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Haiti: Understanding Conflict 2007

Student Field Trip to Haiti

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Introduction   **I. William Zartman**

In Haiti nothing works; in Haiti, everything works. That summarizes the depths of state collapse and at the same time the resiliency of individuals, if not of society itself. That contradiction, and its impeding consequences, captures the dynamics of a Haiti that has hit rock bottom but that is struggling to rebound, under new leadership.

Sixteen students and two faculty members from the Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) took the second Conflict Management Field Trip to Haiti in search of answers to the question, "How to explain the endemic conflict in Haiti?" During the week of 14-20 January 2007, we interviewed some 30 individuals ranging from President René Préval and Prime Minister Alexis to a score of civic leaders (all unemployed) in the newly cleared gang quarter of Bel Air, as well as Archbishop Louis Kébreau, arch-houngan Max Beauvoir and many others who graciously gave their time.[1] Each student was asked to address the question using a particular term of analysis; the following chapters are the result.

Haiti is a place where institutions, economy, security, infrastructure, education, state, and legitimacy have collapsed, the 8th worst country in the Failed States Index, as these chapters develop in detail. Yet it works, and that paradox tells much about Haitian society. In this situation of collapse and dysfunction, people live at an enormous span of levels. They live because they become experts at making do. Per capita income is notoriously low but Haiti is not a land of distended bellies; once they make it past the age of five, people find their way through the meager morass of their world. The subsistence survivor gathers a dozen mangoes and sits by the street corner, hoping for a small sales profit. The greatest mass—*moun pov*—simply make it for themselves and their families through an ethos of survival, at a very basic level.

But that ethos also explains the behavior of more identifiable segments of the population. The politician learns to make it through contacts and now through vote-getting, and then milks the prebends of office, such as they may be, formal and informal, to corner a better living. A few have made it very well, thank you, floating on the top of society and economy, and they intend to keep it that way, caring little about those who find their way at lower levels, and making sure that their children float on the top as well. The purveyor of services, governmental or private, make it at an above-subsistence level by taking side-payments for whatever he is inadequately paid to provide, whether it is justice, security, gas, water, medicines, licenses, or whatever. The nimble-fingered specialize in an occasional pocket-picking; the fleet-footed do a little drug-running; the pretty girls sell their charms occasionally. When these entrepreneurs become adept at their trade, they move to the next level of making it, joining or organizing their gangs. And everyone understands, while complaining about the side effects, because they are all making it, surviving, in their own way.

So crime, corruption, drug traffic, arms and poverty keep every one in their place, in a well regulated society that cannot escape its fate because survival at any level imposes a ceiling on what is possible and presses back those who would try to change the system. And yet in 2007

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there is a palpable sense of hope and change, compared to the impressions of the previous year's Field Trip.

Security is improved, despite some egregious kidnappings in December 2006, and quartiers such as Bel Air have been taken out of the hands of the gangs and given back to the people. They still do not know what to do with it, unsure as to what government can provide, how much they should depend on the International Organization on Migration (IOM), and what they can do themselves. But the challenge is there, and one learns by facing challenges.

A government has been freely and fairly elected, with a president known for his honesty and a leadership style that is above all one of consultation and conciliation. As François Duvalier in 1957 was above all a reaction to successive coups overthrowing short-lived regimes, and Jean-Bertrand Aristide after 1990 was a reaction to the iron hand of the Duvaliers, so René Préval is a reaction to the kleptocratic demagoguery of Aristide. There is already restiveness over his mild leadership style and nostalgia for a man on a white horse, and he will have to combine inspiration and direction with his light touch and long rein to let parties get used to resolving their conflicts constructively. But such is the delicate tightrope of basic political change.

International agencies and governments have adopted a new attitude of long-term support. They promise not to fund and run, like the last time a decade ago. Since governments such as US and France, IFIs such as the World Bank, and international organizations such as the UN Security Council (in charge of MINUSTAH) are all political, that commitment is not to be taken at face value, but, still, it is an indication of a change in attitude for now. As such, their challenge is to enable the Haitian government to take up the operations they support, rather than acting as a benevolent occupier.

All that is to the good, signaling the prospects of an important upturn. Because of that, there is much yet to do, along with hopes of seeing it done. The following chapters complement their analysis with recommendations, for the short, middle, and long term. Some of their recommendations are already in the general consensus; the value of mentioning them here lies in underscoring them among many others. Other recommendations are original, and hopefully their articulation will draw attention and help them to enter the general consensus. Some overarching themes stand out.

The most important is the need for the leaders, led from the top, to engage the people—*pèp la*—and give Haitians ownership of the reconstruction process. The need refers to the state vis-à-vis the international agencies as much as to the local communities vis-à-vis the state. President Préval talks of going into the countryside—he is a farmer himself—and asking people what they need; he needs both to assure them of state responsiveness, since they no longer have any faith in their government, and also urge them to pull on their own bootstraps. *Vin moun* (become someone), as the Church says. This message comes across in many forms in the following chapters.

Another is the need for comprehensive planning. A success in any area cannot be left standing on its own or it will fall back into the habits of society that make for failure. Next steps

need to be considered at the same time as first steps, and lateral links as well as forward links need to be developed. Reforming the police makes no sense if the judiciary is not reformed, and reforming the judiciary will not last if the police are not reformed, and this is true in all areas of change treated in the following chapters.

A third is the need for a cultural reform and at the same time for its material basis. As pointed out at the beginning, corruption is universal, expected, and deplored, but it is part of the need to make do in a survival society. The work ethic, the notion of civil service, the idea of public trust, the sense of self-empowerment and community responsibility are all values that need to be planted in popular culture and nurtured. The Haitian is a hard worker, a believing soul, a proud national, and an enormously gay and artistic spirit, and these values need to be held together in a bundle with hope, trust, and confidence. This need for cultural change underlies the many more technical proposals contained in the following chapters.

My favorite Haitian experience came at the end of our previous trip. The whole week had been gloriously sunny and bright, but the rains had to come sometime. They did so on Saturday night, turning the streets into rivers and waterfalls that washed away all the day's trash and dirt—until the sewers burst! The clean rainwater turned to grey, fetid sludge, and the people around me took their handkerchiefs to their noses. "This," I thought sadly, "is the real Haiti; happy sunshine was too good to be true." The next morning, I was up at 6 to go to church. The streets had been completely cleared and clean, remaining trash gathered into piles for pickup. The sun was shining again. In Haiti, nothing works; in Haiti, everything works, with the hope and promise of more work in prospect.

Leadership

"Reason and calm judgment, the qualities specially belonging to a leader." - Tacitus, History
"To grasp and hold a vision, that is the very essence of successful leadership . . ."- Ronald Reagan

Haiti's past leaders, while representing vastly different backgrounds and political positions, share one essential common trait: they have sought to cultivate and perpetuate the power of their leadership position. As Robert Fatton Jr. notes, "the historical tendency of most Haitian leaders [is] to look at political power as an indivisible quantity that can be won collectively but that must be kept individually and exercised absolutely."[2] Jean-Jacques Dessalines, military commander of the revolt against the French and Haiti's first ruler after independence, made this intention clear: "if you [the Haitian people] either refuse or accept with reluctance the laws dictated to me for your well-being by the spirit that watches over your destiny, you will deserve the fate of ungrateful people."[3] This vision of strong leadership has been enshrined in most of the country's constitutions since 1801 as well as in the national psyche. Dessalines is a national hero. Busts and portraits of him are everywhere in Haiti and he is a nationalist figure that unites even those deeply divided by politics. Yet, each leader's cultivation of individual and absolute power generated opposition, domestic or international, that led to their undoing. Dessalines was assassinated; Jean-Claude Duvalier was forced into exile; Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by Raoul Cédras and then returned to power by the United States; while the presidency passed peacefully from Aristide to René Préval and back, Aristide, was driven out of the country in 2004. Haiti's tradition of autocratic leadership, as well as the political, social, and economic upheaval it has generated, has been a major cause of the endemic conflict in the country.

Leadership Transition as a Cause of Conflict

The violent leadership transitions in Haiti are a major cause of conflict for several reasons. First, the history of forceful transitions followed by retribution against the previous leader has generated a fear on the part of Haiti's leaders that they will be overthrown. To ward against this fate, they have often sought to reinforce their power through means that have both ignited conflict and, ironically, contributed to their downfall. For example, the Duvaliers consolidated their power by punishing any opposition, a policy that eventually led the opposition to force Jean-Claude Duvalier into exile. Even with the rise of democracy in Haiti, the pattern continued. While elected with 67 percent of the vote, Aristide was quickly overthrown by the military and returned to power only with pressure from the United States. Aristide subsequently adopted a myopic focus on solidifying his power, often through rewarding his supporters by way of corruption. Further, Aristide dismissed the army and surrounded himself with his own armed

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[2] Robert Fatton Jr., Haiti's Predatory Republic – The Unending Transition to Democracy (Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002), 13.
[3] Quoted in Fatton, 14.

guards for protection. In 2004, a group of these guards turned the arms Aristide had given them against him and led the movement that forced his ouster. Second, Haiti's violent leadership transitions have been extremely detrimental to the country's economy. The embargo that the international community installed to pressure Cédras into stepping down crippled the already struggling Haitian business sector, which has not recovered. As discussed in chapters on gangs, drugs, and the economy, Haiti's weak economy has exacerbated the gang and drug problems leading to insecurity and conflict. Finally, the norm of violent opposition has created a self-fulfilling expectation in Haiti that force is a legitimate means to leadership change. In fact, the only elected Haitian leader to serve a full, uninterrupted term is the current President Préval. While democracy is beginning to take root in Haiti, Préval is not immune to the possibility of violent opposition or overthrow.

Why have Haiti's leadership transitions so often been tumultuous? One reason is that institutionally, the Presidential system lends itself to the personalization of power and lacks the mechanisms for substantial change during times of political contention. In Haiti as in other Latin American countries, this has led to forced leadership change. As Juan Linz says, "The zero-sum game in presidential regimes raises the stakes of presidential elections and inevitably exacerbates their attendant tension and polarization."[4] On the other hand, by giving the leadership a clear mandate for a fixed length of time, the Presidential system can also generate stability.

Still, more important for stability than the form of government is the support of the population. The polarization of the Haitian people, probably both a cause and a consequence of its leadership history, has proven a challenge to the country's leaders. Haitian history has proven that to survive politically, a Haitian leader needs the confidence of the powerful in Haitian society: the elites who have the money and influence to create change; the lower class who have the numbers to do so; and the armed groups with the means to force change. In the past, when a leader has solidified power within one of these groups, he has invariably ostracized another, which in turn instigated his removal, again a zero-sum notion of power. Interestingly, each regime has tended to rise to power by appealing to those alienated by the previous regime and reacting against a previous leader's faults. For example, as a charismatic priest, Aristide appealed to those who were neglected and disillusioned under the Duvalier era, mainly the urban poor and the repressed. In addition, Aristide posed a threat to the power of the elites, leading to their support for Cédras. Richard Neustadt describes this cycle of fear and need with regard to a president's relations with his fellow government officers, but it also applies to a president's relationship with the people: "Their need for presidential action, or their fear of it, is bound to be recurrent if not actually continuous. Their need or fear is his advantage."[5] Thus, the president is in a position both to support and to ostracize certain groups, but he too needs and fears these groups and, thus, he draws power as well as vulnerability from his position.

At the same time, Haiti's close ties to the international political and donor communities mean that these groups must also be considered by Haiti's leaders as they have proven to be influential in Haitian politics. For example, when Aristide was first elected in 1990, many in

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[4] Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of Presidentialism," in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, *The Global Resurgence of Democracy. Second edition* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 129.

[5] Richard E. Neustadt, "The Power to Persuade," in Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (New York: Free Press, 1990), 31.

Washington opposed him because he was seen as too radical and resistant to their economic policy suggestions. The US Central Intelligence Agency supported the anti-Aristide political group Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH) and listed Raoul Cédras on its payroll. After Cédras' overthrow of Aristide, the international community put pressure on the military regime and designed Aristide's return. In 2004, sentiment again turned against Aristide and the international community did not stand in the way of his deposition. Thus, Haitian leaders must balance many different parties, all of which have shown that they can not only bestow power, but also take it away.

What Kind of Leader Does Haiti Need?

Even with last year's majority election of President Préval, the question of leadership is still a pertinent and heated issue. Presumably most Haitians would agree with Archbishop Msgr.. Kébreau that Haiti's leader should be "a man capable of serving and loving his country." Yet, what does this mean? What political system would select the best leaders for Haiti? What background is most effective for a leader? What style of leadership does Haiti need? Table 1 presents leadership characteristics for Haiti's recent leaders.

Leader	Political System	Power base	Style	Faults
François and Jean-Claude Duvalier	dictatorship	elite	strong front-men	repression
Aristide	democracy	urban poor	charismatic spokesman	corruption
Cédras	military	military	military General	lack of legitimacy
Préval	democracy	rural and elite	pragmatic conciliator	softness?

Table 1. Haitian Recent Leaders and Leadership Characteristics

In Haiti, the democratic system continues to be questioned. One man from the Haitian elite argued that with an 80 percent illiteracy rate among voters, democracy cannot work properly in Haiti as the uneducated poor are too susceptible to being paid for their vote. Others support centralized rule in light of the current security crisis. Many Haitians evoke the Duvalier era with nostalgia as a time of security and order and Msgr. Kébreau called for a return to strong leadership. On the other hand, those who suffered under Haitian dictators generally prefer a democratic, if unstable Haiti, to the repression of the past. President Préval illustrated this point of view by pointing out those in the room who had lost family members and suffered under the Duvaliers. These disparate positions illustrate the leadership challenge posed by a population polarized by fundamentally different experiences with the past. A further consideration is that

the international community embraces democracy, having proven that it will act to remove, or at least not protect, a leader it does not consider legitimate.

Whether their position was inherited, appointed, elected or imposed, Haiti's leaders have drawn power from diverse characteristics such as their support base, skills, and past experience. There has been no one formula that governs who gains and who looses leadership in Haiti. What are the most important qualifications and background to lead the country? While Aristide drew power from his populous powerbase in the poor, at the same time, he was in turn beholden to them and turned to graft to garner and maintain support. In contrast, Préval is widely praised for his honesty, which is now often emphasized as an important qualification for the office of President, and has the support of much of the elite. Also, unlike Aristide, he has work experience in agriculture and business, useful skills to run Haiti. Still, he is under pressure to maintain his support. Any background will have its benefits and liabilities, thus a president must use the benefits and accommodate for the liabilities.

While leadership styles have ranged from the strength of the Duvaliers to the charisma of Aristide, Haiti's presidents and dictators have tended to see themselves as powerful figures directing the country forward while centering power around themselves. This, as previously mentioned, has tended to contribute to their downfall. However, there are other forms of leadership and approaches to power. Writing on leadership in international negotiation, Arild Underal identifies three basic modes of leadership through: unilateral action, coercive action, or instrumental influence. Whereas coercive leadership is based on using rewards and punishments to impose one's preferences on another, instrumental leadership involves persuading others to work towards a common goal.[6] Préval's vision of a leader as, "someone who gets people together" and "pushes others forward," resembles Underal's instrumental mode of leadership. This more introverted and collaborative style of leadership can be very effective in contested political situations where rivals must work together. For example, Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany has relied on this form of leadership to rise to power within her party and to hold her coalition government together. Préval is similarly faced with the challenge of leading a coalition government.

On the other hand, Préval must also contend with the Haitian tradition of strong leadership as well as Haiti's security situation. Civil society leaders have criticized the President's technocratic, micromanaging style as well as his "lack of a backbone," while citizens have bemoaned his lack of vision and unwillingness to communicate, leading many to complain that the government is absent. He is further weakened by rumors of his ill health.

Préval can draw power from the position of president, which embodies a power to persuade: "The status and authority inherent in his office reinforce his logic and his charm."[7] Neustadt's description of a president's power of persuasion applies to both other members of his government as well as the citizens of the country. With a style less polarizing than those of the past, perhaps Préval will succeed in steering Haiti from the helm and dodging the storms that have swept previous leaders overboard. The key may rest in his ability to sustain a power base

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[6] Arild Underal, "Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management," in I. William Zartman, ed. *International Multilateral Negotiation* (Jossey-Bass Publishers: San Francisco, 1994), 178-197.
[7] Neustadt, 30.

that is less deep, but more broad than that of past leaders. Still, Haiti's security crisis, history of political instability, and economic problems, will continue to produce large and threatening waves. As Préval acknowledged, the "[Haitian] people have a traditional idea of leadership," that of "someone who imposes," and "it will take time for them to adopt a new vision of leadership." Yet these are some steps the President and his administration can take to encourage this change.

Recommendations

If Préval is to weather the current storms and maintain power in a country that has often seen forceful leadership change, he must **improve communication with the population and establish confidence in his leadership**. The answer is not to change his style by pretending to be what he is not, but to persuade the people to adopt a new vision of leadership by inspiring their trust in him. In short, winning support for his leadership style of instrumental influence as opposed to coercive action as Underal describes, or as Neustadt writes using the persuasive power of the office of president.

Short-Term Recommendations

While the President expressed a dislike for making empty promises and dealing with dangerous political questions such as the return of Aristide, political communication is not limited to such topics. Préval needs to **express to the people his hopes as well as his concrete priorities and plans for the country**. The five months that he spent garnering support for Haiti within the international political and donor communities has proven very effective as evidenced by the amount of donor support and a recent US State Department statement that he is "working well with the international community."[8] In the same way, Préval could use his upcoming travel around the country not only to learn of the people's problems and priorities as he indicated, but also to share his vision for the country and to garner their support. These travels, especially through interaction with local people and the corresponding media coverage will be essential to strengthening his image and helping the people to understand his style and personality.

Further, **meeting with the mayors** is a very important way to demonstrate the President's philosophy on the importance of local governments. It can also serve the purpose of asserting his leadership role, overseeing the current situation, and helping to coordinate the plans of mayors and local government officials with his national plans.

The national government would do well to **select, publicize, and complete several immediately visible high-impact infrastructure projects**. While Préval said that he will use his upcoming travel to inform townspeople which projects will be funded by international agencies such as the World Bank and the European Union, he did not mention informing them of projects spearheaded by his government. Although the aid community will likely be able to fund more projects, it is essential that the administration select several development projects that are government led, perhaps with the international agencies as partners. In this way, the people will

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[8] US State Department, "On-the-Record Briefing on the Haiti Core Group Meeting" (Washington, DC, February 1, 2007) <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2007/79749.htm>.

recognize the value and responsibility that the national government has to them. These projects will help generate respect for, and recognition of, the presence of the national government. By helping to foster a sense of national identity as well as support for the Préval administration, these projects could give the population a boost of confidence in Haiti's leadership before the post-election hope fades into disillusionment.

Another top priority should continue to be an **improved security situation**. While this topic is covered by the chapters on the security and gangs, among others, security is also a main threat to Préval's leadership. Improving the current situation will go a long way toward fostering and maintaining the support of the Haitian people.

Medium-Term Recommendations

In the medium-term, President Préval should continue to do what has won him much support across the country. He should **continue to establish a broad support base** by listening to and appealing to the power groups previously mentioned. It is essential that, unlike his predecessors, he not begin to favor or ostracize certain of these groups. As Haitian history has shown, favoritism is a recipe for overthrow.

Further, he should **continue to communicate openly and effectively with the international political and donor community**. Clearly the passage of the Hope Bill in the US Congress and the amount of international aid awarded Haiti is an indication that he is off to a good start. Donor coordination in the style of the 2006 Madrid donor conference should remain a priority. While international aid is currently a large part of the Haitian national budget, it is vital that President Préval maintain an overarching coordination of the efforts of the diverse and active aid community in Haiti. While efficiency is largely a matter for the aid and donor organizations, the government can play a role in its improvement though coordination. Not only will this continue to cement Préval's leadership position, but also it is important that the aid in Haiti is used effectively in order to secure future aid and eventually the aid community's withdraw once Haiti can manage on its own.

The aid community recognized the problem of donor coordination in Haiti and seemed ready to accept more direction from the government. That said, aid organizations often are reluctant to focus only on one type of project or limit their geographic focus, typical ways of coordinating their projects. One potential way to work toward coordination and maintain the leadership of the Haitian government could be to **establish a Minister for International Coordination within the government.** The Minister would be responsible for coordinating donors and overseeing and improving the efficiency of the use of Haiti's aid money. While this would not solve the donor coordination problem, it would be a constructive step toward ensuring that aid money is used effectively and in a manner directed by the government.

Long-Term Recommendations

In the long-term, the current administration needs to **build confidence in a peaceful transfer of power and a trust in elections**. President Préval has already made a significant step in this direction by saying that he will step down at the end of his term. The promise of an open

and fair competition for the Presidency in 2011 would do much to instill further confidence in the democratic system in Haiti. Elections that have not been free and fair have been detrimental to this notion, and so, it is essential that the campaigning period leading up to the elections, the elections themselves, and the post-election period are transparent and peaceful. Confidence in democracy in Haiti will give opposition groups an incentive to express their political differences by way of the ballot box instead of by violence. A future tradition of peaceful leadership transitions would go a long way to ending the endemic conflict in Haiti.

Haiti – The Absent State

Institutionalization

Since independence in 1804, Haiti has lacked the appropriate institutions or democratic culture that characterize the majority of modern states within the Westphalian nation-state system. The role that institutions play in fulfilling the duties of the state in other nations, such as the United States or most European countries, are not just deteriorating — they are in fact absent and have never truly existed. As a result, in over 200 years of survival, Haiti has never been a functioning state (as defined by Weber and discussed in greater detail below). The absence of institutionalization has contributed directly to the class conflict that has plagued the country over the same time period.

Before proceeding to a discussion on the role of institutionalization in fuelling conflict, it is necessary to understand what is meant by the terms state and institution. The essence of the pre-modern state was a web-like structure with an urban center, a political system in which the government attached itself to society and extracted resources; the state in essence was a bandit that was kept alive by robbing the populace of money, goods and services. As Karl Marx famously believed, the state was a hegemonic instrument used by the ruling classes to suppress everyone else. The fuel for change was growth, specifically, the realization that if the state provided security, the people would in turn consent to taxation — a tradeoff that benefited both in the long run. This Hobbesian conception of the state as keeper of the legitimate use of force to protect its population, both internally and externally, defines the modern conception of the nation-state. Sovereignty rests within the people, who give up a certain degree of freedom for protection and the provision of a basic level of services from the government.[9]

This relationship is essential to the functioning of a state, and the channels through which it is expressed are state institutions. Institutions cover the functions of the state in the security, political, and economic realms; they represent the legitimate presence of the state within the general population and therefore the consummation of the public/private pact implicit within modern state structures. States that both retain the legitimate use of force and provide basic services to its citizenry are *de facto* states; states that are internationally recognized are *de jure* states. States that fail to complete one or both of these functions are *de jure* states without *de facto* functions, or states in name only. In a state that is *de jure* alone, power is not filtered through institutions but is often consolidated in informal sectors. These states aspire to become *de facto* as well yet are often stalled in their pre-modern shape. Haiti is a *de jure* state with aspirations to become *de facto*; it has been stalled by endemic class conflict due to the absence of the institutions required to fulfill the public-private partnership.

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[9] Much of this discussion was drawn from a lecture given by Dr. Camille Pecastaing at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies on Jan. 30, 2007.

The endemic class conflict, discussed in a later chapter, that continues to plague Haiti stems from the absence of the appropriate institutions through which state power can be filtered and which therefore give it legitimacy. The strength and capacity of a state are measured by its ability to formulate policy; enact laws; control graft, corruption, and bribery; maintain transparency and accountability; and enforce laws.[10] The power given to it by its monopolization of the use of force must be channeled through the separation of powers, an independent judiciary, a military that is subordinate to civilian control, and security forces intent upon the protection of the people. Instead, in Haiti, power has traditionally been personalized within the executive; throughout most of the 20th century, Haiti existed as a 'strong-man state' under the Duvaliers.

Prior to the Duvaliers (and the previous US occupation in the early part of the century), Haiti was ruled by a series of military dictators in the strong-man style, with repression of the poor used as a political *habitus*. The politics of the belly replaced any nascent democratic culture that existed post-rebellion, as the acquisition of wealth through the conquest of state offices defined political life. The institutions of the state were used to secure the interests of the elites instead of securing the interests of the Haitian people. Early Haitian leaders such as Dessalines faced a choice: they could either abolish the plantation system and provide land rights to the former slave population, or they could continue the agrarian-based economic plan, make the state rich and therefore have the means to fight of the substantial external enemies at the time, including France.[11]

It was at this critical juncture when the first opportunity to place Haiti on the long-term path towards resolution of its class conflict was missed: instead of using state institutions to redistribute land and provide economic governance towards development, Haiti's leaders took the easy way out and opted to conceive of power in a zero-sum fashion. When they did this, they turned the state into a predatory democracy, a game of power in which political elites fought for supremacy and essentially ignored the Haitian people in their quest for control. Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, this pattern continued and the relationship between political society and civil society was subverted to the rule of the gun as opposed to rule by the people.

This subversion of political institutions to strong-man politics contributed directly to the weakness and ultimate failure of the state in the 1980s, when Baby Doc was forced from power. History, however, is not deterministic and Haiti faced an extraordinary opportunity in 1987 with the writing of the new Constitution. The 1987 Constitution reduced the President's constitutional powers, decentralized governmental authority, and established elected councils for local government. Yet, as a Creole proverb states, "a constitution is made of paper, but bayonets are made of steel." The exclusion of Haitians from any regularized political process due to the lack of institutions was, paradoxically, the result of initial overwhelming support for Aristide; he was plebiscited with an incredible mandate by the Haitian people, but he failed to create the institutions necessary to operationalize a democratic culture and ultimately solve the class conflict.

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[10] Fukuyama, Francis. "The Imperative of State-Building." In *Journal of Democracy* 15: 2, April 2004.
[11] Fatton Jr., Robert. "Haiti: the Saturnalia of Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule." In *Third World Quarterly* 27: 1, 2006.

The opportunity that Aristide squandered, to install Haitian institutions and fully implement the new constitution, was a deliberate choice on his part that condemned the state to eternal weakness. He chose to renege on the public-private partnership he entered into when he was elected president and instead followed the path of his predecessors and refused to exercise his power through institutional mechanisms. The populism that carried him to power (itself a symptom of the lack of institutions in the country, as there were no other effective channels through which the people felt they could be heard), eventually turned against him in the traditional Haitian fashion: through militarization and the seizure of political power through violence. The utter lack of institutions enabled Aristide to be ousted from power two times, an outcome he himself made possible by further weakening international efforts to implement the constitution.

Efforts to rebuild, or even just build, Haiti have been akin to trying to erect a house without first constructing a stable frame. As Alex Fils Aimé, head of MINUSTAH's Demobilization, Disarmament and Rehabilitation program (DDR) states, the Haitian people do not understand their own power, because their have never had the channels through which they could make their voices heard. This is due to a lack of fulfillment of the contract between society and the state, a contract that cannot be implemented without functioning institutions. In essence, the state has been absent in Haitian society because it has been too preoccupied with its own pursuit of power in a zero-sum game. In a state where even the most basic symbol of government functions, a civil registry of births and deaths, does not exist, there can be no resolution of the basic challenges that face most Haitians: clean water, food, educational and work opportunities, and a sense that the state serves its needs in exchange for physical protection. A judiciary that does not provide due process, security forces that prey upon the populace, and an elite that uses its position to suck the country dry of resources, cannot do anything but continually weaken the state and lead to growing frustration among the populace. As a result of the nonexistent development of formal, entrenched institutions, class conflict continues to the present.

Much of the discussion has been focused on internal indicators of state weakness; however, the international community has also played an important, although mostly inadvertent, role in the continuation of class conflict in Haiti. In keeping with the 'best-practices' mentality that many international institutions adopted in the 1990s, many found that no matter how much money was thrown at institutional-building programs (such as the creation of the Haitian National Police), without functioning indigenous institutions any external development would collapse once international actors left the scene. To further this problem, as William Holbrook of CHF mentioned, international donor agencies and organizations must avoid the trap of institutionalizing themselves within Haiti. Because there are no institutions through which funds may be channeled (which severely inhibits the legitimacy of the Préval government), they themselves take over the basic functions of the state. In addition, there is no international body capable of building government institutions as a focus of their strategy. As a result, international organizations may serve to further entrench class divisions by not creating the internal means through which conflicts can be resolved and institutions can be strengthened.

Haiti has been in a process of state-building since independence, with very poor results. This process has been hindered by the militarization of the state, the personalization of power, the class division of society, and a peasant-based economy. Haiti as a state is currently in limbo

between a pre-modern and modern state; it still has not gained the capacity or scope necessary to fulfill the social contract between state and society (something that it is only pursuing in earnest for the first time under the Préval government) and become a *de facto* as well as *de jure* state. The conceptualization of power within Haiti is slowly being changed from a zero-sum game towards a process of redistribution and decentralization. The road by which this must be done, however, is slow and bumpy.

Because of the lack of the institutionalization of power in Haiti, the mechanisms to change power have historically been violent, and because no institutions existed at the end of the 20th century, Aristide, the military, and paramilitary groups were able in succession to grab at power through undemocratic means. The incapacity of democratic institutions to function is directly due to the lack of appropriate channels through which power may be channeled. This absence of the state is the primary cause of the enduring class conflict still present in Haiti. However, change is on the horizon in the form of the Préval government. Local and municipal elections were held in Haiti in January 2007, the first time since the 1987 Constitution was implemented. The importance of these elections cannot be overstated; for perhaps the first time in Haitian history, a state structure that can represent the voice of the people is being put into place. The relationships that will develop between Haitians, their local representatives, and the central government will repair the broken state/society contract that has hindered the development of institutions in the past.

Recommendations

A nascent culture of institutionalization is growing within Haiti; however the state remains a shell in many areas. There are many different needs that must be addressed in the short-term, medium-term, and long-term, with the understanding that institution-building is necessarily a long-term project that must be aided by both internal and external political will. These recommendations do not give suggestions for specific institutions, such as the judiciary or national police, because these topics will be addressed more fully in other chapters of this report. Instead, they will address more general ideas of institutionalization in the state.

Short-Term Recommendations

Within the next year, **the most critical need facing local governments and parliament is technical support**; technical capacity will enable local officials to follow through on the essential delivery of basic services and also ensure that Haitians begin to develop a relationship with the face of government in a less-abstract manner than the previous relationship.

In addition to the technical support, **legislators and mayors must have their salaries paid in a timely fashion**. More than 80% of the newly elected legislators have never served in political office and they are not familiar with the Constitution. So that they continue to serve without falling prey to corruption, they must be paid on time.

