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PERSPECTIVES



2005 EDITION

The Business of Development

Dear Readers,

This edition of PERSPECTIVES is different from those in years past. This new look is the result of a new vision and refined set of goals created by this year's editorial team, in consultation with the International Development (I-Dev) department.

Development is big business. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), total development aid dispersed in 2003 reached \$68.5 billion, the highest ever in both nominal and real terms. The aid business is a huge, unregulated global industry whose key players are as interested in market share as any Fortune 500 company.

With over 50% of SAIS I-Dev students choosing Finance and Microenterprise as

a functional specialization, this topic hits home. While it is important to have a solid technical background when implementing a development project (whether at the field or headquarters level), it is also important to be a good manager. This issue of PERSPECTIVES looks at development from a business standpoint, debating issues such as management, accountability, efficiency, marketing, political economy, and finance. Development workers must not leave Western management techniques behind when boarding the plane to their next project, and headquarters staff should consist of solid managers as well as idealists in order to make development happen.

Development work is difficult enough without office politics and internal complexities. This issue is dedicated to all of those development workers who have persevered and facilitated social change despite challenging management structures within their organizations. We hope that the articles inside will remind decision makers in NGOs and donor organizations of the importance of sound management, and will inspire them to think of innovative ways to develop leaders among their staff and improve organizational efficiency.

Sincerely,

The Editors

COVER

Clients of Mann Deshi Mahila Sah Bank, the first rural bank for women in India, sell their hand-made brooms at the weekly market.

PHOTO BY KATE BOTHAM

ARTICLE BY MELISSA DRAPER

The women that grace this cover represent the nexus of business and development as it is played out at the micro level in remote rural India. *The Mann Deshi Mahila Sah Bank, Ltd* ("Women's Bank" or "Bank") is a microfinance institution that was founded through the persistent and dedicated work of a group of women in the town of Mhaswad in the state of Maharashtra. Chetna Gala Sinha—later named an Ashoka Fellow in 1997—spearheaded the mobilization of women from over 200 rural communities in the drought-prone region south of Mumbai (Bombay) to form credit and savings cooperatives. From those groups grew the initiative to form an officially-recognized bank that would target the poorest of the rural women, including sheep and goat farmers, vegetable vendors, weavers, and wage earners. The Bank's primary objectives

include securing legal property titles for women, providing integrated social security programs, and building the capacity of local women by giving them access to information and markets.

Mann Deshi received a license from the Reserve Bank of India, the country's top regulatory bank, after an unprecedented battle with national officials to allow a group of predominantly illiterate women to establish a bank. The Bank continues to be an innovator, adapting the requirements of a fully profitable, regulated institution to the needs of its marginalized and impoverished clientele. This year, the Bank is launching its Mobile Markets initiative to provide outlets for loan and deposit transactions on market days in villages that do not have Bank branches. The Mobile Market program will also help women negotiate prices with wholesalers for their agricultural goods and educate them about practical marketing strategies.

The Women's Bank has also become

a catalyst for transformative local development practices that complement the economic support that the Bank provides through the creation of a parallel NGO, *Mann Vikas Samajik Sanstha*. Successful social and political development projects have been supported by the bank through decisions made by the women shareholders—who are primarily of the lowest castes—and show the integrity of local-based development initiatives.

Melissa Draper, SC&D '05, worked with *Mann Deshi* and its partner NGO in the summer of 2004 on a political development initiative that mobilized the women leaders of the Bank's Self-Help Group and women of the local government councils, or *panchayats*. The initiative coordinated priorities among women's groups to formulate a proposal for Maharashtra state officials, which included a recommendation on women's property rights that has recently been accepted by the state assembly.

Building Political Will to End Hunger

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POVERTY POLICY

DAVID BECKMANN AND EMILY BYERS

The world's political leaders have long recognized that rapid progress against hunger is possible. Indeed, in 1963, President Kennedy told delegates to the First World Food Congress, "We have the means, we have the capacity to eliminate hunger from the face of the earth in our lifetime. We need only the will."¹ Over the last several decades, many reports and conferences on world hunger have concluded with a long list of action areas and a call for more political will. But political will does not just happen, and political leaders can seldom act entirely on their own initiative.

