adults in particular) from attending school or higher education. Children are involved in organised crime, and those as young as 12 have been caught by UN forces in connection with the drug trade. Without figures for gross school enrolment it is difficult to accurately assess the proportion of children in education, but it is clear that a literacy rate of 52% is extremely poor in comparison to the low income country average of 61% and the Latin American & Caribbean figure of 89%, indicating that school enrolment and/or the quality of education is low.

Erosion of social capital

From an institutional view, social capital- that is the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively- has also been undermined in Haiti. The vitality of community networks and civil society are both by products of well functioning institutions, institutions that have been undermined by corruption and nepotism supported by the trafficking industry. Criminal networks in urban and rural environments have also served to break down traditional community structures, despite the growth in NGOs and other community organisations. Trust no longer exists in Haiti.

2- Favourable conditions for crime

Poverty and expectations

A variety of factors facilitate the trafficking of cocaine through Haiti. Fundamentally the financial rewards to trafficking are a powerful incentive. The 36-40 tons of cocaine trafficked into the US today through Haiti makes up around 8% of the US market, a \$1.1bn industry talking in around a third of Caribbean revenues. Economists estimate that around 10% of this money stays in Haiti, a pervasive incentive in a country where 76% of the population live below the poverty line. A two way flow of Diaspora and migrants also facilitate the process, smuggling merchandise as mules and laundering the proceeds through \$800 million to \$1 billion worth of unregulated remittances. Criminological paradigms would also suggest that the failure of expected rises in income is a clearer incentive for criminal activities. Haiti's economic growth in the 1970's was followed by sporadic economic development and finally negative economic growth, creating uncertainty among the population about their financial futures.

The "Predatory state"

Haiti's predatory state, a hybrid of authoritarianism and fragmentation, also aids the trafficking trade. Like any good predator, Haiti's state is one which perpetuates and benefits from state fragility, preying on its citizens and reaping rewards for itself, making negligible investments in social infrastructure and poverty reduction. The 'winner takes all' mentality, typified by a vertical power relations headed by a chief executive, is a characteristic of this model and of Haiti. We only have to look endemic collusion between the 'hierarchs and lowerarchs', where the latter pay tribute to the former in the form of bribes, to see evidence of this model. Corruption, an essential element of the drugs trade is much easier in a state where

every man is out for himself. A distrust of the institutional infrastructure has also been key in creating a culture of distrust, undermining social capital.

Impunity and the ‘Dead Hand’

Impunity is another factor contributing to drug related activities. Collusion and cooperation (the ‘Dead Hand’) has created a culture of lawlessness, facilitated by presidentially appointed court judges, a poorly paid and unprofessional police force and circumventable sentencing procedures. In Haiti, a man convicted of stealing a chicken is more likely to end up in prison than a man caught shipping drugs. Corruption and a political culture of impunity has led Haiti to be ranked the most corrupt country in the Western Hemisphere by Transparency International.

Corruption is complimented by institutional weakness such as a lack of basic resources for law enforcement. Even if Haiti’s police service were ‘clean’, its force numbers just 6,000 for a population of around 8 million, an average of one police officer for every 1333 people. Outside the capital of Port au Prince, the disparity grows to one officer for 6,944 people. In comparison, Jamaica has a ratio of around 1:343. Haiti’s counter narcotics force, the BLTS (Bureau de la Lutte Contre le Traffic des Stupéfiants, BLTS) has a staff of just 50.

Geography

Haiti’s unique geography is what initially caught the attention of traffickers. Not only is Haiti positioned directly between Colombia and the US, it has porous borders with the Dominican Republic, from which cocaine is shipped to Puerto Rico just 80 miles away, a territory of the US where customs procedures have generally been less rigorous. Haiti is America’s back door for traffickers, with its 1125 miles of shoreline and its numerous ports and beaches, making it easy to drop off cargo. Overall the BLTS estimate that around 15% of people travelling to Haiti are either carrying drugs or are in some way connected with the trade.

3- Recommendations and response

There are no new solutions to the Haitian problem. At a very basic level undermining Haiti’s attractiveness to traffickers involves three elements: 1. Rule of law promotion to address security issues through community initiatives and state building that strengthens the scope AND the strength of the state while creating checks and balances to prevent abuses of power and eliminate avenues for corruption. 2. Border protection to secure Haiti’s external perimeters via enhanced physical and financial security measures. 3. Enhanced drug demand reduction and treatment programs in end markets.

Rule of law promotion

- Building trust from below

As Thomas Carothers has noted, reform needs to be bred as much from below as above thus rule of law promotion should encompass trust building initiatives at a community level as

well as government orientated capacity building programmes. Initiatives are already underway, but they need to be improved and expanded. For example, the national reconciliation project, National Dialogue, needs to include all members of Haitian community, including social 'undesirables', such as Cité Soleil slum dwellers. With the elections over, trust building and community specialists in the NGO community should be the focus on donor funding and educationalists should be sent into Haitian schools to organise workshops aimed at reducing tendencies towards crime and violence. Trust in the community reduces crime.

- Institutional Reform: Creating a credible punitive framework

Top down initiatives must continue in order for the Government to impose law and order and earn the trust of its people. A variety of reforms are being undertaken to meet this goal, although there is a lot of work to be done. In its 2006 report Human Rights Watch described the Haitian National Police as *"largely incompetent at carrying out investigations are responsible for a catalogue of extra-judicial beatings, killings and collusion with the traffickers."* Since the return of Commissioner Andrésol, police reform has been progressing slowly but surely to remove these officers from the force, drive out corruption and professionalize officers. He has made good progress, and this process must continue, along with better conditions and pay for police officers, registration and the recruitment of new, untainted staff.

Judicial reform also continues at a ministerial level with technical assistance, training of staff and rehabilitation of the ministry. But given that the judicial system hardly functions, donor projects will need to expand to a local level to speed up the process of reform (particularly so that given the nature of the trafficking business, most activity is being carried outside of Port au Prince where state capture by drug interests is far more institutionalised). Tougher penal measures for criminal activities and better witness protection need to accompany judicial reform. Future planning should look to try and create space between the criminal elite and the public at large, particularly between low level gang members who like to style themselves as Robin Hood type characters, stealing from the rich to feed the poor. Public information campaigns advertising wanted criminals and publicising convictions will create a public platform on which to design an anti-crime campaigns, collect information on criminal activities and open a communication channel between the state and its citizens.

Serious issues and human rights violations in the penal system also need to be addressed: the conditions and capacity of prisons, haphazard sentencing and the holding of petty criminals and children. Building prisons and juvenile detention centres in provinces without penal facilities will act as a useful public works project and as a sign that the state is serious about tackling crime. A one-time amnesty for petty criminals or could also free up space in prisons, although a campaign which prioritises a crack-down on organised crime will inevitably lead to an increase in petty crime over the same period as resources and attention is diverted.

Border protection & rural security

Border protection and security in more remote areas without sufficient police presence and must be improved to physically prevent trafficking. At a minimum central control of ports around the country and Haiti's airspace must be secured and taken out of local control where

local politicians funded by traffickers operate rights of entry. While the US Coast guard monitors shipments between Haiti and the US, there is no force patrolling the waters between Haiti and Colombia. A reconstituted and corruption-free Haitian national customs unit, coast guard and air force needs to be deployed over the long term to resolve this problem with oversight from a central level and with a force constituted of non-locals who may express less bias. Having created and trained a costal force before the USCG is in the best position to advise on how to create checks and balances to avoid the problem of the Coast Guard being re-corrupted.

Control over the Haitian-DR border and the strip of no-man's-land that serves as a trading ground also needs to be resolved, problematic given Haiti's limited resources and ongoing corruption in the DR. While human rights violations such as Child Trafficking are also mobilising the international community to put pressure on the DR to maintain constant border security year round, ongoing messages, such as the US Governments reiteration that it will cancel the visas of Dominicans found to be involved with the drugs trade (such as ex-Justice minister Víctor Cespedes Martinez) are needed.

Drug demand control

“Congress can repeal a lot of laws. The law of supply and demand is not one of them,” quips Institute for Policy Studies Drug Policy Director Sanho Tree in a 2002 documentary “Plan Colombia”. Anti-trafficking operations are unlikely to have any long-term effect without a reduction in demand in end markets. While the US, as well as its European counterparts operate anti-drugs education and addiction clinics, funding is drying up. In what the Join Together alliance calls the *“stingiest anti-drug budget in many years”* the FY2007 drug budget proposed by the Bush administration refuses to make any additional funding for a keystone \$1,759-billion substance abuse prevention and treatment block grant. It cuts funding for both the Centre for Substance Abuse Treatment (CSAT) and the Centre for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) compared to FY2006 appropriations, and reduces funding for the National Institute on Drug Abuse. The overall split in anti-drug resources devoted to police, prisons and military operations as opposed to treatment facilities is a ratio of 70:30.

In addition, only 10% of people who need treatment are receiving it, a result of poor follow through for those convicted of drug related felons with only California and Arizona implementing programmes that offer non-violent offenders treatment. However, even in California, civil society groups argue that financial support is not sufficient to fully implement the program and is slowly being cut. A variety of other public policy problems accompany this issue, including the lack of childcare facilities available for those seeking treatment.

Conclusion

With a dire poverty problem, a number of immediate humanitarian issues seem to be crying out for funding ahead of security reform in Haiti. Yet without restoring the basic functions of Haiti's state, through capacity building, community projects and anti-corruption drives, and wresting away control from traffickers, Haiti's conflict cannot come to an end. While in the post 9-11 world, attention and funding has switched from the war on drugs to terrorism, the drug trade and weak states such as Haiti pose an equal if not greater threat to our societies, undermining

social capital and creating safe havens for organised criminal groups who may themselves be involved in terrorist activities. Collective action, in cooperation with the Haitian people and authorities, is required to address the trafficking trade and restore trust to a broken society.

Slums

Introduction

Although countless studies and books have been written about Haitian history and politics, there are very few scholarly works specifically dedicated to one of Haiti's most pressing and urgent problems – urban slums, the majority of which are located in or near the nation's capital, Port-au-Prince. In these socially and economically blighted areas, people live in inhumane and unsanitary conditions, locked in a never-ending struggle to survive in the face of debilitating violence and poverty.

Despite these extreme conditions, the Haitian government has historically done very little to improve the conditions of slum dwellers. Former dictator “Papa Doc” François Duvalier was initially given his nickname because of his paternalistic concern for the poor, but his 14-year dictatorship did little to improve their conditions. “Baby Doc” Duvalier only exacerbated problems of poverty by squandering government money and living lavishly on funds he could have used to help the poor. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, though elected president because of his appeal to the impoverished masses, was stymied by his lack of political experience and shunned by foreign aid donors. Even worse, Aristide distributed weapons to pro-Lavalas gangs living in slum neighborhoods, thus condemning the poor to a fearful existence of violence, manipulation, and retaliation.

The end result of a tumultuous past and decades of government neglect is that Haiti remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, with 80% of the Haitian population – some 6.5 million people -- living below the poverty level. Alarming, the slum population continues to rise, fuelled by high birth rates and rural flight brought about by depressed economic conditions. Haiti's rapidly growing population (on average, 5 children for every Haitian woman) and the economic decline of the agricultural sector in rural areas are pushing the number of slum inhabitants to record proportions. When asked how Haiti had changed from when he first led the American diplomatic mission in 1998-1999, US Ambassador Tim Carney saw one striking development: “The slums have expanded dramatically. Every year, they climb higher and higher up the hills.”

If humanitarian reasons alone are not enough to encourage swift and decisive action on the part of the Haitian government and the international community, there are also compelling political and security reasons for addressing the slum crisis. The depressed economic and social conditions in urban slums make them easy breeding grounds for violent elements of Haitian society that are the source of destabilizing internal conflict within the country. Brutal murders and the wave of kidnappings at the end of 2005 perpetrated by slum gangs in Port-au-Prince have left the general population feeling frightened and vulnerable and have heavily contributed to the climate of insecurity currently plaguing Port-au-Prince. This climate of fear and insecurity not only threatens Haiti's fledgling experiments with democracy, but has also driven away economic investment, tourism, and Haiti's best and brightest citizens, further contributing to the country's decline. If Haiti is to rise above its tragic history and triumph, the slum problem needs to be addressed – urgently.

The roots of the Conflict

Ultimately, depressed social and economic conditions are at the heart of the slum problem. First and foremost, little to no employment ensures a long and persistent lifespan for depressed urban areas like Cité Soleil, Carrefour, Bel Air, and Martissant. Nationwide, it is estimated that around 75-85% of Haitians are unemployed (i.e. not working in the formal economy). The figure worsens for slum neighborhoods, where the little employment to be had is most often in the informal sector – usually in reselling small necessity items or produce at makeshift stalls along major thoroughfares. With so little opportunities for income, people are forced to skimp on basic necessities, including food. The UN World Food Programme describes half of the Haitian population as “food insecure,” and reports that 50% of Haitian children are undersized due to malnutrition. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that people often accept any type of work to survive, including assisting gang members with violent and/or criminal acts or even becoming gang members themselves.

Access to health care also remains elusive for the majority of slum dwellers. The little care residents receive is provided by a few crowded clinics run by international humanitarian organizations like the Red Cross and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). The current climate of insecurity and threat of violence, however, has all but driven out international health care workers from the slums. “Our ability to work in Cité Soleil is precarious,” said Loris De Filippi, the head of mission for MSF’s programs in Cité Soleil, “we never know how much access we will have from one week to the next.” The upswing in pre-election violence has been so bad that MSF issued a press release on January 19th, 2006, calling for armed gangs to “respect the safety of civilians” and allow MSF medical personnel to “treat those wounded during clashes.” In December 2005 alone, MSF reported helping 220 victims of gunshot wounds in the Turgeau and Cité Soleil neighborhoods. The number was up from 147 in November 2005, a startling 50% increase. Overall, MSF estimates that it has helped over 2,500 victims of violence-related injuries in these areas since December 2004.

Much of the conflict in slums stems from criminal impunity. Human rights workers at the Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH) explained that violence often breaks out in impoverished neighborhoods because there is little to no punishment of crimes and serious offenses. Criminals with money can easily buy off judges to escape prosecution and imprisonment and remain at-large in the population, unaccountable for their crimes. The International Office of Migration (IOM) estimates that out of 1200 people that had been charged for crimes, only about 10% were ultimately brought to justice. With both judges and members of the Haitian National Police on the payrolls of criminal gangs, innocent victims have few choices – either suffer in silence or take matters into their own hands.

In addition to gun violence, abominable sanitary conditions further exacerbate health problems. With no indoor plumbing, no waste removal, and no access to a clean water supply, health conditions reach appalling proportions in the slums. Sudden rainstorms further aggravate conditions by sending torrents of water and built-up refuse down the hillsides from Pétienville, flooding the low-lying slum areas near the sea with filthy, contaminated water. Because the simply constructed corrugated-tin shanties that most slum dwellers live in are located on flat land

and have no drainage, dirty, foul-smelling water often builds up inside homes during the rainy seasons. Presidential candidate Charlie Baker recounted the horrific tale of one Cité Soleil resident that lost her child during these rains. In the middle of the night, the infant fell from its mother's bed and drowned in the putrid water filling their makeshift home.

Access to educational opportunities presents another severe problem for both slum residents and the larger Haitian population. Due to high birth rates, Haiti is the Western Hemisphere's second most densely populated nation, with 43% of the country's 8.1 million people below 15 years old. Providing education for Haitian young people then – especially those living in the slums -- is a challenge of biblical proportions. Nearly 90% of schools in Haiti are private and can run upwards of \$1,000 per semester, an impossible sum for families just scraping by to put food on the table. Haitian universities, including the Université d'Etat de Haiti in Port-au-Prince, are woefully under funded and lack qualified teachers. President Préval cited the lack of teachers as the most difficult part of improving the education system, explaining that he had unsuccessfully tried to woo educated Haitians living abroad into coming back and teaching in Haitian schools. The salaries the government was offering, however, were just too low to spark any interest.

The social crisis of the slums has also spilled over into the political arena, terrorizing the Haitian elite in the process. The vast gap between Haiti's rich and poor – exacerbated during Aristide's presidency when he publicly proclaimed that the poor should rise up and head to Pétienville to extract what was due to them – still exists today. The elite fear a reversal of fortune and the uprising of the poor and dispossessed; the poor disparage an elite they feel denies their very existence and blocks them from advancing up the socioeconomic ladder. Of the myriad of people our group met with – journalists, politicians, aid workers, presidential candidates, students, members of the international and business community – each and every person believed that the criminal gangs in the slums could potentially disrupt or even threaten the elections. Some went further, expressing their belief that the gangs would perpetuate violence during the elections in order to derail the political process. Some even went as far to suggest that voting should not be allowed to take place unless the gangs could be eliminated.

Managing the Conflict: Suggestions and Recommendations

1.) Security

The problem of slums, and of Cité Soleil in particular, calls for a two-pronged approach: security, then development. Security should be a first objective, because foreign investment and aid to Haiti essential to development will not be forthcoming without it. This sounds easy enough, but the devil is in the details. With no standing army and Haitian National Police Chief Mario Andrésol proclaiming that a large number of the police force are corrupt and working in conjunction with criminal gangs, the national police cannot be counted on to resolve the security problem.

UN forces (MINUSTAH) have also had little success in eradicating the violence and lawlessness in Cité Soleil, even though it is estimated that only a few hundred gang members operate among the 300,000+ people living in the slum. Mark Schneider, vice-president of

International Crisis Group, is correct in suggesting that disarmament should be the first step in re-establishing security. But the question is how? Colonel Atouriste, former head of the Haitian armed forces and member of the National Disarmament Committee (NDC), was critical of the NDC's disarmament process.

First, the methods employed were ones that had worked well in other countries, but had not worked in Haiti because the context was not one of two well-delineated groups engaged in a civil war. Secondly, the disarmament program that was employed by the committee ignored illegally armed gangs, and focused on ex-military members who had already been disarmed in 1995 with the disbanding of the Haitian army.

Colonel Atouriste suggested that a "commando operation" might be the most effective method of removing gang resistance in slum areas. He estimated that Cité Soleil could be "cleaned out" in a one-day operation, with an additional two weeks to consolidate control over the area. Despite the fact that this type of operation would undoubtedly result in the death of innocent civilians, the method remains a popular one among well-off Haitians, who believe the gangs are ruining the country at everyone's expense and should be eliminated, even at the risk of civilian casualties. Former coup leader Guy Philippe and presidential candidate Charlie Baker also took a hard-line view on the security problem, pointing to a rebuilt military force as the ideal method of combating slum lawlessness. Baker, whose son is a US Marine, backed up his views by referencing the US intervention in Haiti in September 1994 that restored Aristide to power: "300 US Marines took Cité Soleil in three hours," he said, "without a shot being fired."

Although Baker makes it sound as if a swift and precise military force could solve the Cité Soleil problem in a short amount of time, it seems highly unlikely that this type of operation could be as painless as he describes. What he fails to mention in the example of the 1994 US intervention is that there would have been little reason for pro-Lavalas gangs to resist US forces. Because they supported Aristide, they were willing to cooperate with US forces that had been sent to restore their revered president to power. So, despite the perceived attractiveness of a "quick" commando operation, it should only be used as a last resort before all other avenues have been tried. At this point in time, other options still exist.

One of these potential avenues is the United Nations peacekeeping force currently in Haiti. It is doubtful, however, that the present UN mandate will allow enough peacekeeping forces to re-establish security in gang-infested slums. In addition, UN forces suffer from a serious image problem among the Haitian population. On 16 January 2006, Port-au-Prince ground to a halt as the general population went on strike to express their frustration with the UN peacekeeping force. Some Haitian media have also started smear campaigns against the UN, decrying "massacres" in slum areas and criticizing UN Special Envoy Juan Gabriel Valdès of not caring about the "collateral damage" inflicted by UN operations in poor neighborhoods. Valdès insists this is untrue: "The UN is not prepared to undertake commando operations against gang leaders," he said, adding that former UN attempts to take control of Cité Soleil had resulted in the deaths of several Jordanian peacekeepers. Rather than continue to lose men in slum shootouts, Valdès ordered peacekeepers out of Cité Soleil. Jordanian forces are now engaged in a containment operation, where they are attempting instead to police the perimeter of the troubled area with a series of checkpoints.

Another less-mentioned option that has not yet been tried is negotiation. Rumors that gang leaders have promised to give up their weapons if they are given American or Canadian visas abound. Even if these rumors are untrue, the fact is that there has been little direct negotiation or communication with slum gang leaders. NGOs like IOM adamantly refuse to communicate with gangs (perhaps, rightly so) for fear of losing credibility with the communities they are trying to assist. Gangs also have little to no communication with the media, for the most part, so it is difficult to discover what their true motivations and intentions are. Political? Criminal? Monetary? Psychological? The one exception to this virtual communication blackout is the Red Cross, which has directly negotiated with gang leaders in order provide humanitarian assistance in slum areas.

President Préval, who is supported in the slums because of his old links to Aristide, suggested that negotiation was definitely a possibility that had not yet been tried, but should be. “There is no security problem in Haiti,” he said, “the problem is Cité Soleil.” It will be interesting to see whether President Préval continues with the option of negotiation. Other avenues that could also prove fruitful in solving the gang problem include cutting off access to gang drug money by working in closer cooperation with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency and putting a stop to the financing of gang leaders by members of the business community.

Additionally, the UN’s success in restoring security to the slums of Bel Air should also be studied and adapted elsewhere in Port-au-Prince. Most importantly, development money needs to immediately follow areas where security has been re-established. Valdès, who continues to prod the UN for an additional \$6 million to develop employment opportunities in Bel Air, is correct when he says that development is the ideal solution for breaking the cycle of violence in the slums. IOM concurs, having seen ripple effects in development projects undertaken in the Fort National area of Bel Air after the UN had cleared out the gangs. However, in addition to assistance from the international community, the Haitian government should also help blighted areas by offering incentives to local businesses that invest in impoverished, but secure, neighborhoods. To date, no businesses have gone into Bel Air to invest, ensuring that the area will continue to remain impoverished and a potential breeding ground for conflict.