In the absence of official civil registries for births and deaths, it is important to follow through with the Prime Minister's plan to **establish national voter ID cards.**

Although the Prime Minister has recommended amending the Constitution's electoral laws (given their expense to the state), **the electoral system should remain as it is** in the short run. The Constitution retains its legitimacy and in the absence of strong institutions, any effort to amend it may just become a tool for manipulation.

Revenue collection in the form of taxation must be improved; this point relies heavily on the development of stronger border controls and a more legitimate Port Authority presence on Haiti's coast. Haiti's economy is under-taxed: taxes make up only about 8% of the GDP (according to World Bank figures), whereas in a 'typical' country the level is doubled. Strengthening the collection of customs duties would solve the revenue crisis facing Haiti and substantially strengthen the role of the government in relation to international organizations.

Medium-Term Recommendations

A program for civic education of the general populace is essential in the next three to five years if democratic institutions are to become entrenched within society. Not only would such a program teach Haitians about how government works, but it should also adjust expectations to realistic levels. Institution-building is a long-term process in which results may not be immediately realized and therefore, civic education should stress the daily role that government plays in providing basic needs while stressing that greater change will only come with time.

Political parties remain personalized within Haiti; in the last national election 114 parties participated, many of them organized around a person rather than a program or ideology. In the medium-term, **institutionalization of the party system must be a major goal** of the government. Once political parties are tied to ideas rather than individuals, they will be more likely to work through government institutions to achieve their goals rather than grab for personalized power within a zero-sum environment.

International organizations must take care to **formulate a bottom-up approach to the development of institutions**, so that once they leave in the long-run, they will not take with them the leadership, skills, and capacity necessary for institutions such as the judiciary and the national police to function effectively. In addition, international organizations must begin **to channel donor aid through government institutions**, as opposed to spending it directly themselves. This will add legitimacy to the government and also help to relieve its revenue crisis.

To move from a pre-modern to a modern state, one with both *de jure* and *de facto* power, **the government must take care to secure its borders**. The absence of the state in border areas and along the coast is a telltale indication to Haitians that the government is still not fulfilling its part of the deal – physical protection. It undermines government authority and contributes to illicit drug trafficking, which fuels a great deal of the informal economy in Haiti.

Long-Term Recommendations

The transformation of personal leadership into collective leadership, in the words of President Préval, is an essential long-term goal in the establishment of strong institutions in Haiti. Sovereignty as it has traditionally been constructed must change ownership, from the

political elite to the masses. This can be done in the next five to fifteen years, but it will take concrete measures on the part of the government and international institutions to ensure that it happens.

In the long-run there must be a **clearer position on the part of the government as to what exactly is requires from MINUSTAH.** MINUSTAH is not operating under an executive mandate, and although it was granted UN Chapter VII powers, it cannot become entrenched so that when it leaves, security and disorder return (as it did when international forces pulled out in 2000).

In the short-run, international institutions are only really able to create organizations that provide certain services; they do not become successful institutions until they offer solutions to real problems, and they address long-term problems by listening to the people, not to 'best-practices' literature.[12] Therefore one of the most important goals for the long-run is to **move from order imposed through power towards the institutions that will maintain that power in the future.** But these institutions must be accountable to the people in that they provide the mechanisms to redress grievances that the people face. Implicit in this recommendation is that a level of trust must be created between the government and the Haitian people, which can only be done through consistent decentralization and accountability on the part of the government.

Economic governance programs, as implemented by the World Bank, must continue their work in formalizing the majority of the economy. The centralization of both political and economic activity in Port-au-Prince has hindered the development of the rest of Haiti. **Economic institutions should focus in the long-term on developing strength outside of Port-au-Prince and should also reform land and property rights.** In addition, economic investment should have a demand-driven focus at the grassroots level to ensure the proper institutionalization of community-driven development.

The story of Haiti has been a story of an absent state; the lack of institutions has contributed directly to class conflict because their absence has not allowed for dialogue or communication between the people and the elites, which in turn has allowed the elites to continually repress the majority of the poor populace. However, the political will now exists and this is a final opportunity that cannot be missed to enact real change in Haiti's institutions. Whether or not this will happen depends on the government's ability to prioritize goals in the correct order and successfully manage the very difficult transition to democracy that lies in its future.

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[12] Ottaway, Marina. "Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States." In *Development and Change*, 33: 5, November 2002.

The Haitian Parliament

"I don't have a job and can't feed my kids or send them to school," said one voter, Espira St. Fleur, 56. "So, hopefully this government will give us a chance for a better life."[13]

Of all Haiti's institutional gaps, one of the most notable over its two centuries of independence, is the absence of a functioning parliament that has performed its democratic role properly. Without a functioning parliament, violent conflict between different spheres of society is almost inevitable. It is imperative to have a parliament that can represent the various groups in society, address their grievances, and give the people a forum to show their disapproval of governmental politics without having to resort to street protests and, ultimately, violence. In Haiti, the absence of such a body has led to an endemic conflict that has yet to be resolved. Nonetheless, the 2006 election of the first democratically elected parliament in many years has provided the Haitian state as well as the international community with a window of opportunity within which it can act to strengthen the Parliamentary institution and, thus, directly address the endemic conflict in Haiti.

The Role and History of Parliament

As a directly elected institution, parliament is positioned between the people and the President, making the executive accountable to it for its actions, including decisions about allocation of the budgetary resources, and the nomination of judges and ministers. This means that a well-functioning parliament is pivotal for the execution of any democratic mandate. Parliamentarians are the ones most likely to be committed to democracy, rule of law and the welfare of a state's citizens. Their view is justified by their role as vigilants over the executive. Parliament is, therefore, an important prerequisite for democratic governance.

On 29 March 1987, the latest Constitution established Haiti as a presidential republic, with the president both head of state and head of government and a bicameral National Assembly, with a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. Chapter II of Title IV of the Constitution, which deals with the legislative branch, clearly gives parliament the duties of oversight over the executive and judiciary and gives it the sole right to make and interpret laws relating to "all matters of public interest." Without effective democratic oversight, presidents become autocratic despots, more interested in their own self-enrichment than in the situation of their country, as explained in the chapter on leadership.

In Haiti, history has been against the development of a strong parliamentary system. Isnel Pierreval of the Peace Caravan (Caravane de la Paix) sees the autocratic nature of the political system since independence as well as the fragile nature of the Haitian state in the past twenty years as having prohibited Parliament from fulfilling its constitutional duties. The principle of

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[13] New York Times: "Haitians Go to Polls to Elect Their First Parliament in Three Years", 4/22/2006

exclusivity in the political sphere that developed during colonial times as well as the institutionalized repression of the slave system all led to the establishment of an elite rule and to the repression of the opposition from the onset of statehood. The fact that it was the army that liberated Haiti meant that the country was founded on military principles and extraordinary rule, with a strong man leading the country, mostly disregarding the opinion of the majority. Whenever a nominal parliament would stand up to such a strong man, it would be dissolved and rule by presidential decree was normal.

At the same time, the 1980s economic crisis drastically increased poverty and revealed the incapacity of leaders to implement democratic rules and the weakness of national institutions. The middle class emigrated and left behind a social disequilibrium easily exploited by political leaders that formed movements around their persona rather than stable political parties. The Post-Duvalier era of high instability is, therefore, a consequence of the country's history of weak institutions and utter inexperience of the Haitian people with democratic governance. As William Holbrook from CHF International put it, 200 years of extraordinarily bad governance, centralized around a leader, civilian or military, has made the political system vulnerable to dubious leadership in form of a strong leader. Rather than developing a strong state, Haiti developed to be a strong-man state. Into this political context entered Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's last despotic ruler.

Aristide and Parliament

Haiti's transition from dictatorship to democracy was marked by the absence of parliamentary oversight over the executive's actions. When Aristide won Haiti's first free elections held in 1990, he was hailed as the prophet of a better and brighter future, finally empowering the Haitian people to decide their own governance. After his inauguration, however, Aristide learned the constraints of his office. He wanted to establish a plebiscitary democracy, without restraints imposed upon his presidency by a bureaucracy or parliament. He did not understand the importance of a well-established and functioning parliament and consequently deprived himself of a necessary tool for legitimizing his executive decisions.

Once elected president, Aristide showed an utter disdain for the democratic institutions established by the 1987 Constitution, pushing for his own way instead of compromising. This led to the alienation of large parts of the Haitian political elite and the quick worsening of the already bad relations with parliament. Increasingly, Aristide came to rely on despotic rule rather than democratic decision-making. The presidency again came to overpower the legislative, which still lacked the institutional depth to stand up to this new challenge. Ultimately, this lack of democratic legitimacy led to the first coup against, and exile of, Aristide only a few months after his inauguration and the ensuing brutal dictatorial rule of Raoul Cédras.

Aristide returned in 1994 to finish out his term. In 1996, René Préval was elected President in elections that the opposition deemed fraudulent, and in 1998, the government was not able to conduct the necessary legislative elections. By January 1999, Préval dismissed parliament and ruled by presidential decree until the end of his term in utter disdain for the democratic need of a functioning parliament. Legislative as well as presidential elections finally held in 2000 threatened to be so fraudulent that all major opposition parties boycotted these

elections, while only about 20% of the electorate turned out to vote to return Aristide to the presidency. By 2000, Aristide had decided to rely solely on his own person and the movement that had formed around him. He returned to the presidency with no legitimate parliament behind him. Although most observers agree that Aristide's Fanmi Lavalas would not have needed to rig the elections, Aristide felt that he needed to consolidate his hegemonic presidency by controlling a majority in parliament, making it his de facto puppet and robbing it of its legitimacy. This time, however, the Haitian people took their disapproval to the streets, protesting against the fraudulent elections and bringing the country to a virtual standstill. On 29 February 2004 Aristide resigned as President and went into exile in South Africa.

The continuation of the habits and patterns of the old Haitian rulers also meant that Haitian society was not developing away from its autocratic roots toward a more participatory democracy. Rather, Haitians continued to view the state as a predatory instrument of the powerful, upon which they were not able to exert influence. During Aristide's years in power, parliament was dissolved or completely disregarded. Members of parliament, rather than being loyal to their office and their constitutional role, were loyal to the president and became part of his nepotistic network. Instead of being an independent body of oversight over the executive, parliament was an accomplice in the continued disempowerment of the Haitian people.

The 2006 Parliamentary Elections

Historically, there has always been a low turnout for parliamentary elections in Haiti, mostly due to focus on strongmanship and the office of the President. However, the 2006 parliamentary elections witnessed voter turnout of over 60%. As DDR director Fils Aimé puts it, there is a strong hope that a legitimate parliament will help turn the page to a new, more peaceful and democratic chapter in Haitian history. Although President Préval's Lespwa party won a majority in both the Chamber of Deputies and Senate, it can only rule through a coalition government. For the first time in Haitian history, it seems that the executive has come to accept the need for and role of parliament. Both Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis and President Préval have pointed to the need to maintain good relations with Parliament and keep it fully involved in all governmental projects. Such projects waiting for approval include an anti-corruption bill as well as one to formalize the informal sector of the economy.

As another sign of the appreciation of parliament, President Préval waited for the parliamentary elections to be complete and took his oath of office in front of the newly constituted parliament. All this puts the new parliament into a position where it can actually control and assess the executive. During our dinner with Haitian law students, we learned that the parliament is finding its place in Haiti and taking its supervisory role more seriously, frequently disagreeing with the executive and challenging its decisions. For the first time, the government budget was passed on time. Parliament, nonetheless, continues to be featured very little in the news, mostly because the tradition of focusing on the leader and his actions continues to be persistent. At the same time, Lionel Delatour of CLED points out that the pressure on elected officials is very high as they now have a small window of opportunity to prove to the Haitian people that democracy is the best way to govern and develop their country.

Recommendations

Although there has been substantial progress in recognizing the importance of a functioning parliament to end the endemic conflict in Haiti, more needs to be done. Parliament today is very deficient, with Members of Parliament lacking basic IT support or personal bureaus from which to conduct their daily business. As UN Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) Edmond Mulet of MINUSTAH put it, the major challenges facing Haiti are the triple transitions from conflict to peace, autocracy to democracy and from failed state to nation-state. For these transitions to be successful, it is vital to have a well-functioning parliament with educated parliamentarians, willing to fulfill their democratic mandate.

Short-Term Recommendations

Most members of parliament are first-time officials with no formal education or knowledge of the actual meaning of their functions. Not too few of them believe that they stand above the law. It is, therefore, **vital to develop, together with the Haitian parliament, educational programs on parliamentary accountability, professionalism, and oversight**. Many have pointed out that education has not prepared Haitians to be democratic. Haitians are in need of positive role models to show them the virtues of competence, honesty and hard work.

As Prime Minister Alexis has mentioned, all members of government must **respect the constitution.** This is only possible when all understand and internalize what it means to be an elected official. As long as this is not clear, corruption of the legislative and executive, *inter alia*, will continue to be rampant. Although the president and the prime minister respect the duties of the parliament, it is also important for members of parliament to understand their duties as laid out in the constitution. Furthermore, when voting on legislation, parliamentarians should consider the medium- and long-term implications of their actions.

A few programs by USAID as well as CIDA already strive to increase the professionalism of the political parties in general and the parliamentarians in particular as to the specifics of their role. These programs need to be significantly expanded in the short-term, thus reaching all parliamentarians and making parliament an effective and well-functioning democratic institution.

As SRSG Mulet and others have pointed out, any school in the United States is better equipped than the Haitian Parliament. Parliamentarians currently lack staff, computers, desks, and they must share small office spaces with each other and their secretaries. These conditions are not favorable to the development of a strong parliamentary tradition.

It remains vital to have **quick and visible improvement in parliamentary infrastructure in the short-term.** Therefore, some quick impact programs from bilateral donors need to be designed. Such include, but are not limited to, the development of proper working spaces from which Members of Parliament can conduct their daily business and the supply of proper IT hard- and software.

The Inter-American Development Bank has recently approved a program of technical assistance to the Haitian parliament. This $260,000 program is designed to improve the

organizational and administrative structure and the quality and efficiency of parliamentary support services and is to be implemented over the course of 18 months.

Parliament itself has recognized its administrative and organizational shortcomings and developed the Programme de Développement du Parlement Haitien (PDSPH), which can serve as reference point for donor community involvement in parliamentary reconstruction efforts. Stronger public institutions would lead to a more efficient allocation of international funds, thus leading to less wasted resources and more measurable outcomes.

We have heard many times that **Haitian institutions need to be re-empowered and be in charge of the implementation of development projects**, thus giving them more credibility. As long as the institutions lack credibility, development projects will lack it as well. Therefore, the international community must encourage participatory democracy and parliamentary efficiency in order to help Haiti move away from its despotic past.

Medium-Term Recommendations

As Msgr. Kébreau has pointed out, there is a sense that the country is moving without a clear direction or anyone steering it. People who grew up in a system of injustice and do not know anything else need leaders to restore order and faith in the workings of the government. On our visit to Bel Air, there was this sense of easy discouragement and the continuous feeling that the government has let them down. Discontent with government institutions is high, although only few of the community leaders we met have ever tried to run for public office. The disengagement from the public sphere is remarkable and unsettling. While there is a high sense of entitlement to aid, there is also a lack of self-realization. This highlights **the necessity of increasing the awareness within the media and the citizenry of the workings of Parliament and of promoting elections.** Parliament must come to be seen as an effective tool to address grievances and enable citizens to actively change their current situation. If people are not educated, they will fall back into the same old patterns of relying on despotic leaders rather than on themselves.

Parliamentarians must necessarily connect with the disaffected people in the slums and show them peaceful ways to promote their needs as well as provide them with democratic tools to improve themselves. The majority of community leaders in the slum areas are still young and could effectively be engaged in the political process as candidates for parliamentary seats, as long as they can be made to see that such a career is not only attainable but also desirable.

A woman we met on the streets of Bel Air had just successfully run for public office. When asked why she decided to do that, she said that to her, engagement in the political process meant being able to contribute to ending the cycle of violence in the slums. As more people come to associate peace with development, they must find parliament effective for addressing their grievances. One way to achieve more citizen awareness is through the continued use of the Caravane de la Paix. A road-show educating the population about the correlation between peace and development, it can also be used to help people bring their grievances before parliament. A responsive parliament, therefore, is an essential part of ending the endemic violence in Haiti.

As SRSG Mulet pointed out, parliamentarians are positioning themselves against the government, which means that political party building is an urgent matter. President Préval said that people would always prefer voting for representatives they know and not for a president that most have never personally met. This means that **parliamentarians should be on the forefront of development projects.**

There is also an enormous amount of dependence on international aid, and the international community will have to play a significant, if fading role in the development of Haiti. As William Holbrook of CHF and others have noted, the donor community must move from just assistance toward sustainable development. This again frees up political space for the active engagement of parliamentarians in the administration of development projects. As parliamentarians become more accountable to the electorate they represent, one measure of their engagement can be their active role in addressing the grievances faced by the people.

President Préval plans a "road-show" with his ministers in the various constituencies of Haiti to be able to see first-hand what kind of development projects are mostly needed in what areas. **Taking along parliamentarians to show the president around their native regions and help him identify priority development projects that can be financed out of the current budget** would give more credibility to the parliamentarians, to the president, and to the development and governance processes. The top-down approach to development has not worked in the past; the international community cannot impose development projects from abroad. At the same time, the president cannot make decisions about such projects alone. It is time to try a bottom-up approach where parliamentarians are actively involved in identifying development priorities with the local population.

Long-Term Recommendation

Once members of parliament have been educated about the meaning of their work, have been provided with the proper technical as well as administrative support, and have increased their standing in the public eye, it is time to develop the idea of improving Parliament even further. **International parliamentary exchange programs**, first with other nations developing their democratic institutions and later with mature democracies can engage **members of parliament from Haiti in an active exchange of new ideas and best practices for parliamentarians worldwide.** Such programs can deepen their appreciation for democracy and can help in actively engaging parliamentarians in the fight against official corruption. The more committed parliamentarians are to the democratic process, the more it is likely that a root cause of the endemic conflict in Haiti can be eliminated.

Judicial Incapacity

The historic and ongoing dysfunction of Haiti's judicial system is inextricably linked to the political, economic, and social ailments that continue to plague the country. It is both a source and product of the vicious cycle of conflict that has reinforced its weaknesses and denied justice to the Haitian people. As a source of conflict, judicial incapacity and the virtual nonexistence of the rule of law have laid a foundation for rampant vigilantism, corruption, violence, and instability. It is also a product of Haiti's history of conflict and injustice, from the time of colonization through the two centuries of "strongman" rule and political volatility. As expressed by Professor Robert Fatton Jr., the judiciary has traditionally been a "political weapon"[14] — merely an instrument of despotic rule used to exact punishment on political opponents and to fortify the positions of those in power. Challengers were judged by the whims of a dictator rather than by the rule of law.

At the risk of repeating the contemporary discourse on this topic, this chapter will provide a brief synopsis of the judiciary's role in Haiti's endemic conflict and the consequences of Haiti's judicial weaknesses. It will then detail some of the underlying problems inherent to these weaknesses. Finally, it will offer some key policy recommendations for rehabilitating the judicial system and promoting the long-term sustainability of the rule of law.

Synopsis and Consequences

Haiti's judicial system is based on French Napoleonic Code, and a criminal code from 1832 that has been infrequently amended. Former Haitian law students explained that, while the codes were originally "beautifully written," they are in desperate need of revision to conform to the realities of Haiti's situation. The Constitution calls for an independent judicial branch as well as civil and legal rights, such as the right to a fair public trial, the prohibition of arbitrary arrest and prolonged detainment, and a ban on interrogation unless a suspect's choice of counsel is present during the process. However, as Pierre Espérance of the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH) explained, these rights are widely violated and the judiciary is by no means an independent body. As it stands, it has few functioning institutional powers, and many sitting judges, some of whom are completely unqualified, were previously selected through a politicized appointment process by the Ministry of Justice. William Holbrook of the Cooperative Housing Foundation (CHF) reiterated that sentiment, and described the "impotent and crippled judicial system" as one that has generally "never functioned." These traits can be attributed to the relentless legacy of a weak and incompetent judiciary: if not under the heavy influence of the executive, many in the judicial branch have vigorously pursued their own interests because of insufficient oversight, disorganization, and institutional fragility. Those circumstances are part and parcel of the judiciary that exists today.

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14. Professor Robert Fatton Jr., interview by author, Charlottesville, VA, January 29, 2007.

In fact, almost every interview conducted for this report tied Haiti's endemic conflict in some way to judicial incapacity. The weak judiciary and absence of the rule of law have perpetuated debilitating security crises and thus prevented economic development — two of the dire consequences associated with Haiti's conflict. This cycle has impeded job creation and the collection of government revenue that could otherwise be used to strengthen government institutions and services. Emphasizing this point about security, Isnel Pierreval of Caravane de la Paix stated that when "people lose faith in the justice system, they take the laws into their own hands," and as a result, society has no incentive to abide by the law. Violence, gang activity, kidnappings, and arms and drug trafficking are testimony to the failings of the judicial system. The state is paralyzed under these conditions, incapable of protecting either its citizens or the investments of the private sector. As the security situation has become the top priority of Haitian officials, they have been unable to fully dedicate their attention to the institution building that is necessary for the long-term development of the rule of law. As Holbrook summarized, "[N]othing can happen in an insecure environment without the rule of law."

Both President Préval and Prime Minister Alexis readily acknowledged that without the enforcement of laws and a professional and independent judiciary (and police force), the crime and unrest will continue to discourage local entrepreneurs and drive away businesses. Max Antoine, Director of the Presidential Commission for the Management of Border Development Funds, articulated this causality by stating that the "weak judicial system causes weak investment," because businesses not only weigh the security risks, but they also expect legal rights and protection of their assets. The security and legal uncertainties repel the economic development that Haiti requires. Therefore, the population will remain jobless and rely on whatever means possible for survival. Unless judicial reform is successful, there is little chance that Haiti will be able to move past its history of endemic conflict.

Underlying Problems

While there are countless problems identified with Haiti's judicial system, there are three that were consistently cited on the ground and are regularly discussed in the literature. The first two problems are interrelated: systemic corruption, which is deeply embedded within all aspects of the judiciary, and impunity.

Judges are poorly paid, and thus can be swayed by the lure of "money for justice." Because they possess a certain degree of power, they use their position to extort or bargain with defendants, who may be hardened criminals or simply unfortunate victims brought up on phony charges. A judge may also convict an innocent person because someone seeking revenge was able to bribe police and judicial authorities. Furthermore, judges risk retribution if they actually rule according to the law, thus there tends to be little motivation to do so. From the perspective of a suspect, corruption is often justified as the only alternative because the criminal code does not permit plea-bargaining.[15] Both judicial reform advocates, like Espérance, and community leaders, such as Msgr. Louis Kébreau, Head of the Episcopal Conference, complained of the "justice for sale" mentality and impunity that are prevalent within the judicial system. The lack of oversight and the weak nature of judicial institutions allow this behavior to go unpunished,

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15. Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefing Nº14, *Haiti: Justice Reform and the Security Crisis*, 31 January 2007, 5.

which continues to poison the system and deteriorate the rule of law. And "if you don't have rule of law," as Holbrook asserted, "someone with money will always be able to corrupt the system."

One of the more outspoken realists on these topics is Mario Andrésol, Chief of the Haitian National Police (PNH), who publicly denounced the judiciary on 18 December 2006. According to Andrésol, who recognizes the need to reform the police force, the judges did not like his criticism, but their actions completely undermine the PNH's efforts to lawfully arrest and detain known criminals. He and others alluded to the fact that after the police have completed sound investigations and arrested obvious delinquents, judges have released them. On the other hand, the police have not always enforced the rulings of the judges. Overall, the clash between the judiciary and the police over corruption and impunity has only made it more difficult for justice to be served.

Sadly, corruption and impunity seem to have captured the judicial system. Without an independent council or investigative unit to examine and oversee the activities of judges, there is no accountability. Thus far, judicial authorities have not faced any repercussions. As cited in the International Crisis Group's Haiti Policy Briefing, a 2006 report by the Inter-American Commission stated that there has never been a judge prosecuted on the grounds of corruption.[16] Moreover, the judicial code of ethics is limited, if followed at all, and a proposed update to the code has yet to be passed into law.

The third underlying problem that corresponds to Haiti's judicial incapacity is logistical, relating to a general lack of resources and case management. Bernard Craan from the Center for Free Enterprise and Democracy (CLED) explained that civil servants have "no computers, no desks, and no staff," and the judiciary is not likely to be any different than the norm. Edmond Mulet, head of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), described institutions as hollow "shells," with no capable bureaucratic staff to support their operations. Physical infrastructure, such as formal courthouses and offices, is frequently in disrepair, if it exists at all. In addition, Espérance stressed that Haiti needs more qualified judges, as well as training and technical assistance. Training for judges, lawyers, and legal staff has been severely inadequate, and those who are competent will find that they have no equipment with which to do their work. As a result of the shortage of even basic office supplies, case management and record keeping, which are vital to any judicial system, are impossible. There are regular delays and lost documents during a transfer of a case between police and the courts. In some cases, there are no arrest records for those who are in prison, and no criminal records from previous crimes. The International Crisis Group's interviews have revealed that, even when criminal records are available, the database is under the correctional authority, not the police or the courts.[17] Consequently, while currently there is significant funding directed toward logistical improvement and training, it will take time to see any major progress.

The problems listed here are not at all exhaustive, but they do illustrate the immense obstacles that the government must overcome. The following section identifies some of the

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16. Ibid., 10.
17. Ibid., 8.

strategies the government should employ (or is currently considering) to advance its efforts in judicial reform and promoting the rule of law.

Recommendations

Given the condition of Haiti's judicial system, every aspect of reform is a priority. However, it is unrealistic to expect all reforms to be accomplished in the immediate future. Some reforms, such as the cultivation of a civic culture that encourages respect for the rule of law, will take generations to incorporate into society. The role of the international community is essential in the short term, to help the government with the initial steps of reform, and in the medium term, to ensure the sustainability of these reforms. The donor community and the Haitian government must coordinate strategies and goals so as to maximize the efficiency of their efforts and ensure the greatest chances for success. As David Delgado of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) emphasized, the international community also must make a commitment to Haiti's long-term development if it is to entertain any prospect of progress; otherwise, as in the past, the efforts and funding now will amount to little in the future. They must be certain to formulate a transition plan to assure that Haitian institutions will be able to function effectively in the eventual absence of international actors, especially within the judicial apparatus. Throughout this challenging process, the international community must play an integral part in reforming and supporting changes to the judicial system. The following is an abbreviated list of short-term and medium-/long-term recommendations for the Haitian government.

Short-Term Recommendations

Pass the pending legislation that would determine the status of the magistrates, reform judicial training and legal studies through the National Magistrates School, and establish the Judicial Council, granting it the ability to oversee judicial operations. The Council should also be given checked authority to enforce violations of the code of ethics. Furthermore, careful consideration should be given when determining the composition of the Council's members. As Marilyn Allien of the Haitian Heritage Foundation (LFHH) cautioned, to ensure just decisions by the Council, it must also include voices independent from the judiciary. Judges cannot solely be responsible for issuing judgments on their colleagues.

Establish a reformed code of ethics, perhaps based on the suggestions of the National Association of Haitian Magistrates (ANAMAH).

Police-Judicial Relations: While refraining from overt executive influence, President Préval should assist in building communications between Justice Minister Magloire, PNH Chief Andrésol, and other key members of the police force and judiciary. It is critical that these parties work together throughout the reform process and establish a constructive relationship that will reinforce their efforts.

Create an independent judicial review board, such as the Judicial Inspection Unit, which, among other duties, would initiate a formal vetting process and investigate the activities

of judges. Subsequently, it should provide its findings to the Judicial Council for action. All judges who are found guilty of violating the code of ethics should immediately be removed from their position. In debating the role of the Council, the government will have to confront the difficult decision of choosing punishment or "forgiveness"—removing judges from their posts but not pursuing prosecution—for judges found guilty of such violations. Given the institutional weakness of the Haitian government, it may have to sacrifice justice for stability. This is far from an ideal choice, especially when trying to build the rule of law. The Council should therefore set an example of prosecution in cases it deems egregious and consider forgiveness for lesser violations.

Begin the constitutional amendment process of allowing extradition to the United States. This would alleviate the immense burden on the court system. In the meantime, as the International Crisis Group recommends, Haiti should work with its neighbors to establish a regional tribunal that would take on difficult cases, such as those involving drug trafficking.

Launch a viable judicial protection program that will protect witnesses, lawyers, judges, and other legal administrators from the risks of fulfilling their responsibilities. Threats on the lives of those involved with cases have discouraged dedicated judges from enforcing the law and led some to unethical practices. It is likely that threats have also deterred committed individuals from pursuing legal careers. By creating a protection program, the Haitian government would be simultaneously strengthening the judiciary and rule of law.

Institute a judicial salary adjustment based on an individual's qualifications and position. The pay for judges, for example, is currently too low to attract competent and skilled professionals. In order to professionalize the judicial system, salaries must be raised.

Overhaul the penal and prison system. This includes a lengthy process of investigations and records review, and the creation of a special court that will complement the process and assist with the backlog. Every prisoner should know his/her rights, which should be respected by the courts and police. The government should guarantee the right to counsel for anyone charged with a crime, and suspects should be presented with plea-bargain options. In addition, the government must also construct more prisons and renovate those that are dilapidated. Prisoners should be separated according to age, gender, and crime.

Establish a national case and criminal records database. The Haitian government should work with the international community to obtain technical assistance and resources that would eliminate some of the judicial system's administrative deficiencies.

Encourage young law school graduates to devote their talents to the transition within their home country. The government should also reach out to legal professionals within the Diaspora who may be willing to assist in the development of a stronger legal community in Haiti.

Engage with the public. Local communities, as well as individuals within the legal community, should partake in the reform process. This is the only way that the long-term process of civic learning will take place.

Medium-/Long-Term Recommendations

Confront issues of accessibility, especially with the poor and the non-French speaking population. All materials should be available in French, as well as Creole to ensure that all Haitians have access to justice.

Encourage diversity within the legal community by working with women's groups and schools to give women the opportunity to pursue legal careers. The government should also reach out to rural areas and smaller cities outside the capital to ensure that opportunities, as well as legal services, are available.

Continue to match prison capacities with the needs of the judicial system as a whole. The Ministry of Justice should develop reintegration and education programs for suitable candidates in prison.

Continue a dialogue with countries that can relate to the civil law system, such as Canada and France, to work on long-term reforms to the codes. In many instances, Haitian codes are obsolete, and by working with countries that have a developed judicial system, Haiti would benefit from both their experience in the law and technical assistance. Encourage legal exchange programs for Haitian students.