Years of research have gone into seed types, agricultural economics, and nutrition program administration, but relatively little attention has been paid to how political processes impact the implementation of the measures that so much research has shown will reduce hunger. This is partly because intergovernmental development

institutions, like UNDP or the World Bank, are limited by their member governments from involving themselves in countries' political affairs. But if political constraints have kept the world from making the progress against hunger that is feasible, then we must find ways to understand and change the politics of hunger. The lack of analysis on the subject, however, is striking.

"Politics" is often cited as the reason why otherwise well-designed and implemented development programs fail to produce intended results. Alternatively, "getting the politics right" is often credited for a large portion of successful poverty and hunger reduction. Why, then, is so little attention paid to the political aspects of hunger? According to one study, much of the attention that aid and development agencies do devote to politics is spent explaining why things went wrong, assessing the reasons why poor and hungry people lack the ability to influence public policy. But identifying the constraints is only the first step toward

finding ways around them.

After many years during which politics was relegated to the margins of development theory and practice, a small but growing number of studies are going beyond the broad assertion that "good governance" is necessary to reduce poverty. Some studies are now seeking to "examine the various ways in which political processes, actors, institutions, events, ideologies and struggles inform the reproduction and reduction of poverty."²

Exploring what drives politics in poor countries can help us identify openings for political coalitions and alliances that benefit the poor, ways in which "friends of the poor" (both inside and outside of government) can shape public programs and policies to increase the political capabilities of the poor, and areas where there are common interests between the poor and non-poor. This "provides policymakers with a more realistic perspective on their programs and projects."³ Political analysis can also

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The views expressed in this magazine are not necessarily the views of the International Development Program.

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Hunger

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reveal where and how to apply pressure to policymakers, and how to galvanize public support for pro-poor policies.

What is political will? It is the desire to act on the part of those holding power. Political will cannot be wished into existence. Rather, it must be built. Building political will means developing

decisions about development assistance and trade policy that are important to hungry people worldwide. One way to build political will is to create or strengthen governmental institutions that are dedicated to reducing hunger and poverty. Although there are some common themes that can be applied in many countries, strategies will vary according to whether a government is democratic or not, how much power the

discussion for different audiences is important. In Brazil, hunger is often expressed in terms of a failure of citizenship; fighting it resonates when expressed as an act of solidarity with the poor. In some contexts, however, a hunger focus may seem a narrow way to describe human deprivation, and can conjure up images of handouts and dependency.

Interest group pressure is an important influence on national governments. Increasing the size, effectiveness, and influence of groups that defend hungry people raises the political costs of neglect for any government. Doing so requires both bolstering the political capabilities of poor and hungry people and persuading groups of non-poor and non-hungry people to push for policies aimed at ending hunger.

Poor and hungry people have difficulty forming effective organizations to represent their own interests. Hungry people are scrambling for their next meal. They have little time, energy, or resources to devote to defending their interests politically. Thus, there are relatively few strong organizations of poor and hungry people. Organizations that also include non-poor people more often succeed in amplifying the voice of their poor and hungry members. Such organizations may include trade unions; farmers' organizations; community, religious and ethnic organizations; and political parties. However, such organizations may themselves cater more to the interests of their non-poor members.

There are also many examples of advocacy for hungry people by groups that are comprised mainly of non-poor members. Bread for the World members, for example, are mostly well-educated, religious people. In Brazil, the Landless Workers' Movement has gained the support of many of the elites who see the current land ownership structure as an archaic embarrassment, preventing Brazil from becoming a truly modern nation.⁹

The power of groups depends on their capacity and place in society and on political structures that facilitate group influence on government decisions.¹⁰ For

Some studies are now seeking to “examine the various ways in which political processes, actors, institutions, events, ideologies and struggles inform the reproduction and reduction of poverty.”

ideas and institutions that cause those in power to want to make a sustained, effective effort to reduce hunger. Commitment on the part of politicians is necessary but not sufficient to improve nutrition; a wide range of actors must also be committed to hunger reduction, including civil servants in various levels of government, technical experts, project managers and field staff, development assistance agency officials, and local communities.⁴ The steps to building political will vary with individual country circumstances. History, institutions, type of economy, social structures, place in international power structures, and luck each play a role in determining the extent to which a government will—or can—make an effort to reduce hunger. Political will can be built into various types of institutions at all levels—state, civil society, public, private, national, and international.⁵

Of all the stakeholders, national governments are the most important. “Because national governments still have an exclusive claim of sovereign authority, NGOs, donors, and even powerful international financial institutions such as the World Bank have difficulty taking the local actions needed to end hunger.”⁶ All governments make policy decisions that have far-reaching implications for hungry and poor people within their borders, and industrial-country governments make

executive has, whether the legislature is a congress or parliament, the number and character of political parties, the balance between national and local government, and other factors.