2.) Development

Development within Haitian slums should focus on two main areas: social solutions and economic solutions. Two organizations in particular – Haitian think tank CLED (Centre pour Libre Entreprise et Démocratie) and US-funded IOM (which works in conjunction with the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives) – have several excellent ideas on how economic and social development might be successfully accomplished in poverty-stricken neighborhoods. It should be stated here that forceful removal or relocation of slum residents is not ideal, as it wastes financial resources that could be better spent elsewhere and destroys community fabrics and social networks already in place. Additionally, simply relocating people does not address the root of the problem – lack of employment, resources, and opportunities. Hence, the development strategies detailed here advocate solutions that can be used within the slums themselves.

Social Solutions

IOM's strategy in slum areas is threefold: 1) create a dialogue between slum residents and their government, 2) create social adhesion within slum communities, and 3) change the way residents of impoverished neighborhoods are viewed – both by those living inside places like Cité Soleil, as well as those who live outside of the slums. Although achieving these objectives is a long-term and tremendously difficult task, IOM has employed several innovative methods with some success.

In order to develop a relationship between slum dwellers and their government, IOM encourages government involvement in community projects. When a school in a slum neighborhood was rehabilitated, for example, they invited the Minister of Education to come to the school, thus establishing a link between government and community development projects. This type of linkage is important, so that slum residents feel their government is attentive and responsive to their concerns. Additionally, in order to disassociate humanitarian assistance with a specific official or individual, IOM also tries to involve government civil servants in development projects, as they are much less temporary than many of the higher-up, elected officials and can thus enjoy longer-term relationships with the communities they serve.

To encourage social cohesion among slum communities and change mindsets both in and out of poverty-stricken neighborhoods, IOM has also sponsored the establishment of local media (radio, for the most part, as literacy rates are low) and has set up intra-neighborhood soccer matches between poor and well to do neighborhoods. Unfortunately, the success of these initiatives is highly dependent on the security situation. A soccer match IOM set-up in Martissant in 2005 was brutally shot to a halt when corrupt members of the Haitian National Police infiltrated the stadium and killed several spectators.

Another very interesting strategy IOM has employed involves encouraging slum communities to find solutions to their own problems. One instance where this technique was used occurred when gang members fired upon IOM trucks engaged in a food drop in Cité Soleil. Rather than request security back up from the UN or the Haitian National Police in order to deliver the food, IOM flatly refused to continue the assistance unless the community members themselves could find a way to ensure that shipments would be safely transported through their neighborhood. What ensued was that the community organized itself to find a solution: they set up community member escorts at various checkpoints along the delivery path who would ride with the truck drivers to act as deterrents – the “he’s with me, don’t bother him” factor. IOM believes that encouraging this type of community problem solving is important in establishing a more permanent social network that residents can use to solve other problems in their communities.

Economic Solutions

Although Haiti is threatened by “donor fatigue”, foreign aid has increased since 2004. This is a positive development, as the five years prior to 2004 saw only a miniscule trickle of foreign aid. With political instability gripping the country, donors were concerned that funds might be misused. In July 2004, however, foreign aid picked up again, with international donors

pledging more than \$1 billion in aid for 2005 and 2006. The US alone has pledged \$230 million in aid through fiscal year 2006.

Foreign aid alone, however, is not sufficient to resolve the slum crisis. In addition to large infrastructure projects like improving rural roads and upgrading the Port-au-Prince airport, it is essential that projects that specifically help slum residents receive funding. Foreign aid earmarked for health and education are welcome, but in order for slum communities to lift themselves out of poverty, financing programs that increase job opportunities is crucial. Haitian think tank CLED (Centre pour Libre Entreprise et Démocratie) has several ideas on how this can be achieved.

One of CLED's more ambitious ideas involves the formalization of the assets of the poor. CLED member Lionel de la Tour estimates that although more than 70% of the Haitian economy is informal, the poor own more than \$3 billion in assets that they could potentially use to grow their own businesses. The problem is that slum dwellers and poor peasants have no formal titles to their land and thus, no access to the formal economy. If a process of formalization were instituted, De la Tour argues, the poor would be able to use their titles as collateral to finance their own micro enterprises or invest in their properties, ensuring that they too would become players in the Haitian economy. Inspired by the success of land formalization in countries such as San Salvador (where CLED says 60% of settlements have been successfully formalized), CLED is overseeing a land title pilot project in the city of Delmas. There, the organization is working with the tenants of 3,000 dwellings. CLED hopes to use the results of this project to convince other Haitian communities of the benefits of this approach in the future.

However, the formalization program is not without its problems. For example, in the case of Cité Soleil residents, it seems highly unlikely that dwellings in this area could be used as collateral with financial institutions, even if slum dwellers did manage to receive a title for their property. Additionally, former president Préval mentioned a second logistical concern: as it stands, there are currently more titles for land than there is land in Haiti. Without a strong judiciary or a land dispute arbitration court (proposed by CLED), it will be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the rightful owners of thousands of acres of property.

Another solution that could ease the slum problem greatly is the development of Haiti's agricultural sector, which would encourage migration to rural areas and thus relieve some of the population pressure on urban slums. Under French colonial rule in the 1780s, Haiti was considered the "Pearl of the Antilles," a coffee and sugar producing powerhouse that created more wealth than the United States and the West Indies combined! At that time, nearly 40% of all of the sugar consumed by Britain and France and 60% of the *world's* coffee was grown in Haiti. Today, however, Haiti faces severe environmental problems, including severe deforestation, which makes coffee production that much more difficult (shade trees are necessary for sensitive coffee plants). Additionally, since around 63% of Haiti's land is too steep for agricultural production, not all land can be used to grow crops. The land that is available for farming, however, is underused due to the lack of irrigation systems, and the lack of roads in rural areas hinder the transport of produce to markets, often resulting in crops going bad or being thrown out. If financing could be provided to develop the agricultural sector, it would benefit Haitians in all parts of the country, not just slum residents.

Conclusion

The violence and conflict that breed in Port-au-Prince slums is a crisis in need of immediate and sustained attention. Whatever hope Haitians have for their future will not and cannot be realized without improving the lives of the country's poorest citizens. If Haitian citizens, working together with a stronger and more democratic government, can solve the problem of the slums, they will have eliminated a major obstacle on the path to a freer and more prosperous Haiti.

III. Governance and Security

Section 7

Kate Turner

The Haitian National Police (HNP)

By definition, public security in any conflict situation is at best inadequate, and at worst, non-existent. The Haitian people currently suffer from widespread lawlessness, where gangs and ordinary citizens take matters into their own hands in the absence of a trusted police force and judiciary. The Haitian National Police (HNP) is plagued by corrupt elements that regularly engage in human rights violations and crime, ranging from petty extortion to major crimes such as kidnapping and drug trafficking. Building an effective police force and judicial system must be at the heart of any stabilization strategy. Sadly, these monumental tasks are among the least popular projects for donors to fund. When considering the overall security situation, it is important to remember that on the ground, reform of the police and judiciary goes hand-in-hand with disarmament.

This section discusses the sources of the instability and conflict in Haiti, from the perspective of the HNP, and then outlines recommendations for HNP reform in the short to long term, as a means to break the cycle of violence and restore stability to the country.

An estimated 30 percent of the HNP is ex-military, according to retired Colonel Antoine Atouriste. It has already seen two changes in its chief since the international intervention in February 2004. The current Chief of Police, Mario Andrésol, is widely praised for his efforts to fight corruption and professionalize the force. Juan Gabriel Valdés, head of the UN mission in Haiti, attributes much of the recent progress in addressing HNP corruption to Andrésol. Nevertheless, Andrésol is constrained by limited resources, lack of trust between the HNP and external actors (the United Nations Civilian Police [CIVPOL] and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti [MINUSTAH]), and lack of public respect for and confidence in the police. All these stem from *and* result in ongoing corruption. The cumulative effect of the HNP's corruption and abuse of human rights is not only further violence, but also serious undermining of the credibility of the state.

No one knows how many police exist in Haiti; there is no comprehensive register identifying police, their location, or what weapons they possess. UNPOL has plans to do so, but has been slow in achieving this goal. The HNP supposedly has 3,000 policemen manning checkpoints, but there are also, reportedly, about 5,000 checkpoints generally operating in Haiti; it is not clear which number is more accurate, and indeed it is not even certain that all checkpoints nominally run by "police," are in fact run by true police forces. Even the Chief of Police, Andrésol, can at best only offer an estimate of the number of police in the HNP (he believes there are 6,000), while others estimate 4,000. In Petite Goâve, population of 180,000, the director of the local radio station, Radio l'Eko 2000, estimated that the city has 18 policemen. However, when two groups of local police were asked how many police operate in Petite Goâve, both groups claimed 45 to 48. Even assuming the larger number of 45, the proportion breaks down to a pitiable 1 policeman per 4,000 people in the city.

At the most fundamental level, lack of resources translates into salaries so low that corruption is almost inevitable, and police who are so ill-equipped that they cannot perform their job. Some police have no shoes, and in many stations there are no radios, phones, or bathrooms. Other complaints include lack of working vehicles, dorms to sleep in, insecure stations, and lack of food. The international community attempts to discuss rules of engagement, but if the police cannot eat, they cannot fight or protect. The HNP and MINUSTAH have signed a document stating that the HNP cannot do any important operations in Cité Soleil without MINUSTAH. In some rural counties, the nearest police are six to eight miles away.

Lack of resources is linked to poor management of resources. Former President Préval reportedly bought 200 cars for the HNP; one year later, only ten remained. Each time 500 police graduate, only 250 men or fewer receive weapons, and the most recent class of graduates received no weapons. Some of this is, of course, attributable to the effects of graft and corruption. But at another level it represents the break-down or absence of the modern infrastructure that is so critical to a modern police effort.

One would think that perhaps the HNP's effectiveness might be multiplied by cooperation with MINUSTAH and UNPOL. Despite the fact that Andrésol appears to work closely with the UN, we heard repeatedly that lack of trust, both ways, between MINUSTAH and the HNP, and between UNPOL and the HNP, is a major problem. This distrust is evident, for instance, in attempts to fight kidnapping. As even Chief of Police Andrésol concedes, many police are involved in kidnapping. At the same time, it is the HNP that knows who and where gang members are. Thus, UN forces face a dilemma: the HNP is the logical partner to help identify gangs, but the UN has little means of discriminating between upright police who can potentially locate gang members, and corrupt police who may well have been involved in the kidnapping. (Or at least MINUSTAH appears not to have made an effort to do so.) Further, one can speculate that reputable policemen endanger themselves when they take action against the criminal elements with whom their corrupt colleagues are associated.

Recently Andrésol himself described an incident that illustrates this distrust: When a policeman was shot in the leg during security operations, while standing next to MINUSTAH armed vehicles, the UN forces did not offer him aid. He was forced to drag himself to the secure area around the vehicles, all the time under fire. More generally, his police refuse to work with UNPOL because they don't want witnesses when engaging in corrupt activities.

The problem of distrust extends to the HNP's relations with the general public, particularly the poor. The justified perception of the HNP as a *source* of criminal violence rather than a guarantor of public security appears to be growing more entrenched. The ICG warns that this trend "threatens to generate the same hostility in citizens that developed against the army and contributed to its dissolution." The problem is most acute in poor areas, where the police have repeatedly opened fire indiscriminately, killing innocents. Wounded Haitians seeking medical treatment are routinely arrested without proof of wrongdoing, an added affront to victims caught in crossfire. These abuses fuel alienation, anger, and a sense of persecution in the poor neighborhoods. Families fear retribution, so do not denounce these officers or file a complaint. For example, in Petite Goâve, the local population has a collective memory of the

HNP's unresponsiveness in times of crisis. According to Louis Jean Pierre, director of Radio l'Eko 2000, in December, 2003, two opposing groups confronted each other in the streets amid rumors of a coup against Aristide. They set fire to buildings and general violence ensued. People cried for help from the police but there was no response. More generally, the police do not patrol by night, when thieves roam freely. Pierre insisted that he noticed no improvement in the functioning of the police since Andrésol's arrival.

Lack of resources and distrust of the police both facilitate and are caused by corruption. Andrésol estimates that 25 percent of his force is corrupt (ICG November 2005, 4). He says that when he arrived, he found a force controlled entirely by a mafia, operating with different people at various levels of command. Andrésol has been trying to dismantle this endemic corruption. He has arrested at least 50 police involved in kidnapping and the drug trade, and claims that one to two officers are involved in every drug case.

While Andrésol states that he does not have difficulty recruiting new police, it is unclear what draws men to apply. Surely it is a combination of factors for different people. It may be the prospect of a job (in a society of 80% unemployment), or it may be, as Joseph Delva (Reuters) emphasizes, simply a matter of entering an institution that puts one in a position of power and ample opportunity for extortion.

This endemic corruption is only exacerbated by the fact that the judiciary system, the second of three legs in any functional nation's rule-of-law processes (the final being corrections facilities), is also corrupt. Haiti faces a deep structural need for stronger institutions and the rule of law. It is crucial to consider judicial reform specifically in the context of police reform. A good justice system is fundamental to an effective police force, and vice-versa, because the efforts of one are undercut by the other if both institutions do not share the same interests. When criminals pay to be freed by the courts, it puts the HNP in an embarrassing situation. An inhabitant of Cité Soleil might be arrested for stealing bananas and remain in jail indefinitely, while a kidnapper able to pay off judges goes free. If the justice system does not work, the HNP cannot do their job to bring people to justice, and cannot become a professional force.

On a more abstract level, Haiti suffers from the lack of an ethic of public service. There is a cultural belief that power equals privilege, rather than service. One manifestation of this belief is the politicization of the HNP. Joseph Delva of Reuters described how former members of the army (disbanded by Aristide in 1994) became enemies of Aristide and his supporters. Those elements of the police fear a return of Aristide, or anyone aligned with him. They know most people in Cité Soleil support Lavalas, and thus tend to see the poor as enemies, rather than as a population to be served. In the face of so many difficulties in performing their job, it seems almost laughable to speak of instilling an ethic of selfless service in the HNP.

Reform of the HNP in the Short, Medium, and Long Terms

I define the short term as one to two years; the medium term as two to five years; and the long term as five to twenty years. In the short term, conditions can be changed on a material level (e.g. developing infrastructure), but it is not realistic to expect true change at the cultural level over this short period. Thus, professionalization of the HNP is not a realistic goal in the

short term. In the medium term, however, the culture of institutions can begin to change. Finally, in the long term, the goal should be to develop the integration between institutions so that professionalization of the HNP is continually reinforced, sustained, and advanced.

In the short term, a top priority must be obtaining greater resources for the HNP, including such basic necessities as food, shoes, radios, telephones, and working vehicles. As discussed above, the HNP cannot operate as an effective protecting and fighting force if its officers are under-nourished and un-clothed. Because Haiti has virtually no tax base, international aid would be well spent on fulfilling some of the HNP's basic needs. At the same time, resources cannot be simply disbursed due to the absolute certainty that corrupt officers will appropriate valuable equipment.

To effect viable material changes in the conditions of the police they must be given the tools to develop systems. Along these lines, if they are to be given vehicles, there should be a significant portion of that donation (perhaps as much as 75%) allocated towards the creation of a national maintenance system, complete with garages and fuelling stations. Similarly, there must be a mechanism for registering equipment such as radios and vehicles, and a system of reprisal when bad management leads to the disappearance of these items. Perhaps the most valuable equipment could be distributed on the basis of criteria that include registration of all police at a particular station, and a record of no human rights violations or of investigations into complaints.

Along the same lines, when the police are reduced to subsistence existence, their priorities are not primarily directed towards the rule of law. The HNP must be paid adequate salaries on which to live. This must occur in a way that prevents even more corruption. Here the issue of "ghost police" becomes relevant, and may explain some of the hugely disparate estimates about the number of police in the HNP. In a society that is entirely cash based, and within a dysfunctional management system, one of the most effective ways for more senior police to enrich themselves is to "pad the payroll." By submitting false reports on the number of police at their stations, and then receiving the pay (in cash) for those non-existent police, the police "leaders" can become relatively rich. One mechanism to reduce opportunities for this system of "skimming" by the senior level management that disburses pay checks is to implement a system of direct deposits for the pay checks of the individual policemen. Obviously, this initiative requires a functioning banking system, which is an entirely separate conundrum.

Registration of police, in tandem with closer vetting and strict selection, is also a short-term goal. Ambassador Valdés sees registration as one of the top three priorities for police reform. UNPOL should step up its program to register and vet all police, identifying where they are and what weapons and general equipment are in their possession. If, as Andrésol claims, recruitment is not a problem, then the HNP should afford to be extremely selective in its recruiting process.

The most fundamental medium to long-term goal is the professionalization of the HNP. While this goal will not be achieved in the near term, measures must be taken in the short term to lay the groundwork for cultural and institutional change. Andrésol has made admirable progress in beginning to turn around a culture of impunity; his efforts to hold the police accountable for human rights violations and corruption must continue. However, he cannot succeed alone. First,

Andrésol needs a judiciary that will cooperate in the prosecution of corrupt officers and those that commit human rights violations. (See the “Institutions” section of this report for more on judiciary reform.) Further, Andrésol needs other sectors to broadcast anti-corruption measures to the public so that the people are informed about reform efforts. These measures, such as investigations into indiscriminate violence by police officers, must be vocally supported by political and business elites, the media, humanitarian organizations, and international actors. This show of support would enhance Andrésol’s ability to carry out internal investigations. The problem of persistent corruption at senior levels of command, however, might necessitate a third-party actor, such as UNPOL, to serve as an authority to which upstanding police can report their colleagues’ illegal activity.

These efforts might begin in the near term, but would take root in the two to five year timeframe. The HNP would gradually feel increased pressure from its chief and the broader society, to refrain from corruption and human rights abuses. The desired effect would be not only to professionalize the force, but also to change the public’s expectations of the HNP and create a positive feedback loop for further reform.

Increasing the size of the HNP must occur in tandem with the process of professionalization. A force of 30,000 is considered appropriate for the geography and population of Haiti, even under ideal conditions (Andrésol). Haiti has a long way to go from the roughly 6,000 officers, who are not fully trained or equipped, to a force of 30,000. These needs emphasize the importance of prioritizing the police in Haiti’s federal budget (i.e. the trade-off of reconstituting the Army vs. building an adequate police force), not to mention the fact that international aid for this task will be vital.

Another means toward professionalization, which we heard repeatedly, is increased cooperation between the HNP and international security forces. Here the problem of mutual distrust rears its head, so that trust-building becomes a first-order objective for the medium to long term. To achieve this goal, Haiti should look to improving its U.S. State Department-sponsored (also supported by the Canadian and French governments) program. One possible solution may be to model their program along the lines of a program introduced in Iraq in the spring of 2005. The Police Partnership Program (P3), begun in April 2005, brings international police liaison officers (IPLOs) (under U.S. State Department/US DOJ sponsorship) as well as their military counterparts, to work on a daily basis at selected Iraqi police stations, rather than merely conduct sporadic monitoring visits. A parallel program in Haiti could begin in the short term, focusing on 25 percent of Haitian police stations for one year, then expanding in the medium to long term. IPLOs would be drawn from CIVPOL forces, as well as from MINUSTAH. As in Iraq, police officers are needed to advise on how to enforce the law as civilians, but military personnel (from MINUSTAH) could be used to advise on basic managerial and institutional/systemic matters (such as the creation of a logistics, or personnel system). The synergistic benefits of such a program would be to increase face-time and trust among the HNP, CIVPOL, and MINUSTAH (necessitating interpreters) forces, and in doing so expose the HNP to more entrenched, and presumably more professional (see Section on MINUSTAH), security forces infrastructure.

One opening to the interaction described above should be CIVPOL's and MINUSTAH's involvement in registering the HNP and its resources. The human rights organization RNDDH emphasizes that when it enters a police station for a monitoring visit, it first asks the officers about their working conditions. When RNDDH shows this interest in the HNP's lives, the monitors usually gain access to detention facilities; RNDDH gains the officers' trust. A similar approach could be intentionally used on the part of international security forces. That is, CIVPOL and MINUSTAH forces could initiate their P3 program with a demonstration of respect for the difficult conditions in which the HNP must operate, through the vehicle of registering men and equipment. The data gained by the registration process could be used by the international community to determine which officers and stations need what equipment and assistance. If this effort led to actual delivery of resources, a bond of trust might be formed between the HNP and CIVPOL and MINUSTAH.

Finally, on the deepest psychological and cultural level, the HNP must develop an ethic of service. This goal is part of a much broader societal change that is needed to rebuild and heal Haiti. It comes with consistency in civil servants and retention of institutional knowledge, the decentralization of government, a strong public education system, and a tradition of political courage to confront corruption. One outcome of such an ethic is a civil service geared toward not the next chance for extortion, but instead long term and strategic planning for the stability of the state. If the HNP pursues reform in the short and medium term, in conjunction with similar processes in its sister governmental agencies, then it will be on a path of cultural change. The development of a public service ethic can be the glue that holds the HNP – and indeed the state – together. The key to movement toward that ethic is strong and selfless leadership that embodies an ethic of service, creates a system of rewards to encourage it, and holds accountable those who do not abide by it. The HNP is currently in the hands of this kind of leadership. A crucial question is whether other powerful actors (in politics and the judiciary) will facilitate Mario Andrésol's leadership, and provide the space for more such men to succeed. As we have seen, Haiti and the international community cannot hang its hopes on one man alone.

MINUSTAH

From its founding over 200 years ago, Haiti has had near continuous security crises. Its economically divided society has been misruled by kings, dictators, and populist presidents who in general have used their positions to enrich themselves at the expense of the population, keeping Haiti the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. Given Haiti's proximity to its neighbors, international actors have been inextricably linked to Haiti's security crises for most of its history. The US has led repeated invasions of the island, including an occupation of the entire country by the US Marines from 1915 to 1934. The current period of crises, caused by the difficult transition from the Duvalier dictatorships to democracy, has been no different. Since 1990 there have been five different United Nations missions to Haiti. Unfortunately, these missions have failed to bring lasting security and stability to the country.

The UN's current presence in the country has been named the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, or MINUSTAH, and was created by Security Council Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004. A Section VII UN mission, MINUSTAH has peacemaking as well as peacekeeping responsibilities. MINUSTAH took over this mission from the Multinational Interim Force, which the Security Council authorized in February 2004 to establish security after Haiti's dubiously elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was forced from the country by an armed uprising. The MIF created a surface calm throughout the country, and left MINUSTAH to continue this process of stabilization. MINUSTAH has a fairly robust mandate, when compared with previous UN missions. (Harvard Law Student Advocates, 12) The mandate gives MINUSTAH three distinct areas of responsibility: a secure and stable environment, the political process, and human rights. While all three of these aspects are essential to creating a viable state in Haiti, this paper will focus only on the first, which has been the most problematic for the mission.