Create a long-term strategy for the future of the judicial system. Systematically review short-term accomplishments and failings, taking steps toward the long-term goals. Haitians must be committed to the reform process and willing to participate in the changes.

Conclusion

The weaknesses of the judicial system and absence of the rule of law have played a major role in Haiti's endemic conflict. Judicial incapacity has resulted in long-term negative consequences that will take time, dedication, and resources to repair. These consequences, namely related to security issues and economic development, are a part of the perpetually damaging cycle that has contributed to the persistence of this endemic conflict. Many problems that are inherent to the current conditions of the judicial system must be resolved in order to move forward in the reform process. Systemic corruption, impunity, and serious logistical deficiencies are some of the significant hurdles that will challenge reforms and the resolve of reformers. This chapter provided a brief list of policy recommendations in the short- and medium-/long terms that could serve as steps through this difficult process. Building and strengthening Haiti's judiciary and rule of law will ultimately assist in ending the endemic conflict. They are and will continue to be fundamental components of any solution for sustainable progress and peace.

Security

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Haitian National Police And MINUSTAH

Despite the restoration of democratic governance and the first signs of economic revival, the government of President René Préval faces daunting security challenges that serve to perpetuate the conflict in Haiti. Unable to guarantee the security of its citizens, Haiti suffers from widespread violence, crime, and impunity caused by a historically weak state security apparatus overly dependent on international military support. Lacking a state monopoly of coercive force, Préval and the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, face the core challenge of a security gap and the need to re-establish law and order as the source of the ongoing conflict. The government must effectively confront the illegal armed gangs and criminals terrorizing the slums, curb the rising drug trafficking problem, and contain the emergent kidnapping for ransom industry in order to win the respect and trust of the population. Successfully disarming the gangs and pursuing serious police reform supports every broader goal of the new administration from job creation, education reform, infrastructure, private sector investment, and governance. The Haitian National Police (PNH) needs to shed its reliance on MINUSTAH and transition to a more independent state security arm while global dynamics still allow for an international peacekeeping presence and aid attention.

Conflict Analysis

Haiti lacks the means to deal effectively with violent conflict. In spite of the recent progress with a peaceful political process and the presence of foreign security forces operating under the UN mandate, the security situation in Haiti remains dangerous and unpredictable, with violence primarily restricted to Port-au-Prince and a few other cities. Tasked with restoring order to Haiti, the national police force and UN peacekeepers struggle to provide adequate security in the face of escalating criminality, drugs, kidnappings, and armed gangs. Although the security situation has improved since the election of the Préval administration, Prime Minister Alexis admitted that effectively tackling the widespread violence and insecurity is the primary challenge for Haiti. The government of Haiti (GOH) lacks the capacity to guarantee internal security since their instruments to execute the state monopoly on violence are largely inefficient. The inadequacy of the GOH to ensure the state monopoly of legitimate force is the central problem of the conflict-prone society. In order to open a path to peace and development in Haiti, the government with the assistance of the international community must reinstate a monopoly of coercive force that effectively transfers responsibility for law enforcement to the PNH while maintaining regional and international support of security efforts.

Haitian National Police (PNH)

The legacy of politicization, corruption, and neglect by Jean-Bertrand Aristide resulted in a history of poorly equipped, underpaid, and sometimes dangerously corrupt PNH. Spread thin

and minimally trained, the PNH presently lacks the capacity to protect citizens and to confront the regional smuggling threats in drugs, weapons, contraband, and human trafficking, flowing through the porous ports and borders. Max Antoine of the Commission of the Development of the Border lamented the fact that only two police officers protect every 10,000 inhabitants along the border shared with the Dominican Republic.

For only 7,000 police officers nationwide currently maintain public security in a law enforcement situation where the major infrastructure and police facilities are non-existent, inadequate, or destroyed. The current Division Headquarters in Port-au-Prince also offers no suitable facilities for any of the five principal PNH organizations. The majority of the 200 police stations require rebuilding and rehabilitation and only about 400 PNH vehicles are operational across the country. The police continue to suffer from a shortage in basic police equipment in radio communications and defensive equipment as well as the absence of trained and experienced commanding officers in the field. Allegations of political interference, criminal behavior, and police brutality continue to shake public confidence in the PNH and tarnish the image of an institution trying to rebuild itself. The human resource asset of the PNH suffers from the absence of training and development plans appropriate to the exercise of its police functions. Virtually incapable of conducting trials, the already dilapidated prisons overcrowd with each additional arrest as street crime escalates daily and court procedures move at a snail's pace.

Appointed in August 2006, Director General of the PNH Mario Andrésol completed a comprehensive purge of the police force under the supervision of MINUSTAH in late 2006 and dismissed 525 members of his force. At considerable risk to his own personal security, Andrésol arrested dozens of officers involved in drug trafficking, organized kidnapping rings, and politically motivated extra-judicial killings. His efforts to clean up the police force make him a symbol of reform and yet a target for retribution by his former, fired police officers and political opponents in the judiciary. His reputation as clean and intolerant of corruption within his force has started to redeem public faith in the PNH and their duty to serve the people. However, a brooding conflict continues between the police force and the judiciary as judges accuse officers of complicity in kidnapping, drug trafficking, and corruption while Andrésol blames the problem of impunity on magistrates for accepting bribes and releasing guilty criminals.

United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

Recognizing that Haiti constituted a threat to international peace and security in the region, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1542 on April 30, 2004, establishing MINUSTAH. With its military forces under the command of Brazilian Major General Dos Santos Cruz, the mission operates at an authorized strength of 7,200 troops from 45 different countries and 1,951 civilian police. Guatemalean Mulet heads MINUSTAH as the UN Secretary General's Special Representative (SRSG) and the mission supports the Government of Haiti by ensuring a security climate conducive to good governance, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance delivery. In response to concerns raised by the People's Republic of China (PRC), the United Nations Security Council unanimously extended the MINUSTAH

mission for eight months to 15 October 2007 rather than the requested and recommended full year from the date of expiration on 15 February 2007[18].

MINUSTAH helped Haiti through three rounds of elections in 2006, leading to the restoration of democratic governance at the presidential, parliamentary, and local/municipal levels. Despite this progress, Haiti still faces significant challenges with security foremost among them as ongoing MINUSTAH/PNH joint operations seek to break tight gang control of slum areas. Despite intensifying public outcry over allegations of civilian casualties in MINUSTAH anti-gang operations, SRSG Mulet emphasized that "everyone in Haiti supports the UN mission." MINUSTAH also continues to help the GOH promote the rule of law and reform its police, judicial, and prison systems. Further progress to stabilize the security environment in Haiti in the short-term depends on MINUSTAH's continuing presence and long-term international donor commitment. At a US-hosted meeting on 1 February 2007, 15 key donor and troop contributing countries and seven international organizations unanimously agreed to support future renewals of MINUSTAH's mandate, while stressing their long-term support for Haiti.

Discussion

National Police Reform Plan

Haitians have never experienced a police force that worked to protect the population from crime. Past security forces killed, tortured, beat, and extorted money from the people they were meant to serve.

Disbanding the military and instituting the PNH in 1995 failed to overcome endemic corruption, patronage, and the perception of the state as a means to personal enrichment. Due to the historic precedent, a major training and weeding-out process will be essential to strengthen capacity, professionalism, and the respect for human rights within the PNH, which is necessary to regain public confidence. For over two decades, donors spent tens of millions of dollars initiating police reform with few concrete results. In the early years following the end of intensive US training of the PNH, officers were largely trained without defined standards and the lack of discipline and respect for the command structure has never been fully corrected.

Formulated by MINUSTAH and the Haitian authorities with backing by Security Council Resolution 1608 (2005), the Haitian National Police Reform Plan proposes to combat insecurity by setting up a professional police force. The reform plan hopes to expand essential policing functions to a target of 14,000 well-trained and well-equipped officers in the next five years, without prejudice to quality at the rate of 1,500 new officers per year. At the same time, the Plan reflects a general consensus that 18,000 to 20,000 police and other security officers would be required to cover the full range of security needs in Haiti and provide for a supplementary strategy for the development of specific capabilities such as a Coast Guard, border control and

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[18] In September 2006, Haiti sponsored a resolution in the General Assembly regarding security in Asia that favored the Taipei position on the Taiwan Straits. While the resolution was not enacted, the Beijing threat to veto the MINUSTAH mandate on the deadline of its expiration was credible as the PRC has successfully terminated UN missions in Guatemala in 1997 and Macedonia in 1999 due to their diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

surveillance, fire brigades, and penal system. The target figure will be attained through the recruitment of new personnel, together with the review of the officers currently employed. Vetting the current personnel within two years remains a priority; the disciplinary and training record of each officer is examined; personnel unfit for police service are dismissed and new adequate training is provided. The GOH budget can support the staffing expenditures but lacks the allocation for capital investment in the development of the PNH, supplemental funding from international donors is necessary.

Although previous efforts to reform the PNH into an effective, efficient, and accountable force largely failed, the difference with the new Reform Plan lies in the commitment of Police Chief Andrésol and the base of senior officers he creates around him and in the absence of a paranoid head of state to undermine the reform. Yet Andrésol's public repudiation of corruption and reputation as a clean official may not be enough to overcome the large number of dismissed police officers who will likely take their academy training and intimate understanding of the PNH underground to the already sophisticated gang networks.

Peacekeeping Efforts

With a mandate to assist with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs for all armed groups in Haiti, MINUSTAH reached agreement with the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR) on a program in May 2005. The program to address criminal armed groups in the slums of Port-au-Prince was not supported by a central authority with the discipline to demobilize individuals; traditional DDR program was inappropriate because the Haitian case dealt with small gangs of bandits, as discussed in a following chapter, and not with organized rebel groups. Yet President Préval revived Haiti's DDR program in August 2006, creating the national committee headed by Presidential Advisor Fils Aimé to oversee the process. The current program offers technical training and the possibility of micro-credit and participation is limited to rank-and-file gang members. MINUSTAH implements the DDR program, registering the weapons and managing the orientation and training facility.

Since early August 2006, MINUSTAH has been reducing the gangs by seizing their land and holding their territory, and setting up checkpoints on the roads leading into and out of the slum areas. SRSG Mulet described the MINUSTAH effort as laying medieval siege to Cité Soleil and "squeezing" until the gangsters are pushed out. The mission has experienced a programmatic shift away from DDR and toward violence reduction and community development projects designed to create jobs, infrastructure, and visible services to bolster the state's presence in Cité Soleil, Bel Air, Martissant, and other armed group strongholds. If gang members refuse to disarm, they are targeted by special PNH units backed by MINUSTAH troops and police (UNPOL).

Recommendations

National Police Reform Plan: Professionalizing and strengthening the Haitian National Police is vital to creating the necessary security environment for economic development, investment, and the democratic process. Police reform that includes **vetting current officers**

must be announced formally, implemented urgently, and monitored transparently on a rigorous timetable with accountability to the population and international donors.

Independent PNH: Under the leadership of police chief Andrésol, the **PNH should work to take the lead on anti-gang operations and strengthen relations with communities** as they transition to become the primary security force in the country.

MINUSTAH Squeeze: In a joint effort with the PNH, UN peacekeepers must continue to squeeze the gangs by seizing and holding their territory in slum areas until the armed criminals are pushed out of Port-au-Prince and the country. The joint forces must **capture gang leaders and prosecute them immediately** in order to prevent gangs from simply moving from one slum to another.

Community Violence Reduction Strategy: The programmatic **shift from a conventional DDR strategy to a community violence reduction strategy focused on job creation** is the key to long-term stability. Security forces must concentrate their efforts on the armed gangs in the red zones and help those communities to actively participate in reducing violence and crime.

Haitian National Police

The reforms will not occur quickly since citizen trust in the PNH has been deeply damaged over two decades of erratic democratic transition and the state does not yet possess the monopoly on legitimate use of force necessary to provide adequate security. With financial and technical aid from donors, immediate practical steps for the new government and MINUSTAH must include fully implementing the National Police Reform Plan by **establishing a clear timetable to vet every officer at least once a year** after the point of graduation from the academy. The international community and MINUSTAH must **provide technical and material support to assist the PNH in conducting the vetting process** in addition to maintaining and **regularly updating a database of offenders as well as an official registry of all police officers** and their weapons. The force must concentrate on retaining, retraining, arming, and mentoring cleared individuals while removing guilty individuals and allowing those without pending criminal charges a soft landing in a retraining program. Standards for recruitment, merit-based promotion, career development, and a new code of conduct must be determined and then expressly communicated to the existing force as well as the Haitian population to help establish a sense of self-esteem essential to the consolidation of a democratic police force. An urgent need exists to **improve PNH officer conditions of employment and benefits** as well as building the 200 commissariats called for in the police reform plan and considering co-locating some with health clinics, legal aid offices, and potable water sources, where women and children gather.

In the medium term, the PNH must expand beyond securing Port-au-Prince to **incorporate the fledgling Coast Guard and border control** in order to physically regain control of the docks and border crossings and ensuring customs and ports fees are paid into the state treasury. In keeping with the plan for the next five years, PNH training plans must be fully developed and PNH capacity built to **expedite the basic training of as many cadets as possible to meet the anticipated staffing targets** while strengthening the existing force. The PNH lacks the managerial capacity to undertake the desired development phases and requires administrative

assistance from the international community in the next few years to establish sustainable institutional support. Efforts to strengthen the PNH are essential to rebuilding democratic institutions and creating the security environment necessary for economic development. As a comprehensive PNH reform represents a long-term challenge, the rebuilding of a professional police force capable of ensuring the rule of law depends not only on the quantity of officers and caliber of weapons but also on the quality of training and character they possess, which ultimately requires material support, oversight, assistance, and patience. Without such steps, a police force risks contributing to the conflict rather than helping to solve it.

Another important strategy in the long-run campaign to create a healthy relationship between the police and the population involves **extensive police participation in community activities.** According to the National Human Rights Defense Network (RNDDH), "People+Police=Solution" is becoming a more popular slogan and mentality among the population since civilians are gradually relying more on the PNH than MINUSTAH, who many view as inept and abusive. In the face of the kidnapping surge, more Haitians accept continued MINUSTAH presence as necessary and far better than the alternative of an immediate UN departure. Yet the PNH must capitalize on the positive shift of public opinion in their favor and learn to take the lead in anti-gang operations and gradually allow MINUSTAH to assume a secondary and back-up role. Several community policing initiatives have been successful when PNH officers visit schools, sponsor local sporting events, participate in community development projects, and meet regularly with community groups to fight crime. In particular, the communities of Del Mar and Tokyo in Bel Air revealed that the relationship with the police force has significantly improved in recent months due to combined efforts with the local population to push out the gangs. The experience of most internationally sponsored reconstruction programs demonstrates that long-term external engagement is required to re-establish the monopoly of force and yet the UNDPKO has operated in Haiti since 1993. Rather, the national police can greatly profit in the long-run from the structural changes necessitated by intervention if Andrésol can succeed in emulating a more hierarchical and respect for chain of command within his organization while peacekeepers remain in Haiti.

MINUSTAH

Co-sponsored by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Canada, France, Peru, Panama, and the United States, the unanimously approved UNSCR 1743 stresses operations in support of the PNH against armed gangs, to accelerate efforts to reorient DDR resources towards a comprehensive community violence reduction program as decided in Resolution 1702 (2006), and to provide operational support to the Haitian Coast guard in order to address cross-border illicit trafficking of drugs and arms. Despite the fact that the GOH's August 2006 decision to revive DDR interrupted MINUSTAH's reorientation towards a comprehensive community violence reduction strategy, the mission should focus in the short run on stabilizing conflict areas and providing alternatives to criminal activities through job creation and the use of peaceful community leaders and civic groups in enhanced law enforcement efforts. According to US Embassy Political Counselor John Mariz, the current strategy of anti-gang operations with MINUSTAH and PNH forces squeezing the gangs from red zone communities and preventing the possibility of return to recaptured neighborhoods is essential to the full restoration of security in Haiti. International efforts in the medium term should also strengthen civil society and extend Haitian government

control to conflict areas. The Bel Air stabilization program offers a model for future efforts and yet, the lack of perimeter security in Bel Air allowed gang leaders to escape to Cité Soleil. MINUSTAH and the PNH **should arrest and prosecute gang leaders as quickly as possible** under the constraints of a corrupt judiciary, preventing them from relocating again in another slum and continuing to squeeze the armed gangs until they are eliminated.

The Haitian government should also **embrace stabilization initiatives in Cité Soleil,** similar to the innovative United States program that integrates security and development and strengthens government presence and local institutions, Haiti's most dangerous neighborhood and a persistent source of instability. The Haiti Stabilization Initiative (HSI) aims to improve access to police and justice, strengthen local governance, provide vocational training, and to create jobs through infrastructure and public works projects. The GOH must also incorporate the work of NGOs like the Caravane de la Paix with broader international efforts in order to gain initial access into red zone communities and make the way for projects. The HSI will support other international efforts to foster conditions for longer-term assistance projects and private investment and could serve as a model to be replicated by other donors throughout the country in the long run.

Brazil's leadership of MINUSTAH represents a change from its traditional disinclination to engage in peacekeeping. The Lula government remains steadfast in leading MINUSTAH, despite domestic political opposition and a lack of popular support. Fourteen Western Hemisphere nations contribute half of MINUSTAH's strength and **it is vital that the "Friends of Haiti" heavily involve the Latin American countries in order to ensure the survival of a peacekeeping presence.** The Haitian government must capitalize on present international goodwill and attention from a diverse group before competing interests for aid and consideration shift to greater US concerns in Iraq and Afghanistan. With Taiwan as the elephant in the Security Council consultations room on Haiti, as it was recently on extending the Liberian diamond sanctions, the GOH must act with far greater discretion in its dealings with the PRC. The departure of MINUSTAH in the near term would be "catastrophic and prone to chaos," as Joseph Delva from Reuters predicts. Although the PNH must accept responsibility for security in Haiti in the long run, MINUSTAH is necessary to maintaining order and combating the gangs in the short and medium terms. Acknowledging criticism for negotiation with armed gangs, President Préval stressed the need to disarm gangs and dismiss corrupt elements of the police force at whatever cost, which vastly differs from his police chief's policy against negotiation. Préval, Andrésol, and Mulet must reconcile tactical differences and speak with one voice in order to send a message to the citizenry that the forces are working to establish an effective security arm.

Gangs

The prevalence of gangs within the Haitian society is not only a causal factor of endemic violence, but is also a response to the vacuum of a functioning government and society. It is both symptomatic of the present conflict and actively fuels future conflict. It is a vicious cycle quite difficult to break for gangs provide much of what the Haitian government cannot or will not provide for its citizens: security, employment, even meager rations of food. Gang activity both causes insecurity and benefits from the impunity within the country. Although many of the evils plaguing Haiti today are interwoven, priority should be given to security, rule of law, education and employment in order to effectively tackle the current gang situation.

History plays a large part in the gang violence that has manifested itself in recent years. Although Haiti was the first independent black republic that successfully broke the confines of the colonialist oppressors and declared independence in 1804, the democratic tradition never became ingrained within the workings of government. Peaceful transitions and effective elections have been absent. The militaristic mentality that allowed for the overthrow of the colonial system continued to permeate society for the next two hundred years. Duvalier ("Papa Doc") initiated the Tonton-Macoutes, a paramilitary group designed to maintain his power, "Baby Doc" Duvalier had the Leopard Battalion; and Aristide had his Chimères to ensure his stranglehold on Haiti. Aristide further agitated the problem by the dismantling of the army in 1994. According to Isnel Pierreval, Project Manager of Caravane de la Paix, this action left a void among the security institutions of the country, where the new police force could not make the transition and citizens who took up arms met no consequences.

Two types of gangs have evolved in Haiti in recent years: political and criminal. The politically motivated gangs were highly active in the time predating the 2006 presidential elections, though activity slowed around the time that the elections took place. Criminal gangs have been consistently active because they are not affiliated politically; they are easily enlisted to kill and kidnap for the promise of money. Prime Minister Alexis spoke of both his and Préval's negotiations with gang members in an attempt for disarmament. Their efforts must be commended, but as it was noted by a Reuters journalist, Alexis cannot negotiate with the criminal gangs because they cannot be found. The transient nature of gangs is problematic. Even when MINUSTAH manages to push gangs out of an area, they are able to regroup and migrate elsewhere. Underground gang activities, some joined by members of the Haitian National Police force, are extremely difficult to remedy. When PNH Director Andrésol, was asked about how the reformation of the PNH will proceed in light of alleged active gang members as part of the force, he replied that investigations will take place and that a willingness to clean the force and gain accountability does exist.

The lack of quality, government-provided education has fueled gang activity. According to Prime Minister Alexis, an education plan is at the forefront of the government's agenda, as more than 500,000 school-aged children are not currently attending school. In a meeting with community leaders around the Bel Air and Tokyo neighborhoods, it was noted that 80 to 90% of

parents that can afford to send their children to a private school do so without any assistance from the state. One of the community leaders, a trained teacher, stated that teachers are poorly regarded in society and, consequently, are not paid well. He attempts to be a good teacher, though often finds himself focused upon his own hunger. When children are afforded the opportunity to attend school, the education they receive is sub-standard and leaves them ill-equipped to face the outside world. They are disgruntled by the lack of opportunities that await and their anger oftentimes manifests itself in gang violence. On the other hand, without an opportunity for education, many children seek gangs as their only option to combat the miserable, bleak situation in which they find themselves. Presidential Commission Director Antoine for the Development of the Border Region, noted that there are 12.5 million children aged 15 to 25 years old who are not going to school or working. As a result, they can easily be coerced to kidnap and engage in drug activities for money. It is essential that the youth be educated and paid to work, though this is no easy task when no employment opportunities are within sight after graduation.

A lack of employment opportunities strengthens the pull of gangs. William Holbrook of CHF International noted that part of this problem is rooted within the 200 years of centralized leadership and economy in Port-au-Prince that encourages migration from the countryside. Swarms of people come to Port-au-Prince in hopes of opportunity. What they find instead is a lack of infrastructure and education, as well as the high illiteracy rate, unemployment rate and poverty levels. The abject poverty in which the average Haitian lives fuels violence. Matt Huber of IOM noted that under Duvalier in 1972, Haiti was referred to as "the Pearl of the Antilles." Presently, deforestation due to lack of alternatives has forced more people into Port-au-Prince with many children and no viable option for sustaining a livelihood. The children become delinquents and act out due to hunger and misery. The lack of jobs leads to frustration with the government and, eventually, criminal activities exhibit this discontent. According to Samba Boukman of NCDDR, people are willing to tolerate violence because it may be the only way of escaping the misery. The whole of the population doesn't approve of crime, though when people are hungry, they will join gangs for food. Although gangs can provide food, they are not equipped to fill the void of professional training and schooling. Alix Fils Aimé of the NCDDR stated that an important goal is transforming the relation that the gang members have within the communities. It is necessary to create opportunities and conditions where guns are not needed and demonstrate that the sum of the benefits and available opportunities is greater than the sum of the criminal activities.

An irresponsible, unprofessional media has exacerbated the gang difficulties as well. SRSG Mulet of MINUSTAH noted that in their campaigns of terror, such as Operation Baghdad and the attempted Operation Baghdad II, gang leaders have manipulated the media in order to publicize their dubious plans and calls for violence. A gang leader will call a meeting and the media responds by offering air time. Gang leaders, drug traffickers, rapists and kidnappers are able to hold court, publicized by the media institutions and gain ill-gotten legitimacy. The irresponsibility of the media worsens the rule law deficiencies in Haiti.

Weak institutions and a lack of rule of law have emboldened gangs and left an open door for violent crime. Until living wages are paid for honest, professional work, gang activity will be a temptation for police officers, like others in society. Police have been involved in

kidnappings, a known gang fundraiser, and the problem has escalated to the point where the average Haitian family avoids involving the police in these situations, due to fear that the police may actually be party to the kidnapping plot. Should the kidnappers be apprehended, the corrupt judiciary is easily bought and sold by gang members. Pierre Espérance of the human rights group, RNDDH, noted that the problem of impunity permeates many facets of the government. When the police arrest kidnappers, the judges are paid off and no prison time results. The combination of the corruption within the PNH and the judiciary create a consequence-free system for gang members and others who have the money to purchase justice.

The breakdown of the rule of law feeds gang activity in another manner – the loss of foreign direct investment and development on the island, both which would lead to employment opportunities and alternatives to a life within the gangs. President Préval noted that a climate of justice is absolutely necessary and that this year's budgetary focus will be on justice and the police because without safety (safety being defined as judicial safety for goods and property), no investment will result. Préval also spoke of his intentions to install institutions to encourage private investment in order to increase state revenues. Fear of kidnapping, violence and corruption within the government has kept investors out of the island. An increase in investment and a tighter reign on the corruption within the government would allow for tax revenues to be collected in order to provide essential social services, such as education and health care. Investment and proper allocation of revenues can make significant strides in addressing the abject poverty and despair thorough which most Haitians must endure. Possibilities of education and employment would notably reduce the need to rely on gangs for survival.

Recommendations

Because the gang problem permeates many aspects of the Haitian society, the issue must be addressed from several different angles, within the short-term, medium-term and long-term.

Short-Term Recommendations

Continued international focus on Haiti (UN, NGOs, etc.) to provide an environment capable of reform and to prevent further deterioration of the security situation. The key to addressing gang violence in the most immediate sense is the continued support from the international community. It is essential that MINUSTAH continue its involvement in Haiti to ensure a climate of increasing stability. Gangs benefit from a chaotic environment in which impunity reigns. The collaboration between the PNH and MINUSTAH is important in that it provides both a sense of legitimacy to the operation and Haitian ownership.

Grassroots, community-based projects ("trickle up" instead of "trickle down") with specific focus on use of community leaders. Community-based grassroots projects are an effective weapon in addressing the gang violence within Haitian neighborhoods. Organizations such as OTI and IOM have had great successes with such projects. Projects driven by community leaders are extremely beneficial in that they are able to mobilize the community for action, support and to drive the gangs and violent offenders out of their neighborhood. Matt Huber of IOM spoke of interference by gang leader, BiBi, in various Cité Soleil projects. Within

the Bel Air neighborhood, the collective frustration of the community allowed youth leaders to effectively drive gang members out of the area in order to complete projects. Also, the community-driven projects afford a sense of ownership for the results. The smaller, short-term projects emanating from groups such as IOM or USAID produce visible results that encourage future community support. NGOs and international organization should focus their funding on such projects to reap the positive rewards of community engagement.

Disciplined, professional media behavior. The role of the media and their interaction with gang leaders must be addressed immediately. As previously mentioned, the media attention paid to known gang leaders and the willingness to cover press conferences on their behalf lends an air of legitimacy to criminals and criminal activity. The media must not be used as a pawn. Proper media training funded by the international community or even adoption of a code of ethics in the most instantaneous sense must be pursued.

Continued emphasis on DDR. The DDR program is of utmost importance as well. Gang members are in possession of artillery more powerful and capable than those issued to the Haitian National Police. The work of Fils Aimé and the NCDDR must be supported in funding (Haitian government and the international community) and physically by MINUSTAH. Beyond mere disarmament, gang members must be convinced that actual benefits exist in exchange for relinquishing a life of crime.

Medium-Term Recommendations

Focus on security to encourage the return of investment and tourism. In the medium-term, the focus must be drawn to the security situation. Although this is no easy task, vigilance is essential on this matter in order to encourage the return of investment and tourism within Haiti. As mentioned, increased job opportunities and collection of government revenues will follow. MINUSTAH support and continued training and reform of the PNH is an important step. Increased revenues can be directed towards increasing the size of the police force.

Beyond mere disarmament in the short term, **development of rehabilitation programs and vocational training for ex-gang members is imperative.** The work of Fils Aimé must be continually funded and NGOs should focus their attention on funding such programs. Training programs are essential for the sustainability of security. Gang members must be given an alternative to violence, self-sufficiency is that alternative.

In order to increase efficacy, **MINUSTAH must improve relations within the Haitian community.** Although many claim they are grateful for the stability MINUSTAH brings, when community leaders were questioned about current operations they replied that MINUSTAH was initially successful in pushing criminals out of their neighborhood, though now they have resorted to accosting innocent youths and even engaging in theft when searching residences. Wild, unconfirmed media reports of skirmishes between MINUSTAH and gang leaders aggravate this relationship by possibly exaggerating death toll figures and fabricating reports of civilian casualties. If MINUSTAH is to successfully tackle insecurity, they must make amends within the communities.

The PNH must also address community relations and visibility. Although the reform process begun under Mario Andrésol is commendable, the police must recapture a notion of credibility and legitimacy after many years of flagrant corruption. Although the current police force is painfully small when compared to the needs of the country, an increased police presence must be felt in order to uphold the rule of law.

Long-Term Recommendations

Educational reform is also a key piece of the puzzle. **Children must be armed with an education and hope for the future** so that gangs are not their sole option. Special attention must be paid to **encouraging teachers to return to Haiti and training of additional educators.** Curriculum must be standardized and relevant in order to give Haitians a chance in the increasingly globalized marketplace.

Reform of the PNH and judiciary is necessary to sustain a system in which rule of law is maintained. To constantly comb these institutions and fire corrupt members is only a temporary solution to the problem. Without a sense of accountability and oversight, corruption can and will continue. International organizations such as NDI and the like can play a role in the reformation process. **Gangs must be discouraged by the threat of consequences and legal punishment, not encouraged by a complete vacuum of law and order.**

Drugs and Arms

Regardless of the investigational topic or hypothetical recommendation, all aspects of Haitian endemic conflict and developmental challenge are rooted in the trafficking of drugs and small arms. What began as a limited venture by politicians to win the hearts and minds of citizens has developed into a multi-million dollar industry with no remorse for the disastrous effects it unleashes on this struggling island country. The trafficking industry is conveniently modeled by the free market principles of supply and demand, both of which begin beyond Haitian borders. This industry remains lucrative for traffickers because Haitians generally do not use the drugs transiting through Haiti, but they increasingly desire weapons for self-protection. By utilizing the chaos that has gripped the nation over the last decades, opportunists have established a criminal transit hub in Haiti for the re-export of South American drugs to the United States and import of internationally manufactured small arms into Haiti. Thus, no other policy can be effectively implemented in Haiti until the trafficking market is disrupted and personal security is returned to Haitian citizens. This section defines *how* to disrupt the trafficking industry through a focus on demand reduction, thereby creating a stable environment under which other development policies can flourish.

When considering where the issue of trafficking truly began in Haiti, one must concentrate on the most basic principles that drive markets: supply and demand. Seeing as that demand induces supply, the former will be more heavily investigated here, though most current efforts to end trafficking focus on the supply. Within the demand investigation are two pertinent components: external and internal Haitian demand. External demand for drugs comes largely from the relatively high drug consumption in the United States. This demand has long been a problem for both the United States and the region, leading to the heavy South-North transfer of drugs from countries such as Colombia to the United States.