Discussions of poverty politics often cast the problem as one of poor versus non-poor, each group acting according to its material interests. Indeed, material interests do play a part, but ideas also play an important role in the politics of poverty and hunger. The idea of fighting hunger has moral power. It has the power to reach beyond the ranks of poor people and motivate those whose immediate economic interests differ enormously from those facing hunger. Hunger is such a basic human need that it appeals to people across both the political spectrum and income brackets.

When polled, US voters of both political parties display similar attitudes: strong concern about hunger, coupled with doubts about the efficacy of development assistance and other large-scale efforts to reduce it. Some voters are also skeptical about ambitious global goals, such as cutting world hunger in half by 2015. But nearly all US voters express support for specific initiatives that seem efficient and effective.⁷ Other recent polls echo these findings.⁸ Hunger can be a salient political issue as well as an entry point into wider poverty issues.

Knowing how to frame the hunger

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example, a study of Ugandan poverty politics concluded that “the institutional representatives of Uganda’s chronically poor are currently marginal in terms of command over resources and policy influence.”¹¹ Representation does not necessarily translate into influence.

National governments are also influenced by external pressures: other governments, international institutions, NGO networks, and the international press. For poor countries, even full commitment on the part of the national government may be insufficient. “It is easy to say governments should do a, b, c and d. But the governments of the poor countries, in many cases, do not have the human or institutional capacities to undertake these measures.”¹² In addition, poor-country governments are often dependent on aid from other governments, so their policies can be swayed by donor governments and international financial institutions.

The governments of the industrialized countries can also be influenced by international pressures. The UN conferences of the 1990s raised public awareness of global problems and stimulated some new commitments from governments, international organizations, and civil society organizations. However, the lack of follow-through on many of the commitments made at these conferences has damaged the credibility of such conferences and their sponsoring agencies.¹³ The Millennium Development Goals have built on the conferences of the 1990s in a promising way, however, and have become a useful and important organizing tool for industrialized-country civil society.

In addition, the industrialized countries are certainly able to put pressure on each other. The G-7 Summits, for example, have increasingly become a forum in which leading governments focus on international development issues. Debt relief is a notable example.

International NGO networks have become an important force in pushing

social issues on the international stage. They have had an impact on issues ranging from food-company marketing to the end of apartheid in South Africa; from poor-country debt cancellation and the environmental policies of the World Bank to the land mine and climate-change treaties. International networks are particularly good at getting government—and even corporate—attention paid to otherwise-neglected issues.¹⁴

At a Bonn conference on world hunger in 2001, the president of Germany, Johannes Rau, argued that we need an “anti-hunger lobby” comparable to the environmental lobby. At the World Food Summit Plus Five conference in 2002, he proposed the establishment of an International Alliance Against Hunger. His proposal was adopted, and the three UN food agencies in Rome have been working on this together since May 2003. The UN agencies have helped to launch—or have simply recognized—alliances against hunger in more than 80 countries. The International Alliance Against Hunger promotes such efforts and facilitates communication among them.

Building political will must be a program of work like any other aspect of development. It must be approached with the same attention to resources and strategy. Investment in social capital must include investment in the political capabilities of the poor¹⁵ and organizations that speak on behalf of the poor. NASFAM (National Association of Smallholder Farmers), a Malawian farmers’ cooperative, has as its slogan: “The future belongs to the organized.” But organization takes time, resources, knowledge, and effort.

No international conference should ever again end with a vague prescription for greater political will. The analysis should instead continue, explaining what practical steps will be taken—or can be taken—to build it.