While the deeper causes of Haiti's insecurity lay in the desperate poverty of most of the Haitian people and the country's long history of social polarization, the current insecurity and violence has a very specific cause: a number of armed groups who reject the current direction of the country and the entire process of stabilization. The oldest problematic group is the former Haitian army (FAd'H), which Aristide disbanded in 1994. Many former members of the FAd'H are resisting the loss of their power, and have been able to do so violently as they still retain weapons from their military careers. Another set of armed groups are the supporters of Aristide, who have organized gangs that want to destroy the credibility of the Interim government so that Aristide can return to power. These gangs also retain weapons from the Aristide period. Finally, with poverty as desperate and widespread as it is in Haiti, crime has become a growth industry. Criminal gangs rule many of the slum areas in Port-au-Prince, using ransoms from kidnappings and profits from the narcotics trade to fund their operations. By spreading criminal profits and weapons around their communities, these gangs have gained complete control of slums such as Cité Soleil in the center of Port-au-Prince.

The existence of a high level of violence in Port-au-Prince a year and a half after MINUSTAH arrived in Haiti shows that something has gone terribly wrong with the international effort to bring "security and stability" to Haiti. Many Haitian people have in fact

lost patience with what they see as MINUSTAH's incompetence and complicity with criminals, leading the business community to call a general strike throughout the country on January 9, 2006. Officials from international organizations such as the International Organization of Migration report that they cannot openly work with MINUSTAH or they would lose credibility with their local Haitian partners.

Haitians do have legitimate reasons for this distrust and anger with MINUSTAH. While the allegations of complicity with criminals are probably false, MINUSTAH has been negligent in fulfilling its mandate. On the most basic level, many Haitians report that some MINUSTAH soldiers watch crimes and violence taking place, but refuse to help the victims. A US embassy official related that the embassy knows of three separate incidents when MINUSTAH soldiers failed to help Americans in danger. Haitian politicians report similar incidents where friends have been injured or kidnapped while MINUSTAH watched. Such a basic failure of the duty to help people in danger, which is not only a basic duty of all peacekeepers but also a specific duty within section I.f. of MINUSTAH's mandate, are tragic in and of themselves, but are also terrible for the population's confidence in the international community.

MINUSTAH has also failed to implement its mandate to assist with a disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program for Haiti's numerous armed groups. The abundance of illegal weapons, estimated to be between 13,000 and 18,000, in the hands of those who want to prevent the restoration of order to Haiti is clearly a threat to the entire mission. And yet little has been done to collect these weapons. The UN has had success with DDR programs in the past, but the dynamics of Haiti's conflict defy past models. Haiti is not in civil war, where there are two warring factions, but it has many violent groups without much organization and with small, easily hidden weapons. The Interim government has begun a program to pay an indemnity to ex-FAD'h officers as part of a disarmament program, but failed to link the first payment to an actual handover of weapons. (Harvard Law Student Advocates, 44) No other program has been implemented to collect weapons from other criminal gangs. As these weapons allow insecurity to continue, the lack of a DDR program is not only a failure of MINUSTAH's mission but has made its job harder on a day to day basis.

The existence of concentrated slums in the center of Port-au-Prince creates a particular problem for MINUSTAH troops. These slums, such as Cité Soleil and Village de Dieu, are crowded with weak houses, often made out of cardboard and with only narrow alleys between them. Many streets are unmarked, making the areas very confusing for outsiders. The language of the people in these areas is Creole, which troops from outside of Haiti cannot understand. In such an area, any MINUSTAH operation that involves shooting is likely to cause harm to innocent people, as bullets can go through their intended destination and into nearby buildings. Any successful operation in such a setting that would take out criminals and not harm civilians would have to be a commando-type operation, with trained Special Forces troops who have good knowledge of their surroundings as well as their intended targets.

MINUSTAH is simply not equipped to conduct this type of raid successfully. MINUSTAH is staffed mostly by regular infantry troops, many of whom come from countries as culturally different from Haiti as Jordan and Sri Lanka. As Juan Gabriel Valdés, the Special Representative to the UN Secretary General, pointed out, there are no Creole-Sinhala translators.

These soldiers do not have the experience and training necessary for these operations. The national differences also make coordination between troops problematic. Soldiers are aware of how dangerous these operations can be, and accusations were made that, in particular, Jordanian troops refused to carry out orders given by the Brazilian force commander. These staffing deficiencies have led MINUSTAH to take more of a containment strategy with the gangs of Cité Soleil. Jordanian troops currently surround the slum with tanks and attempt to prevent armed gangs from going in and out of the area. This strategy has been poorly implemented, however, and gangs continue to move throughout Cité Soleil and the rest of Port-au-Prince with ease, to which the recent spree of kidnappings testifies.

Despite these problems, which are inherent in urban guerrilla warfare, MINUSTAH has had some success in freeing neighborhoods of gangs. Bel Air, also in the center of Port-au-Prince, was a middle class area but it decayed and eventually became a slum and stronghold of Aristide's Lavalas movement. Prior to MINUSTAH's arrival it was run by two to three gangs, and so dangerous that even the Haitian National Police avoided it. To root out these gangs, Brazilian troops invaded the area and took possession an old fort in the center of the slum. Gang members attacked the fort on the first night, but once this one attack was repulsed, the Brazilians were able to secure the entire area through a combination of negotiation and military operations. NGOs were also important in this operation, as once MINUSTAH provided some security, international aid workers were able to enter the area. Development projects completed by these groups showed residents the dividends of peace. Despite this success, Bel Air still does not have the food, water, and schools it needs, and even Mr. Valdés fears that if the Brazilian MINUSTAH troops leave, the gangs will come right back to Bel Air.

Haiti's problems are deeply rooted and based on a lack of economic development and social cohesion. A UN peacekeeping mission such as MINUSTAH cannot be expected to solve these long term issues. But the factors that will revive Haiti from its failed state status- long term political and economic development- all require security as a sine qua non. Neither the international community nor any future Haitian government can build a water or electricity system in Cité Soleil if it is not safe to enter the area. Without basic rule of law there can be no credible government, no stable economy, and no investment in the future. Given the complete collapse and thorough corruption of all of Haiti's law and order institutions- the Haitian National Police, the judiciary, the penal system- all short term efforts will have to be made by the international community, meaning MINUSTAH.

It is therefore essential to Haiti's recovery that MINUSTAH become a more effective peace enforcement force. Open violence in Port-au-Prince and seething tensions below the surface in the rest of the country need to be rectified. The first step in this process is to recognize that the UN presence in Haiti is a long-term project. Despite the valiant efforts of the new Police Chief Mario Andrésol, it will be years before this force will be able to provide real security to the country as a whole, as rooting out corruption and recruiting and training new policemen takes time. Fixing the corrupt judiciary and penal systems will also take years. Therefore, temporary six-month extensions of MINUSTAH's mandate are not enough. The Security Council should recognize this situation, and give MINUSTAH the authority to plan for the long term. As MINUSTAH's current mandate expires on February 15th, the new mandate would be an excellent opportunity to make this change in outlook.

In the short term, there are many steps that MINUSTAH can take to improve its effectiveness. The first is that the mission needs more troops. Slow deployment by UN member states of the initial allotment of 6,700 military personnel and 1,600 police officers initially hampered MINUSTAH's effectiveness. Even when full strength was reached, however, its numbers were vastly inadequate for a population of 8 million that is armed and not under the rule of law. As a comparison, the KFOR mission in Kosovo has 40,000 troops for a population of 2 million, or about 2,000 times the troop to population ratio of MINUSTAH's original mandate. On June 22, 2005 the Security Council increased the allotment in Haiti to 7,500 military personnel and 1,897 police. This increase has been helpful, although still more people are needed to truly establish security throughout the entire country.

Additionally, a different mix of types of soldiers is needed. First and foremost, more Francophone troops are essential to being able to interact with the population. Given the integration of criminal elements with the general population, being able to talk to local people and respond to their tips and guidance is essential to rooting out these gangs. More trained commando troops would also be helpful in the short term to be able to conduct operations in areas such as Cité Soleil with a degree of professionalism that is currently lacking. Finally, more international police are needed to conduct foot patrols and fill in where the HNP cannot act. According to Police Chief Andrésol, UNPOL forces currently do not work at night, leaving a large time window open for criminal activity. All MINUSTAH troops should also make a much more serious attempt to understand Haitian culture. This cultural adaptation should come with the recognition that MINUSTAH will be in Haiti for the long haul, and needs to act accordingly.

Another immediate need is for a comprehensive DDR plan that encompasses all the different parties to the current conflict. Paying ex-soldiers without taking their weapons is not a disarmament plan. MINUSTAH and government authorities need to have a monopoly on the use of violence as a pre-condition of a legitimate state, and this will never be the case until the illegal weapons are contained. DDR plans are more than just disarmament, however. A way must be found to demobilize all of the rejectionist groups and bring them into the political system, rather than allow them to act outside of it. This reintegration could include involvement in the HNP, provided that the newly demobilized gang members are thoroughly vetted and re-trained. Through such incentive programs and negotiations, and most importantly through a real show of effort, MINUSTAH should be able to accomplish the elimination of gang leaders in the short to medium term. This will go a long way towards ending the perpetual violence in the country.

In the medium to long term, MINUSTAH needs to develop a good working relationship with the newly elected government. The international community can only hope at this point that whatever government comes out the February 7th elections and the subsequent rounds has the best interests of the country as a whole at its heart. Whoever is elected, their task will be enormous, and MINUSTAH has a significant role to play through coordination with these new officials. By working with the government to create an overall security plan for the country, MINUSTAH could help Haiti take part in its own security, a plan that would be seen as more legitimate as it would be home-grown.

This coordination has to begin with a thorough reform of both the Haitian National Police and the entire justice system. In the short run this should involve an international takeover of the judicial system to deal with the truly violent criminals, who should not be allowed to buy their way out of jail while minor offenders remain imprisoned without trial. The June expansion of MINUSTAH's mandate to include the ability to arrest people is a good first step, but MINUSTAH is still unable to detain these criminals. MINUSTAH should be allowed to run a prison facility for criminals it apprehends in its new raids. International judges should also take part in setting up trials in the short run, although a purge and re-training effort for judges must be made a priority in the medium term.

There is serious debate in Haiti about the reconstitution of a Haitian Army to deal with the security problems. The main purpose of an army, however, is defense against an external force, not internal suppression. Haiti is not in danger of an invasion, and therefore an army is an unnecessary step to resolving the security problem. In the long term, however, as MINUSTAH begins to withdraw its forces, it may be appropriate to create a more elite gendarmerie that could perform tasks at the higher end of the combat spectrum. This force could also be related to the building a Coast Guard, which in long term will be necessary to protect the country from drug traffickers.

The lack of security in Haiti is a short to medium term problem, but it intersects with all of the causes of the country's long term issues. Security is a precursor to economic development and a stable political system. It is tragic that the last 18 months of MINUSTAH's mandate have not achieved better results, but this week's election should be seen as a turning point. MINUSTAH must reform itself to be larger, stronger and more proactive if it is truly to bring security to the country. The Security Council must also give MINUSTAH the tools it needs to complete this mission: a larger mandate; a longer timeframe; and capable, appropriately trained soldiers. A powerful international security force is the only way at the present moment to allow Haiti to build on what will hopefully be successful elections, and finally to create a peaceful democratic state.

Institutions

As a failed state, Haiti does not fit the most common models. Rather than being ravaged by war, it has been a victim of its own government. While group tensions and contending objectives exist, Haiti failed only after successive regimes continually took steps to weaken state-level institutions in attempts to solidify their power. The lasting effects can be seen in the ineffectual institutions known more for their widespread crime and corruption than for provision of services. Haiti is a failed state because of its failed institutions, and recovery will only be possible if significant steps are taken to rebuild professional, capable state-level institutions.

This section will briefly review the causes of this institutional failure, point out the consequences and current challenges to building strong institutions, and provide some suggestions for both domestic and international actors willing to take on the challenge.

Causes and Consequences of Haiti's Failed Institutions

In recent history, Haitians have been treated more like subjects than citizens. While the population has repeatedly gone to the polls, the victors have been unable to uphold either the institutions or intent of democracy. Among those elected into office, one declared himself ruler for life, several supported illegal armed gangs to maintain control over society, and the only one to serve a full term in office undermined this success by dismissing the Parliament to rule by decree. Several coups, an armed uprising, and repeated military and diplomatic interventions by the international community have further devastated Haiti's domestic capacity and legitimacy to govern.

The result of these successive failures has been the personalization of politics. When elected leaders stopped using official channels to effect change within the government, and institutions stopped providing consistent or reliable services, citizens and civil servants looked for new ways to find what they needed. The two most pervasive and corrosive symptoms of the personalization of politics are corruption, and a factionalized political sphere.

Corruption can be found even within the most stable of governments, but the network of corruption that exists within Haiti's police and judiciary is almost an institution in and of itself. The origin of the current system can be found within the privatization and criminalization of security forces by the Duvalier regime and the Aristide administration. What was temporarily an effective means of maintaining power, turned into the destabilization and de-legitimization of the rule of law, and loss of monopoly on the use of force. The Tonton Macoutes under Duvalier and the urban gangs buoyed by Aristide served to integrate the state with the criminals. When police no longer protected the people, and innocence could be bought from a judge, personal safety became a matter of personal connections. The institutional became personal.

Today, both the gangs which rule the slum areas of Port au Prince and the drug traffickers who operate the ports have close ties with members of the police and judiciary, thereby ensuring impunity. Corrupt officials protect the criminals by allowing them to maintain control over the slums and the drug trade, and releasing arrested suspects in exchange for a fee. In return, the criminals provide supplementary income to the complicit judges and officers, often multiplying

their salaries. This mutually beneficial relationship provides a strong incentive for them both to work to preserve the current state of chaos.

Given the entrenched nature of corruption within Haiti's standing institutions, any attempt to disrupt it will be frustrated by those resistant to the change, from both outside and inside the government. By way of example, the recently appointed commissioner of the Haitian National Police (HNP) is cognizant of both his achievements and further challenges as he works to professionalize the police force. Having made it a priority to upset this network of corruption, Andrésol is aggressively pursuing reports of corruption and arrests any individual implicated in criminal activity regardless of social standing, wealth, or any other indication of protection from this network. This approach has effectively reduced the estimated percentage of corrupt officers within the HNP, but is simultaneously undermined by the intact criminal network within the judiciary. Those jailed by the HNP are often released prior to facing charges or trial by paying a fee to some of the judges. Also, the fact that Andrésol's personal security cannot be left to his fellow police, but rather is provided by the UN, is an indication of the prevailing threat. While considerable progress has been made within the police force, the establishment of the rule of law will be obstructed until there is cooperation and complementary actions from the judiciary.

A fractured political sphere is the other outcome from Haiti's failed institutions. The symptoms are everywhere; in how candidates are chosen, how parties garner support, how the opposition behaves, and ultimately in how the institutions operate. The cause is more difficult to observe, because it resides in the individual psyche and in the society's learned response to politics. Coups, dictatorships, the misuse of power, and the disregard for the Constitution, Parliament and opposition parties have taught the Haitian public that government is unreliable, unpredictable, and untrustworthy. The only consistency is that after a leader is elected, or self-appointed, the government becomes whatever that leader creates. Thus again, weak institutions lead to the personalization of politics, and in the lead up to elections this has translated into factionalization of the political sphere.

The plethora of political parties and presidential candidates is confusing given the shortage of concrete platforms. There were more than 30 presidential candidates for the elections on February 7, 2006, representing more than 40 political parties. Campaign posters abounded, and a few of the candidates had billboards, radio jingles and even TV ads despite the paucity of televisions in the country. However, few candidates had a message. Even some of the leading candidates admit that there is no ideological rift preventing them from uniting behind a single candidate.

Why are there so many candidates if most of them do not seem to know why they are running? Why has number of contenders not reflected an equal number of contending approaches? Hypothetically, the more candidates in the race, the more it would behoove them to articulate a platform which differentiates themselves from the others. This has not happened. A Haitian journalist explained the large number of candidates by clarifying their likely motivations. The Presidency is a unique opportunity in Haiti to be meaningfully employed, and to reform the government. While there will only be one winner, it is better to try than to be guaranteed the alternative: unemployed and excluded. Regarding the conspicuous absence of campaign promises, a Western diplomat pointed out that there is no supply where there is no demand. A

survey collecting the opinions of likely Haitian voters was intended to provide information on people's needs and priorities to the Presidential candidates so they could build their political platforms. Disappointingly, both voters and candidates focused their attention on the statistics, discarding the more useful information on what Haitians want and need.

Without the benefit of party platforms and an identifiable ideology, voters are left to choose candidates based on what they know: the person, their past, and maybe a motto. It is therefore not surprising that the leading candidates included two former Presidents, even though one only served for four months and the other has been accused of maintaining ties with ousted President Aristide, the gangs of Cité Soleil, and the drug traffickers.

Recommendations for Building a Strong Haiti

In order to emerge from this cycle where individuals loom larger than laws, the institutions need to be rebuilt. This is a long term project which will require patience and sincere commitment especially early in the transition process. The goal is to depersonalize politics in Haiti, and substitute the cult of personality with a respect for institutions. In the near term this means developing and enacting transparent and consistent political procedures consistent with Haiti's 1987 Constitution. Over time, this adherence to a recognized legal standard will develop into recognizable physical institutions immersed in a stable bureaucracy.

By definition, the path out of personalized politics has to be led by, or at least sanctioned by the strong personalities in Haitian politics. As mentioned earlier, the incentives for individuals to abandon the current system for a more bureaucratic one are weak. The potential for personal gain through the continuation of corruption and unchecked presidential powers is far greater than under a strong, stable government. Pressure to depersonalize the political sphere, coupled with positive incentives to strengthen the political process should be provided by the international community in the form of diplomatic, economic and military support.

These recommendations for continued international involvement are coupled with words of caution: Haiti, with all its problems and promise, belongs to the Haitians, and the rise out of statelessness must be accomplished by, and accredited to the Haitians. There is a proud history of independence in Haiti, and the appearance of an imposed solution backed by foreign money and troops will not be welcomed or sustained. A recent example highlights the importance of local ownership of the reconstruction process, and can provide useful insight on how to achieve this. The call to postpone presidential elections from January 8 until February 7 originated with the Haitian interim government out of concerns that free and fair elections were unlikely given delays in distributing voter identification cards, printing ballots and securing election observers. However, despite the domestic origins of the final election postponement, statements by both the United Nations and the Organization of American States urging elections to be held no later than February 7th were seen as directives issued by international interveners, rather than international support for the domestic policy. The reaction in Haiti was a general strike across the country in protest of international involvement.

Bearing in mind the importance of local ownership of Haiti's recovery, the following steps should be taken by the international community and Haiti's new administration to encourage strengthening of the political process.

Pressure the President to disassociate from criminal and violent activity

In the lead up to the elections citizens, candidates and international observers discussed their concerns and suspicions of ties between presidential candidates and the various criminal elements operating in Haiti. Some even went as far as to predict possible alliances between the victor and leaders of the gangs. While candidates may have been reticent to explicitly denounce the gangs, drug trafficking and corruption rings while campaigning because of the potential loss of votes, it will be crucial for the new President to make it clear to all Haitians that the government is no longer partnering with criminals. The legitimacy of the administration, the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies, and the reinstatement of the rule of law all depend on this message.

Pressure the opposition forces to build a coalition

One of the difficulties in embracing democracy is accepting the reality that not everyone wins in elections. Accepting defeat, however, does not have to mean accepting exclusion from the political process. Since the opposition has been sidelined in Haiti's past, it will require a mixture of encouragement, advice, and material support for today's fractured opposition to find a common voice. The international community at both the state and sub-state levels can provide the necessary resources to solidify the role of opposition.

The ideal situation entails a strong, united opposition coalition in Parliament which would allow for a Prime Minister from the opposition to counter-balance the President. The stand-off between President Aristide and the opposition which directly preceded the current interim government is both a testament to the potential strength of a united opposition, and the weakness of the state once its primary actors abandon the political process. Recommitting both the President and the opposition to address issues using the political process is a critical element of democratization and stabilization.

Pressure both the President and opposition forces to uphold the Constitution

This recommendation is an extension of the previous two. Instantiation of the political process requires a common understanding and acceptance of the rules of the game. The Constitution provides such a set of rules.

Although some have characterized the 1987 Constitution as a reactionary document in the aftermath of Duvalier's regime, it can nonetheless lend some legitimacy and temporary certainty for the next administration. The executive and legislative branches will likely have enough to debate and resolve without addressing the suitability of the country's Constitution as well.

Pressure the international community to remain strong supporters of Haiti's democratic transition

Haiti is at a critical point. It has the potential to emerge from a governance crisis, but also the possibility of relapse. There are many positive indications that Haitians are ready for change, not the least of which is the success of the elections on February 7th. High voter turnout,

and patience and relative peace as election workers resolved problems reinforces the messages that Haitians want this process to work.

But will alone is not enough to rebuild a country. Haiti's poverty, corruption, abundance of arms and gangs who use them, lack of a positive precedent of democratic governance, and memories of recent turmoil pose significant challenges to even the most well-intentioned of political elite. The international community has the ability to bolster the efforts of Haiti's leaders through a commitment to provide economic development aid, capacity-building assistance, security forces, and technical advisors.

According to a high-level UN official, two countries have already privately indicated that they will withdraw support from the UN mission in Haiti should the elections process fail. This warning is not the type of pressure needed from the international community. Analysts at the International Crisis Group attribute Haiti's current crisis in part to the premature withdrawal of US forces following the reinstatement of Aristide. While Haitians are not interested in being permanently protected by international forces, even those who call it an occupation admit that the extra security is necessary until Haiti has had the time and resources to build up a domestic security capacity.

In addition to military support, Haiti is in need of development and capacity-building assistance. Through programs such as the US Agency for International Development Office of Transition Initiatives, local level programs funded by donors can provide short term employment, encourage local initiation and participation in community building, and start to change the culture of civil service. This Section has emphasized the roles of leadership in building and sustaining strong institutions, but the civil service can also play an invaluable role in depersonalizing government affairs, and local capacity building programs are an effective way for the international community to be involved without undermining the principle of local ownership. Specifically, community oriented projects which require communication between community leaders and civil servants can connect the population with the government at the local level. Following the mantra that all politics are local, depersonalizing politics can happen by deemphasizing the high level political appointees and elevating the visibility of more permanent civil servant. In this way citizens can develop confidence in their state and local institutions independently of their confidence in the current President.