The demand chain runs as follows: external drug demand from the United States generates a regional market to satisfy its needs, some of which are fulfilled via Haiti. This external demand then creates an internal drug demand within Haiti to serve as a link between drug-producing countries and the United States; the drugs entering Haiti are largely *not* for consumption, but rather for re-export to the United States. The drug re-export business then leads to a demand for a second product — small arms. Small arms are required to protect drug shipments and ensure efficiency in the drug trading business that often includes racketeering, rape, and murder. This results in a sense of vulnerability amongst the civilian population who partake in the second type of gun-demand — that of personal security. With drugs as a good and weapons as a currency, these four areas of demand comprise the mechanism that principally describes the trafficking industry in Haiti.

Haiti's internal drug demand is largely for profit. The direct transportation of drugs to the United States has become somewhat difficult for countries south of the United States, requiring new and innovative techniques to partake in the US drug market. The answer is smuggling through Haiti. By "out-sourcing" to Haitians the final, most difficult leg of transport,

and thus transferring the burden and risk, the annual $10 million to $100 million drug trafficking industry alleviates the most challenging tasks in the process. In addition to the profits made by Haitian individuals transferring the drugs, there are also ancillary benefits such as local prestige, power, and respect that emerge from this industry. When combined with the monetary benefits, the trafficking of drugs becomes a financially and socially lucrative trade for the enterprising members of the impoverished Haitian society.

Therefore, the external drug demand found in the United States drives the Haitian internal demand. Yet with such a profitable market and almost no government regulation, how is one to ensure that deliveries are made and goods received? Enter the use and trafficking of small arms in Haiti. As stated by a representative of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), "Drug traffickers enjoy the violent instability because it creates a corridor by which the transport of drugs can continue unhindered." The demand for small arms is self-evident when one considers the value of these drug shipments; the extreme level of poverty requires that any means of income be heavily protected, especially if the income source is illegal.

Small arms entering Haiti to protect the movement of illegal drugs create a secondary reason for internal demand of guns: personal security. As more armed bandits began to roam the streets of Port-au-Prince, individual citizens could not rely upon the Haitian National Police (PNH) nor the international community to provide personal security. Civilians began to acquire small arms as a means of self-defense. According to Fils Aimé, head of the DDR, this lack of personal security led politicians to provide small arms to personal security guards for physical security and also constituents in an effort to win hearts and minds. According to Delatour of the Free Enterprise and Democracy Center (CLED), other politicians such as President Aristide used anger to obtain office, but in doing so, created a society that fed off anger and established drug traffickers and gang leaders as role models. Unfortunately, these effects grew beyond the control of politicians, further deteriorating Haitian society and bolstering the drug and small arms trade.

Just as there exists an external drug demand which erodes Haitian society, so too is there an external drug supply with complementary damaging effects. Within only a few hour's sail or flight, drugs can be deposited anywhere in Haiti from northern South America with ease and efficiency. The Haitian Coast Guard is essentially non-existent and the international forces in Haiti are thoroughly preoccupied with the gang problem in Port-au-Prince. In the rural area located near the border with the Dominican Republic, there are roughly two PNH officers for every 10,000 citizens, making this a prime entry point for the trafficking industry. Thus, mitigation of the drug supply largely depends on Central and South American countries preventing the *export* of drug shipments as opposed to Haiti interdicting their *import*. Unfortunately, this is far from the reality witnessed in the Caribbean over the last 20 years.

A similar supply-demand relationship exists for the gun market in and about Haiti, yet in a somewhat different direction. It is perhaps shocking to learn that the two greatest external sources of small arms to Haiti are the Dominican Republic and the United States. Even more curious is the exchange between the latter and Haiti. In efforts to support its neighbors to the South, the United States has supplied the Haitian military and police with small arms for over two decades. Though this seemed a benign relationship, many small arms were resold on Haitian streets by individuals working for the military and police — something that was only

worsened when President Aristide disbanded the Haitian Army. Today's Haitian law enforcement is confronted with American M-16s in the streets of Port-au-Prince because of an unfortunate combination of foreign political assistance and poor domestic civilian-military relations in Haiti.

Additionally, the United States black market is now directly transferring small arms to Haiti in exchange for drugs. Upon re-export from Haiti, the drugs are often taken to geographically advantageous locations in the United States, such as Florida. There, the drugs are traded for cash or small arms, which are then transported back to Haiti for use by gang lords or for sale to civilians who desire personal security. Via these mechanisms, drugs and small arms are circulated through Haitian society because of the inability to control the supply and demand of these contraband goods.

Recommendations

When looking at the short-term recommendations, a two-pronged approach must be taken: one to change perceptions of demand and the other to change practices of supply.

Short-Term Demand Mitigation Recommendations

Increase regional efforts to end external demand. It would prove tremendously effective on both fronts if the Caribbean community and the United States visibly demonstrated their desire to assist Haiti via more active patrolling of borders and greater cooperation among the region's law enforcement divisions. Delatour of CLED stated that if the US does not also bolster support for the Haitian border patrol, Haiti will have an extremely difficult time establishing any sort of defensible frontier. This assistance need not come purely in the form of funding or equipment either. For example, the DDR's Fils Aimé highlighted the fact that the US has the legal ability to enter Haiti and arrest drug dealers, yet has not once acted on this unprecedented capability. This is not a level of cooperation that should be wasted, yet there does not appear to be any intent on the part of the United States to act upon such cooperation.

Demonstrate presidential leadership on the arms and drugs issue and provide vision to the people of Haiti. Haiti must have leadership from within, and as many of those interviewed clearly stated, this leadership must start with the president. Specifically, the Haitian people are looking for the president to provide his vision for the future as well as the visible examples of leadership they expect in a democratic leader. Using the momentum of this leadership, Haiti can target the strongest driver of demand and the weakest link in supply and seize upon them if a realization of short-term changes is to occur.

Begin community-based projects with financial incentives to community workers. The government and international community must realize that drugs are trafficked for profit. The people of Port-au-Prince who traffic drugs must be targeted by development agencies and the federal government and bought away from their habit by stable, less dangerous and better-paid jobs based on community improvement projects. Holbrook discussed a CHF workforce training program and small-to-medium enterprise development with the explicit goal of enticing Haitians toward legitimate employment and away from crime. The lure of drug trafficking can

be made to decline by both increased wages and personal investment in community development.

Increase community leader development and trust of PNH/MINUSTAH. It is the role of the government to provide its people with the appropriate means to take action against traffickers. President Préval said, "The people know what they want; it's a matter of the government helping them achieve it." Through increased community outreach linked with the PNH and a developing community self-reliance and cooperation in development activities, the community will soon produce leaders who refuse to allow their neighborhood to be over-run by bloodshed and fear. However, until the PNH has the ability to operate effectively on a self-sufficient basis to assist these community leaders, the support of MINUSTAH will be required, as the previous chapter noted. Only with these practices installed will the demand for personal security be satisfied in the short-term, especially when coupled with the active participation and cooperation between communities of Port-au-Prince, the PNH, and MINUSTAH.

Provide basic services or coordinate NGOs to temporarily do so. As the director of the DDR commission stated, it is essential for the national government to provide health, education, and vocational training services, and if the government lacks the capacity to provide these services, it must actively recruit and coordinate NGOs to do so. As if in response, Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis made it clear that it was the desire of the national government to resume control of such services and provide a leadership that will assist in the dismantling of the gang foundation as soon as possible. Thus, where gangs provide food services to the poor in efforts to win the hearts and minds, it will be the government or NGO provision of healthcare, education, and other social services that will undermine the legitimacy of the gangs. It is for this reason that the World Bank and USAID must continue to contribute to community development by conducting community-driven investment programs that have goals determined as high priorities by the community for the community, with guidance from the two organizations.

Short-Term Supply Mitigation Recommendations

Quarantine Port-au-Prince and expand this boundary of control outward. The supply for drugs and small arms must be addressed beginning in Port-au-Prince then radiate outward to the rural areas. Security measures that exist now must be strengthened and propagated around Port-au-Prince to ensure that the capital is quarantined with regard to both guns and drugs using MINUSTAH law enforcement personnel and dependable members of the PNH that have been vetted as described in this report.

Immediately arrest and prosecute suspects. Additionally, those who are allegedly guilty must be immediately arrested and prosecuted under a legitimate system of justice, as discussed in a previous chapter. This disruption of gang activity is essential for organizations such as the DDR commission in order to undermine the traffickers and demonstrate a new beginning for those who wish to be reintegrated into society.

Medium-Term Recommendations

Appoint a Drug Efforts Coordinator to ensure continued implantation of the above policies and incorporation of best practices. To keep these efforts reinforcing each other and on track, a Drug Efforts Coordinator with effective powers and autonomy (like the status of the DDR and administrator) needs to be appointed. Assuming the Port-au-Prince model is successful in significantly mitigating demand and supply of arms and drugs, the best practices must then be expanded to the more rural areas. According to Max Antoine, Director of the Presidential Commission for Economic Border Development, the Haitian Border Development Fund will work in conjunction with the UN, PNH, and recently created anti-drug trafficking bureau to strengthen government presence on the border via increased border checkpoints and mobile patrol units to address cross-border trafficking activities. As the PNH expands its circle of control that radiates from a new stronghold in the capital, the search for drugs and weapons must be even more thorough and must take care not to lose the ground gained in Port-au-Prince. By this point, the PNH will have sufficient resources with which to begin conducting offensive maneuvers against rural drug traffickers whose boats wash ashore at night or perform low altitude drops onto Haitian soil. This would further disrupt the supply chain of drugs to Haiti, significantly reducing the "currency" with which to purchase additional small arms.

Supply: Increase government presence along border / anti-smuggling operations

Demand: Expand community development to the rural border regions

Demand: Institutionalize community self-reliance. Additionally, the community development and self-policing program must become institutionalized in Haitian society. Media, inter-community exchanges, and simple word of mouth must all express the same message: Haiti is not a refuge for drug runners and bandits. This mindset must then be coupled with increased foreign investment in rural parts of Haiti so that individuals will be drawn toward legitimate business that has lower associated costs such as jail, injury or possible death. By focusing on the agricultural, tourism, and general investment potential of the border region, the Border Development Fund hopes to undertake projects that focus on the protection of natural resources, agricultural job creation, education as well as the attraction of local and foreign investment. This would ideally complement a CHF-stated goal, which is the engagement of commercial banks and the private sector to develop businesses *outside* of Port-au-Prince, thereby alleviating the strain on the capitol by enticing Haitians to live and work in rural areas. Communities will learn that personal security and increased quality of life require working *with* one another and the government and *against* those who look to rob the Haitian people of their right to security and financial advancement.

Long-Term Supply Recommendations

Maintain the Coordinator to re-evaluate effectivness of previous programs and implement improvements if necessary. Create specialized anti-trafficking units within the PNH. The most essential component of the long-term recommendations is that all previous practices be sustained and improved upon, under the control of the Coordinator. With regard to the supply of drugs and small arms, the country must be ever vigilant to dissuade opportunistic

traffickers from considering Haiti as a transit point. This vigilance can be displayed by creating special anti-drug/anti-gun units within the PNH specifically to gather intelligence and conduct operations against alleged traffickers.

Actively engage external demand and supply countries to develop mitigation strategies. Port-au-Prince must never run the risk of once again becoming a safe-haven for traffickers. Port-au-Prince is a psychological symbol of Haitian pride and motivation to take back what belonged to the people. This Haitian pride must then extend beyond the borders as politicians continue to call upon regional leaders to partake in the mitigation of drug and small arms trafficking. These practices combined will allow Haiti to continue its focus on other issues within its society in a secure and stable environment.

Long-Term Demand Recommendations

Create interdependent societies.

Encourage community leaders to run for public office. Holbrook of CHF specifically stated that there is a crucial requirement to inter-link different portions of Haitian society in an unprecedented partnership that will sustain *one another* as opposed to relying on external support. President Préval furthered this concept when he stated that "Haitians vote for a senator or congressman they know, thus putting their faith in these individuals." Community leaders can advance into national government positions, great trust will be instilled in the people of Haiti toward their government because it is comprised of individuals they have seen make a difference in their communities. A population's faith in its government is essential for the advancement of a country.

Corruption and Conflict

Summary

Pervasive corruption continues to undermine the Haitian state and is a central contributor to Haiti's ongoing conflict. Whether it is police officers cooperating with criminal gangs, judges acquitting kidnappers, or public works officials soliciting bribes, many Haitians abuse public office for private gain. While not all public officials are corrupt, the sheer extent of corruption prevents meaningful reform of government institutions and feeds the very socioeconomic decay that lead to violence. Haiti's people, its leaders, and the international community must make the elimination of corruption a central part of any effort to address the endemic conflict.

Despite its deep roots in Haitian society, corruption and those that fight it are not locked in a static standoff. For the first time in a long time, the measures necessary to combat corruption are both culturally and politically feasible. Over the past five years, the attention of domestic media and civil society has steadily increased public awareness of corruption and its corrosive effects. This public demand for clean institutions and reliable public services has led to the introduction of some laws and reforms that promote transparency. At the same time, President Préval, with his honest reputation and governing experience, can serve as the leader for an institutional and normative shift away from the type of rent-seeking that has so crippled Haitian society in the past.

Moving away from Haiti's corrupt system will be very difficult because it threatens powerful financial and political interests. Previous attempts to curb corruption have largely failed, because they were used as a blunt political weapon or addressed a single cause of corruption. Instead, a comprehensive approach to corruption that engages all legitimate segments of society must be developed.

Corruption's Direct Contribution to Conflict

In Haiti, corruption has so thoroughly undermined the justice system that few effective deterrents exist against violent and organized crime. Corruption among the police, judiciary, and detention officials make it possible for politically and economically motivated gangs to act with almost complete impunity. While MINUSTAH provides somewhat of a check on this violence, most criminals know that a few well-placed bribes will secure their ongoing freedom. According to DDR Head Alex Fils Aimé, a $20,000 bribe on a $60,000 kidnapping can secure a kidnapper's acquittal. Similarly, Msgr. Kébreau, the Catholic Bishop of Hinche, tells the story of a young girl who identified the local policeman as the man who had fed her during her kidnapping. The routine abuse of positions of public trust by police officers, judges, and prison guards allows gangs, kidnappers, and drug dealers to exploit Haiti's vulnerable.

Corruption's Indirect Contribution to Conflict

Marilyn Allien, President of the Haitian Heritage Foundation, a chapter of Transparency International, is not far off when she argues that the "anticorruption is *the* battle for human rights." Stripped of all opportunities, hope, and dignity, people in any society will lash out against their government and one another in an attempt to survive. In the shantytowns of Port-au-Prince, corruption contributes to the poor socioeconomic conditions that breed conflict.

In slums like Bel Air, Tokyo, or Cité Soleil, where hundreds of thousands of people live on less than a dollar a day, subsistence businesses and private sector employment provide the most regular source of income. Whether it is selling handfuls of maize, recycling scrap metal, or hawking handicrafts, many Haitians start micro-enterprises to make ends meet. Unfortunately, corruption makes it impossible for all but a few of these entrepreneurs to register their business, take out small loans, or use the public services like electricity, water, or telecommunications. Public officials working in public utilities or licensing offices regularly abuse their authority to solicit bribes. Faced with these barriers to legitimacy and forced into a cycle of poverty, some Haitians choose to join criminal enterprises or gangs to make a living, as discussed further in the next section.

Causes of Corruption in Haiti

Haiti's corruption has a myriad of intertwined causes that reinforce one another leading to some of the worst corruption in the world. Everything from low salaries to the lack of a middle class to low institutional capacity helped Haiti earn Transparency International's designation as the most corrupt of 163 countries they evaluated in 2006.

Until salaries improve, civil servants will continue to abuse their offices for personal gain. Haitian National Police officers earn between $200 and $400 per month. Similarly, lower level judges (juges de paix) also earn between $200 and $400 per month, while the first instance judges earn $400 to $500 per month. In both instances, the salary can come at intermittent intervals. This problem is compounded by the high salaries commanded and offered by drug traffickers. For many police officers and judges, bribery supplements their low and uncertain income and allows them to provide for their dependents. Even the Haitian President earns only $2,000 per month. While René Préval is widely considered honest and immune to bribery, his successors may not be similarly inclined.

The lack of a Haitian middle class to push for reform and hold public servants accountable also facilitates corruption as discussed in a subsequent chapter. In most societies, the middle class seeks to consolidate any monetary gains by advocating for the fair and consistent application of the law. Free from the day-to-day struggle for food and shelter, an educated middle class can organize and rally against gross abuses of power through the media and civil society. Unfortunately, most of Haiti's middle class has emigrated to the US, Canada, and other Caribbean islands as discussed in a later chapter.

The Haitian government's low institutional capacity further encourages rampant corruption, as noted in a previous chapter. Prior to 2006, the Haitian government had not proposed, amended, and ratified a budget on time in recent history. In many years, there had been no budget and little effort to keep track of revenue. In such a climate, embezzlement and bribery become relatively easy to hide. Similarly, to date, there is no record of a single public official in Haiti who has been investigated, prosecuted, sentenced, and incarcerated for corruption. With little deterrent to corruption except the potential loss of a low paying job, Haitian public officials can and do act with impunity.

Lastly, a history of corruption in Haiti helps perpetuate more corruption. Through a cycle of indifference, learned helplessness, and inertia, Haitians throughout society do not believe they can change the system. Michel, a Port-au-Prince lawyer who travels regularly to Miami, argued rather grandly that it is the "responsibility of all classes in Haiti to help" develop Haiti. When he later identified the judiciary as the biggest problem in Haiti, the newly minted lawyer confessed that "I can't do anything." This helplessness exists in the lower classes as well. During a question and answer session, a group of community leaders in Bel Air had a ready list of the things the government could do to improve the slum. When they were asked what they could do without government assistance, the community leaders could not come up with a concrete answer.

Recent Efforts to Address Corruption

Haiti's fight against corruption is not without hope. In the past five years, fledgling programs in civil society, government, and the international community have raised awareness on corruption and laid the institutional groundwork necessary for future anti-corruption efforts. Furthermore, while it is unclear whether President Préval will prioritize the fight on corruption, he does want a depolitization of anti-corruption efforts and himself has a clean reputation.

Through the hard work of local NGOs, media, and pioneering universities, the Haitian people are quickly becoming aware of the detrimental effects of corruption. Organizations like the Haitian Heritage Foundation (LFHH) now collaborate with the media to highlight patterns of corruption, propose anti-corruption legislation to Parliament, and educate both national and municipal officials in their civic responsibilities. Universities like the University of Glasgow have begun offering courses on corruption. Together, efforts like these focus discourse and public attention on corruption in a way that did not exist five years ago.

Within the interim and Préval governments, some steps have been taken to improve transparency and reduce corruption. In cooperation with the World Bank in 2004, the Ministry of Economy and Finance established a semi-independent anti-corruption unit named Unité de Lutte Contre la Corruption (ULCC). To date, this anti-corruption unit has focused its efforts on education, standardizing accounting, and drafting legislation. Since President Préval's inauguration, government officials have been required to publicly declare their assets before taking and upon completing office. If strictly monitored and enforced, this ULCC-drafted law could reduce the more overt abuses of public office. Very unusually, the government also proposed and passed its budget on time in 2006. This makes proper financial auditing and accountability possible.

Under President Aristide, anti-corruption was merely a tool for punishing political opponents or mobilizing the masses. This approach left many Haitians cynical about the true intentions of anti-corruption efforts. In our interview with President Préval, he spoke to the importance of a distance between day-to-day politics and anti-corruption efforts. While this approach may slow the institutionalization of anti-corruption efforts, it could make it more sustainable. On the other hand, it may simply postpone necessary reform.

In and of themselves, few of the recent efforts to address corruption will significantly reduce corruption. However, they do make future anti-corruption efforts possible.

Recommendations

Given the extent of corruption in Haiti, it is hard to know where to begin. If Haiti only reforms its police, who will try the criminals? If Haiti only reforms its judiciary, who will prevent its criminals from "escaping"? If reforms of the entire justice system are effective, how will low paid civil servants avoid the temptation to supplement their salary with bribes?

Ultimately, Haiti's people, its leaders, and the international community must work together on all of these issues. However, not everything can be accomplished in the short term. In the next five years, Haiti should focus its attention on anti-corruption efforts that are currently within reach given today's laws and governmental resources. The exception to this is the urgently needed reform of the justice system, as previously noted. If these short-term efforts are successful and create a positive momentum, the Haitian people, its leaders, and the international community can expand their anti-corruption efforts to affect broader societal, institutional, and legal change.

Short-Term Recommendations for the Haitian People and Civil Society

In virtually every interaction with government officials, Haitians are generally very tolerant of bribes to speed up or otherwise improve service. Whether its connecting telephone service or licensing a business, most Haitians willingly offer a small bribe to the relevant officials to avoid inconvenience. If they are serious about tackling corruption and changing the norms, **Haitians must work together to demand bribe-free service.** For example, the next time an official from the water company shuts off the water main, the neighborhood should organize a consumer group, petition the local office, and bring attention to the bribe soliciting official. Protesting visibly will motivate like-minded individuals and lead to more effective tactics.

At the municipal or national level, **voters need to hold their elected representatives and public servants accountable.** Too often, Haitians focus on the misdeeds of their political opponents and overlook the ethically dubious actions of their favorite personalities. Creating a citizens group and asking the local police chief how he paid for his new car will be difficult but promote the right behaviors. Right now, corruption in Haiti is largely discussed as a set of corrosive patterns, as though individuals are free of responsibility.

Short-Term Recommendations for the Haitian Government

While the legal environment is far from ideal, **the Haitian government should begin punishing corruption.** To date, the Haitian government has focused on anti-corruption education efforts and improving financial accounting. Although necessary, these initial efforts do little to eliminate the sense of impunity that most public officials feel. Using the 2004 asset declaration law, anti-corruption units should identify and investigate the most corrupt officials of all political parties. The guilty officials should be fired, and if possible, prosecuted.

Once the work of anti-corruption units leads to the firing or prosecution of corrupt officials, their officials will face physical intimidation or be under pressure to accept bribes. Of course, the public reputation of any anti-corruption campaign will be seriously damaged if either of the anti-corruption units themselves engage in corruption. Consequently, **public servants working within the ULCC and UCLEF should have relatively high salaries and improved security.**

Right now the ULCC (of the Ministry of Economy and Finance) and UCLEF (of the Ministry of Justice) answer directly to their relevant ministers, limiting their independence. While it may have been politically expedient to subsume authority within an existing cabinet, the President and his cabinet should work with Parliament to **grant the anti-corruption units more independence.** Even if the current ministers are honest, their successors may not be. Independent anti-corruption units may check the worst Cabinet-level abuses in the future.

In speaking with average Haitian citizens, members of civil society, government officials, and the international community, it is clear that **the justice system is broken and needs fixing.** With at least 25% of police officers and judges corrupt, gang leaders, drug dealers, and kidnappers conduct their illicit activities with impunity. Necessary reform includes, but is not limited to, improving laws, vetting, salaries, on the job training, case management, and the quality of public defenders.

Short-Term Recommendations for the International Community

Although past efforts to reform the justice system have fallen short, **the international community must invest considerable resources to supporting and encouraging the Préval government in reform.** Comprehensive justice reform would challenge many vested interests in the judiciary, the police force, and criminal circles. MINUSTAH and the international community must provide the necessary political cover and security.

Long-Term Recommendations for the Haitian People and Civil Society

Over the next 15 years, the Haitian people and civil society should work to promote the values they want to see in society. **Through the introduction of norms against corruption in civic education**, social change is possible. Haitians who understand their responsibility to the society will be less likely to engage in corruption if they know and understand its corrosive effects.

Long-Term Recommendations for the Haitian Government

Right now, the laws promoting transparency and addressing corruption are inadequate and do not deter officials from acting corruptly. Over the long term, the Haitian government must work with the Haitian people, civil society, and the international community to **draft and ratify improved legislation.** This would include laws like a Freedom of Information Act and harsher penalties to deter public officials from acting corruptly

As the Haitian government improves tax collection, **it must raise salaries and security for all government employees** to reduce the incentives for acting corruptly. A successful reform of the justice system should followed by **reform in all ministries** including Customs, Public Works, and Education. This would improve public services in both procurement and interactions with their customers.

Long-Term Recommendations for the International Community

Over time, fighting corruption is the responsibility of the Haitian people and their leaders. The international community can support real reform by offering its expertise, monitoring, and resources. This should be done sustainably and with a view to best practices from other fragile states.

Conclusion

In a country where Mario Andrésol, the Haitian National Police Chief, laments "the system is very corrupted…I don't see how we are going to change because there are not so many men of good will," optimism does not seem warranted. However, viewing the changes over the past five years, a more dynamic picture emerges. Awareness of corruption is up thanks to the efforts of the media and organizations like the Haitian Heritage Foundation. The introduction of regular budgeting, auditing, and vetting indicates a growing institutionalization of the Haitian state. Lastly, reputable and experienced leaders like President Préval can make it harder for corrupt officials to act with impunity. The Haiti people, its leaders, and the international community should seize on these trends and push hard for the societal and institutional changes necessary to eliminate corruption and reduce conflict.

The Economy
—
In-migration and the Informal Sector

The reason that Haiti is home to endemic conflict is, above all, economic. Economics is the study of what to do about the problem of scarcity, and Haiti confronts this question regularly as the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. With 80% unemployment, highly unequal income distribution (Haiti's Gini Coefficient is .65, as compared with the Caribbean average of .38), little investment, rampant corruption, and deteriorating infrastructure, Haiti is having trouble meeting its citizens' needs. Given Haiti's dire situation, it is no surprise that some Haitians choose violent means to ensure that they are not the ones left wanting.

Haiti's economic problems have compounded themselves with the help of a broken political system and weak rule of law. The lack of job opportunities for young people has contributed to the rise of gang and drug activity. With no licit way to support themselves, they turn to organized criminal activities in order to earn money and respect. Civil servants, service providers, and private sector employees are generally underpaid and demand bribes in order to supplement their income. The lack of economic opportunity has led to significant brain drain and middle class flight, particularly to the US and Canada.

All of these outcomes of Haiti's economic situation have had a part in the country's violent history, and all of them are being covered ably in other chapters of this report. The purpose of this chapter is to look beyond these obvious economic problems to two of the less conspicuous economic causes of turmoil in Haiti. First, historical neglect of the Haitian countryside has resulted in large-scale deforestation and mass migration to Port-au-Prince. Second, red tape has driven a huge amount of economic activity into the informal sector, with consequences for economic development and government revenue collection.

The Neglected Countryside

The state of Haiti's border regions speaks volumes about the lack of government involvement in rural Haiti. The 15 municipalities along the border with the Dominican Republic are home to 5 million people and comprise one of the poorest parts of the country. According to Max Antoine of the Presidential Commission for Economic Border Development, the border regions have an average of two policemen, two secondary schools, and eight primary schools for every 10,000 people. There is no infrastructure to speak of, nor public electricity or running water.

The rest of rural Haiti is similarly underdeveloped, and it is from this context that several of the less obvious causes of endemic conflict arise. The conditions in the countryside have left rural Haitians with few economic opportunities outside of subsistence agriculture, and even this

has become a difficult way to survive. As the quality of the land has eroded, people have been forced to seek new ways to support themselves and feed their families. Some have chosen crime or drug trafficking, which are covered in other chapters. Here, we will discuss two other common choices. Many Haitians have turned their energies to the forests, while even more turn to the capital city of Port-au-Prince, where they migrate in hopes of finding better economic opportunities.

Haiti is approximately 98% deforested, a point made powerfully with an image of the Haiti-Dominican Republic border in the Al Gore documentary "An Inconvenient Truth." Rural Haitians have been forced into deforestation by the dire economic situation they face in the countryside. The wood acquired by clear-cutting forested areas can be turned into charcoal, which is Haiti's main cooking fuel. In addition, the clear-cutting opens up new plots of land that are, for a short while, fertile enough to support a family.

While this practice provides short-run sustenance for those in the charcoal industry and subsistence farmers, it compounds the problem they are trying to escape. Deforestation leads to erosion of the most fertile layers of soil, thus exacerbating the problems of infertility that led to deforestation in the first place. In addition, it results in a landscape that is more vulnerable in the face of natural disaster. In September 2004, 10,000 Haitians perished in flooding resulting from a major storm.

Calls for awareness campaigns on the effects of deforestation miss the fact that where they have been tried in isolation they have been largely ineffective. The peasants involved in deforestation know the consequences of their actions, but need to eat. The incentive structures in place neither dissuade them from clear-cutting nor encourage them to choose a more productive course of action. This incentive structure needs to change in order for the behavior to stop.

The use of charcoal as a cooking fuel also merits attention. Haiti is one of the last countries in the world still using charcoal as the primary household fuel. It is dirty, with negative environmental and health effects, and is not nearly as efficient as the options most developing countries have chosen, such as propane and natural gas. But it is cheap and fairly easy to produce, and thus it persists in Haiti. Any attempt to stop deforestation must address the demand for wood-based charcoal.

As deforestation degrades agricultural production further, more and more Haitians have elected instead to migrate to Port-au-Prince. The slums surrounding the city, including the infamous Cité Soleil, are packed with some of the poorest and most vulnerable Haitians. Despite the fact that most of the inhabitants of the *bidonvilles* came from the countryside, either directly or indirectly, what they have found in Port-au-Prince tends to be even more unpleasant than what they left behind. Lionel Delatour of CLED claims that the cost of the migration is relatively low, given that everyone coming to Port-au-Prince already has friends or family in town with whom they can stay. That, along with the somewhat irrational prospect of better employment opportunities, continues to bring Haitians to their capital city.

The consequences of this overcrowding are obvious: deplorable health and safety conditions, massive unemployment, rampant gang activity, and an insufficient education system

all stem directly from the population surge. As one Haitian put it: "There isn't a single problem that wouldn't get better by moving half a million people out of Port-au-Prince."

Clearly, neglecting the countryside's economic development has played a major role in the prolonged conflict in Haiti. The lack of infrastructure and opportunity has led to destructive behaviors, including clear-cutting forests and migrating to Port-au-Prince, which have in turn made the situations in both the countryside and the capital worse.

Informality

It has been said that in Haiti, "nothing works, but everything works." Indeed, two centuries of violence and poor governance have resulted in a state without a single properly-functioning institution, as an earlier chapter analyses. But the lack of institutions does not mean that economic activity does not take place. Rather, most economic actors in Haiti have opted to conduct their economic activities outside the formal legal channels. The experts we consulted estimated that 70 to 80% of all economic activity in Haiti takes place off the books.