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Locusts and Empires

EMERGENCY FOOD AID SUBCONTRACTING IN THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF MAURITANIA

KRISTEN HIMELEIN

During the summer months of 2004, a series of locust swarms invaded the fields of West Africa. Able to eat twice their body weight in a single day, the locusts decimated cereal crops across the region. Hardest hit was the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, where nearly half of the harvest was lost, prompting the government to request 1,100,000 metric tons (around 2.4 billion pounds) of food aid to meet the needs of its population. Multilateral international organizations—such as the World Food Program (WFP)—received contributions and supplies from donors, and then solicited partnerships with local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to distribute foodstuffs. This collaborative system is relatively recent, having been implemented only in the last few years as a response to allegations of government mismanagement of food aid. While it is generally agreed that the partnership be-

Food Program estimates that seasonal domestic cereal production meets the consumption needs of only about a third of the population. Even in years of adequate rainfall, there is a structural food deficiency—termed the “hunger gap”—from May to August, leaving the country heavily dependent upon food aid.

Prior to the recent changes in food distribution, Mauritians relied on a partnership between the WFP and the government food security office, *Commissariat de Sécurité Alimentaire* (CSA), to deliver food aid. Donors were increasingly dissatisfied with the WFP’s performance, however, believing the organization to be merely “dumping” food on the CSA with little to no accountability; as a result, many supplies failed to reach the intended recipients. Under the current system, it is estimated that between 70% and 80% of this year’s emergency food aid will be distributed through NGO partners. These organizations are granted contracts on

has described the two major objectives for any NGO in Mauritania as “survival and publicity,” goals facilitated by participation in distribution programs. In terms of financial survival, certain groups have been accused of using the 5% management allowance and skimping on distribution services in order to make a profit on some operations. This surplus can be used for what another practitioner has described as “empire building,” in which NGOs use the money gained from one contract to buy more vehicles and open more offices, thereby increasing their eligibility for future contracts. Unsurprisingly, the NGOs deny the accusations and produce agreements showing themselves to be responsible for a large percentage of the funding—usually around 30%. It can be argued, however, that fixed expenditures like general operating expenses and permanent staff salaries would need to be paid regardless, and that the NGOs are profiting by adding these costs to WFP contracts. In the realm of publicity, NGOs can use food aid as a “front door to the village,” whereby being associated with humanitarian relief gives the organization the credibility to implement other programs in their core mission. In response, the NGOs argue that their programs complement the work of the WFP, and that it is logical that they share resources and be implemented together.

Despite the World Food Program’s awareness of the problems, its options are limited. The WFP is restricted to partnering with organizations with a field presence that is extensive enough to reliably carry out the distribution. Furthermore, because open-market competition for contracts does not exist, the WFP is subject to donor pressure to work with certain NGOs. For example, the United States—the largest

A local development practitioner has described the two major objectives for any NGO in Mauritania as “survival and publicity,” goals facilitated by participation in distribution programs.

tween the WFP and NGOs has improved services, a number of criticisms regarding transparency and efficiency remain.

Mauritania is an arid and sparsely-populated nation straddling North and West Africa on the Atlantic coast of the continent. With arable land covering less than 0.5% of the country, the fragile Saharan ecosystem is greatly dependent upon the irregular seasonal rains. In addition, the ongoing process of desertification has rendered the land more susceptible to drought, flooding, and biological pest invasion. The World

the basis of their field presence, which is measured in resources on the ground, such as vehicles, staff, and offices in remote provinces. Oftentimes, partner NGOs also have programs from their core mission already in place in targeted communities.

The partnership system, however, is far from flawless. Some groups have been accused of having mixed motivations for their participation, and with limited oversight, each organization is essentially free to pursue its own agenda. A local development practitioner

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donor—would prefer that contracts go to American NGO World Vision, while the European Union would support European organizations. It follows that World Vision, with American backing and access to supplementary funding from private contributors, is the principal distribution subcontractor in Mauritania. Admittedly, this perceived pressure is partly the result of American legislation requiring both that partner organizations have a certified accounting system and that they—or a sister organization—be registered in the United States.

The most common criticism, however, relates to the program's expenditures. In the current relief operation, in addition to the contribution of commodities, donors pay the World Food Program \$142 per ton for logistical expenses associated with the distribution. From this \$142, the WFP must pay for storage and transportation, and partner NGOs receive between \$30 and \$40 per ton for their expenses. One donor official estimates that \$110 per ton remains, on average, for the WFP's

operations. Spread over the government demand of 1,100,000 tons, this translates into about \$120 million, a sizable amount to be divided among the Nouakchott office, the regional office in Dakar, and the global offices in Rome. The NGOs receive approximately \$30 million, with thousands of dollars going to even the smallest local groups. In a country whose 2003 GDP was estimated to be just over \$5 billion, emergency aid programs and food donations represent a significant portion of the economy.