Legislation

Introduction: Endemic Conflict in Haiti

Political violence has plagued Haiti for much of its history since its independence in 1804. There has been an upsurge in violence and politically-motivated conflict since Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted from power in 2004. December 2005 proved a particularly crime-ridden month in which gang violence rose in anticipation of the coming presidential elections held in February 2006 and in which there were over 240 reported kidnappings. Most of these kidnappings are attributed to Aristide supporters living in slums such as Cité Soleil. These gangs use violence to undermine the transitional government in the hopes of returning Aristide to power. Such violence and crime often go unpunished in what one human rights worker deems the culture of impunity that pervades the country. Although myriad historical, political and economic factors underlie Haiti's endemic violence, this section will seek to address why institutionalized legislation in particular has been ineffective at upholding the rule of law and curbing the conflict in the country.

The failure of formal lawmaking to improve the security situation will be ascribed to four factors: (i) the polarized political environment in which laws are made, (ii) the weakness of the Haitian parliament, (iii) its consequent lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Haitian population, and (iv) lack of capacity in those institutions needed to support formal legislation, specifically the judiciary and the police. After delineating the factors contributing to the failure of lawmaking to help solve Haiti's security problems, possible avenues for improving the effectiveness of institutionalized legislation will be addressed.

The Failure of Institutionalized Legislation

Polarized Political Environment

Much of the violence that plagues Haiti stems from the winner-take-all character of the country's political environment. Politics is seen as a zero-sum game in which the dominant political group uses the power of political office to suppress the opposition, resulting in a severe lack of healthy political debate. A journalist with Agence France Presse notes that Haiti has no precedent for political pluralism, thus contributing to the winner-take-all mentality that leaves many turning to extra-legal means to voice their discontent. Without a tradition of legislation (or the prospect of legislation) borne of political compromise and cooperation between opposing parties, violence is often viewed as the only way to express political discontent. Mired in poverty and marginalized by the political system, Aristide's supporters in Cité Soleil provide one example of the result of such a winner-take-all system. The polarized nature of the environment is exacerbated by the fact, as noted by a U.N. official, that an important part of the political spectrum (Aristide's supporters) does not want to participate in the formal political system as it currently exists. In such a polarized political environment, partisans of marginalized groups may feel no obligation to obey laws viewed to be solely the product of their political rivals.

This belief in the politically-biased nature of formal legislation is not unfounded. Laws are perceived to be applied unequally and their implementation and enforcement are often considered politically motivated. A February 2005 ICG report notes that:

further undermining the government's image is the fact that several Lavalas leaders and supporters, including high-profile figures such as former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune and former Minister of Interior Jocelerme Privert, are held in preventive custody in clear violation of the due process guarantees of Haitian law.

Neither side of the conflict is immune to accusations of selectively using the law to bolster their own claims. A Haitian reporter with Reuters notes that under Aristide there were protests against arbitrary arrests and enforcement of the law but the Group of 184, a coalition of civil society organizations formed in opposition to Aristide, is silent on arrests and illegal imprisonment of former Lavalas officials. Political actors and citizens feel little obligation to respect or obey laws when they believe legislation either exists or is implemented to protect the interests of a particular political group.

Weak Parliament

The effectiveness of institutionalized legislation is also hampered by the weak Haitian parliament. Although the 1987 constitution provides for separation of powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, Presidents Aristide and Préval consolidated executive power such that there were minimal checks on their authority. The weakness of the parliament was dramatically shown in the aftermath of the controversial 1997 legislative elections, which were considered fraudulent by many both within Haiti and in the international community. The ensuing political paralysis prevented the organization of parliamentary elections scheduled for 1998, leading President Préval to dismiss the 18 of 27 senators and entire Chamber of Deputies whose terms had expired. After the dismissal of the legislature, President Préval and Prime Minister Edouard Alexis ruled by decree. Such events serve to highlight the weakness of the legislature, violate the spirit of separation of powers mandated by Haiti's constitution, and ultimately further undermine public faith in the democratic process and institutionalized legislation.

Lack of Legitimacy

Institutionalized legislation may lack legitimacy in a state where laws are considered reactionary to the previous regime. The 1987 constitution was written in response to 29 years of authoritarian rule by the Duvaliers. When legislation responds to previous events and does not seek to address the present needs and challenges facing a state, both its political elites and its citizens are less likely to feel beholden to it in the long run. Such is the case in Haiti where "heads of state have often drafted and abolished the nation's constitutions at will, treating the documents as their own personal charters," as evidenced by the disbanding of parliament in 1997, discussed above (Haitian Law).

Electoral controversy also serves to undermine legislative legitimacy. Laws are less likely to be obeyed when they are the product of a political leadership deemed to have been fraudulently elected, as was the case with the 2000 elections, viewed by many Haitians to have been “stolen” by Aristide.

There is a pervasive sentiment in the country that political power is a means to personal enrichment. As such, political actors are often thought to be guarding their personal, not national, interests. When laws are viewed to have been either drafted or invoked to protect the interests of those in power, their legitimacy is undermined in the eyes of the population. There is little trust in the effectiveness of lawmaking in a predatory republic. Public faith in lawmakers has not improved since the fall of Aristide since Prime Minister Gerard Latortue’s government is not viewed by most (including members of the international community, most notably CARICOM) as legitimate.

Weak Complementary Institutions

Ultimately institutionalized legislation has failed to solve Haiti’s security problems for the simple reason that laws are not obeyed. Legislation cannot be effective in a society lacking the necessary institutional support to enforce such legislation. The underlying institutional causes of the lack of obedience to the law are the weak judiciary and the weak police force.

A weak, understaffed, and corrupt police force means that the laws existing to protect Haitians from the violence and conflict are not effectively enforced on the ground. Furthermore, the inability of the police to protect its citizens breed public distrust that dissuades citizens from reporting violations of the very laws meant to protect them and curb the violence.

Likewise, a weak judiciary allows those caught violating the law to evade the consequences easily. Many of the interviewees cited the impact of the weak judicial system that allows justice to be bought and sold. One cited as anecdotal evidence a criminal with over 500 warrants for his arrest who buys his freedom from judicial officials after each arrest, only to return to perpetrating violent crime. Many interviewees told of similar occurrences of pervasive bribery and corruption in the judicial system, the prevalence of which implies that laws only apply to those who cannot pay to violate them. A weak judiciary undermines institutional legislation by failing to enforce laws equally and fairly.

What Can Be Done?

Although Haiti’s history shows the limits of institutionalized legislation in curbing political violence and fostering security, there are specific areas of legislation which should be addressed in order to mitigate the conflict. Such legislation should address election law reform, anti-poverty measures, and corruption. Additionally, to improve the effectiveness of lawmaking, efforts must be made to strengthen the legislature and law enforcement institutions.

Election laws to depolarize the political environment

According to a professor at the Université d'Etat d'Haiti, Haiti never developed a mechanism for free and fair elections. In the absence of such a mechanism, for those seeking power, the professor claims that the “insurrectional path always trumps constitutional path.” As the upsurge in violence in the months leading to the February 2006 presidential election shows, the failure to develop such a mechanism contributes to the violence and conflict. Reforming election laws could help suppress the conflict by depolarizing the political environment. A February 2005 ICG briefing specifically advises that “all sides must be able to campaign without fear”. Legislation providing for protection of the opposition during the election, as deemed necessary by the ICG report, and a clear role for the opposition after the election may help to lessen the political polarization that encourages political violence. A representative of the Tripartite Commission agrees, citing the need for an amendment in the constitution protecting the status of the opposition. Such legislation should extend beyond electoral laws to provide for an overall inclusive, pluralistic political environment.

Anti-Poverty Legislation

One presidential candidate expressed his view that the real struggle in Haiti today is against social inequality. Therefore, legislation that addresses Haiti's endemic poverty could also serve to ameliorate the conflict. Representatives of CLED propose legislation based on the work of Hernando de Soto. They advocate legislation creating a capitalization institution to officially recognize informal human settlements, the informal economy based on the activity of the poor engaging in economic transactions not recognized by the state or included in the formal economy because the poor lack formal title to their property. CLED's proposed legislation will require institutional reform, such as in the judiciary, to support and protect the formalization of land rights, and therefore may not be an appropriate legislative measure immediately. However, in the longer term, legislation recognizing informal human settlements may be an effective way to close Haiti's poverty gap and stem the political conflict that it produces.

Anti-corruption laws

Tougher anti-corruption legislation is needed to boost the legitimacy of laws and combat the culture of impunity in Haiti. Political corruption undermines the rule of law, the absence of which was cited by many interviewees as a core factor contributing to the conflict. On a more practical level, discussions with presidential candidates and civil society leaders indicate that much of the violence is perpetrated by those who have been arrested in the past but repeatedly evaded justice by paying a bribe. Tougher anti-corruption laws, specifically focusing on members of the judicial system, would have an immediate mitigating impact on the conflict by keeping repeat offenders off the streets. The venality of public officials also contributes to popular distrust of the political elite, further de-legitimizing the political system and the laws it produces.

The economic effects of corruption also contribute to the conflict. One presidential candidate claims \$600 million is lost to corruption each year. Corruption impedes foreign investment needed for economic development and therefore contributes to the conflict by perpetuating poverty, inequality, and political discontent. The 1897 constitution, the civil service law, and the penal code all criminalize the offer or receipt of a bribe with a punishment of one to

three years imprisonment. However, stronger anti-corruption legislation with tougher penalties, such as barring those found guilty of corruption from holding political or state office, may increase the effectiveness of current legislation.

Strengthening the legislature

Efforts must be made to strengthen the legislature in Haiti if laws it promulgates are to be viewed as legitimate and obeyed. The separation of powers in the constitution must be respected so as to limit the domination of the executive over the other branches of government. The international community can assist in these efforts through legislative strengthening projects such as those implemented in several countries by the United States Agency for International Development. Increasing the strength and legitimacy of the legislature will also address the problem of the personalization of politics that weakens and destabilizes institutions and contributes to the conflict.

Law Enforcement Institutional Reform

Ultimately, any discussion of the failure of formal legislation to stem the conflict in Haiti must address the need for reform in the institutions providing the necessary complement to lawmaking. Laws can have no effect on the conflict if they are not properly, fairly, and universally applied and enforced. Such is not currently the case in Haiti due to the weak state of the Haitian National Police and judicial system discussed above. Therefore, reform of those two institutions is the *sine qua non* of any attempts to mitigate the conflict through legislative measures.

Conclusion

Institutional legislation has failed at the macro level, manifested in the preference for the insurrectional rather than constitutional paths to power, as well as the existence of political corruption, and the conflict spurred by elections. At the micro level, the failure of institutional legislation is witnessed in the prevalence of politically-motivated crime and the impunity afforded criminals based on their ability to evade justice through bribery. These failures are predicated on the polarized nature of Haiti's political environment, a weak lawmaking body lacking legitimacy, and lack of capacity in the police force and the judiciary to enforce institutionalized legislation. As discussed above, measures to improve the effectiveness of institutionalized legislation include electoral reform, economic development, and anti-corruption laws, as well as efforts to strengthen the legislature and law enforcement institutions. Through the enactment of these measures, lawmaking may become more effective at addressing the conflict endemic in Haiti.

Civil Society

The Haitian polity is desperately weak and its state institutions weaker. Civil society in Haiti can play an important role in fostering national dialogue and decreasing the tension in Haitian society. However, civil society in Haiti has had varying degrees of success and its position remains precarious. It has gone through several cycles: repressed under the Duvaliers, galvanized and vibrant following Jean-Claude Duvalier's fall, co-opted under Aristide. Hopes were high for a more open political system when Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected in 1990, but civil society was again repressed under the military dictatorship that took hold of Haiti when Aristide was deposed. Civil society leaders played an important role in bringing Aristide back to power, only to be put at risk by Aristide's anti-democratic policies. Civil society groups played a role in his departure in early 2004 and have since been able to operate freely, though under the intimidation and societal violence that affects all sectors of Haiti. Civil society's role in Haiti is precarious and would benefit most from increased state recognition and a more diverse representation of Haitian society, encompassing the urban poor and citizens living outside Port-au-Prince.

Civil society: A working definition and typology

Civil society organizations are voluntary groups of citizens independent of the state that work to affect public decision-making. CSOs may advocate on behalf of their constituencies by negotiating with the state, by collaborating to organize public services themselves, or by mobilizing the populace to demand changes in public policy. Thus, this paper distinguishes between charitable non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that concentrate on service-provision and CSOs, which seek to advocate with the state, creating a voice for themselves and their members. Violent non-state actors, such as the armed gangs of Haiti, the notorious *chimères*, are excluded from the definition; these groups do not seek to negotiate with the state, but instead hope to intimidate state and civil society actors.

In Haiti, the most visible CSOs are those representing private sector groups, particularly in Port-au-Prince. These groups benefit from the economic and political power of their members, who often come from the Haitian elite. Church groups and peasant organizations are common, too, especially outside the capital. They tend to focus on local-level governance issues. CSOs that draw attention to human rights abuses by the state are present, but are subjected to even more intimidation than other CSOs. There is a dearth of CSOs representing the middle classes within Haiti; these are more common in the diaspora communities abroad. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, few CSOs that specifically represent poor Haitians have a national platform. More recently, CSO coalitions made up of representatives from various sectors have joined together to engage in the (re)building of the Haitian state.

A major weakness of civil society community in Haiti is its lack of non-partisan CSOs that focus on preparing Haitians for more effective democratic citizenship. These organizations potentially could play an important role in Haiti's process of democratization by providing basic civic education, conflict resolution trainings, or working toward freedom of information

legislation, for example. Instead, CSOs in Haiti tend to focus narrowly on representing their limited membership lists.

Haitian civil society under the *ancien régime*

François (“Papa Doc”) Duvalier and Jean-Claude (“Baby Doc”) Duvalier led Haiti for a combined four decades. Power was highly centralized under the Duvaliers as all state institutions fell under their control. Dissidence was not tolerated and civic groups were prevented from building alternative foundations of support among the Haitian people. Repression and predatory practices by the state kept the populace atomized and fearful. Social cohesion and the public trust needed to build effective civil society organizations were weak.

Following the fall of Jean-Claude Duvalier, a dynamic civil society began to grow for the first time. A diverse range of civic, popular and professional organizations were galvanized by the newly open political system.

Civil society in the Aristide years

On December 16, 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected by two-thirds of Haitian citizens in an election judged to be relatively free and fair, perhaps the first since Haiti’s inception as a republic. Aristide rode a wave of popularity among average – that is to say, poor – Haitians. Civil society groups allied with Aristide and his Lavalas movement operated freely.

Aristide was deposed just nine months after taking office and the military government, led by General Raul Cédras, proceeded to consolidate its control by ruthlessly suppressing the civil society that had blossomed since the end of the Duvalier regime. The military attempted to prevent citizens from developing an organized foundation for opposition.

Into this context Aristide returned, backed by a wave of popular support from Haitian citizens. A broad civic movement had made its power felt. Nevertheless, it was the United States that ensured Aristide’s return; he did not return as a direct result of Haitian citizens’ pressure.

With no intention of allowing the recent past to repeat itself, Aristide proceeded to repeat the more distant past, by consolidating and personalizing politics. His regime systematically broke down any budding democratic institutions, relying instead on overtures only to supporters. Because Aristide appealed most to poor Haitians, the elites that dominated the existing CSOs began to move away from him, taking their organizations with them.

Aristide’s anti-democratic politics began to worry even those people who had supported him. Amid the increasing repression and intimidation of Aristide’s regime, popular, autonomous civil society was developing, spurred by the anti-democratic direction of the state. These organizations included unions, peasant organizations, human rights groups, and trade and professional associations. They were supported by the other developments, including the Catholic and Protestant churches and the Chamber of Commerce taking a more active role in supporting a more democratic political culture.

One of the most important, pioneering organization founded was the Group of 184 (G-184), a coalition of CSOs representing fourteen sectors, including business, civil, church and

peasant organizations. The group's goals were to fight the developing dictatorship under Aristide. Though they hoped to foster dialogue between different sectors of Haitian society, G-184 was dominated by business groups, those most affected by Aristide's populist politics. G-184 had a dearth of representatives from the middle class, many of whom had left Haiti in the 1980s and 1990s under Duvalier and Aristide.

CSOs that emerged in response to Aristide's growing power were subject to serious intimidation by Aristide supporters. Opposition CSOs dealt with infiltrators and violence, including shootings. This only served to galvanize those CSOs and to attract more popular support.

Some opposition CSOs were accused of ties to the armed groups pressuring Aristide to leave, accusations that were denied. It is difficult to rule out allegations of ties between some civil society factions and the many armed groups operating in Haiti. There is a history of ties between the business community and criminal gangs, who are paid to protect the elite.

By late 2003, some members of civil society, including G-184, joined with opposition political parties and representatives of the private sector to call for Aristide's resignation. These calls played a major role in mobilizing Haitians worried about the state of democracy under Aristide. As support for him collapsed, Aristide officially resigned his office and left Haiti in February 2004.

Civil society after Aristide

The Council of Elders (also called the Council of Eminent Persons, *Conseil de Sages*) was established to oversee the creation of an interim government headed by Prime Minister Gérard Latortue. A representative of the civil opposition took part, as did representatives of Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas party and the international community. With Aristide gone, CSOs again began to hope for a more open political system that would allow their voices to be heard.

Though satisfied – even delighted – with the departure of Aristide, some elements of civil society have criticized the interim government. Most notably, the Group of 184, the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (CLED), and the Chamber of Commerce have criticized decisions by Latortue's government and have even called for his resignation. In response, Latortue bluntly criticized the CSOs, increasing the tensions surrounding the transition government. Latortue has conceded to some demands, recognizing his need to court CSO support.

Civil society in Haiti, like politics in general, traditionally has been overly politicized and partisan. Seeking to overcome this and to incorporate more sectors of the Haitian populace, the interim government of Latortue was given a mandate to formalize a non-partisan national discussion about the direction of Haiti. The idea had begun after the fall of Duvalier and was promoted initially by the Catholic, Protestant and Voodoo churches. Participants hoped to address the "heavy weight" of political, social and economic divisions and political intolerance in Haiti. This process culminated in early 2005 with the establishment of the National Dialogue, made up of representatives of more traditional CSOs (including peasant and business groups),

political parties and the three main religious groups in the country. The Dialogue incorporates representatives from all ten of Haiti's regions, hoping to overcome the historic focus on the capital.

In contrast to the growing voice of groups like G-184 and the National Dialogue, CSOs specifically representing poor Haitians have failed to establish a national platform. Most groups, such as peasant organizations in rural Haiti, have limited memberships and geographic reach. Traditional civil society has been weak in urban enclaves like the notoriously violent and poor Cité Soleil in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Just as politics are dominated by the Haitian elite, civil society too is in danger of becoming a voice only for the elite. .

Challenges for Haitian civil society and prospects for the future

Civil society in Haiti has secured a role for itself in Haitian society, but has failed to secure a strong position in Haitian political culture. The first steps toward change have occurred under Latortue's interim government. Perhaps because Latortue lacks the power of past Haitian leaders, he has had to accept and incorporate civil society into Haitian politics, albeit grudgingly. Even given their growing strength in the last few years, the role of CSOs is precarious and they may again be bypassed or repressed under the next government. Until recently, CSOs have not been sufficiently organized or powerful to advocate for themselves as a distinct sector of Haitian life. If CSOs are able to do this, they may secure a place for themselves long-term as Haitian society rebuilds itself.

Civil society exists to lobby state institutions on behalf of its members, however in an all-but-failed state like Haiti, there are few public institutions with which to negotiate. In short, there has been almost no one making policy in Haiti. This is especially true since the departure of President Aristide in February 2004. The caretaker government of Latortue was a lame duck, without the political power to implement major new laws. The most civil society organizations could hope for is to be left alone to build their capacities in preparation for a new, longer-term government. Furthermore, there is little that CSOs can ask for from the bankrupt state; the Haitian state has had little to provide.

As Haitian civil society continues to grow, it has important and perhaps unique roles it can play in Haitian society. Its members can lend their expertise as the state rebuilds itself, providing knowledge about institution-building, privatization, justice reform, and corruption, for example. Given the trenchant cleavages and over-politicization of Haitian society, non-partisan (or multi-partisan) CSOs should play an important role in fostering dialogue and coming to a national consensus the country's priorities. Haitian civil society can play an important role as a watchdog, overseeing the Haitian National Police and other state institutions charged with human rights abuses.

Arguably most important, non-partisan CSOs must be fostered and must be *perceived* as non-partisan by the Haitian people. CSOs could do so by focusing on providing civic education, conflict resolution, and other trainings to help Haitians to understand their responsibilities as democratic citizens.

The Haitian state has much it could do to improve the status of civil society in Haiti. CSOs in Haiti continue to face intimidation and violence. The Haitian state should prove its democratic credentials by guaranteeing CSOs and their members' safety and voice.

Challenges to civil society come from outside Haiti, too. Outside intervention in Haitian politics arguably has disempowered Haitians and kept Haitian civil society from building its own capacity. International actors in Haiti, including the United Nations, have not engaged Haitian civil society. They have not incorporated civil society into policy-making, nor have they used civil society's unique understanding of local conditions to design and implement appropriate policies. This ensures a lack of widespread public support for international initiatives. On the other hand, if and when international actors were willing to incorporate civil society into their policy-making, there was little framework within which to organize cooperation. This may change a bit with the National Dialogue as a model of state-CSO collaboration.

Conclusion

A genuine campaign of inclusiveness through democratic processes is critical if Haiti is to break out of a vicious cycle. The reconciliation process must also go beyond bringing together political foes to encompass other social, economic and regional groups, which are arguably best represented by civil society organizations. The government should create space in its institutions for the expression of these diverse interests. Beyond strengthening individual CSOs, the role of civil society in Haitian society must be strengthened. Specifically, the new Haitian government must formalize mechanisms giving civil society consultative status. At the same time, it is important that new state institutions act as counterweights to CSOs, which are most valuable as independent entities that can negotiate with and respond to the state without being co-opted by it. Perhaps the only groups in Haiti with the capacity to form effective civil society movements are those people who arguably do not represent average Haitians: the business and political classes. In response, the state should encourage the development and recognition of a range of civil society organizations that represent more sectors of Haitian society, including the urban poor and those living outside the capital. This will allow a political "outlet" for those outside power and will foster ownership by citizens of state policies.