Informal economic activity is somewhat nebulous to define. At the most basic level, it is all economic activity that takes place outside legal channels. It is by no means exclusively commerce in illicit goods, and in fact many experts in the field exclude such activities from their definitions altogether. In the context of Haiti, informal economic activity includes such diverse activities as the manufacture and distribution of charcoal (described above), street corner sale of chicken or oranges, or the provision of standard services from the front room of a private house. Nor is there agreement among experts about which aspect of the informal sector is most insidious: the missing tax revenues, the lack of worker protections, the unfair competition for legitimate actors; all are problematic.

The problems of the legal status of land and the challenges of starting a legitimate business have had dramatic consequences. Conversations with Haitian lawyers revealed an impenetrable tangle of legal restrictions on owning multi-story buildings in Port-au-Prince. CLED reported that selling a piece of property is currently a 2-3 year process.

Property rights are particularly tricky in the *bidonvilles*, where according to CLED, 2 million people occupy over 300,000 dwellings. These shelters are built on government land and their inhabitants have no rights over them. Work by Hernando de Soto has argued that a lack of property rights makes development nearly impossible. Without a formal claim on their most valuable asset, Haitian peasants have no collateral with which to take out loans and start a business. CLED estimates that if peasants' dwellings were owned they would represent $10 billion in capital that could be put to use developing the Haitian economy and lifting people out of poverty. The lack of property rights also discourages investment, which has been shown to be a key input in economic development.

Starting a business is also difficult, with the World Bank reporting that in 2004 doing so took over 200 days. With so many hoops to jump through, it is no wonder that those who are able prefer to operate their businesses under the table.

In addition to the anti-development nature of informality discussed above, informality has had another damaging effect in Haitian society. The citizenry have become accustomed to not paying taxes, and now the democratically-elected government is encountering stiff resistance to its attempts at raising revenues. Widespread corruption and porous borders and ports have made it commonplace for importers of licit goods to avoid paying duties. With severely limited resources, the government is unable to provide even the most basic services to the population.

Haiti's expansive informal economy has helped cause endemic conflict by trapping people in poverty and inhibiting the government's ability to collect revenues.[19]

Policy Recommendations

Far from offering a comprehensive economic plan, this section offers recommendations for ways to create new incentive structures that will encourage behavior more beneficial to Haiti.

Deforestation is caused jointly by a need for more arable land and by the need for wood to make charcoal for cooking. To quench the thirst for the former, **increased investment in technology and infrastructure in Haiti's fertile valleys** will allow for greater agricultural production. The President, an agronomist, named this as a priority in his plans for the rural areas.

Regarding the need for charcoal, the issue is best tackled from the demand side. Many countries, including the neighboring Dominican Republic, have recently made the switch from charcoal to gas or propane as the primary cooking fuel. Doing so has required significant education campaigns, government subsidies, and smooth-running import markets. Most experts expressed skepticism that Haiti was ready for such a change, but recent work by engineers at MIT may have found a suitable intermediate step. By making charcoal out of agricultural waste, they created a fuel that is easy to make, uses a plentiful resource, and burns just as efficiently with less ill health effects.[20] **Introducing the new charcoal-making process** would create jobs for Haitians, both in the production and sale of the charcoal and in the education and training campaigns that the change in technology would necessitate.

As the government has its hands full with establishing security and building national institutions, projects moving Haiti away from wood charcoal would best be undertaken by NGOs and international actors. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has already introduced related projects to stem the tide of deforestation and the World Bank is funding programs to introduce alternate cooking fuels. The agricultural waste charcoal project showed promise in its pilot stage but has not yet been picked up on a large scale.

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[19] For more on informality, see De Soto, Hernando, *The Mystery of Capital*, Basic Books, 2000; the World Bank's report on the "Concept of the Informal Sector" is available online at:
<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/eca/eca.nsf/Sectors/ECSPE/2E4EDE543787A0C085256A940073F4E4?OpenDocument.>

For information on Haiti's informal sector in particular, see: <http://www.webster.edu/~corbetre/haiti-archive/msg08949.html>.

[20] For a brief report on the project, visit: <http://web.mit.edu/d-lab/resources/nciia_files/charcoal.pdf>

Migration is the result of a combination of push and pull factors. Hopes of better economic opportunities are pulling people to the slums of Port-au-Prince while difficult times and deteriorating agricultural conditions are pushing them out of the countryside. Once they get to the capital, however, it becomes clear that the opportunities they were hoping for are unlikely to materialize. Nonetheless, few return home from Port-au-Prince. While life in the *bidonvilles* provides a host of push factors, there are no pull factors to speak of. Lionel Delatour of CLED informed us that recently, 20 to 40 thousand occupants of Cité Soleil have left due to the escalating violence there. While some have gone to rural areas, he asserted that most had simply moved to other parts of town, such as Del Mar and Pétionville. This is a clear indication that the push factor is not enough on its own.

The solution is **to increase the pull factors and to make it easy for people to move out of the capital.** In line with suggestions above, **investing in agriculture will create jobs in the countryside.** The recently passed Hope Bill is expected to create light industry jobs as well, many of them located away from the capital. Additionally, **improved infrastructure and the availability of microcredit would allow for Haitians to start productive enterprises outside the city.** NGOs would be well suited to taking over the latter pursuit, while international donors will likely need to team up with the government on the former two. Additionally, it might be a good idea for donors **to build momentum for migration to the rural areas** by helping to defray the costs of doing so. The benefits for the burgeoning rural community and the city they leave behind could be significant. In the medium to long term this would no longer be necessary, as the pull factors would be in place to act on their own behalf.[21]

President Préval has demonstrated an interest in formalizing the informal sector since his first term as President, but Haiti's traditionally oral culture has made the transition difficult. Still, the new government has already taken steps to **streamline the process of starting a business**, creating a one-stop shop for the endeavor, with hopes of cutting the times required to do so from 200+ days to 1-2 weeks. Similarly, a single authority for property and deeds, an arbitration court for property disputes, and a digitized and transparent deed office, similar to ones already in place in Peru and El Salvador, are in the works. Vested interests are sure to fight for the maintenance of the present system, and they will have to be convinced through the use of incentives that the system will work better for them in its new form.

Broad-based land reform would be a radical step, but if enacted properly, could have a profound impact, particularly in the slums. While the proposed institutions mentioned above will be effective once property rights are established, it is not clear how present ownership will be determined through the tangle of competing claims. Economic theory and some empirics suggest that a one-time redistribution of land, with some carrots for key vested interests, may be the best way to reverse centuries of economic inequality.

One of the consequences of widespread informality is a culture that does not pay taxes. According to the World Bank, the Haitian population and private sector are undertaxed, and poor collection has cost the state $120 million in tax revenue. CLED estimated that smuggling and

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[21] For more on the economic theory behind migration, see Van den Berg, Hendrik, *International Economics*. (New York: McGraw Hill-Irwin, 2004), 564-595.

corruption are costing the government approximately $300 million in lost tariff duties. Part of the solution is no doubt **a larger and better trained tax-collecting body**. Aside from that, a creative solution to undercut the smuggling and improve revenues in the long-term may be found in the example of Kosovo.

When the UN took over the administration of Kosovo, they found that the smuggling of cigarettes was inhibiting the establishment of legitimate economic activity. To combat the problem, they reduced taxes to a token level in order to eliminate the incentives for smuggling, encourage licensed vendors to set up shop, and learn what the standard levels of trade looked like. After a few months, they raised the taxes again. With legitimate paths to market established, the smuggling problem was undercut and government revenues increased dramatically.[22] A similar trade-off of short-term for long-term, in combination with improved local enforcement capacity, may help in the establishment of legitimate trade in Haiti.[23]

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[22] For more information about the economic governance of Kosovo under UNMIK, see Covey, Jock, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley (eds.), *The Quest for Viable Peace*. (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2005), Chapter 8.

[23] Unless otherwise stated, statistics reported in this chapter are drawn from the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.

Infrastructure

Arriving into Port-au-Prince, one immediately sees the poverty that runs rampant across Haiti. Broken blockhouses and trash in the street are common in the capital city. But the roads in the capital are mostly paved and in relatively good condition. The night sky of the capital is now lit up, as the state-run electric company has once again begun providing power to the city's inhabitants. If one were never to leave the capital, he might guess that Haiti's roads were not that bad and that electricity is not a huge problem. However, a short trip in any direction outside of the capital exposes the lack of any usable infrastructure. The lack of infrastructure cripples the country, both economically and socially.

Infrastructure consists of many things: roads, electricity, water and sewage disposal, communications, ports, etc. Haiti lacks nearly all of these public systems, and their absence contributes to conflict in several ways. Lack of infrastructure prevents business from succeeding in Haiti. Without a way to transport products and without reliable electricity, businesses cannot maintain operations. Inability to produce profits contributes to the extreme unemployment, which is a major source of the country's poverty and instability. In addition, when the government is not providing resources generally considered to be its responsibility, public support for the government fades away. Providing infrastructure should be the government's responsibility, but Haiti's governments over the last decades have continued to ignore this need. The infrastructure problem in Haiti paralyzes not only the economy, but also society in general.

Roads in the country are barely usable, making it take much longer than necessary to go from one town to another. For example, the road from Quanamithe to Cap Haitian is roughly 70 kilometers but takes over 3½ hours to make the journey. Apart from driving up the cost of transportation, poorly kept roads are also dangerous. To drive from Port-au-Prince to Hinch, one must pass over Mount Cabrit, considered one of the most dangerous roads in Haiti.

Some communities in Haiti are virtually cut off from the rest of the country because of the lack of roads. Jeremy, in the Grand Anse region of Haiti, has one of the worst roads in the country. It takes over 12 hours by public transport to travel the 283 kms, rather circuitously go from the capital to this town. Haiti is about the size of Maryland, so there is no reason why it should take 12 hours to get to anywhere in the country (even with mountains). Anse Pet, in the southeast, and Port-de-Paix, in the northwest, are communities that are easily forgotten because of the extreme difficulty in traveling to them.

Surprisingly, there is a Ministry of Public Works, Transport, and Communications. This department is responsible for roads, electricity, telephones, water, sewage disposal, and most other activities related to public works. Haiti's lack of substantial revenue from tax collection prevents this government entity from providing the services it should. In this situation, as has been noted in previous chapters, corruption is a serious problem in the country, affecting virtually every part of government and society. A Haiti profile by the US Library of Congress

states "mismanagement by the state has offset more than $100 million in foreign investment targeted at improving Haiti's energy infrastructure." From 1995 to 2005, the amount of donor disbursements for infrastructure in Haiti totaled over $585 million, according to the World Bank. The misappropriation of funds has devastated the country's network of roads and other networks, leaving them in a state of disrepair for over a decade.

Unofficially, Haiti has slightly over 1,000 kilometers of paved roads. Most of these roads are located in the capital and the quality of the roads is not measured. Economies are dependent upon trade, markets, and movement of goods. If the lack of adequate roads limits access to markets, businesses cannot expand and grow. Rough roads also drive up the cost of goods and services not only from the added time spent in getting from one location to another, but also the wear and tear on the vehicles that pass over these roads. All of this adds up to higher prices for goods and services. What's more, lack of adequate roads limits the variety and supply of these goods and services. Adding to Haiti's dire economic condition, Haitians are forced to pay higher prices for a smaller selection of goods and services to cover the high cost of transportation in the country.

Haiti's comparative advantage lies in its inexpensive labor force. However, most businesses cannot fully exploit this advantage because of the high cost of doing business in the country. The lack of reliable electricity forces businesses to invest in expensive generators to power their facilities.

> Less than 10 percent of the Haitian population has access to electricity and those who have access received on average 10 hours of electricity a day in the last two years, with very large disparities among the areas covered. Over the past 20 years, EDH … has been unable to meet demand. Electricity coverage and quality of service are unsatisfactory. (World Bank Report Number: 36362-HT)

The International Energy Agency also reports electric power consumption in Haiti of 36 kilowatt hours per capita compared to 1,503 and 457 per capita KWH respectively in Latin American & Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.

Prime Minister Alexis stated the government is currently looking into a way to privatize part or all of the EDH. Several companies have expressed interest in generating the country's power. However, these same companies are not expressing interest in managing the disbursement of the electricity. There is currently not a well-functioning system of payment collection in any of the provinces outside Port-au-Prince. With many Haitians both in and outside the capital having illegal connections to electricity, the EDH is unable to generate enough revenue to cover its costs.

Financing the EDH is the main challenge to the government providing its citizens with electricity. "EDH has a negative cash flow and could not function without government financial transfers" and is "technically bankrupt." Given the government's current financial state of affairs, the problem of financing electricity will not be easily solved.

Apart from roads and electricity, functioning water supplies and sewage disposal are also noticeably absent. According to the WHO/UNICEF, Haiti had a lower percentage of population with access to sanitation facilities than both Latin America/Caribbean and Sub-Saharan African regions. Access to water (not necessarily potable but just acceptable) is difficult in both rural and urban areas. In rural areas, residents can be forced to walk for several miles to obtain water from an acceptable water source. In urban areas, lack of a water system forces citizens like those in Bel Air to use what little income they have to buy water from private distributors. As with electricity, there is little or no system of collecting payment for government water service. This lack of revenue contributes to the problem of building and sustaining adequate water and sewage systems.

The ports are a large revenue generator for the country. High tariffs for incoming goods provide the government with a steady stream of income and raise prices for consumers. However, the number and quality of ports in the country is again inadequate. Port-au-Prince, Cap Haitian, and Miragoane are the only ports capable of handling large ships and cargo, and they lack current technology. The inefficient and deficient infrastructure used in the ports combine with corruption to create a completely broken trade environment.

All of this lack of infrastructure creates an atmosphere unfriendly toward business and investment. The lack of economic activity is a direct result of the country's poor public systems. Apathy towards the government is also product of these poor public systems. When citizens do not feel that the government is providing services considered to be the responsibility of the state, support for the state dissipates. Conflict in the country is a direct result of economic hardship and lack of confidence in the state from its citizens. Why would one defend a government that consistently overlooks the needs of the people?

Recommendations

In looking for ways to prevent conflict in Haiti, supporting the infrastructure needs of the country is an important element. Current donations flowing into Haiti are larger than the country has ever seen. The European Union is wholly financing the building of the national road from Quanamithe to Cap Haitian. The World Bank is financing an 'Electricity Loss Reduction Project, and is also targeting small infrastructure projects in urban ghettos like the Cité Soleil. Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a program designed to change the poor physical environment that breeds violent behavior in these ghettos. Cleaning the slums, providing street lighting, building parks and public meeting places are all part of the CPTED plan to decrease conflict.

While international assistance in addressing Haiti's infrastructure needs is of great importance, **a Haitian government role in the development of these projects is also key.** People in Fort Liberté, the department capital in the northeast of the country point out that the European Union is building the new national road and that the Italians have provided the machines to build it; while such foreign aid is positive and needed, Haiti's government should be taking larger role in these projects and in so doing would gain legitimacy amongst the people.

Signs are needed on the side of the road that promote not only the EU but also the Préval government in the building of the road.

Road building is just one step; maintaining the road is another challenge altogether. During meetings with NGOs and government officials, many of them recollected on the number of times the road from Port-au-Prince to Cap Haitian had been built. Maintenance of roads is difficult not only because of the lack of government money with which to maintain them, but also because of the rainfall patterns. With the deforestation in the country, large amounts of rainfall can create dangerous situations, easily washing out roads and bridges. An institution called the Fonds d'Entretien Routier (FER) has been established to maintain the roads through earmarked taxes. The Fund director Revel Mompremier declared that the once the roads were handed over to this fund, they would be maintained. While his assurances are promising, road maintenance programs have been set up in Haiti before and have failed. Independent supervision of the management of this fund is essential for the FER to be able to carry out its mission.

A decentralized approach is needed. EDH in its current form is inefficient and ineffective. An office in Port-au-Prince is not sufficient to carry out the management of electricity across the entire country. **The division of the country into units is needed, with each unit purchasing fuel to produce its own electricity.** That unit is then given the task of billing and collecting from the local population and the responsibility to prevent illegal connections. The local population needs to pay for its electricity, even if at a subsidized rate. There will not be a sustainable electric system in Haiti if the consumers do not pay for their usage. Currently, large electric generators have been purchased and placed in communities such as Fort Liberté; they need to be well maintained.

Once a better electric capacity is established, access to water should become less of a burden. With electricity, water can be pumped from deep wells, providing residents with not only a more reliable source, but also with better quality water than shallow wells provide. Development of functioning water and sewage systems throughout the country appears to be the most insurmountable of all of Haiti's infrastructure needs. Privatizing the water company could prove to be a way to increase capacity and efficiency.

An efficient environment for imports and exports into and out of the country is also needed before FDI will flow into Haiti. Current corruption and lack of technology prevent the port system from achieving efficiency and growth. **Turning over the responsibility for port activities to a private company would bring both technological improvements and efficiency** to the outdated and inefficient port system. It would also lighten the bureaucratic weight that the Préval administration faces.

Equally crucial is legitimizing the current government. Having the active support of the population will allow the government to grow and fortify its institutions. Seeing new roads and having occasional electricity in their homes should satisfy the population to the point that they will be less likely to engage in activities that produce, promote, and support conflict. This satisfaction should provide the government some breathing room to focus on institution-building activities instead of security problems. Improving infrastructure will allow the country to grow and eventually escape its economic and political stagnation.

Education

The "mainspring of education, now more than ever, needed a strong a healthy action and every child in the island should have felt its power; but the grand infatuation prevailed—'There is no time for this!'…It is indeed to be feared that the idea has got into existence of its being more easy to govern a mass of ignorance than an enlightened people."
- Reverend Bird, 1822 (Logan, 1930)

Education and Conflict

The conflicts in Haiti, Burundi, Rwanda, Nepal, Israel and Bosnia have demonstrated that education may not only help to ameliorate conflict, but may actually contribute to the eruption and escalation of violence. In the Haitian context, education has fueled the fires of civil unrest both directly and indirectly. Before exploring the current education system and how it contributes to endemic conflict, it is important to first take a historical look at education in Haiti.

During French colonial rule slave owners encouraged Haitians to embrace religion, in part, because religion was seen as an instrument of control over the masses. Education, on the other hand, was not broadly supported. It was feared as a tool that might empower the masses, as well as one that might absorb precious resources. As a result, most education for Haitians (typically mulattos) came from non-public sources, such as churches.

Unfortunately, when slavery and colonial rule came to an end, the deficiency of and lack of support for Haitian education, overall, continued. "'In 1804 there was not a school in the country,' for Dessalines himself was opposed to popular education." (Logan, 1930, p. 412) While some leaders recognized the value of education and expressed their support in the form of legislative reforms, most of these individuals left the implementation of these reforms to their successors. Even when the strongest supporters of education (ex. King Christophe, Presidents Pétion and Geffrard and Ministers of Public Instruction, Élie DuBois and Dantès Bellegarde) actively worked to improve the education system they were hindered by imposing obstacles: political instability; lack of resources; pressure to address other problems; difficulty in finding, training and retaining teachers; linguistic differences (Creole vs. French); and challenges of creating education programs to prepare Haitians for practical yet desired work. Unfortunately, the Haitian education system is still plagued by most of these challenges today.

Current Challenges to Haitian Education

Problems with the contemporary Haitian education center around two main issues: accessibility (quantity) and quality. According to the World Bank, only 8% of schools are public, according to the 2002-2003 census on education. The remaining 92% are tuition-based. Because

of the poverty pervasive throughout Haiti, most schools are unaffordable and therefore inaccessible to the majority of families. In fact, only 55% of children age 6-12 are enrolled in school, and less than one third of those enrolled reach the fifth grade.

In addition to accessibility problems, many Haitian schools perform below basic quality standards. 70% of schools lack accreditation. Without regulatory supervision these schools may provide sub-standard education beneath the radar of the state and families. One reason for this is that the Haitian Ministry of Education (MENJS) lacks the capacity to meet its mandate, including monitoring, evaluating and reporting on the academic performance of schools. MENJS inspectors are overstretched, inadequately trained and poorly equipped to do the daunting task of accrediting and effectively regulating all Haitian schools. There is now approximately one inspector responsible for providing accreditation, pedagogical supervision and administrative support for every 6,000 students. The World Bank also notes little to no harmonization and effective cooperation between MENJS and schools.

There are several other reasons for the low quantity and quality of education provided in Haiti. First, there is a persistent lack of resources. There are too few school buildings and many of the existing schools do not meet basic standards of safety and cleanliness (16% are held in houses, 33% are in churches, and 9% are in open-air environs). Basic school equipment and supplies, such as desks, chairs and textbooks are in short supply. The curricula are outdated and not used uniformly. There is also a dearth of trained teachers. Only 60% of non-public teachers are appropriately qualified. Low levels of morale and interest in teaching excellence is traced, in part, to low wages. The lack of technology in the schools (computers, internet access, etc.) also limits the amount of learning that can be accomplished on this geographically and linguistically isolated island state. All of Haiti's education shortcomings feed directly and indirectly into conflict inside the country.

Education as a Direct and Indirect Cause of Conflict in Haiti

Historic warnings of how education may lead to conflict are still relevant today. "Our school system is not only faulty, but it constitutes…a real social danger." (Logan, 2003, p.428) The inequality and insufficiency of Haitian education leaves families frustrated with feelings of both absolute and relative deprivation. The lower class, especially those committed to education, may experience the greatest relative deprivation regarding the quality of education, primarily because the education they *are* able to afford is of the lowest quality. "Compared to their peers from upper income quintiles, Haitian children from lower income households get less and worse education" even though their families pay a much higher percentage of their household revenues for the inferior education. (World Bank, 2006, p.126) The poorest families who invest (i.e. gamble) the most—67% of household revenues—in pursuit of a better future for their children will experience the greatest disappointment when their painful sacrifices do not yield what they expect, especially when compared to the educational and occupational outcomes of the upper class. This form of relative deprivation is just one way that education may serve increasingly as a cause of conflict.

Relative deprivation may also be experienced more broadly among the masses regarding political leadership. The current government may be in particular peril should it fail to clearly outline and implement significant short-, medium-, and long-term policies that result in meaningful improvements to the education system. The current Préval Administration has made verbal commitments to the National Strategy for Education For All (EFA). However, according to World Bank figures, Haitian public support of education in FY2005-2006 was only 1.7% of GDP. This was the lowest rate of public support for education in the LAC region, which averages 5% of GDP. It was more than twice as low as the average sub-Saharan African standards (3.9%). Even when international donor funds were included, public financing rose to only 2.1% of GDP. While Haitian leaders give verbal support to EFA, the government's financial support was/is relatively weak at only 11% of the total budget, far short of the 20% that stands as the World Bank's EFA standard qualification benchmark. This discrepancy between the state's verbal and financial commitments to education has not eliminated hope for universal education, however. Should the reality that political leaders help to create fall significantly short of popular expectations, an increase in political unrest may well be expected.

Tied to relative deprivation as a component of calculable conflict is the evocative issue of inequality. Because quality education, a universal human right, is effectively reserved for Haiti's economically advantaged, the majority of Haitians who are excluded from this service are justifiably frustrated and may direct expressions of frustration at the state and possibly at the wealthy, French-speaking mulattos. The implication of inaccessibility is that the poor are somehow less deserving of the basic right afforded to those who have historically enjoyed positions of greater power. While their advantaged counterparts continue to advance through academic and thus economic opportunities, the poor are prohibited from progressing even with immense financial sacrifice and hard work. The chasm between the classes grows, as do grievances related to educational inequities. The potential for violent unrest will only grow as information sharing increases and the average Haitian becomes more aware of their rights, especially if there is not also a meaningful increase in educational opportunities.

Whether or not it is intended, education's inaccessibility may be viewed as a mechanism of suppression and exploitation. Because of the state's unwillingness or inability to substantially improve the education system, those in poverty may view themselves in a calculated education-poverty trap. This trap prevents them from plausibly overcoming economic stagnation and social immobility despite immense efforts and sacrifices on their part—as long as they give legitimacy to the system that supports the trap. There is reason to fear future political unrest because although the group suffering most from these inequities and frustrations is the poorest, it is also the largest, most unstable segment of society with arguably the least to lose (*real* liberty and property) and the most to gain (equality) from a *new* legitimate system via revolution.

Education may also contribute to violent conflict if economic growth and job opportunities do not advance proportionally to educational advancements. As students—especially economically disadvantaged students who have overcome daunting odds to succeed in their academic career—graduate, they will expect that their perseverance and their parents' financial sacrifice will pay off in terms of appropriate employment. If such employment exists in insufficient quantities then valuable human capital may flee, or the very smart and discontented may support or even organize revolt. This danger was recognized in 1905 when the Haitian

minister of public instruction warned the president about the "social peril that the overcrowding of liberal careers creates" (Logan, 1930, p.426) citing that "the law school graduates are generally considered the element behind most of the revolutions." (Logan, 1930, p.426)

Again, the warnings of the past may be insightful: "Three-fourth of [students], disappointed, become scattered in the bosom of society. There, what becomes of them? Without means of honest existence, vexed by their own deceptions, furious with those who failed to recognize their genius, always ready to revolt, they become the conspirators, and throw themselves into every sedition in order to upset the existing government and to cause to rise in its place a new power which will give them justice by rewarding the zeal they have displayed in killing, burning, destroying, devastating." (Logan, 1930, p.429)

Referencing historic ties between education and conflict may offer valuable insights for analyzing the potential for violent conflict today, but there are important differences that exist between the Haiti of today versus the Haiti of the 1800s and 1900s. Differences include a higher level of violence with new weapons and tactics, and an expansion of domestic and international criminal activity. Inaccessibility of education now contributes to a dangerous and often deadly mix of youth and violence. When youth are removed from the classrooms they flow into the streets and are consequently more exposed to armed gangs, drug dealers, sexual predators and other criminal elements, as discussed in an earlier chapter on drugs and arms. Youth are, overall, more vulnerable either to becoming victims of such elements, or to becoming co-opted into the groups that perpetrate violence against others.

The choice that some youth make (intentionally or otherwise) to enter into a life of violent crime is understandable. They are surrounded by absolute poverty without a plausible, legitimate way of breaking out of the education-poverty trap. Feeling helpless, they may be more easily seduced by the power of gangs, realizing that these "entrepreneurs", not the state, hold the *real* power. Saying "no" to those who may be able to provide short-term benefits that youth would not otherwise be able to reap legitimately—even in the long term—may become increasingly difficult. The inaccessibility and poor quality of education seriously reduces the incentives for people to support the government, the rule of law, security and stability that serve to keep the majority of Haiti's youth and their families in this infuriating education-poverty trap.

Recommendations

Approach

Educational **accessibility and quality must be increased simultaneously.** "Simply increasing the number of children in school may not necessarily decrease the likelihood of conflict..." (Smith and Vaux, 2003, p.18) Leaders need to give political and financial support to education with the view that proper education reforms are complementary to—more than competing against—other efforts designed to increase security and stabilization. There must be centralized coordination but decentralized components that allow for community groups, local and central authorities, NGOs, donor agencies, banks, schools, Diaspora and religious groups to do what they do best.

Short-Term Recommendations

Leaders should **clearly state the plan for improving education via a set of achievable goals.** These goals—based on analysis and planning of education, conflict, and policy experts—must be realistic. If they exceed the end result by too great a value then many Haitians may suffer from relative deprivation and conflict may escalate.

The budget allotment for education should be increased from 11% to 20%. Primary education should receive 50% of education expenditures. At least 25% of the expenditure should go to the poorest families. This may help to reduce the level of deprivation among Haiti's most vulnerable people, both in absolute and relative terms. As a result, this will likely lead to increased short- and long-term security in Haiti.

Haitian families want a strong education system and are willing to work for it. By **including citizens into the process** of (1) identifying needs and priorities and (2) working to meet these needs, the government (central and local) will help to build inclusive, cohesive, empowered and *productive* communities. Such communities are more conducive to security, stability and prosperity. [A specific suggestion is to support the National Partnership Office/National Partnership Fund that links the MENJS, public and non-public educators, teachers' unions, parent and student associations in efforts to improve education.]

Programs that effectively improve education via scholarships, distance learning (ex. USAID-funded Interactive Radio Instruction program for civic education, math and reading), school feedings, sanitation projects, school supply acquisitions, teacher trainings, school expenditure transparency, etc. should be rewarded with increased funding. Similarly, accredited non-public schools that have surpassed quality standards should receive additional funds, either directly or through increased enrollments (via state-sponsored scholarships). These **pecuniary rewards will serve as incentives for other non-public schools to (1) seek accreditation and (2) improve the caliber of education** they provide. This is especially crucial while the state relies on the non-public sector for education provision and while the MENJS is not able to proactively monitor these schools.

Medium-Term Recommendations

Experts from a variety of education backgrounds should be engaged to **develop curricula that incorporates a variety of subject types**:

- Standard (reading, writing, mathematics, science) for a basic knowledge base;

- Technical (computer and vocational skills) for providing useful skill sets; and

- Value-based (human rights, alternative histories, civics) for breaking down psychological class divides, reinforcing the rule of law, increasing civic participation, fostering critical thinking skills, and supporting social, personal and moral development.

The updated curriculum should then be used uniformly throughout schools.

Education must be available to all primary students regardless of native language. However, Creole-speaking students should be educated progressively to become functional in (at least) French in primary school, and should become fluent in secondary school so that the next generation of Haitians is able to communicate at an international level.

Incoming and practicing teachers need to **receive thorough and frequent training on updated curriculum**, methodology, classroom management, educational development and working with at-risk youth.

MENJS **must train and retain qualified personnel**, improve its management systems, coordinate between pedagogical supervision and curriculum development. It must be able to accurately track enrollment, truancy and graduation figures, as well as regulate and report on academic standards in schools.

The state and business community need to collaborate in Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) so as to increase the efficiency and quality of schools while involving central and local authorities in education service provision. Joint projects could include support and construction of new and existing schools, scholarship programs for the most vulnerable families. It is in the private sector's interest to invest in the human capital of tomorrow.

Long-Term Recommendations

After achieving sustainable universal primary education, **more attention must be paid to improving the accessibility and quality of middle, high and technical schools**, in addition to universities. Support of after-school programs, community education, delayed and elder student programs can help to supplement formal education. There must also be economic opportunities for young people after graduation for education to have a fully positive effect on conflict reduction. Even though this is a long-term goal, investments in economic development must be made immediately in order for the youth of this generation to benefit from them.