While there are no easy solutions to these problems, a number of steps could be taken to improve efficiency. On a broad level, additional regulations are needed to identify the permissible level of coordination with core programming. A more targeted change would be to open the distribution process to bidding, as currently exists with most USAID projects and with all transportation contracts in Mauritania. This would give the WFP greater flexibility in choosing partner organizations, which might improve the quality of service. Any monies saved during this process could be added to the WFP's operating budget

for expanded oversight, thereby limiting the NGOs' discretion to follow their own agendas.

Yet even if these measures are enacted, flaws in the system likely will persist. As the World Food Program has essentially privatized a floundering public program without fundamentally changing the system, the organization and its NGO partners are vulnerable to the same logistical mistakes and managerial missteps that plagued the Mauritanian government. By drawing its strongest potential critics—the NGOs—into the process, the World Food Program has been able to avoid some of the toughest criticism; nevertheless, much remains to be done to improve accountability and reduce waste. Continuing reforms and additional coordination across all sectors could lead to greater overall transparency and efficiency, which would better prepare both Mauritians and the international community for the next food emergency that inevitably will arise.

Kristen Himelein is a 2004–2005 Fulbright Scholar in the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

The Complementary Use of Loans and Grants

VIMALA PALANISWAMY

Harriet Mukuba, a young widow living in the suburbs of Kampala, Uganda, tested positive for HIV after her husband died twelve years ago. She received counseling and medical care from AIDS Widows and Orphans Family Support (AWOFS). With no proven business experience, Harriet did not qualify for its loan program, so AWOFS selected her to receive a Trickle Up grant to start a clothing embroidery business. Her success at managing her business and savings later gave her access to AWOFS' loan program, allowing her to expand her business further.

Because some critics argue that grants undermine microfinance institutions (MFIs), there is an ongoing debate about

whether grants and loans can coexist in the same environment. Yet, as the example of Harriet Mukuba illustrates, grants and loans can complement one another when administered and monitored properly. Grants can target individuals who are not eligible for loans and “graduate” them to being eligible for credit, thus reaching the most vulnerable populations while increasing the client base for MFIs. As microfinance products, grants and loans have the same objective—alleviating poverty and reducing vulnerability—and each addresses different needs of the client.

The Challenges of Targeting the Poor

MFIs provide financial services through loans and savings. They offer an

alternative source of credit for people who cannot obtain commercial loans for the small amounts that they need. These clients might otherwise resort to informal moneylenders, who often take advantage of the poor by charging rates of interest that drive the client further into debt, increasing his vulnerability. The financial services offered by MFIs can help the poor to increase their income, build their assets, and reduce vulnerability. MFIs give loans to groups or individuals at interest rates meant to sustain the organization. Their extended presence in communities lends them a sense of permanence and enables them to provide clients with long-term financial services.

Because MFIs are meant to be sustainable, they must reach a large

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number of clients and be selective in whom they serve. Hence, MFIs may not reach the poorest of the poor. These people may be considered “unbankable” even for MFIs because they lack collateral, business experience, or regular income, and they are unable to demonstrate the ability to repay loans. Solidarity groups may keep the extreme poor from joining for similar reasons.

As the only access to capital that a poor person may ever have, grants contribute to the financial sustainability of the individual and his family.

Several studies have found that those who use microfinance services usually fall near or above the poverty line; they generally are not the extreme poor or destitute.^{1,2}

For a variety of reasons, MFIs often cannot serve specific vulnerable groups within the extreme poor. For example, it is not cost-effective or sustainable for MFIs to serve highly-dispersed populations that are costly to reach, populations with high degrees of mobility or instability due to violent conflict or natural disaster, those that lack social capital or social cohesion, and people with life-threatening disabilities or diseases.

The poor themselves may be averse to taking out loans out of fear that an inability to repay loans will add to their debt load or reduce their financial stability. They also may not be able to justify the cost of credit for financing income-generating activities with very low profits. Because the poorest of the poor are generally part of the subsistence economy, their first priority is to feed their families and provide for other basic needs. They have little or no surplus, and they may be unwilling to risk losing the ability to feed their families in order to start a business. In addition to bearing the financial risk of loans, the poor may also suffer from loss of self-esteem, confidence, and social capital if they are unable to repay their loans.