Media

Haitian media has had a troubled past that has shaped the present and sadly seems doomed to shape the future. As one member of the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of Transitional Initiatives (OTI) wistfully said, "The [Haitian] press has not been free since its origin". It is not surprising that the media was heavily controlled by the government during the regimes of the Duvaliers and Aristide; however, the unfortunate reality is that even today, as the Haitian nation attempts to transition to a more transparent democracy, its media is still not free.

According to Freedom House, an independent non-governmental organization that provides annual assessments of the levels of freedom within the media of individual countries, there are several factors behind the categorization of Haiti's media as un-free. Despite increases in freedom of the press since the 2004 departure of President Aristide, the group cites "political instability, political persecution of journalists and the ongoing economic crisis" as main components to the failing of media freedom. Through interviews and additional reports, it is clear that politics and violence are the most dangerous forces for those trying to create free media in Haiti. One journalist, Joseph Guyler Delva, who reports from Port-au-Prince for Reuters and The Haitian Times, highlighted the impact of politics on his profession. Describing a very polarized society, Delva admitted that a journalist's ability to report is compromised when he or she could be a victim of the very factions they are reporting on. While this severely restricted ability to move around and work was even greater during the time of Aristide, according to Delva, politics still rule the media today. There is an attempt to separate the devotion to profession and politics, however, and journalists are forbidden from being part of a political group. This attempt is stymied however, by the reality that members of the media are partisan and will not cover an event if it runs counter to their own political agenda.

The explosion of Haiti's media is nearly half a century old, expanding rapidly between the 1950s and 1990s with radio dominating the market. Throughout the years of the severe Duvalier dictatorship and repressive Aristide presidency, the media was stymied about what it could broadcast and punished accordingly. Following the military coup that ousted President Aristide in 1991, "journalists were assassinated, tortured, jailed, harassed and driven into exile". Under the 1991-1994 de facto military regime, "radio stations were ransacked, and outspoken announcers were kidnapped or killed. Fearing the consequences of political reporting, stations undertook a mode of self-censorship" (Metz). In fact, the military limited freedom of expression so drastically that "even possessing a photograph of President Aristide was a punishable offense" (Gibbons, 1999, p. 40). During that time, accurate and objective reports of the political situation reached the country's airwaves via shortwave Voice of America broadcasts from stations in the neighboring Dominican Republic as well as U.S. aircraft.

Today Haiti has 275 private radio stations, 43 of them are in the capital of Port-au-Prince. The country also has two French-language newspapers and five television channels. The country's illiteracy rate of more than 50 percent fuels radio as its most powerful media genre, and although expensive, the field of television is growing. There are some allegations that television is state-run and biased towards the government; however it appears that change may be imminent. In recent months, Haitian-born rap artist Wyclef Jean purchased Télémax, one of the largest television stations in the country, and has declared his plans for original

Creole-language programming, including children's cartoons, cooking shows and reality television. According to both personal testimonials as well as Freedom House research, the self-censorship of the previous era is still practiced today, especially around the areas of politics and drugs. In fact several journalists cited drugs as one of the most dangerous areas to cover because the money and influence of the drug dealers reaches so far in Haitian society. According to one journalist, "everyone benefits from drug dealing" and those writers who don't want trouble avoid covering the topic entirely. A Freedom House report states that "international observers find that media outlets still tend to practice self-censorship over fear of violent retribution". As supporting accounts of journalists indicate, fear for their personal safety often colors the reality of what today's journalist can write about in Haiti.

Recent events have given journalists reason to fear for their own safety. Haiti's recent history is rife with stories of journalists that have been threatened, kidnapped and killed as a result of their work. As recently as June 2005, prominent radio journalist Nancy Roc was forced to leave the country following threats of kidnapping and death, and in July, journalist Jacques Roche was kidnapped and killed in the Bel Air neighborhood of Port-au-Prince. In January 2005, radio reporter Abdias Jean was beaten and shot allegedly by police after he identified himself as a journalist while he was covering a police raid on Village de Dieu. After that murder, UNESCO Director-General Koichiro Matsuura said he was "very concerned about the situation in Haiti, and persistent reports of violence against the media which have an essential role to play if normalcy and good governance are to be established in the country". According to Marcus Garcia and Elsie Ethéart, directors and editors at the independent radio station Radio Melody and the weekly paper *Haiti en Marche*, "it is very dangerous, but we are playing with caution". These veteran journalists know as well as anyone the dangers of reporting in Haiti, they spent many years in exile in Miami, Florida, and in 2000 their colleague Jean-Dominique was gunned down outside his station.

Haiti's very low level of literacy inhibits the creation of a free press. With estimates of illiteracy at around 50 percent of adults, this problem needs rigorous attention in the field of education and basic services, especially as its implications are resonate throughout the society as a whole. Because few citizens read, radio is the most popular media in Haiti. The variety of shows and messages are a great improvement from the years past that limited both the numbers of stations and the messages that they were allowed to transmit. While the sheer number of stations is itself promising, a closer look reveals some more troubling information. The individual process of self-selection means that many citizens are listening to partisan news—violence-fomenting programs that have little base in fact and more of a foundation in political agendas and criminal mischief. Some stations play voice-overs and messages of embattled, and frequently criminal, leaders. According to one reporter, nearly "every station plays lists of accusations against people, but [on the worst ones] the accused will not be allowed to respond".

In recent months, stations such as these have been issuing death threats against United Nations personnel, including the Special Representative of the Secretary General, Juan Gabriel Valdes. Valdes sees this action as a cultural tactic rather than a personal statement, citing similar treatment for every U.S. Ambassador that was not well-liked and members of the Organization of American States (OAS). Valdes claims that the radio is fuelling sentiments that are not widely shared by others and that those who do not listen to these targeted programs like and appreciate the work of its targets. While freedom of speech should be supported, it is clear that the inflammatory radio reports have little factual basis and hamper the work that Valdes and others are trying to accomplish in Haiti.

These inciting radios are fuelled in part by a Haitian phenomenon that one author has called “Zen”. Zen is “information and rumors passed from one person to the next, [that] continues to play a key role in the reporting and dissemination of news in Haiti”. During the interviews and casual conversations alike, the defining role that the rumor spreading plays in the Haitian society was obvious and it creates an ill-informed and perpetually divided society. With such a prevalent practice, it makes the jobs of the MINUSTAH’s press officers or those of the international media even more difficult. The official channels available are frequently less extensive and pervasive than those who may be sending out incorrect messages that contradict the official missives.

Journalist Clarens Renois, the director of the independent Haitian Press Network who writes regularly for the Agence France-Presse, describes this problem as “the media helping the cacophony of different voices...instead of listening to one or two of the debates. In his view, the role of the media should be that of unity not division. The fact that his country had 35-45 presidential candidates in January 2006 indicated to him that his field had failed its audience. In fact, “instead of appropriately directing the debate, [the press] was the scene of inarticulate ideas that confused the illiterate”. Fuelling this confusion is Renois’ assertion that each candidate was the favorite of one radio channel. Thus, the Haitian population’s quest to become informed contributed to the overall problem of cross messages and confusion. Renois ruefully admits that “ironically, one of the benefits of democracy is that in 1986, Port-au-Prince had 4 radio stations, now it has [more than] 40. But, that is a lot of noise for one head”.

The final problem of the media in Haiti is funding. In a country where per capita GDI is approximately \$390 according to a 2004 World Bank survey, finance is a daily and daunting issue. The grim reality for those in the Haitian media, radio especially, is that they function at almost a volunteer level. Their monthly salary is about 100 U.S. dollars and frequently the required broadcast equipment and electricity are even scarcer. Louie Jean-Pierre, the news director of Radio l’Eko 2000 in the town of Petite Goâve, described a dire situation for his station and many others. Jean-Pierre’s station is lucky enough to have received equipment and training from Creative Associates International, however his station still broadcasts from squalid conditions and is powered by a generator during its hours of operation, as there is no public electricity for the town of 200,000. Even this station is not without its political fears: its previous director Brignol Lindor was killed by a pro-Aristide Lavalas faction in 2001 after inviting opposition supporters to his talk show. Two years after this incident, the station was once again targeted, broken into, and its broadcasting equipment stolen. Despite the difficulties of his daily travails, Jean-Pierre and his staff believe that they have a mission with their work. “We are trying to explain through the radio what should happen to prevent terror again” he says, sounding as wistful as he is resolute.

Current and Future Programs and Prescriptions for Change

When one examines the problem of the un-free media in Haiti, the resolution of the problem seems daunting. In truth, there are short-, medium- and long-term solutions that may build on one another to effectively facilitate change in the future. Some of these programs may overlap; however, progress will be impossible without each one of them. In the short term, Haiti’s journalists need basic services and safety. Indeed, professional safety will come when the rest of the society is secure as well, however, additional measures should be taken to guarantee the personal safety of these individuals if they are expected to work effectively in a free press system. Without basic resources like electricity and office space, Haitian journalists

are not able to do the bare minimum that their jobs require of them. During the medium and long-term periods, plans for training journalists and international partnerships must be utilized to foster a free and strong Haitian media. These measures will be addressed further in the following pages. The long-term goal is of course a free press that operates independent of government or private pressure, that does not spout political messages or rhetoric as fact, that acts responsibly in its factual reporting and that represents many views equally. For this to become a reality for the Haitian people there needs to be a rebuilding of trust, infrastructure and self-reliance within their society. These are the most daunting and difficult goals of all and will require all aspects of national and international society to work for a very long time. The end point is where their political and civil parties trust one another, where there is sufficient infrastructure to allow government and civil channels to operate effectively and a self-reliance and self-sustainability to the economy, the press, the government and the society as a whole. This is the ideal environment that can both foster and sustain a free press. The changes that can be made to bring about this result will also support the development of a free media in Haiti.

The best hope for interim progress in the Haitian media is journalist's training programs that marry both national and international actors. After interviews and meetings with several members of the media community in Haiti, it was clear that the most effective and honest journalists were those who had benefited from international training in their craft. Although there is no formal or institutional relationship between international and local journalists today, there has been a historic interplay, albeit a piecemeal one. In the 1980s, the Haitian journalist corps was offered training by the United States and France with embassy and school programs. In 1988, Clarens Renois and 10 other Haitian journalists were sent to the University of Maine to be trained as professional journalists. While he may be the exception to the rule, Renois seems to have benefited greatly from that training and is better able to offer a worldly perspective on his country and its situation which others without the benefit of external training lack.

While international journalists can offer training and resources that are nearly unimaginable to their Haitian counterparts, it is essential that they be seen as trainers and mentors, not spokesmen for Haiti in the world. Haiti needs to be able to stand on its own. Currently, international journalists are seen as just seeking the basic information and then leaving quickly. Haitian journalists however, can offer both an insider's perspective and an insider's sources; they can travel to places within the country where others are unable to go, although there are plenty of areas, including Cité Soleil, that no writer of any nationality will penetrate. As far as local citizens are concerned, they appreciate the coverage that international writers offer their country; however, there are concerns about personal bias and the time that the writers spend in Haiti. "A person's first impression can be biased", says Haitian journalist Clarens Renois, "People arrive with preconceived notions about poverty and it is hard not to be biased".

According to a U.S. diplomat in Haiti, "the civil society groups here are amazing". These groups have proven to be so effective, powerful and demonstrative with their voice, that for a time, all of the U.S. programming was done exclusively through these actors. While change needs to occur on all levels, non-governmental and governmental alike, this historical precedent of utilizing a less-official track demonstrates a possible channel for the future. By working with civil society groups on the ground, as well as international non-governmental organizations, there is a greater potential for change in the field of Haitian media. Some programs have already been started, including a short-term journalist-training program by USAID's Office of Transitional Initiatives and one by the International Republican Institute

(IRI) that is framed under the auspices of party coalition building. According to IRI's Senior Vice President Georges Fauriol, this program works to train journalists to ask on-target questions of their subjects, to be clear on what they are seeking and to sensitize journalists to the media process overall. Admittedly, this program and additional training actions of IRI are not without their critics; however, the framework provides a good model from which to launch future endeavors of educating and training local journalists. This strategy of shifting the emphasis and assistance to the private sector has its advocates in the field of media too, as Renois says, "in a country where state capacity has been so dramatically reduced, the private sector, including that of the media, will be very important".

There are also local efforts to confront the problems facing radio, television and printed journalism. There are reportedly home-grown efforts underway to train journalists to be objective, and given the current nature of the national reporting scene in Haiti, one can hope those trainings take advantage of assistance from international partners. Additionally, radio journalist Delva highlights the progress that several stations have made with perpetuating a more objective approach. Shows like "Hear it the way it is" and "Look at it the way it is" shirk the political tone for a more objective and less politically charged view of a particular situation. In fact, Delva is keen to add that today, if the audience hears a story or a news brief on only one station, they are quick to suspect that perhaps there is a political or personal motive behind its publication.

Some see the above movements as progress, while others are less optimistic. Clarens Renois, a man who is acutely aware of his country's problems and who documents them succinctly for his readers, stated "I fear for the future because I can't see how we can build on this". However, by the end of his interview Renois was more optimistic when he answered the question "Would a free and independent media help political transition in Haiti?" with "Yes, the media in the society can play a very important role in transitioning, but one must train the media and depoliticize the media as well. It is [really] a question of changing the mentality and intolerance between people... You have to have a Haitian will to change everything and share with everyone else".

Corruption

Background

Haiti is deeply divided by social and political schisms that have made it unrecognizable as a nation-state. Instead, it is a failed state defined by opposites: rich and poor, pro-Lavalas and the Opposition, hope and despair. These schisms have not only allowed but also fomented an illegitimate system of corruption and anarchy so deeply rooted in daily life and reality that it has changed expectations and norms of Haitian society. Utilizing a context-specific approach, this paper follows the causal relationship that leads to the corruption and perpetuates it, and suggests context specific policies that may help deracinate corruption in the daily lives of Haitians.

Introduction: the Model

It is tempting to ascribe corruption in Haiti as a cultural phenomenon—something inherent in the people influencing their behavior and mindset. Such an explanation, however, is superficial and unsatisfactory. The corruption in Haiti is not a cultural phenomenon but a rational response to an environment typified by social injustice and impunity. At the core, the state lacks basic mechanisms to provide for equal access to opportunity, rights, and equal protection under a rule of law. The consequence of this state deficiency is the lack of incentive of the population to follow either de jure or de facto rules. The only reward for transparent and cooperative behavior is to subject oneself to the probability and possibility of exploitation by others. It is therefore not surprising that Haitians, rich and poor, openly flout existing laws and regulations.

Defection to corrupt behavior is a rational choice made in response to the lack of social justice and impunity. It is not the necessary effect of impaired moralities. Social injustice and impunity are variables that create the context in which the Haitian populace operates. Individuals forgo collective action, or cooperation, for action based on self-interest, or defection, in response to these variables. Conceptualized as a prisoner's dilemma game, an individual's decision to cooperate, or collective action, is threatened with likelihood for the other party to defect out of self-interest.

	Cooperate	Defect
Cooperate	3, 3	1, 4
Defect	4, 1	2, 2


When faced with uncertainty and lack of trust, individuals choose to defect, expecting other individuals to defect. This leaves the payoffs to be less than optimal at 2,2. If social trust were stronger, the optimal payoff of 3,3 could be achieved.

As a rational choice, the expectation by individuals to defect becomes ingrained as a norm, which further perpetuates more defection and corruption. The relationship is akin to a feedback loop: corrupt behavior provokes impunity and social injustice, which produces more corruption and conflict and so on. See Figure 1.

Corrupt behavior, impunity, social justice and conflict do not remedy each other but foster, reinforce and sanction each other. In order to inhibit this self-defeating cycle, the dysfunctional context in which Haitians live must be recreated with access to social justice and the enforcement of the rule of law. These goals may be achieved through several means,

explained below, the choice of which should be dictated by the ripeness of opportunity, and the flexibility of actors.

Figure 1



Contextual Variable: Social injustice and impunity

A fundamental sense of fairness and social justice is absent in Haiti. Social justice is a condition of society predicated on fairness, whereby all members have the same rights, opportunities, security, obligations and social benefits. In Haiti, these benefits are exclusively reserved for those who can afford them. Most of the population struggles to survive on a daily basis, while a select few enjoy luxury and excess. Such disparity undermines basic social cohesion.

Social life is an amalgamation of small individual exchanges of goods or non-material items such as ideas and trust. These exchanges are governed by a sense of fairness and justice. For example, in the context of an exchange of goods or services for tender, if the price is too high, the buyer will feel unfairly exploited and will not pay. In negotiations, this same sense of fairness is at work. Consider an accord where A gets two acres of land and B gets 10 equally sized acres. Both A and B are better off because of the transaction. However, A may not agree to the terms because A feels that the agreement's outcome is unfair. This idea has intuitive appeal; an absence of social justice and a lack of opportunity fuels feelings of oppression, victimization and resentment towards those benefiting from such deficiencies. When one feels that one is on the end of an unjust transaction, a choice of defection rather than cooperation becomes the rational choice. Often, then, defection is a reflection of self-interest that results from the lack of incentives and trust to cooperate. Consequently, narrowly defined self-interest becomes the norm for average Haitians.

Self-interest as a norm emerged as a common element during the interviews. The wealthy have access to opportunity, benefits, and security, yet fail to accept concomitant obligations such as the paying of taxes. This leads to the inability of the state to provide basic goods for the people, which in turn affect the rational choices of the society's majority. For example, according to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Haiti, gangs receive support from communities because they fulfill the basic functions of state that Haiti does not or cannot provide. In Cité Soleil, a shantytown stronghold of pro-Lavalas

supporters, the gangs are known to distribute the proceeds from kidnappings and illegal drug trade to the community, which makes neutralizing the gang's grip on the shantytown that much more difficult. Having a stronghold, in turn, sustains kidnappings and drug trafficking. Such activities are now identified as viable means of subsistence.

The election that took place on 7 February 2006 and its aftermath illustrated a number of themes: society's reaction to social injustice, mistrust of the process, and the belief that politics is a game of self-interest rather than a collective action for the benefit of the nation. The process of elections was widely supported as the 63% voter turnout evidences. However, when the election results were almost but not clearly in favor of Préval, accusations of foul play surfaced from both sides. The protestations of "no Préval, no Haiti," voiced mostly by impoverished Haitians, was a signal of resentment and mistrust of any process. The Provisory Electoral Council's (CEP) division of blank votes in a manner that favored Préval, appeared to be a capitulation to the threat of the protestors. The confusing and ambiguous manner in which the president was named reinforces the expectation of corruption, on the highest level. Because one's perception is one's truth, such a beginning does not bode well for the new administration.

An acclimation to continued corruption informs, reinforces, and perpetuates individual and societal expectations that the political process is discreditable and unjust. Corruption's effect on individual expectations of the process is illustrated by a Haitian friend from Port-au-Prince who wrote upon hearing the news of Préval's win of the presidential elections, "It seems that the [Provisional Electoral Commission] CEP has buckled under the pressure of the threat of violent protest and has declared Préval president in the first round. In any case, it's all the same to me who the president is, since the presidency is always a personal rather than national affair." For this friend, an acclimation to corruption formed her outlook of the political process. This sentiment was echoed by Mario Andrésol, the Chief of the National Police, when he stated, "...[Haitians] are accustomed to living in corruption where everything is weak." For Haitian society, adaptation to corruption has fostered expectations that the elections would be vulnerable and ineffective, leaving them at the same time hopeful for a change, yet cynical that such hope will change anything. This further weakens any incentive to cooperate in any organized system.

Impunity

Impunity in Haiti, embodied in its illegitimate and justice-for-sale judicial system, is the second variable that contextualizes Haitian life. The institutionalization of impunity lowers the cost of defection and thus makes corruption more beneficial than cooperation. Sustained by the powerful and the few who can afford it, the judicial system in Haiti excludes most of the Haitian population. As a result,

...most Haitians viewed lawyers and judges—and virtually anyone connected with the justice system—with well-deserved scorn and contempt. People would avoid contact with the system unless it was the last resort. It was expensive, corrupt, and largely mysterious, as all the laws and most of the proceedings were conducted in French, a language most Haitians can barely understand and only a wealthy elite can speak or read. Haitians tried to resolve disputes on their own, sometimes in inventive and acceptable ways...and sometimes in deplorable ways best described as "vigilante justice." (Stotsky, p.96)

As Stotsky states above, the response to impunity and systemic corruption has been recourse to vigilantism and other self-help forms of justice. This is not a surprising phenomenon when the judicial system is viewed by the average Haitian as a dubious or predatory entity that consumes limited resources and family members without justification. The owner of Petite Goâve's radio station similarly explained the logic underlying self-help justice: "when there is trouble in our town, you can't go to the police or the judges. With 18 policemen in a town of 125,000 people, the people take justice in their own hands...they settle their own account." Systemic impunity, corruption and the lack of social justice promote recourse to self-help forms of justice, further exacerbating conflict and subsidizing defection to corruption.

In this system of injustice and impunity, hopeful reforms such as Andrésol's plan to clean out the Haitian National police are stymied. In effect, Andrésol can only arrest and detain individual up until their trial. He explained that the lack of judicial enforcement resulted often in a next day release of rich individuals who may have committed murder, while many poor Haitians who committed lesser crimes and misdemeanors languish in jail without fair trial. Such isolated exercises of reform and cooperation are easily polluted and overwhelmed in such a system.

Recommendations

It is clear that a fundamental paradigm shift is in order when the Chief of the National Police calls for a revolution. Andrésol stated, "Leaders must expose the corruption to the people, and make them make a choice...we need a revolution, to change their mentalities." With the institutionalization of impunity and injustice in Haiti, nothing less of a revolution to change mentalities is acceptable. It is certain that such a revolution mandates the building of institutions and capacity. However, without imbuing the institutions with an ethos of social justice and the rule of law by the people themselves, they will become empty shells that fail absent external support. This demands nothing less than a full recognition of the fundamental need to establish a new frame of reference for Haitians. This is a feat that requires new expectations, a new reality, and a new trustworthy paradigm in which Haitians can have faith.