Role of International Institutions

Foreign and domestic planners must remember historical ties between education and conflict and work to address them. The World Bank, UNICEF, UNESCO and others have been working on a 10-year plan to bring universal education to Haiti. UNICEF has calculated that EFA would cost an annual rate of $78 million, in addition to the money that has already been flowing to education programs. **International commitment must be long-term** in order to prevent an increase of insecurity and violent conflict. **Coordination must improve to capitalize on the strengths of participating organizations**, maximize synergetic outcomes, and minimize redundancy and counter-productivity. To marginalize Haitian leaders would be to tie the nation's hands behind its back, sentencing it to enduring dependency on the international community. Capacity building initiatives must be incorporated into education development in order to build the human capital necessary for a self-sustaining Haiti. The lack of quality, accessible education, has contributed to conflict in Haiti. However, by making the required steps, education can be used as a tool to reduce, resolve, recover from and prevent conflict.

Civil Society

In a back-from-the-brink country like Haiti, it is difficult to separate civil society action from day-to-day livelihood because in the absence of a state and its functions, individuals, communities, and cities have had to naturally pick up the burden. For the men and women going about their daily lives, however, their work is not activism, but survival. Admittedly, most scholars agree that civil society is an arena of activity that should be distinguished from the private realm of the family, the self-interested behavior of the economic sphere, and the state. Larry Diamond, for example, argues that civil society is "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by legal order or set of shared rules," and it is distinct from society in general as it "involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere."[24] Therefore, when speaking about the root causes of the endemic conflict in Haiti, one cannot overlook pointing to the absence of such a "self-generating, at least partially self-supporting" indigenous entity, working for the benefit of Haiti and all its people. Conflicts in Haiti have repeatedly arisen because citizens' grievances have had no outlet and because there have been no alternatives to state-run support mechanisms for coping with the harsh realities of daily life.

In Haiti, the most visible civil society organizations are those representing private sector groups, particularly in Port-au-Prince. These groups benefit from the economic and political power of their members, who often come from the Haitian elite. Church groups and peasant organizations are common, too, especially outside the capital. They tend to focus on local-level governance issues. Civil society organizations that draw attention to human rights abuses by the state are present, but are subjected to even more intimidation than other civil society organizations. There is a shortage of civil society organizations representing the shrinking middle class within Haiti. Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, few civil society organizations that specifically represent poor Haitians have a national platform. Similarly, a major weakness of the civil society community in Haiti is its lack of non-partisan organizations that focus on preparing Haitians for more effective democratic citizenship. These organizations potentially could play an important role in Haiti's process of democratization by providing basic civic education, conflict resolution training. Instead, civil society organizations in Haiti tend to focus narrowly on representing their limited membership lists.

The Burden of International Donor Support

It is not for want of more international assistance that Haiti is currently undergoing such a difficult transition process. Financial, programmatic, and security assistance from the Untied States, the European Union (France, in particular), and Canada have infused a tremendous amount of expertise and support into President Préval's coalition government, giving it room to breathe, undertake a grueling electoral cycle, and take steps to set up a functioning state. Meanwhile, aid organizations from the USAID to the World Bank to Catholic Relief Services

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[24] 1999, 221.

(CRS) have done community-building work, undertaken neighborhood clean-up projects, and worked to instill a sense of community-led activism within some of the toughest neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince and throughout Haiti.

Taking the Pulse of Haitian Civil Society

Attempting to generate a more complete sense of democratic values in Haiti and assess the implications for the development of a more participatory democracy, the American Development Foundation undertook a national survey based on a representative sample of 1000 Haitian citizens and a parallel sample of 120 community leaders, from Port-au-Prince, other urban areas, rural areas accessible by vehicle, and rural areas not accessible by vehicle. As the survey's findings indicated, over two-thirds (69%) of the public believe "public officials don't care about people like me," and well over half indicate that neither their national leaders (56%) nor the leaders of their local government (60%) are responsive to what people want. Although public attitudes toward the leaders are negative across the board, respondents in Port-au-Prince are the most alienated; the most geographically isolated of the respondents were the most likely to give a positive answer regarding officials' responsiveness.

Using a 9-item list to assess the extent to which the population has confidence in the political system, the overall mean for the Haitian population was 46 out of a possible scale score of 100. The support index is considerably lower in Port-au-Prince (32) than elsewhere in the country, and almost twice as low as in isolated rural areas. Most of the population (60%) believe that their local government leaders are almost never responsive to what the people want, and almost three quarters (73%) believe that the public services in their community are at best poor. However, despite this low regard for their local units of government, most Haitians (70%) say they believe it would be worthwhile to pay taxes to the commune to enable it to provide better service to the communal section.

Over eighty percent (81%) indicated that they were registered to vote and, of those, 66 percent indicated they had voted in the presidential election of December 1995. About 40 percent of the population indicate that they attended a political rally or meeting at least once, 10 percent had participated in a demonstration or protest, 12 percent had worked for a candidate or party, and 5 percent had actually run for office themselves. Church or religious groups have the greatest amount of participation (40 percent of the population), with peasant and neighborhood groups being the only other types with participation from 20 percent of the people or more. Nationally, thirty eight percent (38%) of the population indicated they had not participated in any type of organization during the past year, while 33 percent indicated they had participated in one or two groups, and 29 percent indicated they had participated with three or more. In Port-au-Prince more than 50 percent of the people do not participate in any group at all. [25]

As these responses indicate, the population of metropolitan Port-au-Prince is the most politically volatile; however, the residents of Port-au-Prince are by far the least inclined to support authoritarian rule. Taken together, this suggests Haiti will remain in a state of transition and turmoil until a political system consistent with its population's strong underlying orientation toward political liberty is perceived by that population to be in place. Given the current

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[25] <www.adfusa.org/countries_haiti_nationalsurvey.htm>

condition of the Haitian economy and public service delivery system, this in turn suggests that lasting political stability for Haiti will require substantial effort and considerable time. The challenge for the government of Haiti and for those who wish to help it succeed, is to forge linkages of trust between the state and the people and to build a state that is as democratic as the ideal to which the Haitian people are already committed and entitled to.

From the Ground-Up

Despite a general lack of "Made in Haiti" civil society efforts, some indicators are pointing in the right direction. For example, the Haitian Heritage Foundation (LFHH), the Haitian chapter of the Transparency International movement, lead by energetic, well-spoken Marilyn Allien, has been working to combat corruption and promote public/private ethics since November 2002. Most of the organization's funding comes from USAID and the Taiwanese Embassy, with minimal support from local, Haitian foundations and Transparency International. Aside from administering a major corruption-perception survey in Port-au-Prince and the surrounding areas and organizing a public awareness campaign of corruption via a 12-series radio-novella, Haitian Heritage Foundation's main target audience is the government and elected officials. Accordingly, the Foundation worked with Haiti's political parties before the 2006 parliamentary elections and put 53 members from 6 different political parties of the current parliament through corruption-awareness training. Similarly, it took 6 members of the current parliament to the International Anti-Corruption Conference in Guatemala. In turn, these parliamentarians are expected to work toward strengthening Haitian anti-corruption legislation.

LFHH's path to efficacy and prominence as a civil-society institution in Haiti has not been easy. It has been attacked by government-backed newspapers and branded an anti-Haitian entity, while current government officials have shown complete disinterest in anti-corruption efforts and the Foundation's work. Similarly, while parts of the business community partner with LFHH, perceiving corruption to be a nuisance for honest business practices, it is no surprise that the only successful businesses in Haiti are the corrupt ones.

Another active and engaged civil society organization with a wide-ranging target area is National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (RNDDH), whose objectives include promotion, monitoring, and education of the human rights situation in Haiti. It has been active since 1982 and its director, Pierre Espérance, is quick to mention that their aim is not simply to criticize the state in its shortcomings, but to cooperate with state organs and reinforce their capacity to protect and take into account human rights of all Haitian citizens. Perhaps as a result of this cooperative attitude, RNDDH has not been inhibited in its work by the current Préval Administration, whereas Espérance had been the target of a near-fatal shooting during the first Préval term. Still, although most human rights organizations are currently free from governmental interference, they continue to operate in a state of insecurity from those incriminated in the organizations' work.

Yet another take on the role of civil society in today's Haiti is presented by the Peace Caravan (Caravane de la Paix), which works to educate Haiti's citizenry on the effects of violence and arms by means of cultural and theatrical activities, with the aim of changing their mentality regarding firearms. By appealing to relevant and easily-recognizable cultural (Creole) reference points, the project aims to reinforce the message of peace in those communities in Port-

au-Prince which have been hardest hit by daily violence and gang activity. Since March 2006, a team of twelve artists in three teams have been able to stage small productions on the theme of violence-reduction and peace-promotion in four "red zones" throughout Port-au-Prince. It is important to note that this project has been financed and utilized by MINUSTAH, which has seen the great impact and importance of trying to reinforce peace-keeping in Haiti's slums by means of cultural and aural programming.

Still, despite these encouraging movements and points of success in civil-society engagement in Haiti's development, the situation remains quite dire when looking for bottom-up, indigenous approaches to collective action. In some of the most difficult neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince, organizations like the USAID and the International Organization of Migration (IOM) are desperately trying to create a sense of civil responsibility, community-mindedness, and empowered mobilization, to give the poorest and most disenfranchised Haitians a sense of a path towards normalcy and inclusion. In this regard, IOM's Matt Heuber has been administering a $29M USAID grant, with tremendous results, to clear gangs out of neighborhoods, such as Martissant and Bel Air. IOM's success has largely depended on a relationship of trust built between his organization and the community being served, through the identification, empowerment, and guidance of local community leaders. These leaders have been forceful in their rejection of gang activity in their neighborhoods and are impassioned advocates for improved living conditions and standards in the areas in which they live and work and in which their children play and go to school.

These community leaders (in Bel Air, mostly middle-aged men, with one woman and a few young adults) were able to almost-instinctively and forcefully name the five primary problem-areas they would want the Haitian state or Matt Heuber and IOM to tackle in the near term. However, these same leaders were at a loss when asked what changes they, themselves, can make in their neighborhood, city, and country. So long kept subservient to a dictatorial governing structure and recently seeing the international donor community replace the Haitian state as the primary service provider, the poorest Haitians have fallen out of habit of looking inward for power and inspiration on a grand scale. Tired from having to fend for basic life necessities and exhausted by gang violence and kidnappings, Haiti's poor and the majority of the population has resigned itself to sub-standard government services and living conditions, preferring to rely on their own abilities to fend for themselves.

Empowerment as Haiti's Way Forward

Haiti's civil society has become a dependent organ of international donor support and an outgrowth of the government's incapacity to perform its basic functions vis-à-vis Haiti's citizenry. With the notable exception of organizations such as the LFHH, RNDDH, or Caravane de la Paix, which seek to promote the interests of Haiti, as a whole, the only groups in Haiti with the capacity to form effective civil society movements are those which arguably do not represent average Haitians and do not require additional representation: the business and political classes. Prior to the presidential elections that brought President Préval to power, some observers had called for the creation of a consultative space within Haitian institutions, to include the particular

interests of civil society organizations. [26] Similarly, it was recommended that the newly-elected Haitian government place more of **an emphasis on the development and recognition of a range of civil society organizations that represent more sectors of Haitian society**, including the urban poor and those living outside the capital, providing a constructive outlet for disaffection with state institutions and their functioning.

These hopes seem to have been left unrealized and the international donor community has, again, been left to fill the void of the government's inadequate service provision mechanisms. So it will be up to the **international donor community to slowly transfer its status as primary care-giver for Haiti's most disadvantaged to indigenous civil society organizations** which will be empowered to advocate and act on behalf of the interests of the residents in Bel Air, Martissant, Cité Soleil, and hundreds of similar other communities in Port-au-Prince and throughout the country. The education sector should be a primary area of focus, in terms of civic education and empowerment – a recommendation echoed by all sectors of Haitian society and discussed in the previous chapter. The educational system in Haiti should be revamped to include notions of "community service" and "leadership development," to give the next generation of young leaders the tools with which to mobilize their communities and society to decide their own development path. Concurrently, USAID's and IOM's ongoing and future projects — such as the $98M JOBS program — should continue to focus on identifying and empowering local community leaders to act on behalf of their families, neighborhoods, and cities. (The 2006 local government elections should be seen as an area of possible impact and wider involvement for these community leaders).

Fortunately, this movement and Haitian civil society, in general, has a major ally in its struggle for recognition – the domestic media. Although continuously threatened and under pressure from both governmental and private entities, courageous men and women continue to report on the status of their nation – both positive and negative. As LFHH's Allien reports, a free press and media "are the rights that Haitians are just unwilling to let go of." Already-established civil society organizations should be encouraged **to undertake a more concerted public announcement campaign on civil responsibility and activism via radio**, which will have the potential of reaching the widest potential audience.

Conclusion

Haitians are used to dictatorship and that has been the historic basis for devastating stability to the country. The people in the streets — going about their daily lives — want to see a government that's in charge and in control. As Haiti goes through a political transition towards a more representative and inclusive democracy, its citizens must be brought along on that journey. Just as the President and the government institutions are learning to work together, so too should the Haitian people be empowered to work hand in hand with the government – prodding it with suggestions, helping it succeed, and holding it to account at times of failure – to develop Haiti and restore a semblance of normalcy, security, and decency to the lives of Haitians for generations to come.

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[26] I. William Zartman, *Cowardly Lions: Missed Opportunities to Prevent Deadly Conflict and State Collapse* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

The international community must help in this process by insisting on a system of civic education and working in close connection with Haitian media to spread this message of community-centered activism and leadership throughout the island-nation.

Social Structure and the Flight of the Middle Class

George Eaton Simpson wrote in 1941[27] that likelihood of a Haitian peasant climbing out from amongst the masses into the elite, by passing through the middle class was not great. More than 65 years later little has changed. Today, Haiti's middle class is largely gone due to insecurity, violence and a lack of opportunities.

Origins of Social Structure

In order to properly unravel the complexity and implications of Haiti's social structure it is necessary to return to the colonial period and the struggle for independence from which the present class lines were drawn. Three distinct groups emerged at independence in 1804 — the mixed descendants of the whites, known as the mulattos, the freed men, and the slaves. In the revolution for independence, the mulattos and the freed men banded together to oust the French. Each carved out its place in society, tolerating the other out of a mutual desire for and assurance of position. The freed men became the political class and the mulattos formed the merchant class. This structure was carefully crafted to insulate and perpetuate the place of the elite in society to the detriment of the slaves – the agrarian and labor base of the population. The poor were largely ignored. Aside from the freedom that the poor have gained, in two centuries the peasant masses hold nearly the same socio-economic position as at the time of revolution.

During his regime (1957-1971), Francois Duvalier centralized economic and political authority in Port-au-Prince. In a largely agrarian society, the rural masses were charged with the country's agricultural production. The mulatto elites, though clearly not favored by Duvalier, continued their roles as the merchant class in the top rung of society, while a middle stratum emerged to facilitate the growing Haitian economy and the Duvalier political machine. A small bourgeoisie acted as the economic driver in partnership with the urban working class. There was also a fairly healthy middle class in the countryside. Suburban laborers formed a source of cheap labor and added more depth to the middle layer of Haiti's social structure. It was during this period that the middle class really bloomed and social structures expanded.

Middle class terminology is characteristically vague in relation to size, members and income distribution. For many, it simply signifies holding a social position that falls within the extremes (i.e. rich or poor) socio-economic strata. It comprises the government workers, administrators, professions, small business owners and skilled craftsmen. The middle class allows a country to operate smoothly because it controls, not the capital, but the means and flow of productivity – the labor and efficiency of a nation. These are people who can afford a good standard of living; they own homes and cars, can clothe, feed, and educate their families without

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[27] Simpson, George Eaton. "Haiti's Social Structure," *American Sociological Review*, 6:5 (1941), 640-649. <http://www.jstor.org/cgi-bin/jstor/printpage/00031224/di974103/97p0204l/0.pdf?backcontext=page&dowhat=Acrobat&config=jstor&userID=80dcfe04@jhu.edu/01cce4406714d3811084697ce4&0.pdf> Accessed 2-Feb-2007

much trouble, and take occasional vacations. A middle class provides societal equilibrium and stability, balancing an extremely polarized society by providing both hope for the poor and insulation to the elite.

Francois Duvalier played the game perfectly. There were three avenues with which one could gain entrance into the middle class: through the army, politics, and the church. Throughout Duvalier's consolidation of power, Haitians flocked to the capital from the provinces in search of work and prosperity. Duvalier relied heavily on the first two paths to derive his security force, the Tonton-Macoutes, and the petty bureaucrats and ministry officials who became the political base of his patronage system. Duvalierists or loyalists became the first players in the political wrangling that has become a blood sport in Haiti due to the scarcity of resources and opportunities. When regimes change, the recently solvent bureaucrat falls to the bottom rung socially, creating intense competition and a highly contentious and even deadly political game to retain one's position both socially and economically.

Flight of the Middle Class

Our group heard many times during our interviews that the Dominican Republic today is Haiti 20 years ago. Dominicans enjoy a booming tourist trade, decent reliable health care and education, electricity, security and a thriving middle class existence for many. Haiti's middle class is largely gone and there remains little hope for the poorest to change their situation by working towards a stable middle class existence. Aside from those who had the chance to take advantage of job opportunities in the capital, the poor remained virtually untouched since Duvalier's centralization of power in the capital in the 1960s. During the Duvaliers' repressive regimes, successive military dictatorships, and the once hopeful but ultimately destructive and rapacious rule of Aristide, rural and urban poor communities became further disconnected from government and all social services. Some of the poor left as "boat people" in the 1980s, others flocked to the cities in hopes of a better existence.

Years of peasant migration from the countryside to Port-au-Prince in search of work, education, and services has led to intense overcrowding in the capital as new arrivals build anywhere there is undeveloped land. Rows of neat or impressive homes stack up against makeshift dwellings depriving the middle class of the "fruits of their labor,"[28] as unpalatable that commentary may be, it is the reality for many. The middle class is the most vulnerable in Haitian society in terms of what they have to lose as Haiti struggles under insecurity, corruption, and social decline. Haiti loses much more because the middle class provides a vital source of the talent and energy needed to build a nation and an economy. Continuing flight of the middle class has meant enormous and perhaps (semi-) permanent loss of human and financial resources. As things stand, rational actors will choose to leave Haiti as options abound elsewhere. According to a recent World Bank figures[29] 83% of skilled Haitians live abroad.

A single mother in Haiti with an education and a profession is not well paid. She must spend a large portion of her salary to send her children to school for an education of questionable

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[28] Pierre, Hyppolite. "Haiti's Middle Class (Part 2)," Institute for Research in Social Science and Politics, <http://www.irsp.org/editorial/middleclass2.html>.
[29] "Building a Reluctant Nation," The Economist, 10-Feb-2007, p.35.

value. If she is a home-owner, she may find her house soon butted up against squatter dwellings and haphazard "street shops" as she leaves her home to take her children to school, fearing too for the safety of her family due to the rise in kidnappings – to which anyone is vulnerable. If this mother could put away enough money for airfare (she is also likely has a relative in the Diaspora who could lend the family passage), she will find life easier in Canada, for example, where communities of Haitians have been established for decades. Furthermore, in Canada she can get a mortgage to buy a home in a nice neighborhood; she can send her children to public school without worries about violence and uncertain educational quality. She will be better paid and more valued in her new country for her professional skills.[30] The choice does not seem difficult.

Social Barriers

The upper class of Haitian society is struggling to maintain its very tenuous position by erecting barriers, not just socially and economically but literally. More and more families of the elite (and the small remaining middle class) are building walls topped with spikes, broken glass, or barbed wire around their homes and hiring armed guards to protect their families from mounting insecurity. Newly practicing lawyers drawn from the upper class of Haitian society commented during our visit that they had several friends who have been kidnapped. One of the lawyers talked about growing up without walls, but that sadly times have changed and people must now protect themselves. The walls, however, are barely a temporary fix for a problem that has been brewing since independence divided Haiti along class lines.

Today, many of the oft referred to "morally repugnant elite" (MRE) seem out of touch with reality and paralyzed – not knowing how to change the situation in Haiti that has become the norm. Young, highly educated, seemingly engaged lawyers could articulate the problems as clearly and succinctly as the community leaders we met in the slum area of Bel Air. There was a similar storyline running throughout the interviews the group conducted. The problems are insecurity, violence, poor education, and rule of law, but the ideas were lacking. There is limited sense of collective responsibility. One lawyer, when asked if she or her colleagues engage with the poor to bridge the gap or open dialogue, seemed confused by the question. To be fair she works and takes care of her family, both of which are indeed priorities, and she mentioned how she and her peers hope to invest in Haiti, without much idea how, unlike many young US law school graduates who spend some time in social rights or pro bono work. Futility seemed stronger than a tangible effort by young elites to outwardly address the inequality and injustice born by Haiti's longstanding social structure that underlie many of Haiti's corrosive problems.

Recommendations

"Everything in Haiti is a priority."[31] After 200 years of authoritarian rule Haiti has hit bottom. Rebuilding will require concrete plans, commitment, and a dose of faith. Ideas must emerge that engage Haitian society across socio-economic strata, repair its social fabric, and create lasting opportunities.

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[30] Example derived from an interview with Reynold Dominique, Director of Research, ACEP on 18-Jan-2007 at Coin des Artistes.
[31] Quote from interview with Prime Minister Jacques-Edouard Alexis on 16-Jan-07.

It is essential to re-ignite the National Dialogue Project for the Haitians to once again come together regardless of social class, position, or political affiliation to address their divisions and figure out how to work together to both create opportunities and eventually take back the reigns from the international community. In order to function properly this working group will need credibility bestowed on it by the President, Haitian leadership, and prominent and committed representatives of all aspects of Haitian society.

We heard a lot about Haitian pride during our visit, beginning with the Haitian defeat of Napoleon during the struggle for independence. Haitians must once again regain this pride. To establish a cultural campaign alone will not remove Haiti from the grips of violence and poverty, but it would give Haitians a forum to celebrate Haitian culture, art, music, writing, and crafts. Culture is an arena where class distinctions can be erased.

With an emphasis on the fact that arts and pride are a unifying force and a gift to the people from the people, **the private sector can take the lead in sponsoring events that showcase local artisans**, and promote regional fairs and concerts. Haiti is rich in art culture, music, food and mystery. The private sector should also seek to establish partnerships with artists from the Diaspora to commit to sponsoring a global cultural campaign and events program to attract attention to Haiti so that Haitians know that the global community appreciates their art, culture, and history.

Port-au-Prince and Pétionville are characterized by squatters, slums and street vendors. There is nothing to stop people from coming into the cities and setting up house or shop when there are neither rules nor services to control movement or provide alternatives. **It is important to establish and formalize property rights in the slums.**[32]

As it stands, the value of this housing is not secured and cannot serve as collateral for the poorest in Haitian society. The Haitian government must act to formalize the 300,000 dwellings of two million plus people informally valued at $2 billion. Estimates of the formal value range upwards of $5 billion.

A similar program was begun by CLED during Arisitide's regime, but was stalled due to political friction. There are talks that this effort may be renewed next year with the help of the Inter-American Development Bank and Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD). This is an extremely positive step forward in creating wealth within the poorest communities.

After many years of repression and authoritarian rule, Haitians have little if any experience with democracy. Many, due to harsh conditions today, have misplaced nostalgia for the security, albeit brutality enforced calm of the Duvalier years. Although his willingness to take Haiti in a positive direction is clear, President Préval is struggling to get his message out to the people. His leadership style – sometimes silent and listening – is constantly challenged. To many Haitians, Préval seems weak and ineffective. Despite the fact that the president is not implicated in corruption, it is not clear that he will take a hard line on fighting the corruption that has infiltrated every sector of Haitian life. The President has indicated his intention to communicate his vision to the people. He can strengthen his program by **partnering with NGOs**

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[32] Derived from interview with Lionel Delatour and Frantz Bernard Craan of CLED, 17-Jan-2007

to educate people about democracy and how it differs from the political history they know. Additional support for jobs programs must continue along with safety nets and other social services to make this transition to democracy is possible.

Even so, Haiti will have a tough time moving away from a culture of dictatorship and clientelism. Its political culture has caused leaders to watch their backs and solidify support through corrupt networks. This paranoia and patronage that Haitians know so well and expect will take years to unlearn. **President Préval will have to make a very strong stand against corruption** to both earn respect and to gain the means to fund social policies like health and education initiatives that will improve the quality of life in Haiti.

The Haitian government and private enterprise groups should **explore the possibility of forming partnership-based contracts with skilled professionals to rebuild and update Haitian infrastructure and institutions.** Business groups would seek out skilled professionals in the Diaspora to either return to Haiti on short-term contracts or to invest in unique business opportunities. Professionals that choose to return temporarily may bring family or come alone depending on security and conditions. This type of program, as suggested by CLED, could give Haitians living abroad a way of engaging in Haiti without a long-term commitment that allows for the individual to get comfortable with the situation without plunging in with no safety net.

As suggested by Robert Maguire, insecurity and violence have left the elite little choice, but to engage more directly with the majority lest they remain behind walls where they are not indefinitely protected from the deterioration of society. Engagement is not a question of if, but rather, when. It will be necessary to **create space for the elite to engage with the poor in a ways that make them feel comfortable.** One way the program can proceed is by sponsoring entrepreneurship competitions throughout the provinces rewarding best practices in farming, innovations, or community works on a regular schedule perhaps coinciding with local feast days or celebrations. Local entrepreneurs would be featured in newspapers and on the radio or television highlighting his or her ideas, craft, practices or benefit to the community along with a competitive financial prize to help with operations.

The elite have the means to make a difference in society and fix one of the most devastating and widely recognized ills in Haiti – the fractured, almost entirely private education system. The case of education is a unifying struggle for Haitians regardless of class because all Haitians must invest in the education of their children. At least 80% of education is funded privately and of questionable quality. **The elite can provide building space, supplies, funding, and perhaps even teachers on rotating contracts from those within their ranks** willing to do grassroots work for one year in exchange for credit to travel abroad, for example.

All of these programs will need substantial funding and commitment. The Haitian government must **provide a development fund and ongoing budget support** in addition to other types of aid so that it can continue to build its capacity and emerge from its dependence on the international community. However, it is extremely uncertain that Haiti will be able to stand on its own both financially and in terms of capacity due to the loss of an alarming number of skilled professionals over the last forty years. Insecurity and violence will make it exceedingly

difficult for Haiti to retain its middle class and entice desperately needed professionals from the Diaspora to return (see the chapter on Diaspora).

More importantly, in order for there to be political equilibrium there must be an end to impunity and equal laws for all so that new dialogue can begin in Haiti. As it stands, many within the elite class stand in the way of turning the page and shaking off the colonial yoke that has continued to feed the deep social cleavages in Haitian society. The poorest must also come to understand that they can also contribute to change rather than looking for a solution to be handed to them. Until this wall is broken down there is no room for new values to emerge that can support a more equal and humane society.

Religion and Politics in Haiti

Summary

Much of the conflict that has been affecting Haiti for the last two-hundred years is due to unresolved rivalries and distrust among the different social classes. Lack of a strong national identity and of a sense of social responsibility hamper cooperation and development. Catholicism and Vodou have been key actors in the settlement of this mentality. Their role today is to use their community-based structure to reach out to the people of Haiti through individual, institutional and international channels and help foster trust and social engagement.

Introduction

When surveying the extensive literature on Haiti, what astonishes is the amount of statistics and catch phrases used by Haitians and outsiders alike to describe it: Haiti, the poorest country in the Hemisphere; Haiti, the first independent black country, Haiti, the failed state; Haiti and the Vodou-Catholic syncretism; Haiti, the worlds' only successful slave revolt; Haiti and the *système D.*, Haiti and les *grands mangeurs*; Haiti, the country of dehumanization and hopelessness. While intriguing, these expressions suggest an exceptional character of the political and economic conditions affecting Haiti. It is undeniable that the country has its own peculiarities and traditions but, by using them to identify the country, the problems affecting Haiti are crystallized. This creates a symbolism that, in itself, becomes the spirit of the country and makes its problems of underdevelopment and insecurity seem overwhelming and unsolvable.

This study suggests that this terminology is an index of a widespread mentality that underwrites the conflict and hampers development. The study also suggests that religion, Haitian Catholicism and Vodou in particular, have greatly contributed to the consolidation of such a mentality. Namely, the distrust between the *Blancs*[33] and the Creole, coupled with the tendency of Haitians to perceive reality in a detached mode, in which they have no role clearly identified by the Haitian expression: "*Pa fot mwen*" (not my fault). Symbols and images, greatly valued in both religions, add to the process by transforming reality in a theatrical stage where the characters play the roles they have been given but have no decisional power in the final outcome of the story. As a result, if conflict and underdevelopment persists in the country, it is not the people's fault and it is not for them to resolve. Religion, therefore, through its capillary presence and community based organizational structure, could be instrumental in promoting trust-building initiatives and stronger civil cooperation. In particular, this study proposes three levels of action: the Individual, the State and the International. More effective dialogue and cooperation at each one of these levels could contribute to the strengthening of the sense of positive national identity

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[33] With the term Blancs, Haitians refer not just to the people with white skin but also to all those perceived as outsiders and foreigners.

that Haitians still seem to lack and that is the fundamental ideological basis for the creation of stable and democratic institutions.

The Causes of the Endemic Conflict: Religion in Perspective

President Préval has now been in power for nearly a year. Beyond his efforts to favor cooperation by creating a widely inclusive executive, he has the longer and more difficult task of bringing about the much-advocated change in mentality. Class division, distrust, and lack of social responsibility are strongly visible. Economically, Haiti faces a difficult road to improvement. About 50 percent of the population lives below the $1 a day poverty line. [34] Politically, the level of corruption among the judiciary and the police ranges around 25 percent and is made worse by inter-department struggles. The security emergency, caused by military gangs in Cité Soleil and elsewhere, has still not been brought under control. Similarly, efforts are needed to attract foreign investment and start new activities and to restore a vibrant middle class, as previous chapters have noted. Each one of these effects must not be misconstrued as a lack of political will on the part of officials, but instead seen as the challenge for action that addresses the underlying causes of instability.

In 1922, Carl Schmitt wrote: "all the main concepts of modern State theory are secularized theological concepts." This is particularly visible in Haiti. The two official religions in Haiti are Catholicism, and Vodou. [35] Due to the phenomenon of syncretism, [36] Haitian are said to be 80% Roman Catholic, 20% Protestant and 100% Vodou. Vodou is a West African ancestral religion first introduced in the country in the beginning of the 16th century with the arrival of the African slave cargos from the coast of Guinea. The first Catholic missions arrived at the end of the 15th century, but it was not until the signing of a Concordat in 1860 with the Vatican, which had previously refused to recognize the Haitian government, that Roman Catholicism gained official status.