A study by David Hulme and Paul Mosley examined the impact of microfinance services relative to income and found that households at or above the poverty line had a higher average change in income than households below the poverty line, when compared to income changes found in a control group.³ Higher-income borrowers who are near or above the poverty line can take more risks and use loans to invest in promotional activities, whereas those with lower incomes are more likely

to take smaller loans to protect their subsistence. The latter group is averse to making risky business investments and often experiences no substantial rise in income. The loans may even increase debt if borrowers are unable to follow the payment schedule.

The extremely poor also tend to drop out of microfinance programs at higher rates than the less poor.⁴ Poorer clients may not be able to manage the increasing size of regular loan payments. They may also drop out of joint liability groups when the amount of the loans taken out by other group members increases beyond the amount that they can take out themselves; they may prefer dropping out to assuming the risk of guaranteeing these larger loans.

Financial Services Targeting the Most Vulnerable Groups

Grants are a financial product that can reach the most vulnerable groups, which lack access to credit. For the poor, grants represent a risk-free opportunity to start a business, build assets, expand an already-existing business, or reestablish assets that have been lost. As the only access to capital that a poor person may ever have, grants contribute to the financial sustainability of the individual and his family. The following examples show how grants have been used to reach vulnerable individuals and populations:

- After the February 2000 floods in Mozambique, CARE Mozambique provided safety-net grants through two MFIs established in the area. Clients used the grants to recover from their losses by erasing their debt, restoring their credit line, and obtaining new loans.⁵ These grants were a one-time, temporary solution to move people out of the immediate crisis and protect them from long-term problems.
- The American Refugee Committee (ARC) provides grants, loans, and business training to Sierra Leonean refugees returning from Guinea and Liberia after the civil war in Sierra Leone. With few possessions or job prospects, returnees used these services to increase their income, regain their self-confidence, improve their standard of living, and reintegrate into society.⁶
- Harriet Mukuba’s case at the beginning of this piece is just one example of how Trickle Up works with partner agencies to provide vulnerable populations with business training, one-time grants of seed capital, and monitoring of business activities. Target groups that receive Trickle Up grants include the extreme poor, women, refugees, immigrants, people living with HIV/AIDS, people living with disabilities, and those living in extremely remote areas. Many of Trickle Up’s partners are MFIs that use the grants to reach people whom their regular lending program does not target. If entrepreneurs have managed their business properly and contributed to their personal savings, they can “graduate” and qualify for the partner agency’s savings and loans program.

The precise targeting and proper administration of grant programs can address the concerns that grants cause long-term dependence, delay the transition from relief to development, and distort the credit market. When targeted at those who do not qualify for credit, grants can be used as safety

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nets. With appropriate client training and monitoring, grants can be used to graduate people to credit and other services provided by MFIs. Under such circumstances, rather than competing with or detracting from MFIs and their client base, grants can create customers for MFI services.

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Innovative Technology-based Business Strategies Offer More "Bang for the Buck" for Successful International Development

LUCIA WORTHINGTON

"Innovation is the specific tool of entrepreneurs, the means by which they exploit change as an opportunity for a different business or a different service."
— Peter F. Drucker

It is a fact that good business strategies demand up-to-date information and a continuous scanning approach to identify changes as they develop. The business of international development has increasingly complex challenges that can no longer be solved by traditional methods. New problems require new approaches to finding better solutions, and international development practitioners can learn from the paradigm shift adopted by businesses practicing *systems thinking*. Systems thinking is a holistic approach that scans a whole system or organization and demands a collaborative problem-solving approach in every functional area of an organization. With the tools of modern technology, this collaborative approach now can be effected more easily, more productively, and less expensively than ever before.

Worldwide access to people and information no longer requires cumbersome, jet lag-laced trips to faraway places. Today, we have broader and more efficient resources to reach people in all time zones 24 hours a day. In addition, we can now clearly outline problems so that others can take the time to reflect upon and assess them, and then offer professional and more substantive insights and possible solutions.

New problems require new approaches to finding better solutions, and international development practitioners can learn from the paradigm shift adopted by businesses practicing SYSTEMS THINKING.

We can now combine old forms of communication (like the telephone) with new and more powerful tools, such as e-mail and the new technologies contained in computer-mediated web communications systems. These new technologies are used effectively by innovative and progressive educational institutions, transnational organizations, governments, the military, and vast numbers of individu-

als engaging in information sharing and collaborative problem-solving worldwide.