Préval

The new administration, Parliament, local leaders and most significantly, President Préval, have an opportunity to take advantage of the momentum from the elections and relatively high political capital the people of Haiti have put in the electoral process. The problem of corruption must be brought up as one of the key causes of Haiti's ills. Andrésol publicly, through declarations, has shamed many colleagues, judges, gangs, political leaders, and the business elite, who have participated in corrupt practices. Préval is in the best position immediately following his election to similarly bring the problem of corruption onto the national consciousness. As a longer-term goal, Préval must begin to address the corruption that is rife within the ruling elite, and show that he is willing to reform the system by showing that no one, not even within his own administration, is above the law. Equally fundamental, is his need to address the societal context variable of social injustice that is fertilizer to corruption. Enforcing taxation of the few extremely rich elite for a more equal distribution of wealth should be one of his first priorities.

Incentives and Deterrents

Anti-corruption strategies have included employing incentives and deterrents. The use of incentives is viewed as a successful strategy where corruption is a result of need. For example, many have cited the fact that HNP officers consistently accept bribes or drug trafficking money to supplement their subsistence because they lack sufficient arms, uniforms, housing or food. In such a situation, raising their wages, ensuring job security, providing the basic needs may create a greater incentive, or an alternative to cooperate within the system rather than to defect. This strategy also uses deterrents, specifically stronger punishments to compliment incentives. Punishments, especially for corruption stemming from greed and impunity, are seen as a corrective method that successfully elicits the desired behavior of avoiding corrupt actions. Notwithstanding the necessity of incentives and punishments, however, this strategy is insufficient because it assumes that there is a functioning body that can administer punishments and incentives in a credible and reliable manner. The existence of such a functioning body is unlikely given the government and judicial system themselves are entrenched with corruption to the point of institutionalization.

Although creating the hardware of laws and regulations for the system may be ineffectual, they are a start. However, it must be understood that such hardware does not function in the reality of Haitian life without the software of changing norms and behaviors. Currently USAID, and Transparency International have programs supporting the introduction of legislation with the aim to close opportunities for corruption, and to provide safety for whistleblowers. Though the practice of such laws may far from functional, it is a necessary measure to establish rules to work towards in the future. For now, a more medium-term oriented strategy must be implemented; a bolder and more results-led strategy should be taken, which deeply involves the commitment and resources of the international community.

International Organizations

The UN Security Council (UNSC) should apply some of the lessons learned in Kosovo to Haiti. In Kosovo, the mandate given to the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was very unique. It afforded UNMIK unprecedented executive powers and flexibility in exercising its mandate. As a result, UNMIK was able to coordinate economic, political, social and security reform in a reinforcing manner. Though the extraordinary amount of sovereignty, flexibility, resources, and attention cannot be expected for Haiti, the UNSC nonetheless needs to at least equip its mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) with an effective mandate. Such a mandate would allow MINUSTAH a pivotal role in the judicial system.

The UNSC should expand MINUSTAH's mandate to allow them to detain those individuals identified as most threatening to Haiti's process of reform and rebuilding. In the current mandate, MINUSTAH has the ability to arrest people, yet is unable to detain them but is instead required to transfer the suspect to the Haitian judicial system. Returned to the justice-for-sale system, the suspect is essentially released back into society. Efforts such as these waste energy, time, but more significantly, greatly reduces MINUSTAH's credibility. Such flexibility in the MINUSTAH mandate could then help the efforts already started by Andrésol; MINUSTAH's expanded mandate to detain could help sustain the reform of the HNP. Home-grown efforts such as Andrésol's should not be discouraged but rather supported, legitimized, and rewarded. Further, the UNSC and the Haitian government should allow MINUSTAH to help incorporate international judges, prosecutors and lawyers to work in conjunction with vetted Haitian nationals to begin building a legitimate, accountable, and

transparent judicial system. MINUSTAH's primary role should be to act as a monitor and a consultative body for the burgeoning judicial system. By working within the Haitian judicial system, international judges and lawyers can train the next generation of Haitian judicial actors, while also working as a mechanism for change through example, to shame defection, and to demarcate the past of impunity from the future of the rule of law. The bottom line is that showing concrete results is more effective than asking people to believe blindly in something they have never seen or experienced.

In order to successfully sustain such an undertaking, the inclusion of the nationals is pivotal. Habituation to the rule of law and justice can only occur through Haitians' direct participation. Haitian nationals can trail international actors in the judicial system as part of their practical training. Vetted Haitian judges, lawyers, and court personnel must be part and parcel of such a strategy. Links outside of the community must be brought in to experience the judicial system, rather than continue to view it as an alien force to be avoided. Essentially, the participation of the Haitians in the process is vital to reform expectations and the culture of impunity and injustice. Otherwise, such an undertaking will be viewed as the international community's responsibility and out of the hands of the Haitians.

International Community (NGOs) and the Haitian Community

Building the software of norms and a culture that is disposed to collective action, cooperation and justice is the most difficult part of anti-corruption endeavors. Though the international community can take the lead in building the hardware of institutions, the software can only be home-grown. Haiti should capitalize on constructive resources already functioning; efforts such as community mediation, religious institutions, civil society groups, business associations, or local leaders should be supported and used to create a demand for justice and the rule of law. One example of using existing resources is tapping into the Diaspora, a wealth of human and financial capital. Mostly living in the United States, the Haitian Diaspora is an engaged community that desires and seeks change and progress in Haiti. Another community is the private sector. The current administration needs to emphasize the growth of an independent and strong private sector, so that the government does not fall into the same trap as many failed states have as being the sole source of resources, and therefore prone to predatory behaviors.

This area of community and civil society building is more of an art form that does not have a formula, and only rough guidelines. The guidelines, to be strictly followed, should be above all flexible, creative and conscious of what already exists on the ground. NGOs have an integral and essential role on this level. Through multi-dimensional programs using incentives of economic growth and stimulation, NGOs can use the creation of collective-minded associations to habituate the community to more transparent, accountable, and accessible norms. By providing basic services such as water, sanitation, health, and humanitarian assistance, concrete improvements can lead the way to confidence, cooperation and collective action. It is creating a frame of reference on how things can work through cooperation rather than defection.

Conclusion

Creating a new frame of reference, new expectations and norms really does demand nothing less than a revolution. With the end goal being social justice and a rule of law, the ways in which to reach such goals should be flexible. Strategy coordinators and planners of the

Haitian government and the international community must take creative and innovative roads towards this low-intensity, long-term revolution. Meanwhile, coordination and timing underlies the entire process; different actors must coordinate with each other to avoid overlapping efforts, and to apply only Haiti-context specific approaches. Without such, mistakes of the past which were insensitive to Haitian culture and lacked coordination, resulted in inefficiency, lack of durability, and ultimate failure. However, with the possibility of mistakes and setbacks in mind in the future efforts, the Haitian government, the people, and the international community must be prepared to change the strategy when one approach causes more harm than help. The revolution must go on.

Systeme D

Over two hundred years ago, in January 1804, Haiti became the first black republic to gain independence from French colonialist rule. The milestone of emancipation from slavery initiated Haiti's state- and nation-building process, yet today Haiti presents the characteristics of a failed state and a nation in crisis.

Insecurity is overwhelming in Haiti's slums, such as Port-au-Prince's infamous no man's land, Cité Soleil. This insecurity provides a very real sense of unease throughout the country, as evidenced by more than 200 reported kidnappings in December 2005 alone. The destitution is overwhelming, with 76% of the population living in poverty (under 2 USD a day) and 56% in extreme poverty (less than one USD a day – IADB 2005). Access to education is very limited: only about 10% of the Haitian schools are public and about half of the population is illiterate. Unemployment is staggering, with more than half of the population not formally employed. And basic needs such as water are not met, with only 20% of the dwellings in the country having drinkable water.

Haiti thus lacks security, good governance, and a healthy production economy. Yet somehow, Haitians find the resourcefulness every day to cope with their precarious living conditions. Several factors relate to the Haitian society's lack of accountability. First, in the absence of a formal economy there is a vibrant informal sector throughout the country. Second, national and international Civil Society organizations offer a minimal amount of development assistance, such as fresh water, sanitation and irrigation projects, and other basic services that the state should, but cannot provide. Third, Haitians rely heavily upon the remittances that the Haitian Diaspora sends. And finally, there is a basic degree of self-organization within Haitian communities, yet this social 'social capital' is not ideal or even sustainable without extensive external assistance. The ability of Haitians to survive in the absence of a formal economy calls for personal investment and resourcefulness. This way of finding solutions to problems on one's own is generally referred to in the following pages as the *Système D*, a French term that refers to the way people apply their own creativity and personal skills to solve a problem by themselves. D stands for *débrouille*, from the French verb *se débrouiller*, meaning to disentangle, to manage, to cope.

This essay was compiled after field research and interviews with Haitian citizens, past and present government officials, presidential candidates, and NGO workers in the country. The report is divided into two parts. The first gives a condensed idea about the nature and source of the endemic conflict in Haiti, and the second addresses how Haitians manage to cope with the conflict.

Nature and Source of the Endemic Conflict in Haiti

Haiti has experienced a conflict with itself for decades: it is not a traditional conflict with two opposing ethnicities or rival groups, but rather a complex conflict across economic, political and class boundaries. There is extraordinary tension between the elite and the non-elite, the haves and the have-nots, the partisans of a political party and those of another. Upon welcoming the research trip in Haiti, Colonel Antoine Atouriste, Executive Secretary for the National Council for Disarmament (CND), urged us to try and "understand better the problem, know more about the trauma" that Haiti, the "patient," is going through. Haiti's conflict is

indeed endemic, comparable to a disease for which a remedy remains to be found. But why? Many factors are addressed in the other essays of this report, but several dimensions causing this latent conflict should be underlined.

Polarization

The leitmotiv emerging from personal interviews, assessments and reports of Haiti's discord was *polarization*. Because of the imminent National Elections at the time of this research trip, this polarization was even more accentuated within the political arena. The fact that 35 candidates were actively campaigning for the presidency revealed the current level of division in the country. A closer look at campaign platforms showed that the parties did not diverge drastically, thus the number of candidates only partly reflects this polarization. Key themes such as improved security and stability, increased employment, and increased education were present in every single campaign – and in a country in desperate need of improvements of basic living conditions, it made sense for presidential candidates to offer similar programs. The National Dialogue was created in April 2005 to create a space of discussion and bring the society together, yet although laudable, the project did not prove to disentangle the polarized situation, as expressed by a Haitian member of the civil society: “I don't see dialogue happening.”

The Haitian Elitism, the Cult of Personality

Equally important and directly related to polarization is the problem of bad leadership and lack of accountability. Haitian history has proven that strong leading figures can be as much a part of the problem as part of the solution. The 35 presidential candidates could have joined forces or formed coalitions based on shared goals in the country's interest, but what still seems to prevail in Haiti is a ‘winner takes all’ mentality, leaving little if any room for dialogue and cooperation and, therefore, further feeding social division and national insecurity. Politics are a personal affair in Haiti and there is a common cynicism towards any supposedly altruistic goals of political leaders. In the eyes of many the “candidates look for immunity first” (RNDDH) and think of themselves as “messiahs,” while “the masses are waiting for salvation” (Manigat) and coping with harsh living conditions. Hence another recurrent theme constantly cited during interviews is the dearth of good leadership and adequate management in Haiti.

The Two Republics

Another factor contributing to this polarization is the country's geography. Many refer to Haiti as a country divided between the “Republic of Port-au-Prince” and the rest of the Haitian Republic, which adds extra governance challenges. The capital is the center of economic and political life and has benefited from industrialization while the rest of the country still heavily relies on agriculture. The poor infrastructure is indeed worst in the countryside beyond Port-au-Prince, where a lack of rudimentary irrigation systems and general public services has reinforced a feudal existence. There are exceptions, where random assistance projects or wealthy relatives have funded community improvements – what former President Leslie Manigat refers to as “enclaves of modernization.” But there are no uniform progresses or sustained, countrywide, infrastructure improvement plans corresponding to a common sense of public good.

Insecurity, Weak Justice, Impunity

The security situation reflects Haiti's weak state institutions, including the justice system, which is characterized by its inability to fully prosecute criminals: "impunity is the main problem and should be addressed as a priority," an IOM representative told us. A representative from the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) agreed: "the source of the conflict is impunity; the judicial system functions only for people who have money and power." Without a solid justice system, including a strong police force and improved conditions in overly crowded prisons, Haiti cannot even hope to maintain good order in its cities and towns. Further, without this judicial foundation, the absolute influence of corrupt leaders is unlikely to be replaced by the rule of law.

Education and Demographics

Education is another issue systematically raised during interviews as a direct cause of inequalities within the country, therefore fuelling the conflict. This was one point of consensus among all the interviewees who advocate the improvement of access to education as a key to fostering development and equality. Some even placed it at the nucleus of the conflict. Haiti "needs more educated people to build strong institutions," argued Hans Tippenhauer of *Fondation L'Espoir*, yet "a lot of kids don't go to school before they are nine because they have to walk so far." According to Haitian President René Préval, "ninety percent of the schools are private [with tuitions up to about \$1000 per year] and money is not the only problem, finding teachers is." There is no doubt that without efforts to guarantee access to education, Haiti cannot achieve development, especially given the rapid population growth.

When everything needs to be done

All the above mentioned issues are the part of the nature and main sources of the conflict in Haiti. The biggest problem is that everything needs to be done since every single issue – health, education, security, justice, and demographics – has to be seriously addressed so that there actually is no clear-cut priority: "when everything is a priority, nothing really is." Under these circumstances, how do Haitians get by everyday?

The "Système D", Communities and Civil Society

In French, *Système D* refers to the way people resort to their own creativity and personal skills to solve a problem by themselves. D stands for *débrouille*, from the verb *se débrouiller*, meaning to disentangle, to manage, to cope. With 65% of the population below the poverty line, often living in inhumane, underdeveloped conditions and with little government support, what do Haitians do on a day to day basis to get by? Does this informal system of organization work? Do communities work together towards a form of 'common good'? Are civil society organizations – national and international – necessary?

The Informal Sector

Haitians are hardworking people: the bustling street scenes certainly seem to confirm this statement. It is striking to witness the continuous stream of activities, such as on the two-hour stretch of road stretch from Port-au-Prince southwest to Petite Goâve, via the often tense area of Carrefour. Street vendors are everywhere, markets are swarming, and farmers work their fields while others can be seen discarding old pieces of metal to salvage them to be recycled into art or tools, or part of their home. Women and men carry impressively loaded baskets filled with food or merchandise while mountains of people cram into colorful trucks

called *tap taps*, each colorfully inscribed with positive messages or expressions: “thank you god,” “comprehension” or “hope.” In the absence of a strong regulatory environment, Haitians indeed have to find other ways to earn a living, which most of the time translates into the vibrant informal sector.

An estimated 70% of the Haitian economy takes place outside of regulated mechanisms and appears to be a necessary economic detour for Haitians to compensate for what this conflict-burdened nation cannot provide formally. This sector, if formalized, could turn Haitians assets into capital: “the poor in Haiti own billions in assets but they have no asset titles guaranteeing the recognition from institutions to ask for credits”, as noted by CLED. Solutions to this large grey economy put forward by Lionel Delatour are notably to create a “law to capitalize the assets,” and reform the “corrupt justice system,” through a program that notably “should be financed by international financial institutions.”

Philippe Mathieu, Haitian Minister of Agriculture, specifically talks about the “strategies of survival” that “push people to do things because they have to in order to feed themselves, their families.” In Haiti, games of chance are an example of this *système D* that relies on informal networks. Ericq Pierre at the IADB mentioned the way Haitians try to make money out of luck, playing the “borlette,” a popular lottery game born in the 1960s that he says “sell hope” to destitute Haitians. Haitians gather at informal “borlette banks” throughout the country where they listen to lottery results, “most of the time coming from the neighboring countries like the Dominican Republic.” “One Haitian Gourde can bring 50 Gourdes” and Haitians bet on numbers, sometimes inspired by “Tchala,” the top bestselling book in Haiti, which offers an interpretation of dreams and translates “animals, objects or action appearing in them into numbers that Haitian bet on.” It is claimed that the lottery network “represents 10% of the economy” and “earns almost 250,000 U.S. dollars a day.”

Handmade art is ever-present on the edges of Haiti’s streets, where many Haitians sell their paintings to tourists or trade for food, and is another source of revenue. One art gallery owner proudly claimed that “many of the Haitian artists are self-taught” and manage to make a living through their innate talent, and the colorful Haitian paintings are certainly representative of the country’s many beauties.

Civil Society and Community Development

The voice of the civil society in Haiti has been growing in intensity in the past few years in a bid to “work constructively with the government.” On a national level, a civil society initiative group called Group 184 represents the nexus of the civil society, with 184 participating private and non-profit organizations “representing all the segments of the society” and whose “idea is to promote a new social contract.” The creation of the National Dialogue mentioned above has been instrumental in opening up discussion between the civil society and the government, yet so far this mechanism has not proven to be sufficient and needs more time to materialize.

Furthermore, many international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) are instrumental in providing aid and in building capacity at the community level. IOM thus operates community stabilization programs funded by USAID’s Office for Transition Initiatives (OTI). These programs, such as the organization of soccer tournaments in slum areas, provide a framework for Haitians to get jobs that benefit the community and are not linked to illegal or criminal activities such as drug trafficking: “thank

you for giving me the opportunity to work with a clear conscience” said one Haitian. But, most importantly, the “initial objective [of the program] is to bring the government to hot spot areas.” As polarized as Haiti is, it is definitely important to create bridges between Haitians and their institutions in order to create a level of formal exchange between individuals and institutions, a sine qua non step towards creating social cohesion. IOM therefore insists on the participatory process of the programs it operates: “the community needs to be the first actor and take matters in its own hands.” Haitian community leaders run the projects and interact with government representatives such as the members of the Ministry of Sports, which sets the premises for a dialogue between the community and the government. In the absence of a strong state and with a high density of population (299 people per square kilometre), communities often rely on themselves to get through the day, with or without the help of external organizations. In this respect, how do Haitians organize themselves?

Community Development

Extreme situations of poverty and insecurity force communities to compensate for state provided services. For example, in slum areas such as Cité Soleil, in the absence of government-provided security, communities involved in the participatory process mentioned above have to find ways to bypass dangers and deal with gangs personally in order to run their projects. In this spirit, slum community members commonly meet contractors at some relatively safe location, and would then vouch for and protect the contractors. The community would thus organize a system of "escorts" and pick up the contractors in shifts until they reach their destination. The *système D* performed by gangs organizations can actually sometimes be the only alternative to help Haitians go by every day: when they attack a food truck, they share what they get with the community, creating a volatile and chaotic atmosphere whereby the population ends up supporting the gangs not out of respect but out of necessity. Yet in this particular case the *système D* is a dysfunctional form of social capital since it is based on terms of violence and force instead of shared values and norms working toward a common good.

Other forms of community organization exist in order to compensate for the lack of an equal education system that leaves thousands of children on the margin of society. Thus, groups of women convene neighborhood children and teach them in informal schools. In addition, young Haitians volunteer and offer small services to the community such as picking the fruit trees of those unable to do so or sharecropping for landowners. Men and women offer their help to illiterate people by filling forms waiting in line in front of public administration buildings in exchange of a little money. Another example was given by a seasoned Belgian development worker:

In the Plateau Central we had a nice case where we build a small dam in a ravine to irrigate some gardens downstream of the dam. Some farmers saw there was water enough to also irrigate some land upstream. So they put some pipes together, found an old pump and started planting.

These initiatives are positive and relate to the ‘strategies of survival’ relevant to Haiti. Yet although these initiatives are necessary for Haitians to make it through the day, are they a response to an altruistic will to work towards a common good for the progress on a national level or are they a response only to individual goals?

Social Contract or Individualism?

If the community has no choice but to cope with the situation, then it is reasonable to assume a positive relationship between collective action and common good. Yet, as put forth by Jean Guyler Delva: “as a Haitian, I don’t always see the common, collective interest.” According to a development worker who spend almost two years in Haiti working on community stabilization programs, “it is questionable whether there is a notion of common good and collective action under the present Haitian circumstance (...) there is not much of a social contract.” She adds that: “in general, there is a frustrating lack of community initiative and perhaps this is because a lot of the poor in Haiti survive with help of remittances. I have heard that the amount of money coming into the country is more than the national budget.” The remittances – estimated to be \$800 million to \$1 billion per year – undoubtedly play a key role in the survival of Haitians, but at the same time they have a negative impact by serving as a disincentive to work and solve their problems. This money could be better invested and used to provide progress at the national level instead of merely generating a virtual welfare-state in the absence of the government’s provision. According to an international development worker:

However, I've also heard that it [remittance] comes to Haiti in microscopic increments (i.e. \$20 per month per family). In other words, it is enough to survive on, but not a whole lot more. There have been some attempts at organizing the remittances that have been anecdotally successful. We worked with a Diaspora organization in Petite Goâve which managed to pull together some money for bags of cement for a project.

Another interrogated international development workers agree on the disincentive to collective action derived from remittances:

People asked us to build a reservoir on an existing water system; we knew that water would have to be pumped up to the reservoir. The deal we (actually our partner we work with) made with these peoples was that they would have to buy the pump and do the digging. Once everything was in place our partner would build a reservoir. It took a while (about 2 years) before the people got themselves organized but the reservoir has been build and is functioning.

Forms of community organization combining personal *ystème D* schemes to enhance development on a bigger scale may be a good alternative to remittances. Yet according to an international aid worker, examples of communities “organizing themselves to improve their own situation are not overwhelming; somehow they must be very creative but it is not always obvious, even after spending almost three years in Haiti I still don't understand how most of Haitians make it through the day.” Why not, for example, form an association to clean the road from piling up trash? Another international development worker confirmed this lack of *ystème D* at the group or community level: “other than a few isolated examples, I really don't see a whole lot of organizing here except for political parties and demonstrations. And this combined with a poor sense of common good and a strong sense of jealousy means that there is a certain amount of ‘every man for himself’ which is facilitated by the remittances.” The precarious living conditions provide an understandable explanation to this lack of organization at the grassroots level and Haitians cannot be blamed for that. Haitians, when they can, try to make a difference:

CAMEP - the municipal water system for Port-au-Prince - has a world-renown system of sharing responsibility with communities for water distribution. EDH - the electrical utility - has duplicated this same sort of system. This is

something that HTI has plugged into and magnified, in some cases even constructing community resource management offices to house water & electricity committees. This system has been extremely effective in Cité Soleil.