Haiti became a Republic more than two hundred years ago. Nonetheless, it has retained what, in a simplified manner, could be regarded as a traditional form of society. Secularization and the principle of separation between state and religion are ideals heralded by the present ruling class, but have never really penetrated national conscience. Significantly, the revolt for independence, was ignited by a Vodou ceremony of Bwa Kayiman (Caïman words) in August 1791. According to tradition, during the ceremony, the spirit Ezili Dantor possessed a priestess, one individual presented himself for sacrifice, and all those present pledged themselves to the

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[34] Haiti: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Joint Staff Advisory Note
IMF Country Report No. 07/3, January 2007, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0703.pdf>
Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant to the Republic of Haiti for a rural water and sanitation Project World Bank Report No: 38080, December 21, 2006. For an extensive overview on the economic indicators in Haiti see report by Adam Ross on the Economics and the Informal Sector.

[35] Despite being the third religion in the country, Protestantism will not be investigated in this study due to its low significance as a cause of conflict.

[36] Not all scholars agree on the existence of such syncretism. As stated by Max G. Beauvoir: "No, contrarily to what even good scholars have stated, I don't believe there is any significant Christian-Vodou syncretism or Christian inclusions in the Vodou religion. To the best of my knowledge, I have not found any incorporation of Christian materials in Vodou. Jesus Christ is not a Lwa or Expression of God, meaning an important figure of the 401 divinities of Vodou. I have never seen nor heard of someone who has been possessed by Jesus Christ, possession being an important characteristic of the religion. Neither has any one been possessed by the father, the son of the Holy Ghost, meaning by one of the major figures of the Christian faith.

fight for freedom. This resulted in the mobilization of the slaves against the colonial rule, in the burning of the crops and in the uprising that brought to independence in 1804.[37]

What is most important about this stringent linkage is the dynamics through which it developed. Throughout the centuries, the two realms underwent a process of mutual influence. Clerics became political leaders and politicians became spiritual fathers. Vodou incorporated Catholicism making God the highest and most powerful of all its Gods. However, the opportunistic nature of the process contributed to the creation of distrust between the lower class and the elite that, up to today, hampers the development of strong democratic institutions and national unity. Catholicism undermined the creation of a single sense of national identity by historically allying with the elite and excluding the rural Vodou and Creole-speaking rural population. Syncretism between the two religions worked to restore a single identity. In more recent history, Catholicism paid lip-service to the Duvalier regime and was then used as the ideological legitimization for Artistide's surge to power. Vodou hampered development and unity through its mysticism and detachment from modernity. By recreating a world of spirits and myths and associating itself with the poor and deprived, it encouraged a passive approach to reality and de-legitimized the concept of institutionalized State. Moreover, both religions, with their emphasis on hierarchy and power, provided the necessary theological basis for personalized leadership. As reported by Bernard Craan of the CLED, "both Western and Non Western religions in Haiti should be part of civil society but, it must be said, none of them have even been strong advocates of democracy."

The Catholic Church in Haiti: Power and Politics

In particular, three practices of the Haitian Catholic Church have fueled divisions among the population. Firstly, as soon as the Concordat was signed in 1860, the Catholic Church, knowing that the rural masses in the countryside were attached to fetishism and superstition (in the vocabulary of the time), decided not to engage in the difficult task of fighting mass illiteracy and sickness. Instead, it concentrated its priests in the urban areas while the rural population was neglected. Furthermore, the majority of the Catholic clergy was of foreign origins and, for linguistic reasons, mostly French. As demonstrated by Alfred Métraux[38], the clergy was also entrusted with the mission of creating a climate of opinion favorable to a voluntary association of Haiti with France. To carry out their work, the clerics concentrated on the education of the upper class and excellent secondary schools were opened where students were indoctrinated to the grandeur and civilizing mission of France. By the 1890s the plan had failed, but the conservative clergy maintained an informal alliance with the upper class whose education and interest tended to set it apart from the rest of the population.

In subsequent regimes, the Catholic Church played its role in fostering divisions between classes. Both the Duvalier era and the Aristide regime marked a clear break with the past through their nationalistic nature. The attempt at creating a stronger national unity and free the nation from the colonial legacy finally evolved into tyranny and brought conflict and instability. In the 1950s and 1960s, a process of introspection began throughout the Church worldwide; members of the Haitian clergy tried to break the historical association of the Church with

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[37] Max G. Beauvoir, Vodou Priest (houngan), le Péristyle de Mariani, Mariani, Haiti, interview, 18 January 2007.
[38] Alfred Métraux, Haiti: Black Peasants and Voodoo, (New York, Universe Books, 1960).

despotic governments and colonial rule and end hostility towards other religions. However, Francois Duvalier (1957-1971) exploited this attitude of renewal and, through expulsion, terror and deception finally managed to conquer the support of the Church and bring it under his control. A notable instance is found in the 1966 negotiations between Duvalier and the Vatican to revise the 1860 Concordat. The most significant change was to Article IV. By advocating the need for a clergy closer to the needs and interests of its people, Duvalier was entrusted with the duty of appointing the bishops and archbishops, with the approval of the Vatican. In such a way, the new Haitian clergy became mainly Haitian nationals under state control. This, while reflecting the renewed Church attitude for wider acceptance, compromised the critical influence of the Church making it more vulnerable to Duvalier's power.[39]

The role of Catholicism during the Aristide's regime was similarly political and demagogic. The urban priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was a charismatic populist leader who, during the 1980s found among the Haitian population the perfect breeding ground for Liberation Theology, with its preferential option of the poor. In a climate of popular desperation due to the exploitation and tyranny of the Duvaliers and of the dominant classes, Aristide and his Lavalas movement soon gained wide support. On December 16, 1990, Aristide was elected with two-thirds of the votes and a wave of hope swept across the country. However, hope in effective change was soon disappointed when Aristide, instead of pursuing greater social benefit, became obsessed with the maintenance of his personal power and his role as the sole possible savior of the country. Drawing from the more agnostic and populist current of Liberation Theology, Aristide emphasized the role of the urban poor and exploited lower classes as the agents of social change. As part of his presidential campaign, he accused the selfishness and greed of the privileged upper classes for the underdevelopment of the country. However, both in 1990 and then after his return to power in 1994, he legitimized violence as a means to hold power and then used the state resources to enrich himself and his entourage. Personal leadership, inefficiency and violence were soon recognized as the common pattern of power in Haiti and, again, the Haitian population, whose many sectors had come together in the years between 1991 and 1994 to support the return of Aristide, were once again betrayed by their rulers. Catholicism found itself in an ambiguous position in relations to its defrocked priests and its alliance with the economic oligarchy.

Vodou in Haiti: Symbolism and Disengagement

Haitian Vodou's beliefs and practices also contributed to the deepening of social divisions and the creation of a world of symbolism. This, in turn, legitimizes Haitians for the lack of social responsibility.

Traditionally associated with the slaves and the rural Creole-speaking population, Vodou has developed throughout the centuries an effective way of adapting to the growing circumstances and harshness of daily life. In the absence of the adequate levels of technological and medical knowledge necessary to explain the many diseases that affected and continue to affect the poor, Vodou provided a supernaturalistic explanation of reality. The different Gods, some good and some evil, were the final referee of all events and the ones holding the monopoly

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[39] For a good insight on the way Francois Duvalier managed to gain the Vatican's support see: Francois Duvalier, *Mémoires d'un leader du Tiers Monde*, Hachette, 1969.

of power. Among them there exists a very strict hierarchy and, if it is their will, they can visit people by invading the body and taking over a designated person's mind. Magical ceremonies and spells could be practiced to defeat an enemy and traumatize him psychologically, but man has no access to the high Gods.

According to Vodou doctrine, life is like a network of vital forces in which God, the human being, the many forces of nature including the wisdom or experiences of the ancestors, the forces that sustain the stars and the planets including the earth, the vital forces of the plants and the animals including the human beings are all inter-related. So, one is constantly in touch with one another. At times, services or ceremony or dances are practiced for one or another particular force with which one wants to create greater feelings of harmony (in a sense that is very much alike the harmony among forces in physics or sympathy among people in psychology). The practice of Vodou may be totally individual or collective. One can do it alone in his apartment or participate in very, very large ceremonies with thousands of people in waterfalls, mountaintops, and large extended fields.

Another important precept of Vodou is that Vodouïsts always find most of their problems generally deeply rooted. This justifies the maintenance of a strong feeling of dependency toward God, the main source of vital energy and help. That is the way Vodouïsts express their religiosity. To express that feeling of dependency, they usually adopt an attitude of belief and attachment to what is refered to as "Reality that transcends the World" by concrete actions. These actions allow the individual to find within himself the means to transcend, and to get in touch with "The One who is the Ideal of all of his ideals" and to find within oneself the means that allow one to come close to one's perfection. So, the attachment of the individual and his feelings of dependency toward God are religious. They are an internal attitude that always exteriorizes itself by very concrete behaviors, attitudes, actions, and in a regulation of one's life.

These precepts, despite their emphasis on harmony, seem to have not effectively promoted development in the country. A possible explanation could be that the arbitrary relationship between men and God and the focus on transcendence, dehumanize the individual, and favor passivity by putting men at the mercy of arbitrary fate.

Furthermore, despite Vodou's focus on the achievement of personal harmony through membership and the maintenance of relationships within the context of family and community, a character that would suggest cooperation and activism within society, historically, Vodou priests, or Houngans, have never promoted social work such as the building of a school, programs of community development or innovations in agricultural technique.[40]

Nonetheless, even if not engaged in social works, Vodou priests, today, resent never being allowed political participation in the making of the state and claim the right to greater influence in the creation of policies. The principle of separation between State and Religion is officially supported. However, the line between the two spheres is not always clearly defined. In a recent interview, Houngan Max Beauvoir stated: "The country has never let Vodou be represented in the government. Vodou always suffered from *dechoukaj* (uprooting). Vodou

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[40] Rémy Bastien, *Religion and Politics in Haiti*, Institute for Cross-Cultural Research, Washington, p. 48.

religion should be included in political life because it knows how to bring happiness to people's lives by setting the norms of behavior and distinguishing between what is good and what is bad".

Given its deep embeddedness into Haitian society, Vodou's claim for wider recognition is understandable. Because of its ambiguity about its aspired role in society and political life and its emphasis on transcendence through the creation of a world of symbolism and magic to which men can escape when difficulties arise, Vodou neither promotes the move towards scientific and technological education, nor does it favor responsible civil engagement. Moreover, its belief in distant and moody divinities, which men have to please, creates the ideological basis for the legitimization of personified power. In fact, among the reasons that favored Aristide's surge to power in 1990, was the Vodou belief in the arrival of a Messiah that would free the people from oppression. His defense of the interest of the poor appealed to the oppressed rural sectors, which finally looked at him as the much-awaited savior of the nation. Yet, this mysticism and the belief that all changes can only come from above, reinforce division among the population. It hampers personal engagement and, in final analysis, favors a vision of the State not as a set of mutually influenced institutions, but as a hierarchical division of personal powers.

The Remedies to Haitian Enduring Conflicts: Community Based Trust-Building

If these are fundamental elements of religion that contribute to the instability of the country, it is right to look at religion itself as a source for possible solutions. While many other more imminent issues need to be addressed to help the country rise from its condition of conflict and underdevelopment, if the country is to overcome its endemic climate of hostility it has to address the deeper permissive causes of instability. This would mean overcoming the deep-rooted distrust among the social classes and acquiring a national sense of identity that could favor better inter and intra class cooperation. President Préval made specific reference to this need: "What is needed is a profound change in mentality. A good leader is the one that pushes people forward. He is the one who manages to move the mentality of the people from that of personal leadership to that of collective leadership."

Both Haitian Catholicism and Vodou greatly value the principle of community and the interaction with God through a communal process. However, this does not necessarily entail cooperation, the coordination among the members of a group for the pursuit of one common goal. In this direction, religion in Haiti has not been particularly active. Yet, given its community-based organizational structure, it could be instrumental in the promotion of effective cooperation. In particular, both Catholics and Vodouïsts could use their communal focus as a basis for a change of mentality towards more constructive behaviors.

Recognizing that there are many levels at which society is influenced and that the need for a change of mentality has to occur at each of those levels, the Catholic and Vodou communities in Haiti can act on three levels or images, (derived from Waltz [1954] the human, the state and the international structure as the sources of conflict). Priests and Houngans can modify their message to the individual believers in order to foster more trust and personal engagement in the making of the nation. At the state level, religious and political institutions should collaborate to clearly define the delineating criteria between the realm of the state and that of the church. At the international level, the Vatican and other Christian international

organizations should focus more on the principle of local ownership and help the nation overcome its sense of historical exclusion and isolation. Religion is not, of course, an ideology that can be modified according to necessity. Nonetheless, many of the positions that have been taken in the past by both religions have not been inspired by theology, but rather by political convenience. Therefore, a move from a less political to a more practical realm will in no way contradict the tenets of either religion.

The First Image: Individual Confidence Building

At the individual level, both Catholicism and Vodou, can use their contact with the individual believers to promote the idea of dialogue and interaction between social classes. Resentment and distrust due to historical rivalries need to be overcome, to build a Haitian sense of pride in the realization of individual potential for the benefit of the community — for the achievement of one's own dignity and that of others.

Caught between its compromises with the Duvalier regime and its estrangement with the Aristide Regime, the Church today seeks to build an apolitical sense of individual worth. *Vin moun* (become someone) is today's slogan, and it needs to be taken to the next step to social action. Communities in both religions should **organize in order to create new opportunities for trust-building among sectors (or classes) of society.**

Thanks to their capillary presence across the country, the religious communities could (a) **educate people about high risk behaviors related to hygiene, sanitation and water supply,** (b) **identify specific incentives for change like attractiveness, modernity, education,** (c) **find new communication channels to reach women and educate them and assist them in the bearing of their children.** Better hygiene will not just improve the people's health conditions but it will also enhance their sense of dignity and commitment to communal cooperation.

The Second Image: Cooperation Between State and Religion

Action at the individual level is important but not sufficient. Individual level initiatives cannot be efficiently carried out without the participation of the State. At the governmental and institutional level, the Haitian Catholic Church and the Vodou community should create pressure for the wider inclusion of their communities as active players in society. Archbishop Louis Kébreau seemed greatly disillusioned when he spoke in a recent interview about the lack of response on the part of the government to Church proposals on educational, agricultural, and health programs. Furthermore, he clearly expressed his resentment towards MINUSTAH by saying: *"Cela m'embette, ils font rien"* (it annoys me, they do nothing) Yet both parties need better cooperation.

Similarly, Houngan Max Beauvoir, when asked about the role of syncretism between Catholicism and Vodou in Haiti, testified to the persistence of deep-rooted rivalries when he declared "Has the process been beneficial to the people of the country? I can hardly say yes. The Christians have brought many things that seem good such as instruction, contribution in health development, food etc. But, at the same time, they have created one of the greatest social disease

to the country, which is like a social cancer to any society: the wide division amidst the population."

Said Prime Minister Alexis: "The Haiti state is a secular one and the relationship between state and religion is that of separation. However, it is true that, in some sectors of society, habits of the past still persist and the Concordat with the Catholic Church is still strong. In the past, the state has been deficient in responding to many of the needs of its population. In the field of education, for instance, the state has not been sufficiently active and, for this reason, the Christian communities have often tried to fill the vacuum". Instead, the two institutions need to work together.

For example, IOM's Matt Huber testified that the Salesian community in Bel Air had declined to collaborate with the organization in community works for the slum. The IOM project concerned the reintegration of young gang leaders in the community by sending them to school. The Salesians refused to accept the boys into their school and accused the members of IOM of being foreigners and colonials not genuinely interested in helping the people. This certainly deepened divisions between the people of the community and weakened community aid projects. Future project proposals should be evaluated in the light of these consequences. Another important sector in which, both the Catholic communities and the Vodou communities should engage at the individual level is the education about hygiene. In Bel Air, a community-based project for the creation of latrines and sanitary facilities was abandoned because people would not organize themselves for ongoing maintenance. In Jacmel, the mayor will probably be forced to impose a tax to convince people not to throw their waste along the street.

Among the possible activities in which the Church and the Vodou communities could cooperate with the government could be that of education and health services. However, at the state level, the focus should be more on defining the general principles and directions for the coordination and implementation of the activities at the local level. This would strengthen the legitimization of the State and its control over development driven activities. The importance of overcoming class division and historical rivalries should be emphasized, and the need for better communication and coordination between the urban and rural communities, both Catholic and Vodou, should be underlined.

The Third Image: International Pressure and Inclusion

The last level at which religious institutions can intervene to help the country overcome the historical sense of hopelessness among the Haitians is at the international level. In an historical perspective, conflict and underdevelopment in the country have been the consequence also of the way Haiti has been perceived in the international arena. The many international agencies, including the many Christian-driven organizations, acting today in the country **should put particular emphasis on the need for dialogue with the local communities, even if Vodouïsts, and promote local ownership of every initiative**. Furthermore, the Vatican needs to actively participate in the making of the nation by giving moral and financial support to the community-based activities. The Vatican could also organize seminars for Haitian priests to help them acquire new education and suggest ways to carry out their activities in Haiti. This would

not only help them get new experience, but would also show renewed interest in and recognition of the nation and a genuine international attempt to participate in the creation of the State.

If at all levels the country overcomes mistrust in all that is *other,* and finally humanizes itself and takes on responsibility for its own dignity, more constructive cooperation could be developed. And the Haitians could, once and for all, see the creation of the right conditions for hope or, in Creole, for *lespwa*.

Haitian Islandness
—
An Island Studies Analysis of the Haiti Conflict

For those not familiar with island studies— nissology— the term "islandness" itself may appear odd and indeed even constructed. However, islandness is more than the mere isolation denoted by the word "insularity" and encompasses the entire existence of the state and her people. "Islandness is an intervening variable that does not determine, but contours and conditions physical and social events in distinct, and distinctly relevant, ways."[41] In Haiti islandness has been a significant contributor to the rise and continuance of endemic conflict, but in conditioning the interactions of the people both with each other and with the state, islandness also holds the key to moving Haiti beyond conflict and towards a consolidated and peaceful democracy. While others have focused on specific institutions and cultural aspects of Haitian society, all of these factors are conditioned by the fact that Haiti is an island, isolated and concentrated in ways that mainland states are not. With this in mind, the resolving of other issues must by definition depend on the influence of islandness as an intervening variable.

While Haiti is most obviously an island in the geographic sense, it is also one in the sociological sense. Its non-water border with the Dominican Republic has not joined the two countries in a significant manner. Haiti remains a Creole and French island amid a Caribbean of Spanish. Colonially, the Haitians survived a different system of tutelage than their neighbors. Perhaps even more importantly the Haitians took their independence through revolution in 1804, a path not followed by their fellow-island neighbors, the majority of whom did not become independent until after Haiti celebrated her centennial. Thus geographically, sociologically and even historically Haiti is an island apart, even from the other side of Hispaniola.

Understanding Haiti and her people depends on the acceptance of this fact. The island fabric can respond to the needs of the nation in a way that focusing on any other factor alone cannot. Haitians themselves unconsciously understand this and when asked about the needs of their country can articulate it in a simple way: "What Haiti needs most is trust."[42] It is also expressed in the way that any of them can convey a solution to the endemic conflict: "Every Haitian needs to make the choice to move beyond anger and revenge, to accept each other and work together, " as our security guard said. Unknowingly these statements point to a solution that can only be found in the social capital and trust fostered by a unique Haitian islandness.

Islandness

As quoted above, islandness serves as a conditioning factor for the performance of political, economic and social structures. In continental terms the closest comparison is the small

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[41] Baldacchino, Godfrey. "The Coming of Age of Island Studies." *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie.* 95:3 (2004a), p. 278.
[42] Durban, Deanna.

town. Inside a closed environment formed by geographic separation and limited population size, social interactions become multilayered and intensified. This means that each member of a community plays multiple roles, for instance the mayor is also the auto mechanic (as is the case in Jacmel) and the judge and the school principal are also neighbors and friends. Role multiplicity creates an informal and personalistic social network that is transferred to the political and economic systems, producing greater interdependence. The persistent and repeated interactions with individuals in multiple roles become an enabler for democracy, by enhancing the stock of social capital. This enhanced stock of social capital further facilitates communication between the governed and the governing. Society becomes more participatory and transparent and the polity becomes better equipped to work together to find solutions to common problems. These factors have made island nations among the most stable and democratic, irrespective of their level of economic development.

The strong social fabric of islandness is additionally fostered by the geographic precision of the state. Isolation from the outside world creates a clear identification of who belongs to the island, aiding the formation of island nationalism. A perception of susceptibility to threats and invasions from the larger states of the outside world enhances the national identity with a need to assert the island self against the outside other in areas ranging from the arts to religion to governance. This builds a holistic sense of place encompassing environment, culture, institutions and traditions. Once established this identity is not lost with migration, but provides a permanent connection between home and away, tying the Diaspora to the homeland.

The positive elements of islandness are present in Haiti, but overall Haitian islandness has not fostered peaceful, stable democracy as it has in neighboring islands. At the root of the situation, Haiti has not achieved a salient island identity nor enjoyed the cooperative social fabric and trust that comes with it; instead the Haitians appear to be merely a group of people stranded on an island and waiting to leave *à la* Robinson Crusoe. The culture, history and ecology of the nation are an ideal foundation for the successful formation of an island identity, but Haitian islandness has consistently served as a closed box to contain the divisive history of the country locked up to perpetuate itself.

The Breakdown of Islandness and the Failure of Past Initiatives

Haitian islandness has been captured by the ruling elite. Instead of building an identity that focuses on the long-term goals of the nation as a whole, policies have been focused on short-term gains and sub-national identities. Though color has been historically associated with class, the dominant division in society is class based. From the time of the revolution all politics have been based on the goals of one class versus those of the other, without regard for the long term good of the nation. Freedmen joined the initially slave-led rebellion in 1802 with the desire to build an exclusionary state, similar to what later existed in apartheid South Africa. By controlling the redistribution of land rights, they succeeded, and Haiti was divided into the two republics that still exist today: the wealthy, French-speaking elite and *le moun pov*, the people.

From that time on, those in power have practiced a system of state capture that has systematically denied the rights of humanity to the majority of Haitians, preventing the formation of a Haitian islandness and in its place creating corruption and disenchantment, instead of trust

and enfranchisement. The important phrase in the preceding sentence is "those in power," for even when an individual from a *moun pov* background came to power, that individual also focused on sub-national factions, rather than delivering on promises of national unity.

The convergence of the elite and the domination of sub-national identities have led to two factors that have plagued every attempt to rebuild Haitian islandness and will continue to do so until they are properly addressed. First is the over identification of the individual with office. A tradition of presidents for life and charismatic authoritarian rule in general has created a strong sense of personal identification with regard to public office. As a result, the office holder is personally identified with the actions that take place under his tenure and is held individually responsible. Such identification can make even willing reformers reluctant to act for the common good for fear of retribution once out of office, or, as has been the case throughout Haitian history, removal from office before completion of term. This has fed into the dominance of the factionalist status quo and prevented all meaningful change.

Coupled with this is the predominant role of factions within politics itself. The role of sub-national identities as a basis for power has created a political stasis from which Haiti has been unable to escape. Since political power is derived from the existing sub-national identities there has been no drive to find a unifying national identity. Specifically, promises to build national unity are not kept and the majority is systematically denied the full rights of citizenship that would bring them into the political structure. No politician has successfully built a grand coalition that will enable the full functioning of a stable democracy. Instead, the elite's fears of the masses feed the office holder's fear of retribution or removal, which have led to a stagnated state of crisis.

No one embodies the failure of all efforts to build Haitian islandness better than Aristide. Raised from a humble beginning, he rose in political power through his charismatic preaching and promised to bring his supporters, *moun pov*, with him. Calling for a policy of *tout moun se moun* (all human beings are human beings), he was elected by the public and quickly removed from office by the fearful elite. Under an international embargo, "the people suffered for Aristide's return, but once he was back he made their sacrifice meaningless, " the Haitian Heritage Foundation representative said. He benefited from denying the rights of citizenship to the masses and continued to play on sub-national identities, producing widespread disenchantment with hollow calls for national unity. During both his presidency and his exile, Aristide, like those before him, systematically worked to prevent the formation of Haitian islandness and its uniting, stabilizing qualities.

Reconstructing the Haitian Island

As systematic as the destruction of Haitian islandness has been, its foundations remain within the island and its people. Fifty percent of all police are assigned to Port-au-Prince, leaving the majority of the island without official patrols and with many people who have never seen a member of the Haitian National Police. This means that the bulk of the country is self-policing. In the countryside community identity and solidarity remains strong. Within "The Republic of Port-au-Prince" itself the same sense of community has been triumphant in certain slum areas, where the citizens have stood together and decided that they would no longer tolerate the

presence of gangs. Even in the country's most secure municipality, "The Republic of Jacmel", both the Mayor and the Chief of Police credit the active participation of the community with augmenting the understaffed police force and ensuring that the city does not become overrun with gangs. In both cities, insularity is a dominant characteristic, with no identification with the rest of the country. While these community efforts have not always been peaceful, they have been effective and show that seeds of cooperation exist in the Haitian people.

These seeds of social capital and trust connect deeply with their Creole past, specifically the traditional practice of *kombit*, which translates literally as "working together". Within this idea is the beginning of a resurgent Haitian identity that encompasses the entire population and makes a reality of the idea of national unity.

Reconstructing a Haitian islandness also draws from events of the twentieth century. During the American occupation of 1915-1934, a distinctive Haitian culture separate from the African, French or American began to crystallize across the classes. It relied on the elements highlighted above that create a strong social fabric. By asserting themselves against an outside force, the nation began to form its unique identity. However, once the Americans left and Duvalier took over as President for life, he took steps to separate the country again and use the sub-national divisions for personal gain, restarting the systematic breakdown of Haitian islandness, which has yet to recover.

Some of the organizations present in Haiti have recognized the lack of unity as the root of many of the problems and have begun to include its reconstruction as a primary goal. Caravane de la Paix has focused on the relations within communities to address the questions of disarmament and gangs through the voluntary laying down of arms. The director of the government's disarmament program expressed a similar goal, focusing on the need to "cut away exclusion" and "transform the relations within a community and between communities." The increase in community organizations', representational groups' and local leaders' interactions with the international community illustrate this process forming from the bottom, not only the top. A strong voter turn-out and the eagerness of the people to vote in local elections create hope for a resurgence of Haitian islandness that will lift the nation out of her endemic conflict.

The recommendations below are a starting point. They are at once broad and narrow, covering only aspects that facilitate the rebuilding of Haitian social capital and trust, but these aspects touch every part of Haitian life. In them is the hope for a Haiti that will include all of her people.

Recommendations

For building an infant democracy, which Haiti remains despite its 200 years of existence, a little nationalism can be a good thing. Utilizing the cross-class cultural similarities mentioned above, the people can **begin to rebuild their identity in connection with the state**. A government-led program of "A Haiti for Haitians" could highlight the nation's unique cultural strengths, distinct ecological attributes and the contributions they have made to the world throughout history. "There is something distinct about being Haitian that is not lost with migration and that can be recognized by any fellow Haitian" on the streets of New York, Paris or

Port-au-Prince, the Vodou Houngan told us. This image of Haiti needs to be projected to the world, correcting widespread misconceptions, drawing in tourism dollars and providing incentives for the Diaspora to reconnect with its homeland. "A Haiti for Haitians" would extend beyond cultural promotion to a clearly government-led development strategy, such as has been proposed by Prime Minister Alexis, President Préval and World Bank representatives. A government-led development strategy will remove any residual fears of foreign invasion and reassert national ownership over the development process.

There was a time under the Duvaliers when each morning people would be required to stop in the streets to watch the raising of the national flag and salute. This practice was recounted by Msgr. Kébreau in a moment of nostalgia for Duvalierism. While other Duvalierist practices should not be revived, the installation of civic pride should be renewed. In Jacmel the mayor has focused on civic pride in his city, but his sentiment can be expanded to encompass the entire nation. **Civic education should be renewed from the beginning of elementary education.** Haitians should be taught about the achievements of their country and countrymen, as an aid in the first recommendation to create a Haiti for Haitians. Along with this they **should be taught respect for the institutions of government and justice and the symbols of their nation.** Developing a civic awareness at a young age will rebuild the social capital and trust that have been systematically destroyed under years of authoritarianism, bringing the next generation into the political system.

In speaking with both community leaders and President Préval the sentiment was the same: the people cannot do anything without the government's help. This is fundamentally untrue. Not only must the citizens of Haiti regain their national pride, they must regain their individual pride. They **must be involved in the local projects of both the government and the international community in a meaningful way**, such that each individual can come to appreciate what it is he himself can do. The contractors and employees should be drawn from the local community as IOM is already doing. This will help to curb feelings of dependency. Even more importantly, **communities that help themselves must be applauded.** Currently both the government and the international community are focused on sending aid to the communities like Cité Soleil that are not helping themselves. While these communities should continue to be helped, focusing on these communities sets the dangerous precedent that if a community allows itself to collapse completely then it will start receiving large amounts of aid. This message can be changed by setting aside a portion of aid money for those communities that are pro-active. Such a program would provide both recognition and reward for those citizens that take the improvement of their community upon themselves.

Despite statements by both the government and the international community that holding the constitutionally mandated elections will be both costly and complicated, the elections must move forward as scheduled. The government must follow the Constitution as written and act in a manner that is both understandable and predictable to the public. People must begin to trust **that the elections will occur as scheduled and that post-election transitions will be peaceful.** To do this, the government must ensure that the elections are held. Following this seemingly simple recommendation can change the public's perceptions of and expectations for the government. In doing so the government's legitimacy will increase and Haitians will begin to believe in democratic government as a viable option to authoritarianism. Préval's concern about the current

Haitian view of a leader as a strong man who imposes authority will be abated if the predictability of democratic government is increased. A President who loses favor is more likely not to be challenged if the public knows that in a few years a new election will be held without question.

The Haitian Diaspora

The conflict in Haiti is an outgrowth of multiple dimensions of social breakdown and state failure. Haiti is marked by the absence of dominate social norms and of bureaucratic behavioral patterns that adhere to and support the fundamental ideology and institutions of government. This lack of a dominating, institutionally reinforcing constituency is the central problem that connects the Diaspora to the persistent volatility in the Haitian political economy. The Diaspora is Haiti's missing middle class and center. Though remittances from the Diaspora float the Haitian economy, money cannot replace agency. Remittances also generate effects and problems of their own. Add to this the impact of criminal deportees from abroad that Haiti is ill equipped to handle, and it is easy to comprehend why peace and stability elude Haiti.