However, as mentioned above, the contribution from national and international organizations and from the Haitian Diaspora through remittances seem to provide a welfare state that contributes to this lack of initiative at the grassroots level. The idea behind the creation of the water committees put in place by NGOs is that the community takes over the management and maintenance of the water system in villages where the government does not have the means to do this. Yet according to the same aid worker, these committees “are largely the work of NGOs, both local and international” and do not really stem from a strong community-based commitment to improve the situation. The notion of participation put forward by organizations focusing on community development often encounter obstacles entrenched in the social capital of a country that is hard to change.

Conclusion

The Haitian endemic conflict is intricate because it is fuelled by the deeply rooted and latent issues of political and social polarization, extreme poverty and inequality, as well as instability and crime. Under those circumstances, Haiti can only become ready for democracy when qualified leaders commit to achieving sustainable recovery and development. Haiti was freed from slavery 200 years ago, but the mismanagement of the country over the past two centuries has not only prevented the country from turning its immense economic potential into sustainable development and growth, but also highlights the fact that Haiti’s independence brought challenges of governance and responsibility that no recent leader has been able to fully meet.

Haiti’s future lies in the hands of Haitians, first and foremost. The Haitian elite and population as a whole should join forces and be the primary actors of their development – after all, the Haitian flag’s motto says that “l’Union Fait la Force,” Union Makes Strength. Thus, collective action towards a common good at the community level as well as nationally is the step towards establishing a sense of responsibility and accountability. This in turn, will set the path towards good governance and economic development. The growing and increasingly vibrant Haitian civil society is intensifying efforts to claim good governance and equality, which demonstrates positive signs. Likewise, the will of Haitians to walk from remote areas to go vote and stand in line for hours at voting stations on February 7 sends a very positive message about their desire for change and their will to make this a turning point. Change certainly needs to come from the government but it is essential that participation and a sense of duty intensify at the community level so that development projects shift from being *community based* to *community driven*. This needs to be facilitated by a well-suited civil society including international organizations and the international community which are instrumental in guiding a failed state towards democracy and institution building. The international community owes Haiti its assistance, but should be circumspect in delivering it, careful to avoid that, like the remittances, it disincentivizes the development of Haitian civil society – or ends up lining the pockets of government leaders who are not yet qualified to manage it without extensive oversight.

Haiti was once the pearl of the Caribbean and merits this position but it is only the commitment of Haitians themselves, as well as that of the international community, that it will be able to regain this status in the future.

Culture and Social

What is the nature/source of the endemic conflict from the angle of culture and societal norms?

Addressing culture as a driver of conflict runs the serious risk of becoming a tautology. How simple to say that Haitians have been mired in political conflict since the rebellious birth of their nation because Haitians are simply a conflictual people who cannot get along with one another. And yet it cannot be denied that the everyday choices that people make as members of a given society with a conscious sense of its own culture accumulate and affect the trajectory not just of their own individual lives but of the society as a whole.

In making these everyday choices—to work or to steal, to vote or to rebel—people sometimes take a moment to pause and calculate the likely consequences of their actions. And in this calculation there are underlying beliefs and expectations that must come from somewhere. Other times, in making choices, people get swept up in the momentum of what is “normal” within their society. They simply do what is done, what everyone else is doing without thought. These patterns too must originate from somewhere and the beliefs on which they are founded can be identified as significant drivers of conflict.

Thus, I think it is important to look at culture not as an immutable given that results in conflict in some cases and cooperation in others but as a collectively held set of beliefs, norms and expectations within a society that can change over time. On one hand, culture can be influenced by negative beliefs and destructive norms that reinforce a downward spiral for the society. On the other hand, this same principle makes it susceptible to the introduction of positive beliefs and constructive norms that can help build momentum toward development. In what follows, I attempt to identify the most prevalent negative beliefs on which Haitian people pause to base their calculated actions and the most destructive norms on which they make “non-thinking” decisions. I then make recommendations for ways in which the new government can introduce positive beliefs and constructive norms into Haitian society to counter the existing negative and destructive elements of the culture in an effort to break the cycle of the country’s “endemic” conflict.

Core Negative Beliefs

The belief structure of Haitians is rooted in the Vodou and Catholic religions and the Kreyol language. All three reinforce the arbitrary nature of the universe and the powerlessness of the common man. This undermines rule of law and reinforces the polarized socio-economic hierarchy.

Vodou

The *Vodou* religion is premised on a multitude of different gods, some helpful but others mischievous or even evil, who visit people by invading the body and taking over a designated person’s mind. In this framework, it is the gods who hold a monopoly of power and decide when they will access the man rather than the man having access to the gods whenever he needs their support. This arbitrary and aggressive relationship between man and the divine depersonalizes the individual, reinforces passivity and leaves man at the mercy of arbitrary

fate. There is no way to build a system of expectations based on *vodou* because it promulgates the belief that anything can happen at any time. Moreover, within such a worldview, there is no consequence of action, no incentive to cooperate and earn reward in heaven nor coercion to prevent negative action with the threat of hell.

Haitian Catholicism

While the co-opted form of Haitian Catholicism may in theory put such a Christian incentive structure in place, it undermines its own ethic by emphasizing a divine hierarchy that keeps god inaccessible to the common people. The Haitians mix Catholicism and *vodou* by making the Christian god the highest and most perfect of all their gods. The common people look to this god as a remote beacon of hope, but their everyday interaction and association is instead with the lower *vodou* gods. Thus the Christian realm of the divine, of action, power, self-control and consequences is inhabited by priests and the elite class alone. Meanwhile, the masses perceive themselves as living in a different, lower world where the divine forces that touch their lives are those of *vodou* that come down to meddle from above on a temporary basis. These gods do not stay long enough to foster a relationship among equals that locates morality in the choices of the individual.

Creole, Kreyol, Kweyol

The divide between the French spoken by the elite and the Kreyol spoken by the masses further polarizes Haitian society, while Kreyol's arbitrary grammar and spelling reinforces the chaos of the society of the lower classes. Kreyol is a pigeon form of French blended with African dialects that arose as the language of slaves attempting to speak the French of their masters. Because the vast majority of the Haitian masses are uneducated and illiterate, the Kreyol language follows no standardized rules of grammar and has no standardized spelling. It is as arbitrary as the rest of the world for the Haitian masses. It is very possible that minds that grow up internalizing a language without rules of grammar are predisposed to not following rules at all. Moreover, in Kreyol there is no "I" but only the subjective "me" or "mwen" that is acted upon rather than active. In the beginning this would have created a natural hierarchy between the active master speaking French and using his "je" to impose upon the subjective "mwen" of the slave without an active self. However, these patterns of usage still persist and reinforce this hierarchy between French and Kreyol speakers in the society. Politicians have a tendency to impose power in the third person as if from outside themselves: "Charles Baker is a farmer. Charles Baker understands peasants," he told our group, while Rene Preval reported to the *New York Times*, "Préval is frank and honest. He says what he can and cannot do, and he doesn't make promises he cannot keep." "He" becomes an untouchable figure rather than an ordinary man. While this sounds like a semantic point, the individual "I" of the president is crucial to breaking the mythological bonds that keep the government as a superhuman structure inaccessible and unequatable with the common man's "mwen."

Rule of Law

The lack of a state-enforced justice system further reinforces the arbitrary relationship between action and consequence and the unequal relationship between rich and poor. As Pierre Esperance of RNDDH notes, "The judicial system functions on money and since the [common] Haitian people have no money, they have no access to justice." Justice becomes perceived as a commodity accessible only by the rich rather than an equalizing force across the society so that inequality remains deeply entrenched in the Haitian belief structure.

Lespwa

Lespwa, or *hope*, is widely recognized as the galvanizing force of Haitian life. It is what has allowed the Haitian masses to endure the indignities of poverty and persecution since the birth of their nation. However, hope as a concept is inert. It is pure potential. It is a state of waiting, expectant of change. What hope is not is a foundation for change itself. Hope locates a better day, an improvement in circumstances somewhere off in the future. People do not base action on hope, they base it on hope's more confident cousin belief. If in Haiti you hope for your lot in life to improve, you will wait passively and expectantly to see change before you act as if your lot is actually improving. Hope is an opiate. It allays the suffering of the people with the fiction of tomorrow. On a mass level, a society full of hope but lacking in belief will remain trapped in a suboptimal equilibrium where everyone is collectively waiting for improvement but does not take steps together that are necessary to realize positive change.

Destructive Norms

The negative beliefs above engender destructive norms incompatible with democracy, namely a lack of personal responsibility, social polarization along economic lines, systematized political dysfunction, and politicization of private life.

“Pa Fot Mwen”

The phrase ‘Pa fot mwen,’ literally, ‘not my fault’ has become the bane of the development community in Haiti. One IOM worker claims to hear the knee-jerk response from Haitians several times a day, “They will tell me ‘this country is a mess because of slavery, because of colonialism, because of US policy, because of UN policy,’ anything except themselves and their own actions.” This society-wide inability to take responsibility for the predicament of the country leads to the absence of a feeling of obligation or even power to fix it themselves. The ‘pa fot mwen’ undermines any sense of personal responsibility. It scapegoats blame elsewhere and leaves the individual without the benefits of personal reflection and self-criticism, namely the drive to take action to correct his/her course by changing his/her behaviour. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General Valdes notes a lack of capacity to define problems and address them in the society, saying, “if you ignore problems or attempt to suffocate them with force, you will never get anywhere and that is what has happened here.”

“You Can’t Trust a Haitian”

“A Haitian colleague told me that Haitians would trust a foreigner before they would trust their neighbors just because ‘you can't trust a Haitian,’” the same IOM worker lamented. “One of our colleagues told an indicative joke about Haitian crabs who pull each other down from the sides of the bucket each time one gets near to escaping. Getting ahead is not so much about improving ones own lot but sabotaging the lot of your neighbor.” Once introduced into the society, the expectation that your neighbor will defect on you will cause you to defect on him pre-emptively and create a race to the bottom. We see this at play in all levels of the Haitian society from the in-fighting of elite politics to the lack of cooperation in poor communities.

No Concept of the Public Good

It is widely acknowledged that Haitians have no concept of public service or individual action toward the greater good of their society. “Haitians don’t perceive a common interest or collective interest. All of the groups work to undermine each other,” Joseph Delva of Reuters lamented. This is often attributed to the conditions of scarcity that keep the masses on the brink of falling below the subsistence line. But the same belief can be seen underlying the actions of the elite who live within conditions of abundance but do not even pay taxes to the government let alone actively serve the public good. “The rich don’t pay taxes because they know the money won’t be invested in Haiti,” said Presidential candidate Charlie Baker as if this justified the action.

Responsibility is for *the Blancs*

Blanc in Kreyol refers more to an outsider to Haitian culture than to a person with light skin. A black American can thus be referred to as a *blanc*. Historically, the *blancs* have held themselves aloof from the Haitian people making rules that apply to the masses but not to themselves. In this tradition, MINUSTAH is perceived as “a mission of foreigners on vacation in a country with a lot of problems” (RNDDH). On the day of our arrival in Port au Prince there was a general strike across the city to protest MINUSTAH’s poor performance in Haiti. “All social categories perceive the UN as a limitation,” was the only unifying statement we heard from the politically biased (anti-Lavalas) and unrepresentative (bourgeois and elite) National Dialogue. Regrettably, the negative stereotype of the *blancs* incorporates their penchant for making and living by rules. After Mario Andrésol began making real progress toward vetting the Haitian National Police of its corrupt elements, rumors began to abound that he was a “plant” from the US. “Everytime a person stands up for responsibility he is accused of being pushed by the whites,” Andrésol lamented, “I am an obstacle to [the criminal element] and since they cannot kill me they try to discredit me by turning the population against me.” This demonstrates how a true mentality of public service and respect for rule of law is perceived as foreign or outside of the bandwidth of the Haitian national character.

The Poor Live at the Mercy of the Rich

If you have been to Port au Prince you know that it is a city built into a mountain-face that slopes down to the sea. As if constructed with the hierarchal society in mind, the higher you go up the mountain the bigger the estates of the rich grow and the lower you go down to the sea the more ramshackle the hovels of the poor. Our last night in Haiti it rained heavily and without a proper waste water system we watched the rain collect all of the sewerage of the rich and wash it down the mountainside in fetid torrents until the excrement of the rich pooled in the homes of the poor below. It is no wonder that the poor in Haiti feel powerless in the face of the small wealthy elite that control the country’s economy and government. Those in power have historically thrashed the communities of the poor to pieces, deliberately severing bonds and destroying trust through murder, rape and mutilation in order to prevent class cooperation that they fear could lead to rebellion and redistribution by force. Perhaps as a consequence or more tragically perhaps completely independent of the violence, the poor have no sense of power as individuals or as a group despite their enormous advantage in numbers. They believe that their circumstances are controlled from above. While they will rise up to defend the lead of one elite against another, they have never risen up to secure political control for one of their own.

The Rich Live at the Mercy of the Poor

What Rene Préval noted, however, is that the fear is mutual. “No one talks about the ghettoization of the rich,” he gestured across the palatial estate of a local NGO referring to the armed guards lined up at its gates. “People live with barbed wire. No one can walk freely on the streets or go to a movie. Even the richest are in a ghetto in their homes. To walk freely with their children they have to go to the Dominican Republic or Miami.” The unambiguous lack of justice in the Haitian society engenders fear in the elite that the system will inevitably topple. “We the rich people are the Tutsis and the poor are the Hutus,” Andy Apaid, leader of the civil society Group 184 is said to have proclaimed, “And they will try to come and kill us all”. While the Group 184 initiative to pen a new social contract was constructive, the fear of the rich is exacerbated by their continued reluctance or inability to devolve and decentralize economic and political power to the masses. Those who live in prisons, be they state institutions or guarded enclaves, spend a lot of time thinking about the crimes that put them there. As in the early stages of the South African peace process, the elite recognize that change is necessary but fear of retribution prevents them from any concrete action to devolve power.

The Double-Edged Sword of Charity

Charity is commonly understood as a magnanimous act but there is an insidious dimension to the repetition of the rich giving to the poor that reinforces the hierarchy and rigidity of societal positions and a codified belief in inequality as the social contract. The giving from on high to down low reinforces set roles that are engrained into consciousness. If the people in the roles were to continually mix and switch positions charity could be of benefit. Instead it establishes a rigid division and distinction between givers and takers as if they originate from different species with different entitlements. A member of the international community noted his frustration that a businessman he worked with just could not understand why his vote did not count for more than those of his two hundred workers when he provided for their living. The idea of equality has a long way to go in Haiti.

Making It = Migration

An article on the front page of *Le Nouvelliste* last year featured a profile of a Haitian who had just been elected to Congress. It reported that the happiest year of his life was the year he became a US citizen (IOM). If there is a collective ambition among Haitians, it is to make enough money to leave Haiti. This goes well beyond the brain drain typical of many developing countries to the point where some claim that Haiti does not have a middle class because it is living in the US, France and Canada. Meanwhile, in talking to diaspora, few desire to move back to Haiti permanently. Whatever talents and positive norms they used to get themselves out of Haiti are ultimately contributed to foreign lands and if mimicked in Haiti provide an established path out of the country.

Power = Violence

The history of Haiti is a history of political exploitation through violence. Since the fall of Duvalier *coup d'états* have been the most typical means of winning presidential power. Many note however, that despite the political violence, the Haitian society itself is extremely peaceful. Given the dire poverty, lack of police and corrupt judiciary, there is an exceptionally low level of criminality and violence among neighbors. Professor Laroz of *Université d'Etat d'Haiti* notes that during mass cultural events like Carnaval everyone is on the street from all levels of society and there is never any violence. Violence is centered in Port-au-Prince where

politics are most heated and is a non-issue throughout the countryside where there is less political contestation. Moreover, the history of *coups* has never led to a single civil war of neighbor against neighbor.

Political Office = Personal Gain

When a leader comes to power, he fully expects that he will be able to exploit the government resources to the advantage of his patronage network, providing for them but not for the entire citizenry in the pattern typical of a predatory state. This expectation not only sanctions his doing so and drives his followers to encourage his doing so but then fuels rivalries for power and prevents the deeply divided population from seeing any overlap in its interests. Competition for office becomes a battle for the scarce resources themselves rather than a competition among strategies for multiplying those resources. “This is why we have 33 candidates,” several Haitians noted. “Because people aren’t thinking about their country but about themselves and their friends,” Police Chief Andrésol confirmed.

If I am Right, You Must be Wrong

Politics in Haiti is a zero-sum game. The victory of one leader by his followers is perceived as the defeat of all others and their followers. The losers will protest elections as “unfair” meaning that they did not win, not that any specific technical flaw marred the elections. “It really is a winner-take-all scenario” Benedetto reported, “The loser doesn’t just lose an election but can go to jail or face persecution.” On the other hand, the day someone wins an election everyone turns on him and rather than dealing with the country’s problems he has to spend his time dealing with those opposing him. Clearly this norm is destructive to the political and economic resources of both sides.

The Savior is Coming

“The Haitian people believe the President will and should be the Messiah,” Guy Phillipe explained, puffing his chest out as he geared up for the role. The supply and demand for political leadership in Haiti meet within the figure of the messiah. The legitimate demands of the people for public goods and services are not channeled properly up through a system of local government that can address their needs on a piecemeal basis, but are instead directed all at once at one man, the president. The people, rather than reaching within each of themselves individually to overcome their own lots in life or organizing to provide for themselves as a community, passively await the man who will descend from above and set them free of their burden. On the side of the masses, this myth detracts from an ethic of personal responsibility, rewards passive patience, keeps power at a higher level than themselves and a better day at some point in the future. On the elite side, the demand for a messiah reinforces winner take all politics and the personalization of politics while putting unrealistic demands that cannot be met on the position. “The messiah complex prevents coalition building because even if 3 or 4 people have the same idea, you can only have one messiah,” said Clarens Renois of AFP. It also prevents power-sharing within the government as a messiah would lose credibility with the people if he relied on a prime minister or local government. Even Father Aristide, the closest the country will ever get to a leader that embodies the messiah figure, found himself overwhelmed and unable to address the country’s needs once he took on a role designed for a god rather than a man.

Fact is a Matter of Opinion

“There is no sense of objective truth,” Joseph Delva of Reuters told us, “If you say that it is unfair that Jean Juste was arrested, everyone says that you are a Lavalas supporter. You are not allowed to hold opinions from different sides.” Facts are politicized into arguments for one side or the other. This has been a historical problem in creating legitimacy for elections and for a leader who wins in elections. By criticizing the elections as illegitimate and spreading this opinion throughout the population in the guise of fact, a political loser can gather support for a coup to topple the government. As Bernice Robertson of the OAS notes “the only way to build confidence in these elections is to make sure what you’re doing is technically sound.” Having performed her technocratic duties to a tee and asserting firmly that the technical aspects of the elections process would be fair and free, Robertson was visibly shaken to note the contradiction between the enormous success in registration versus the widespread criticism of the process on the ground.

Political Addiction

“News here is too close to entertainment and has become the main source of revenue for radio. Everyone here listens to the radio and is addicted to politics,” a representative of Radio Melody reports. In the US it is easy to become addicted to the racy storylines of TV serials, action movies, soap operas or even good old fashioned novels. People instinctually follow the ups and downs of an exciting narrative with insatiable appetite. They gather around water coolers across the country to discuss the same characters and twists of plot. Too poor for television and unable to read, the masses of Haiti satiate that same desire by following their own political drama on the radio. Addicted to their own storyline, news stations with political programs proliferate and are widely popular. Everyone on the street is talking about politics. This not only exacerbates the conflict but keeps it ongoing as everyone waits for the next instalment rather than a resolution.

Constructive Alternatives

From *Lespwa* to *Kwayans*

In Haiti, we see that hope indeed springs eternal. But the result is a society that is too patient and enduring, too disconnected from and passive about their present reality. If that same positive orientation and upward tilt of the chin can be grounded in the present rather than the future, they will move from *lespwa* to *kwayans*, from hope to belief. The new president will have managed to harness the hope of the Haitian people and ride it into political power. That hope was for a nebulously better and more just future. He now stands at a crossroads. He can, as Aristide, preach continually about that future and keep hope rooted to a time coming or he himself can take the leap of faith from hope to belief and base his words and actions on the confidence that things are changing. He must ground politics in the now and give the Haitian people a foundation for belief. The best way to do this is to lead by example—to ally with his rivals and create a government of national unity in the interests of the country’s future.

Creating Political Legitimacy through National Unity

What do the people who lose the election want? Power. What did we identify as the traditional Haitian means to power? Violence. The new president needs to pre-empt violence by giving his rivals power. He has won. The people love him. It becomes his duty to protect the people. To do this, he needs to share power. He needs to create a government that incorporates

all of his rivals in some capacity. They need to sit together on a daily personal basis whether they like each other or not and brainstorm on how to pull the country out of its current state of misery together. Traditionally, Haitian leaders have wasted significant amounts of time, energy, money and political capital by arming forces to fend off their rivals. The more clever president will see the economic and social benefit to cooperating with his institutionally. By uniting the whole spectrum of the political elite in an institutional framework, they will all be able to feel important, get their ideas heard, keep a close eye on one another, fight and argue directly and eventually they will find the common ground that will bring the country together. Their leadership will unite the people at a mass level and will leave a legacy of institutional politics to the country.

An Ostentatious New Beginning

The inauguration of the new government should be planned as a revolutionary event. Time must be marked as life starting anew from that day. Without a doubt there will be setbacks and inefficiencies to the new government, but the power of a clean slate and a new beginning cannot be underestimated. The quickest way to change beliefs and norms collectively is to break with old routine. The day should be declared a national holiday. All members of the new government should be celebrated, not just the president.

Fot Mwen

Addressing his citizens for the first time, the new president would be advised to adopt a campaign of *Fot Mwen*. In doing so he would accept full personal responsibility for his own role in the mess that Haiti has become. He would then emphasize the equality of his position with every other Haitian citizen and accuse them of each personally allowing the country to devolve to this pitiful state. He would repeat *Fot Mwen* and urge the Haitian people to each say *Fot Mwen* on a daily basis every time they encounter a new problem. If promoted as a national project with follow-up projects, celebrations, songs and activities, the idea could create a buzz in the society and hold the interest of the masses. In whatever form it takes, the idea needs to be conveyed to the society that there is no one else to blame, that they are all equals and must work together to dig their country out of its hole.

Clean the City Campaign

The best way start to a *Fot Mwen* campaign on both a symbolic and concrete level would be cleaning up Port au Prince. In Sierra Leone, the leader who designated Saturdays as official cleaning-up days is still remembered as a hero despite his political failings. One day a week could be celebrated as a day of national unity in cleaning. The government should provide massive help to the poor in hauling the trash out of the slums. The economic elite should be encouraged to participate and the government officials should be required to do so. As much social mixing among classes as possible should be promoted on these days.

Creating a Norm of In-Group Policing

But security, you object. The slums are dangerous. And I answer that the slums are only as dangerous as the government policy is bad. Real security does not come from a military or police force but from strength in numbers behind a collectively held belief. A mob can always overwhelm a gunman if it unites in action. The Haitian citizens need a campaign of vigilant in-group policing where inappropriate behaviour is defined and not tolerated. Communities

should be encouraged to gather in small groups based on geography and define a list of rules that they want to live by. Members of the community should not only agree to live by those rules but to enforce them on each other whenever they witness a defection. Someone who litters should not be ignored but reprimanded and forced to throw his trash in the bin.

Restructuring Belief

Vodou

With the utmost respect, perhaps the government could coordinate with the *vodou* priests to focus the religion on celebrating and welcoming the more positive gods in their pantheon with particular attention to cultivating their influence. The negative gods would of course still be acknowledged and welcomed but perhaps treated somewhat with disdain or at least with control by the community. Without distorting their cosmology, it might perhaps be possible to emphasize an element of human control in accepting the visitation of the gods and mark a shift from passivity to assertion in the belief structure. All of this would of course be at the discretion of the priests themselves.

Fiction

UN SRSV Valdès noted the striking intelligence and imagination of the Haitian people. Efforts should be made to channel that energy into radio programs that tell ongoing fictional stories. When faced with the option to tune into a saga of romance and mystery, one that is more compelling, more satisfying and ends on a happy note, people will soon tire of their own political drama. Theatre in spontaneously created outdoor stages should also be encouraged. Emphasis should be put on positive and motivational content, though no content should be prohibited. The promotion of a renaissance in Kreyol literature and storytelling to mark the new era could be an attempt to disentangle norms of defection, jealousy and spite by portraying evil characters that fail in the long run using a strategy of defection and virtuous characters who get ahead by cooperating with others.

Impressionable Minds

Along with narrative, education is the best weapon against a defective culture. Clearly, equal opportunity for education for all the Haitian children will be a priority. However, the content of the curriculum should not be overlooked in the logistics of building schools and hiring teachers. A retelling of the Haitian story should cast the slave rebellion not as a struggle of us against them, you as an individual against authority and rules and anything that serves to moderate your behaviour, but as a liberation into a new mode of freedom. The negative elements of the past decades should be included but downplayed to emphasize the positives that have culminated in this moment of historic change when all of the country has put down arms and reunited in the new government.

Creole, Creole, Creole –or– Kreyol, Kreyol, Kreyol

A committee should be formed to standardize the Haitian Kreyol language—vocabulary and grammar—more formally and present the change in an ostentatious official way. Having a grandiose ceremony could mark a shift in moving from a loose acceptance of all forms of the language to a stiff regulation of its form and diction. At the very least it will promote more efficient communication and international respect for the language.

You Can Go Home Again

Outreach to the Haitian Diaspora should encourage them to bring their talents and constructive norms back to the Haitian society, even if only on a temporary basis. Programs should be funded that allow members of the Haitian Diaspora to spend time in Haiti teaching classes and participating in government. The temporary nature of the assignment may be a way to lure the Diaspora and their skills back to Haiti without threatening them with the loss of their current lives abroad.

Constructive Cooperation with the *Blancs*

The international community clearly has a role to play in Haiti but that role should not fall into the trap of the historical pathology and be asserted as authority from above. Instead, MINUSTAH should be set up as a passive repository of knowledge and assistance that Haitian politicians from the President on down to unofficial community leaders from Cité Soleil should be able and encouraged to access at their will. Some form of incentive structure should be arranged whereby actively reaching out to the passive presence of the international community results in access to international aid for Haitian politicians. The UN should be able and obligated to track the progress of all funds and projects, in essence serving in the less glamorous but more valuable role of clearing house and auditor.

Conclusion

To move from a society where defection is the norm toward a culture of cooperation the divided Haitian nation must unite at the political level at which point power and responsibility must be devolved to the masses at the level of the individual. All beliefs and norms that reinforce hierarchy and keep the masses powerless must be gradually shifted through political action at the elite level that promotes equality, unity and personal responsibility.

I. Epilogue

The SAIS Conflict Management Studies research trip to Haiti took place less than a month before the February 7th, 2006 presidential elections. The elections had been delayed four times from the original November 13th 2005 date and some interviewees we spoke with believed at the time that there would be further delays. Haitians expressed both trepidation and excitement at the prospect of the first national election since Aristide had been ousted in February of 2004. We observed both hope and frustration as Haiti prepared to go to the polls.

Although there were long lines and delays on the day of the vote, the elections ultimately took place in relative calm, without widespread accusations of mismanagement or fraud. It is impressive, with so many technical difficulties and logistical challenges, that the elections went as well as they did, with the same minor problems that most developing countries face. Early poll results showed René Préval leading with about 60% of the total, but the CEP announced a few days later that his majority had slipped just slightly below the 50% simple majority needed to win without a run-off. Préval supporters began mobilizing protest, and the mood began to change dramatically when an unusually large number of blank ballots were discovered three days into the vote count. The protesters claimed that in addition to irregularities, the CEP was manipulating the vote count to deny Préval's win. By Monday, February 13th, 125,000 of the 2.2 million ballots cast were declared invalid, with 4% blank but included in the total (CBS News). As street protests increased, the CEP and MINUSTAH called upon Préval to calm his supporters, flying him to Port-au-Prince from his residence in Marmelade. Préval reiterated accusations of fraud and called for protesters to continue, although encouraging them to do so peacefully. Préval also emphasized that he had not orchestrated the protest and that it was beyond his power to recall the angry crowds. The situation took a further dramatic turn immediately after Préval's speech when thousands of ballots were found discarded and burning in a dump. The election impasse was finally resolved when the CEP decided after a lengthy meeting to allot the blank ballots to each candidate based on the percentage of regularly counted ballots they had already received—a solution based on Belgian electoral practice. By Thursday, February 16th, the CEP announced Préval as Haiti's next president.

Unrest dissipated with the announcement of Préval's win and Haiti returned to a relative, if uncertain, calm. The run-offs for legislative candidates were originally scheduled for March 19th, but have recently been delayed until early April, which will also postpone the presidential inauguration. The CEP cited investigations of first-round voting irregularities as the reason for this delay.

II. Conclusions

Although the chapters of this report focus on diverse aspects of the conflict in Haiti, several broad themes emerge as dominant. The sources and nature of the Haitian conflict can be summarized as follows.

(i). Social Polarization

A marked and divisive difference in class is rooted in Haiti's birth as a French colonial slave state in the eighteenth century. The small elite of wealthy French plantation owners and

the slave class were replaced by a small wealthy mulatto elite and masses of freed slaves living in poverty after independence in 1804. The next two hundred years of Haitian history consolidated this structure, as the small, wealthy elite continued to dominate politics and business, while the rural peasants lived in poverty and increasingly difficult agricultural conditions exacerbated by catastrophic deforestation. Undemocratic rule by successive authoritarian leaders entrenched the class cleavage as the state became a nexus of intertwined economic and political power.

It is surprising that economic and social class polarization did not provoke a peasant-based social movement earlier in Haiti's history, but this is perhaps attributable to the brutal repression of leaders such as the Duvaliers and those who preceded them. International pressure, transitions to democracy, and economic crisis laid the stage however, for such a movement to emerge in the early 1990's when the Duvalier era had ended. Jean-Bertrand Aristide effectively capitalized on the mass lower class desire for economic and social justice to mount a successful political campaign for the presidency in 1990.

Prior to Aristide's rise as a leader, it would be difficult to say that a broad conflict existed in Haiti. Political and military (in the form of coups d'état) conflict existed at the level of the state, but no broad rebellion emerged elsewhere between or within the elite and the lower classes. The era of Aristide's presidency brought social awareness, political freedom, and change, broadly mobilizing the Haitian poor in support of his Lavalas party. The nature of the conflict thus changed from elite in-fighting, to a larger social conflict between the poor and the elites. Struggle then continued between Aristide and the elite for control of the state, as he was ousted in 1991, returned to power in 1994, a close ally became president in 1996, Aristide returned to the presidency in 2000, and was finally resigned under internal and external pressure in February of 2004.

A great sense of injustice among Aristide supporters, broadly representing the poor, was born of these events. Aristide was perceived to have been twice cheated out of his right to govern and his supporters felt equally cheated of a government that would have represented their interests, fuelling the social conflict. The elite, generally in opposition to Aristide, feared losing the political power that helped guarantee their economic interests. Aristide in this sense increasingly became a legitimate threat, as the economy faltered and violence and crime rose, arguably as a result of his direct aid in arming supporters in the slums of Port-au-Prince.

What began as a social justice movement at a time of democratic transition in the 1990s has devolved into the social conflict evident in Haiti today. Its nature is social, economic, and political, pervading all aspects of Haitian life. As shown above, its sources are social, economic, and political, but particularly *historical*.

(ii). Absence of law, order, and institutions

As preceding chapters have discussed, Haiti's history of dictatorial rule did not engender the development of effective state institutions. Law and order were guaranteed by a system of repression and institutionalized corruption. This was a dangerous environment into which to introduce democracy as the events of the last fifteen years have proved. The absence law and order, as well as effective institutions has both resulted from and reinforced insecurity and violence, and is thus a source of conflict in Haiti.

Disorder and the weakness of the state also fundamentally define the nature of Haiti's conflict. As evidenced by the chapters concerning drugs, gangs, slums and corruption, Haiti's conflict is of a chaotic, dispersed nature, very different than conflict between two or more easily-identifiable "sides." The virulent debate in the Haitian national and international press about responsibility for the conflict is evidence of a lack of clarity concerning the actors responsible for violence themselves, the sources of their funding, and their specific motives and objectives. This type of conflict in Haiti is also demonstrably self-perpetuating, as the linkages between violent gangs, kidnappers and drug lords with the social factions in conflict are not clear. Regardless of whether Aristide was instrumental in arming supporters in the slums, these parties may have found kidnapping and violence to be economically profitable and thus may no longer be primarily politically motivated, for example. The inability, and possibly the lack of will, of the Haitian state to stop violent crime and conflict, is itself a driver of the conflict.

(iii). Poverty and economic stagnation

Whatever political and social motivations exist for conflict in Haiti, the fact that violence is localized to urban slums demonstrates that poverty is also a source of the conflict. Poverty as both an origin and result of the conflict in Haiti is also driven by the absence of credible state institutions and the rule of law discussed above. The economy suffers when contracts are informal and when the judiciary does not guarantee enforcement. Insecurity reduces trade and the movement of goods within the Haitian economy, not to mention impacting international imports and exports. The preoccupations of daily subsistence further influence the opportunities for participation of the poor in the political sphere.

Poverty should not however, be characterized as a source of conflict in isolation in Haiti. Cross-country comparisons would show that although conflict and poverty may be correlated, causality is more subtle. Although the poorest country in the western hemisphere, Haiti is not among the poorest twenty countries in the world, and among those poorest twenty, a number of peaceful states are included such as Niger, Burkina-Faso, Senegal, etc. (UNDP Human Development Report 2005).

Where poverty is most important to the conflict in Haiti is in perpetuating the economic cleavage that has driven social polarization and the exclusion of the poor. As discussed in the Diaspora chapter, Haiti lacks a middle class due to migration and economic stagnation. Although the majority of Haiti's populace is impoverished, there has only been recent, sporadic, and arguably ineffective, representation of their voice at the level of the central state. With the introduction of democracy, the growth of civil society, and the blossoming of free press, pressure is growing from Haiti's poor for representation and results in terms of economic development. That the poor should demand substantive participation in national politics is admirable; that conflict is the result is tragic.

(iv). International Influences

Finally, note must be made concerning international influences as a source of conflict in Haiti. Haiti, like any country, does not exist in a vacuum; it is rather a recipient of international intervention, aid, and occasional political meddling (or lack thereof). Conspiracy theories abound as to who has backed coup d'états, who is funding opposition, and the motivation of political and economic aid to various stakeholders. What emerges as theme however, is that international assistance and aid has been inconsistent and varied.

While development aid from the United States, France, Canada and other countries has laudably attempted to improve economic and social conditions in Haiti, it has failed to both end the conflict and to ameliorate poverty. Regardless of the reasons, it is particularly significant for the country as a whole, that billions of dollars in promised aid was withheld after the disputed 2000 parliamentary elections. It also remains to question how the billions of dollars of assistance in the last twenty years have not changed the conditions of both the rural and urban poor. As no chapter in this report dealt specifically with foreign aid, this is an area of particular interest for further research.

Development assistance is not the only form of international influence. The United States in particular has chosen when and when not to intervene militarily in Haiti. The U.S. did not intervene to stop the 1991 coup d'état against Aristide, but did secure his return through force and diplomacy in 1994. The U.S. again chose not to intervene in early 2004 when Aristide was faced with an armed rebellion, but rather to facilitate his resignation and departure. The emphasis on these events is not to question the moral or logical reasoning for U.S. support for Aristide, but rather to highlight that the U.S. support for democracy in Haiti has been inconsistent, particularly when treated in the larger context of the stated foreign policy objective of promotion of democracy and democratically elected leaders.

Finally there is the question of United Nations intervention in Haiti. It would be difficult to conclude, after meeting and interviewing high-level members of MINUSTAH, that the mission is anything but well-intentioned. It would also be difficult to conclude, after conversing with Haitians from all levels of society and all political bents that MINUSTAH has been, and is perceived as, successful in Haiti. One may surely argue that greater insecurity and violence would have resulted without MINUSTAH's presence, but it remains undeniable that MINUSTAH failed to end violence and establish stability during the tenure of the interim government. Logistical concerns are clearly at the heart of faith and credibility in the mission. The fact that so few peacekeepers are able to communicate with the population they are mandated to protect, that they are rarely able to enter (and secure) certain slums in Port-au-Prince, and that they have failed to demobilize armed parties all contribute to the perception and reality of this failure. Although the UN mandate has been extended to August 2006, MINUSTAH's role in Haiti stands at a crossroads: will it remain, in the eyes of most Haitians, a necessary evil, or become a positive driver of peace?

III. Recommendations

(i). National Reconciliation

It is not by coincidence that national reconciliation is placed at the head of recommendations in this report. In order for Haiti to move beyond conflict, a process of inclusive, participatory dialogue is essential. All economic and social stakeholders must be brought to the table to determine Haiti's future. Politics must move beyond a winner-take-all game of control and protestation to legitimate democratic alternance.

Small percentage disputes aside, René Préval has received majority support of the Haitian population. It is the hope of the authors of this report that he will use this political capital to unify rather than divide. This can only be achieved by balancing the interests and economic force of the elite with the demands and needs of the poor.

Many of Préval's supporters associate him with Aristide and the Lavalas movement. While this support is necessary and integral to Préval's legitimacy as president, he must use his influence to diffuse the personalization of politics that became inherent to Aristide's tenures in power. He has already ostensibly distanced himself from both Aristide and Lavalas by creating a new party, but he must develop a strategy for incorporating Aristide loyalists and those who support him based on his previous alliance to Aristide into multi-party democracy.

Opposition to both Préval and Lavalas, most visibly embodied in Groupe 184, must also seek a middle ground and accept democratic alternance. Opposition, on both sides, must move from unquestionable dispute of election loss, to recognition of relatively free and fair election results. A crucial part of moving forward to such a future likely entails looking back. So many forward-looking policy pronouncements are made without adequate attention to the psychological and social implications of the scars of the past. Demanding reparations from France for the horrors of colonialism and post-colonial indemnities paid is unrealistic. It would not be impractical however, to implement a sort of national truth and reconciliation process, particularly since the judicial system in Haiti is so weak. In such an instance it less a question of amnesty or punishment, and rather a question of expression of grievance and reciprocal listening that can act to bridge divides and ease polarization.

(ii). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

Although Duvalier's tonton macoutes succeeded in terrorizing Haiti's population with batons and intimidation just as much as actual guns, the number of unregulated and unregistered small arms currently in Haiti is a primary enabler of insecurity and conflict. Although the U.N., as well as various NGOs, have proposed and advocated disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, none have been successful in implementing such a plan. There is no time left to waste in implementing a DDR program preferably under international *and* national auspices. A successful DDR plan must entail adequate economic and legal incentives for armed parties to relinquish their weapons. It is important to recognize as well that DDR stands for more than disarmament. Demobilization and reintegration require long-term strategies involving alternative livelihoods and education. Although several chapters in this report recommended or highlighted DDR, further research could positively contribute to developing specific guidelines for a Haitian DDR program.

Various chapters in this report have discussed the Haitian National Police. It is clear that Mario Andrésol is taking the HNP as an institution in the right direction by aggressively fighting corruption, and he should be praised for his success thus far. Much remains to be done however, both in terms of existing personnel and incoming recruits. Stringent vetting and training are needed for both. Training is an area where the international community and particularly the United States can play a crucial role with greater financial, in-kind and technical resources. The goal of support and reform of the Haitian police is essential to security particularly because of the negative perception of MINUSTAH. Haitians need to be ensuring order for Haitians, in a representative and responsive manner. This is obviously a medium term goal and innovative strategies of combining international support with community policing should be pursued.

Police reform and capacity building will be strongly linked to successful DDR in Haiti. Neither of these endeavors will be possible without a final component: judicial reform. In Haiti, it may be more a question of establishing a functioning judiciary, rather than reform, as trial delays demonstrate the inadequacy of existing courts, judges, and legal staff. This is again

an area where the United Nations has broad experience in other countries that could be drawn upon to inform work in Haiti. It is not worthwhile to invest further resources in police reform without sufficient judicial capacity to support the work of the police.

(iii). International Commitment

It would be disingenuous to claim that the international community hasn't been sufficiently involved in the Haitian conflict; many countries and international institutions have contributed both positively and negatively. It is clear in reviewing development programs and foreign aid that most is of a relatively short-term nature, in the 2-4 year range. MINUSTAH mandates have generally been renewed for example, in six-month increments. These tendencies are unfortunately not unique to Haiti.

The United Nations, International Financial Institutions, and International NGOs must make a long-term commitment to Haiti, taking account of the failures of the past, and realizing that a society transitioning from insecurity and instability faces unique challenges in this respect. If change and uncertainty are characteristics of instability, development programs and aid must demonstrate commitment in terms of time as well as political independence both in terms of administrations of donor governments and also a lack of bias in terms of who comes to power in Haiti, so long as governance remains democratic.

The United States has a particular responsibility to help Haiti build a positive future given its proximity, regional dominance, and the fact that so many members of the Haitian Diaspora reside in the U.S. It makes sense to pre-empt further immigration and political crises by approving *and* disbursing significant levels of aid to Haiti. Although many chapters in this report have emphasized the need for long-term international commitment and development aid, more concrete strategies for the *delivery* of development assistance must be elaborated. As in so many other developing countries, donors face a dilemma of either supplanting state capacity by delivering services through NGOs, or wasting vast amounts of aid on corrupt governments. This cannot be a blueprint approach and should be determined on a country-by-country basis. In Haiti, it could be advisable to invest significantly in credible branches of government that have demonstrated success in eliminating corruption, such as AndréSol's reforms of the HNP.

MINUSTAH represents the greatest challenge and contradiction in Haiti. On the one hand, few policy-makers or Haitians would argue that the country is ready to function without the presence of international peacekeeping forces. On the other hand, the predominant view of MINUSTAH in Haiti is negative: the mission as a whole is seen as ineffective and politically-biased in some cases. The UN should focus more attention on building a better public image of the mission to gain credibility and respect, which will improve the well-intentioned work it intends carry out. Particularly important to MINUSTAH's image are basic interactions between troops and the local population, which are often affected by communication difficulties: local language training is badly needed, and logical in the context of a long-term mission. As discussed above, the UN should also firmly base its goals on building local capacity to provide security, which could perhaps be achieved by more joint activities with the HNP.

(iv). Urban bias

Given time and security constraints, the participants in the SAIS Conflict Management Studies research trip only had the opportunity to travel beyond Port-au-Prince briefly, to the

nearby town of Petite Goâve. This was not unlike a visit typical of diplomats, donor agency heads, or international organization missions. Although the urban poverty of Port-au-Prince could be shocking to someone not accustomed to travel in the developing world, to realize that three quarters of the Haitian population lives outside of the capital, primarily in poverty, should be even more shocking. What little inconsistent public service provision exists in Port-au-Prince is nearly non-existent in many rural areas.

As noted, violence is largely localized to the slums of Port-au-Prince, and the centralized nature of national (presidential) politics increases the focus on the capital. Despite the violence and poverty plaguing Port-au-Prince, many rural parents still strive to save enough money to send their children to better schools there, hoping that they might find better employment opportunities as well. The fascination with and concentration of resources in Port-au-Prince (like so many developing country capitals) aggravates rural marginalization. So many of the presidential candidates insisted on the need for economic development, but few had concrete plans for the rural majority in Haiti. It is impossible to imagine economic progress that does not include, or is not in fact based on, the rural poor and areas beyond Port-au-Prince.

Finally, municipal elections have suffered even greater delays than presidential and legislative. They were originally scheduled to be held *before* the national elections, but postponed to follow, and consequently delayed each time national elections were rescheduled. This decision was based on the need to dedicate limited resources to the primary task of presidential and legislative elections. Now that these processes have taken place, municipal elections should no longer be an afterthought. Although integral to Haiti's macro development, presidential politics mean substantively little in the daily life of rural Haitians. Municipal officials, who adjudicate land tenure, resolve village disputes, and provide basic services (when possible), have a much more important impact in rural Haiti. Resources and attention equal to what has been mobilized for the national elections should be dedicated to municipal elections.

IV. A Note of Hope for the Future

Conflict is the result of confluence in the case of Haiti: confluence of economic, social, and political division. Economic and social cleavages may take decades to overcome, but Haiti has the opportunity to build unity and accord in the political realm. This will entail the adoption and acceptance of democratic practices by all, as well as progress by elected officials in providing public goods in an equitable manner. Despite Haiti's poverty and history of injustice, one cannot visit the country without being struck by Haitians' will to continue to struggle against the odds for survival and faith in a better future. The participants of the 2006 Haiti Research Trip are grateful for their experience in Haiti, and having gained awareness, hope to now raise awareness within our communities, to contribute in a very small way to the better future Haitians so strongly believe in.

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