Economically, unemployment in Haiti is close to 60%. The poverty headcount ratio is $2 per day for 78% of the population. Given low levels of accountability and limited economic opportunities, corruption presents itself as a viable alternative, as previously noted. Tragically, Haitian society lacks a cohesive set of interests strong enough to stand as a countervailing force to the parties that benefit from crooked opportunism. This is the cause and perpetuating element of the conflict in Haiti. The vast majority of the constituency that would reinforce anti-corruption campaigns and protect failing institutions have left Haiti over the past several decades. The large-scale exodus of skilled professionals— doctors, nurses, lawyers, teachers, and engineers— began in the 1950s and hastened following the rise to power of "Papa Doc" Duvalier. During the first six years of his rule, from 1957 to 1963, only 3 of the 264 graduates of Haiti's medical school remained in the country. The waves of emigration that continued at various levels into the late 1990s have eviscerated Haiti's center. Today, the Diaspora represents the lion's share of Haiti's middle class. Two and a half million Haitians live abroad, while the country confronts a debilitating deficit of the professionals essential to successful reform of its failing institutions. For example, in the field of health only about a quarter of new births were attended by a skilled health staff according to 2000 estimates. Further, about half a million school-age children do not attend school. As a result of lacking standards and absenteeism, the literacy rate in Haiti is currently estimated at around 50 to 52%.

The Missing Center

Gang violence, police abuse and corruption, and poverty are all aspects of Haiti's present condition; but they are not its root causes. It is more accurate to pinpoint the source of instability and resulting conflict in Haiti as structural and specifically due to the lack of a political and economic center. In short, in lacking a strong middle class, Haiti lacks an empowered echelon that conceptualizes its vital interest within the mainstream institutions of a society, protects and defends the social institutions that satisfy their needs, and tempers extremism from the lower or higher stratums of society. With its middle class abroad and largely disorganized, Haiti suffers from a polarized social structure that complicates the mechanisms of social cohesion and permits corruption and political extremism to run rampant.

Many members of the Haitian business elite profit from regulatory disorder. Skills in negotiating the convoluted laws and intricate systems of patronage afford this elite distinct advantages over outside economic competitors. Investors from the Diaspora must often partner with domestic business people who "know how business is done" in Haiti. Similarly, participants in drug trafficking and other illegal activities in Haiti have vital interests in maintaining the atmosphere in which they can operate with impunity. Without a social core more interested in reform and able to act as and support agents of change, those who benefit economically from the status quo will continue to dominate.

The power of the Diaspora to generate wealth is clearly demonstrated by the $1.2 billion in remittances sent to Haiti in 2006. Remittances represent about 20% of total GDP in Haiti. The influx of money helps prevent economic collapse and further decay. A sizable portion of remittances go to household and education expenses, where they often go to supporting substandard schools, as already described. Remittances generally flow directly to families in foreign currency, and as such drive import consumption at the expense of domestic development, quickly exiting the country instead of recycling within the domestic economy. Remittances are also blamed for generating levels of dependency by diminishing the overall sense of ownership and urgency of the population in confronting Haiti's development challenges.

Nevertheless, remittances can be seen as aggravating some of the conditions that contribute to Haiti's social problems, not the least of which is the growing threat that those who receive remittances face as targets of kidnapping. Jemmy, a 17 year old girl who left Haiti four months ago because of a kidnapping in her school, explains "When people find out you have family in the US… they think you have money… and so they try and kidnap you." Jemmy recounts how important it is to avoid the appearance of having a connection to money. "People don't feel safe", she says, "You don't have to be in the street. You can be at home and people come to your home…knocking at your door at night." Even at school with armed guards students do not feel safe. "Some schools have men with guns, but they don't use them… they are afraid too… some of the gangs have guns better than police."

Another aspect of the Diaspora's contribution to Haiti's instability is the influx of criminal deportees. Prime Minister Alexis has blamed deportees for contributing to the rising prevalence of kidnappings. Though they are relatively few (202 deportees were sent from the US to Haiti in 1998, plus some from Canada and the Dominican Republic), Haiti does not possess the human and physical resources necessary to absorb them. The Prime Minister publicized his concerns over the issue in December 2006 after he was informed that the number of deportees from the US would increase from approximately 25 to 100 per month. About half of US deportees to Haiti are deported for drug related crimes, but few according to Chans Alternative, an NGO that works with deportees, are actually hardened criminals. Many deportees commit minor drug offenses and all have already served their sentences in the US.

What is clear is that without the capacity to process them, Haitian officials allow deportees to languish in Haitian jails without criminal charges. Many deportees have no immediate family in Haiti, and are therefore cut off from their only source of food. Others do not speak much Creole. Deportees are identifiable and are easy targets of resentment. They are reviled for wasting the opportunity to live abroad, and are perceived as skilled criminals who

magnify Haiti's crime problems. The overall situation of deportees is desperate. Whether deportees are truly criminals abroad or not, in absence of any intervention the overall vulnerability and marginalization of deportees in Haiti predictably leads to criminal activity, adding to Haiti's burden of problems.

What Can the Diaspora Do?

The transition away from conflict begins with security and a working system of justice. The Diaspora will not seriously invest, become regular tourists, make regular excursions to train professionals, or be convincing advocates for Haiti in their countries of residence unless progress is made on the issue of security. Ambassador Joseph has expressed hope that the security situation will improve now that MINUSTAH has begun to target bandits and gang leaders. While the Diaspora is not in the position to implement any reforms for Haiti from abroad, they are able to take measures to aid internally instituted reforms. To this effect the Diaspora is already offering assistance in the critical vetting process for the Haitian National Police (PNH). Haitian police volunteers from the US have been used to overcome communication barriers and enhance the training of new police officers. Five-hundred-and-sixty-seven new PNH have already been trained and more police will be trained and added to the police force as an estimated 1,600 police are removed from the vetting process. The Diaspora should expand their role in these sorts of programs, and further create incentives for members of the Haitian police force. Specifically, by creating funds for injured police and their families or educational scholarships for children of members of the police force, **the Diaspora can help provide a system of benefits that will lead to the overall improvement in the PNH.**

The Diaspora **should also pressure the Haitian Government and international actors to initiate similar vetting processes for judges.** Kidnappers and criminals that the police labor to apprehend can easily circumvent the judicial process and pay for their release, returning to operate with impunity, as discussed in previous chapters. **The Diaspora could help by raising funds to provide incentives to judges that uphold the law** and demonstrate integrity in office. **The Diaspora could also supply volunteer judges** to work with judges in Haiti and facilitate programs in judicial ethics.

To become a dependable channel of resources and advocacy **the Diaspora has to become more organized**. As Holbrook of CHF International in Haiti says, "there is no organization to turn to" in the Diaspora for support. The Diaspora has been successful as an outlet for raising money for individual schools and community projects. For example, Director Antoine, of Border Region Development is currently in partnership with FAVACA in Miami to raise funds for refurbishing a school in the border region. A Catholic church in Atlanta has provided educational and health services in Belle Anse, a village in the Southeast of difficult access, and the Diaspora could add to the project with money and volunteers. Despite these efforts, the Diaspora has not been able to organize itself to provide a consistent stream of funding for ongoing initiatives. **The Diaspora can do more to organize as a collective interest**, according to Lionel Delatour from CLED.

The challenges that impede large scale collective action are deep rooted according to Haitian lobbyist, Alice Blanchet. Blanchet suggests that politics in the Diaspora hold

disappointing similarities to politics in Haiti. The politics of both are marked by systematic undermining and a tendency for personal interests to prevail over collective ones. Attitudes about power carried over from Haiti impede dialogue and complicate the processes that lead to necessary political compromise. Blachet says, "You can't negotiate with anyone who doesn't negotiate in good faith…the willingness to negotiate implies the willingness to lose in Haiti it is winner take all." Others, like President Lesly Kernisant of Société Immobilier Agriculture Commerce Tourisme (SIMACT), are hopeful that individualistic tendencies within the Haitian community can be overcome through the demonstration of collective power. SIMACT, a company that guides its investments based on social impact as well as profitability, has successfully invested close to 6 million dollars in projects ranging from rental properties to exports of wood to Haiti, a venture that aims at diminishing the problem of deforestation. Eighty percent of SIMACT shareholders are Haitian physicians living in the New York City area. SIMACT has won increased financial backing from Haitian investors growing from seven shareholders in 1996 to 31 today. Dr. Kernisant is confident a unified Diaspora can use investments to encourage necessary reforms in Haiti and pressure government officials to conduct their political affairs with a stronger sense of fairness. Irrefutably, the unique successes of SIMACT give credence to the idea that collective enterprises present the best approach for Diaspora members interested in business and development to structure future investments in Haiti.

A unified Diaspora could also become a stronger lobby for policies abroad that benefit Haiti. On the issue of deportation of Haitians, an organized Diaspora could advocate for better policies. They could give stronger support to representatives like Congressman Alcee Hastings, who has asked Congress to pass the Haitian Protection Act of 2007 designed to give "temporary protected status" to an estimated 20,000 Haitians for 18 months. This measure, if enacted which would slow the flow of deportees to Haiti. To further address the issue of deportation, the Diaspora in the US should also organize a legal challenge to the 1996 Anti-Terrorist Act that has been used retroactively to deport Haitians convicted of any crimes. Advocates should push to end the retroactive scope of the law and to have the courts or Congress more narrowly define the crimes that warrant deportation. These advocates can also work to build more international awareness of the deportee practices of the Dominican Republic which often deport native born citizens of Haitian descent, and deny them naturalized status.

As part of a process of organizing, the Diaspora **needs to improve its image in Haiti**. Though the remittance money by the Diaspora is welcome, the Haitian saying "*voyé lajon fémin dyól*" (send the money, but shut your mouth) is telling of the mistrust surrounding the Diaspora's involvement in political and economic affairs of Haiti. Members of the Diaspora are caricatured as arrogant and imposing and are resented by some for leaving the country. The resulting tension poses challenges to cooperative activities between the two groups. These challenges must be meet if the influx of remittance money is to contribute to economic growth.

Lessons can be learned from villages in Oaxaca, Mexico, that have been successful in organizing a system of collective remittances by setting up community boards entrusted with managing funds which are directed to community development projects or entrepreneurial enterprises. Some of these projects have been implemented with government support. The Haiti Diaspora should strive to emulate aspects of these projects. Projects could be coordinated with

matching government funds (or international aid funneled through the government), giving more incentives for the Diaspora to raise money and for local leaders to organize themselves. Through this process, relationships between government officials and community leaders could be strengthened and local leadership further developed. With good experiences, communities will create a trusted institution in the community boards that coordinate activities to address other community needs. Most importantly, remittance money would be cycled into development instead of funneled out of the country through import consumption.

If Haiti were to adopt collective remittance project models from Oaxaca, Mexico, there are important distinctions in immigration patterns that would have to be addressed. In the case of Oaxaca, villages that successfully managed collective remittances had high levels of out-migration and received remittances from village members who created village specific enclaves abroad. Haitian Diaspora migration, though largely centered in particular cities —New York, Miami, Montreal— is more diffuse and less discriminating in terms of regional identities. Given this distinction, the Haitian Diaspora would have to organize collective remittances beyond the ties of village affiliation.

As a missing middle class, the Diaspora cannot practically reinsert itself into Haiti. The best it can do is **to help build the professional sectors that strengthen the institutions and infrastructure of Haiti and create middle class jobs.** Presently, Haiti has the lowest public sector employment in the region, less than 0.7 percent. This must change. In the short term, the Diaspora can fund and provide volunteers for training programs that building skills and professionalism in law enforcement, education, and health care. The Centre d'Apprentissage et de Formation Pour la Transformation (CAFT) program supported by Yéle Haiti is a model of the type of programs the Diaspora must support and expand. CAFT runs workshops for 32 schools that provides teachers with the training in teaching methods. A stronger, more valued and respected, and eventually better paid, education, health, and law enforcement sector would provide a backbone for Haiti's new middle class. In addition, the stability and social safety nets created by these sectors would encourage development in others. As the quality of these services improve, literacy rates, mortality rates, and crime rates would also improve, setting conditions for more robust foreign investment.

For careers in education, health and law enforcement to be stable in the long term, **institutions that can teach and certify professionals will be needed.** Teaching colleges, nursing schools, medical schools, police academies would all be necessary. The Diaspora would need to invest and build philanthropic and other support for these kinds of investments. The contributions of successful Diaspora businessmen could be very powerful in this arena. Professional members of the Diaspora would also need to be willing to function as professors and staff during the nascent stages of development of these institutions.

Conclusion

The Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad, MIHAVE, champions efforts to reduce the steps and time for opening a business in Haiti as indicative of the changes that will bring renewed investment from the Diaspora. Although antiquated laws are an obstacle to investment matter, the central problem for investors from the Diaspora is security and social infrastructure.

To the extent that the Diaspora can assist Haiti in tackling those problems, more economic investment and overall engagement with Haiti will increase. The deepest source of Haiti's instability, its missing middle class, can only improve through strategic investment and development in the sectors of education, health, and law enforcement. The Diaspora with it requisite set of skills and resources is well-suited to play a powerful role in the growth of these sectors.

Conclusion   **Stewart Patrick**

Haiti and the Donor Community
—
New Terms of Engagement

Is Haiti a "Failed State"? This question is arguably more distracting than illuminating.
Policymakers and scholars, myself included, have devoted an inordinate amount of attention to
classifying states into binary categories. This misses the larger point that state strength in the
developing world – indeed in all countries – falls along a continuum, depending on the quality
and resilience of state institutions. Rather than assigning countries into an "either/or" category,
it's more useful to array them along a spectrum and gauge their performance relative to others in
their cohort on their ability to provide the essential political goods associated with statehood.

Using 18 well established indicators, we at CGD and Brookings have ranked 143
developing and transitional countries across 4 main spheres of state function, including: securing
their populations from violent conflict and to control their territory; meeting the basic human
needs of their population; fostering and environment conducive to sustainable and equitable
economic growth; and governing legitimately and effectively. Our index ranks Haiti 13th from
the bottom comparable to its 8th position on the Failed State Index, with dramatic deficiencies on
all components of statehood, notably its political, economic, and social components. Relatively
speaking, this is above Afghanistan and Liberia, for example, but below Burma or Chad. In
terms of social indicators, Haiti fares abysmally on primary school completion rate (with half of
school age children not in school) and on under 5 mortality (an astounding 25%).

So much for numbers. What about conditions in the country as we found it? The
overwhelming impression from our trip was the lack of any functioning government institutions
in the country and the absence of the state as a consideration in the everyday life of Haitians (and
the dominant role of NGOs in filling the vacuum as the state has atrophied). There is little
human capital below 2-3 levels into the bureaucracy, little ability to get anything done or
implement approved policies. The state does not maintain basic records. It is largely absent in
the delivery of social services: 85-90% of education is private (and poor), and a majority of
health care (55-60%) is delivered by foreign donors/NGOs. There is little or no electricity in
much of country. The state is incapable of building and maintaining roads. The new parliament
has no staff, no computers. Without remittances of approximately $1 billion/year, Haiti would
not stay afloat.

For all weakness, **Haiti has a brief window of opportunity, a delicate moment
comparable to the "golden hour" in immediate post-conflict situation.** For the first time
ever, Haiti has a fully elected government, a clean President who understands development, and
Cabinet including talented technocrats. At the same time, the government faces intense pressure
to deliver short-term results at the same moment that it must build long-term institutions. How to
deliver "quick wins" and build capacity at the same time is an acute dilemma. In many quarters

there is already a growing disillusionment with Préval's perceived weaknesses as a leader and a yearning for a man on horseback, a benevolent authoritarian. As the Archbishop told us, "What we need is leadership…. We need somebody who can provide order and institute a vision… We need a man who is truly capable of serving and loving his country." Préval is trying to persuade Haitians to embrace a new type of leadership, not a "providential president", but collective responsibility of all Haitian people, including through local government. Unfortunately, Haitians have a misplaced nostalgia for the social order of the Duvalier years, or what Préval called "la paix du cimetière."   But are Haitians prepared for such as shift in political culture and civic engagement? If Préval does not deliver, there will be growing agitation for strongman rule.

The Need for an Integrated Strategy

I was struck by the interdependence of the security, governance and development challenges confronting Haiti and the need for a long term strategic plan that reflects and addresses these linkages. The dilemma in Haiti, several of our interlocutors intimated, is that **"everything is a priority."** It is difficult to know where to begin. Take physical security. It is clearly fundamental, since nothing permanent can be built, no development can occur, in an insecure environment. The Government's inability to provide safety of its people was underscored by the horrific wave of kidnapping in late 2006. Criminal violence has paralyzed professional and social life, contributing to massive exodus of the young and talented. (There are more Haitian nurses in New York City than in all Haiti).

The presence of MINUSTAH at least ensures baseline stability. But criminal violence continues to hold Haiti hostage. Until Port-au-Prince in particular is secure and perceived as truly secure, there will be no investment, domestic or foreign, no tourism, no incentive for the talented to remain or the Diaspora to return.

Yet insecurity cannot be addressed in a vacuum – say, by conducting MINUSTAH operations and ramping up the PNH — because violence is rooted in Haiti's political and socio-economic pathologies: an authoritarian and corrupt political culture; anemic and unaccountable institutions of government; a corrupt judicial system that enables a culture of impunity and undercuts the rule of law; pervasive social exclusion, atomization and inequality (less than 1% of the population has 75% of the wealth); and inability to satisfy basic human needs, exacerbated by tremendous population growth of 3% and heavy migration to the main slums.

I am normally skeptical of economic motivations for violence, but Haiti tested my prejudices. It seems indisputable that high crime and corruption are both a result of and a significant contributor to Haiti's extreme poverty, underdevelopment, lack of economic opportunity. In previous decades gang activity was largely political in nature; today it is largely criminal, a way to make a buck by kidnapping. As one slum dweller explained to us: "Better to die of violence than to die of hunger." Or as a former gang leader said, "Once you are hungry, you will do the wrong thing to get food." Whether this is a matter of "need" or simple "greed" is a matter of dispute. What is not disputed is that there are 2.5 million young people between ages of 15 and 25, and too many of them are neither going to school nor working. Every year, Haiti graduates another 200,000 students who lack both skills and jobs. In Fils Aimé's words, they are "all dressed up with nowhere to go."

What the government of Haiti and the international community appear to lack is a comprehensive "campaign plan," spanning several years, that seeks to integrate the separate strands of external support, so as to simultaneously address these security, rule of law, governance, and development components of Haiti's predicament. As a template, one might borrow elements of the approach that USIP developed in the 2005 book *The Quest for a Viable Peace*, which sought to build bridges between conflict transformation strategies in four separate spheres: security, politics, the rule of law, and economics. This USIP study group might take the lead in outlining an analogous integrated strategy for Haiti, including addressing difficult issues of sequencing and trade-offs.

The promising news is that external actors are beginning to **move toward more integrated approaches.** One example is the initial adoption of an almost counter-insurgency approach to gangs, whereby the PNH and MINUSTAH use coercion to move gangs incrementally into smaller and smaller zones, establishing "hard sites" within the *bidonvilles*, quickly followed by donor interventions to deliver rapid improvements in the lives of the slum dwellers, including the creation of safe public spaces, stalls for markets, youth programs, especially jobs.

- USAID has 2 big programs in this regard: The first is a $29 million program implemented by IOM in targeted hot spots, through community-based initiatives that work with local businesses, use local materials and labor, and work with leaders to resolve conflicts. These grants are often modest, on order of $25,000, for projects like putting up new lighting. The second is an $89 million JORS (Jobs, Opportunities, Rebuilding Structures) program, which seeks to create longer term employment opportunities and increased economic growth, including by laying the foundations for commerce.

- In January, the Bush administration announced that it would provide $20 million dollars for a stabilization initiative for Haiti, using section 1207 of the Defense Appropriation Act, to help integrate security and development and strengthen government presence and local institutions in Cité Soleil. This will include increased access to police and justice, strengthened local governance, provision of vocational training and new jobs through infrastructure and public works projects.

- The World Bank, likewise, is doing some creative, non-traditional things to try to address the socio-economic causes of violence, through community-driven projects. This includes both quick impact projects and longer-term institution building. The Bank is spending some $38 million this year on Community Driven Development, which goes directly to priorities identified by the community. The Bank has embraced Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPED), and it is financing things like street lighting and building community centers for youth. It is also conducting food programs in some of the most volatile areas. As a Brazilian general told Bank mission staff, "We donors need to follow up our enforcement actions with social interventions because otherwise violence will return."

Another promising – if underfunded – program is Fils Aimé's National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), which aims to provide gang members with alternative livelihoods and communities with a package of social services. As Fils Aimé explained, many of the gang leaders thrive on a Robin Hood-like image – they hijack a truck with bags of rice and distribute it. But what they cannot deliver is real services, including education, health, sanitation (picking up garbage, cleaning up streets). The DDR provides gang members who are willing to give up their lives with training, reorientation and reinsertion, including permanent jobs. There was a lot of disagreement among international actors and within the Haitian government about whether the sort of incentives that the DDR is offering to gang members will actually make a difference in getting them into another line of work. MINUSTAH and US officials were particularly skeptical, arguing that most gang leaders are beyond rehabilitation and must be killed or arrested. One hopeful fact is that it the number of actual gang members that have to be dealt with is not particularly large. More worrisome is that the government of Haiti remains largely absent from the slums, and that the PNH shows little presence in the form of community policing.

New Terms of Donor Engagement

A third impression from the trip was the **clear need for the international community to change the terms of its engagement with Haiti, by shifting toward state-building.** As the World Bank has recognized, the vast sums of money spent in Haiti over the past two decades have had remarkably little long-term impact. Aid has kept Haiti afloat, but in a situation of perpetual dependence. To some degree this is understandable. Given the legacy of autocratic and corrupt governance, and lack of confidence in the government to implement and maintain development projects, donors long ago adopted the approach of bypassing the state and delivering services directly to the people themselves. These programs kept people alive and delivered essential services, but they also created what Ashraf Ghani in other contexts has labeled a "parallel international public sector." This pattern has leeched the Haitian civil service of much of its talent and contributed to a culture of dependency that is by now engrained among the Haitian populace.

While this pattern might have made sense in the past, there is now a legitimate government in Haiti and the Préval Government wants to take leadership of development cooperation. As Prime Minister Alexis explained, "In all history, we have no record of any country that has realized its development by NGOs." But he noted that some donors remain resistant to change, as "bad habits have become engrained" over the past 13 years. Still, the ice is beginning to break up. As a USAID representative said to us, the question for donors is: "At what point do you actually pull back and get the government to take over, rather than replacing it. USAID/Haiti has not asked this question for too long. We need to ask it now. By and large it has been us doing it for them, thus building dependence and postponing the day of reckoning." At a rhetorical level, at least, donors and implementing partners are conceding that the **Haitians must be put in the driver's seat**; that **development cooperation must be demand rather than supply driven** (consistent with the Paris Declaration); and that the **international community must make a long-term commitment** to Haiti, rather than repeat its episodic engagement.

Equally fundamental, there is a growing recognition that **unless donors help to bolster the state, they will not achieve the results that they want.** For too long, donors have sought to keep themselves in business, financing expensive technical assistance missions for foreign consultants, with little impact, and sustaining donor implemented projects that bypass the state, without a transition plan for handing things over to the Haitians. They have overwhelmed the management capacity of a weak Haitian state through project proliferation, and they have poached local talent. Although donors have often complained of a lack of Haitian "absorptive capacity," this also reflects a lack of donor capacity to effectively engage states that possess weak institutions.

In April 2004, donors met with the interim government of Latortue and committed themselves to a Haitian-led strategy. The result was the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) which has 4 pillars: (1) Economic Governance; (2) Political Governance; (3) Economic growth; (4) Social Services (health,education). Two years later in July 2006, donors pledged some $750 million for Haiti's recovery. More recently, in November 2006, 30 countries met in Madrid to review donor pledges, including streamlining the $1.8 billion in pipeline. At the insistence of the Haitian government, donors agreed to recognize the principle of Haitian leadership on the Extended ICF; to ensure that Haitian rather than donor priorities drive assistance; and to harmonize their aid policies to avoid overwhelming the GOH with uncoordinated projects. The Haitain government has tried to force donors into a single approach to applying for and managing donor funds, because it lacks enough skilled officials to handle the burden of multiple reporting and implementing requirements. The Ministry of Planning and Cooperation is also circulating a plan to bolster a secretariat charged with supervising donor activities, including creating first ever database of donor programs in Haiti.

While this renewed focus on state-building is important, there are obstacles to realizing it on both the donor and Haitian side. The head of a major implementing agency in Haiti told us, "There is not a single US implementing partner in Haiti that knows how to build government institutions. There are no tools or instruments. Implementing agencies come here to compete for grants and against one another. Rather than building institutions, they build dependency. International implementing organizations and donors have been a fundamental part of the problem."

Nor is it clear that the GOH has sufficient planning and implementation capacity to design and implement a coherent reconstruction plan or to absorb the aid associated with it. People at various levels of Haitian society complained that President Préval does not appear to have a clear program or plan about where he is taking the country. Both Préval and Prime Minister Alexis told us that the Haitian government is laying plans right now for a comprehensive national dialogue on development, traveling around the country with ministers, parliamentarians, department officials, mayors, to ask the people, civil society and the private sector to tell GOH, "here are our priorities," so that the GOH can match these with donor resources. While this "development from below" experiment is to be applauded, it is liable to be very time consuming.

A few guidelines for donors: These facts suggest the following recommendation for donors:

- **Assist with Haitian government with public revenue generation**: By some estimates Haiti suffers from hundreds of millions of dollars in foregone revenue, including $120 million from weak tax collection and customs leakage. The normal tax collection rate for developing country is approximately 16%, according to the World Bank, but in Haiti it is less than 10%. Customs leakage, meanwhile, is virtually non-existent in many parts of the country, and the government has called on donors to help bolster the National Ports Authority.

- **Put more money through the Haitian national budget**, in return for Haitian commitments to government reform. The World Bank has been one of the few donors willing to put money through the state itself, as well as to finance recurrent costs. The Bank's EGRO (Economic Governance Reform Operations) program provides Haiti with $61 million in budget support to pay for economic governance reforms.

- **Pool donor efforts through greater use of Multi-Donor Trust Funds**. Donors should explore ways to pool their resources, to ensure funding for priority Haitian goals, improve coherence of donor efforts, leverage funds from a variety of sources, and help support recurrent costs of government. As in the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund and other similar experiments, access to funds should be conditional, contingent on transparency on approval from Bank officials, etc.

- **Press World Bank Board for greater flexibility:** Haiti is not considered a traditional "post-conflict" country in World Bank classification. Typically, the Bank can provide only about $7 per capita to IDA countries, while providing some $17-20 for post-conflict countries. To get around this problem, Haiti was made a special case in 2004, when the Bank Board agreed to grants amounting to $150 million for 2 years. This arrangement expires this fiscal year, meaning that from now on amounts determined by Haiti's, so that aid to Haiti would plummet to under $20 million. The Bank Board should consider extending Haiti's exemption in the next round of funding.

- **Top up salaries of returning expatriates**. The IDB is doing small-scale work in this area.

- **Greater use of Joint Project Implementation Units.** Although there are exceptions, such as arrangements between the World Bank and IDB, most donors have resisted these mechanisms.

- **Fund the DDR at higher level.** The success of the DDR will depend in large part on external resources to meet its ambitions.

"Spillovers" from Fragile States

The current US preoccupation with Haiti is motivated in large part by the fear that endemic weakness there may facilitate the flow of numerous negative externalities to the United States, including uncontrolled migration, disease, and particularly narcotics trafficking. Our

interviews underlined the US concern that Haiti is an "ungoverned space." But they also revealed the modesty of US efforts to help ameliorate this situation.

After remittances, trafficking in drugs and other contraband provides the second largest flow of resources into Haiti. It is often claimed that some 10-15% of cocaine destined for the United States transits Haiti, mostly en route to the Dominican Republic and then Puerto Rico. Haiti has 1700 km of coastline and 17 official ports where there are virtually no customs. Satellite photos show multiple remote airstrips in the southeast. The distance from Baranquilla, Colombia, to Jacmel is only an 8-hour ride in a "go-fast" boat. Other drug shipments dropped from air – so that in the south peasants call the drugs *la manne* ("manna"). Although the numbers of Haitians using drugs themselves appears to be modest, multiple Haitian and international officials, as well as civil society actors, warned of the growing danger that the large sums of money from trafficking would increasingly undermine governance and cripple efforts to reduce corruption.

Haiti's status as a major trafficking and increasingly money laundering hub is a direct function of the state's incapacity to control its borders, particularly the ports and its long, essentially ungoverned frontier with the Dominican Republic, 300 km long and largely un-policed. It has 15 municipalities with 500,000 people, but is one of poorest areas of country, with no effective government institutions. There are an average of two secondary schools and eight primary schools per 10,000 people. There is no electricity, phone service, or potable water. A few dysfunctional customs offices exist, but with only 2 police per 10,000 inhabitants, traffic in contraband is unimpeded, with large illicit flows of drugs, guns, and trafficked women, at a value in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As one Haitian, "Haiti is the weak link" in the drug trade between Colombia and the United States.

Drug money is increasingly sloshing around Haitian society, reinforcing the gang problem. PNH Commissioner Mario Andrésol says that traffickers are investing a lot of money trying to corrupt Haitian law enforcement and justice system. "Drug trafficking is creating more problems than any other thing in Haiti," he notes. "The drug traffickers chose Haiti because they like to operate in countries where there are weaknesses." Trafficking is helping criminals create financial empires, and they can deploy this wealth to persuade gangs to exacerbate the instability in the country, which facilitates the further trafficking of drugs. Early last month, President Préval lashed out at the United States for its drug demand problem, which risked turning Haiti into a "narco-state." The US appetite for drugs, he observed, is preventing Haiti from moving forward. In the words of Prime Minister Alexis, "This is a very important issue, connected to the survival of democracy and sustainable development in the country." Unfortunately, the PNH has only 50 officers devoted to narcotics trafficking.

As ICG's Mark Schneider has pointed out, US policy responses to this threat to both US interests and the Haitian state have been pretty weak to date. According to US officials in Port-au-Prince, the INL slot is currently vacant in the Embassy and there is only 1 person to fill 5 DEA slots. Total US counterdrug activities in the country amount to a little more than a million dollars, including for marine interdiction, anti-money laundering, and the creation of a DEA-vetted counterdrug unit. This is clearly inadequate to the scale of the problem. In a few weeks President Préval will be meeting with Presidents Fernandes of the Dominican Republic and

Uribe of Colombia to improve cooperation on stemming the drug trade. But **without greater US attention to Haiti's drug challenge**, these efforts are unlikely to bear significant fruit.

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