Progressive organizations are using web-based work areas for Total Quality Management (TQM) within and across their organizations. Technology-based learning systems can now establish a powerful base for economic and human development in any organization seeking to exchange information on a global scale—across time zones and national

barriers, any time and almost anywhere.

We can use a simple SWOT analysis to explore the use of technology-based learning systems for international development. The **SWOT** is useful in that it systematically examines the **Strengths**, **Weaknesses**, **Opportunities**, and **Threats** by writing each down to assess each category and establish a clear picture

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Technology

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of the possible consequences of a given strategy.

The following is an example of a **SWOT** for using technology-based learning systems for international development:

Strengths

- Access any time and almost any place. Currently, remote locations may require some travel to reach computer-accessible stations. New wireless technology may resolve some of these issues in the future.
- Written communication tends to produce more thoughtful responses.
- Reduces travel time, thus making it user-friendly for those with more complicated family situations or physical limitations.
- Becoming increasingly more cost-effective as equipment costs are reduced.

Weaknesses

- Requires a common language to communicate.
- Equipment may not be available.
- Access may be limited.
- Online costs may be high in some areas.
- Users may be unfamiliar with computers and reluctant to learn.

Opportunities

- Individuals can meet others with similar interests and concerns—globally.
- Project teams can be set up to share information and address specific issues.

- Timelines such as Pert or Gantt Charts¹ can be posted to keep projects on schedule.
- Accountability increases as individual comments are posted and remain accessible the entire time.
- More thoughtful comments and suggestions are possible because individuals have time to assess a problem, as they are not “on the floor” and do not need to respond immediately.
- Collaboration can increase if clear guidelines are established.
- Teams can be established with people located throughout the world and can be set up in a web format.
- Competitive problem solving can be fostered to increase creativity.

Threats

- Resistance to change is the most common difficulty in adopting innovative technologies.
- Poorly-established platforms and work systems can make computer-mediated collaboration time-consuming and wasteful.
- Improper use of computer time (such as excessive personal chatting) can reduce motivation to work and collaborate.
- Inadequate support systems can frustrate users and render the system ineffective.
- Virus attacks or spam can overload or disable the system.

Conclusion

The systems approach to problem solving for international development can enable the participation of parties from all corners of the globe who may have special insights or specific stakes

in addressing and resolving particular issues or problems. A computer-mediated web-based platform can serve as the working base and meeting space for all stakeholders. A blended approach can include on-site visits to encourage first-hand familiarity with specific issues and to further enhance working relationships with those at critical locations. The effective and more efficient use of time and resources can be facilitated by using our modern technological tools to reduce geographical barriers and allow for convenient participation across time zones.

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Endnotes

1. Pert and Gantt charts are practical tools that establish timelines for tasks and larger projects, and can enable an individual or groups of people to complete multiple projects that are ultimately blended into a cohesive whole. These useful tools can coordinate both complex construction projects and simpler events, such as planning a social gathering. For more information, see <http://www.ganttchart.com/> and <http://www.netmba.com/operations/project/ert/>.

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Project Management and Communication

CHRISTOPHER DE VEER

On December 26, 2004, an earthquake near the Indonesian island of Sumatra triggered a tsunami that leveled coastal communities adjoining the Indian and Andaman Oceans. To relieve the suffering, many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) sprang up to focus relief effort in locales seemingly overlooked by larger NGOs and national governments.

I volunteered with one of these “*ad hoc*” NGOs in Thailand, which I will refer to as “the Project.” Upon beginning work with the Project, I noticed the organization had management processes that often made work difficult to accomplish. The Project also suffered from waning morale amongst its longer-term volunteers, causing some to question the organization’s ability to deliver aid. Based on my experience, I believe the Project’s leadership could have maintained higher morale and confidence of all the volunteers by using better communication practices. Specifically, the Project should have communicated goals, failures, and successes clearly and honestly with the volunteers.

The Project began with three volunteers the day after the tsunami. Only four weeks later, the ranks had grown to almost eighty. The initial clearing of debris quickly evolved to delivering boats and building temporary homes. Yet despite the growth in its numbers and scope, the Project continued to operate with management processes appropriate for the original small group of volunteers. For example, all requests for money to buy materials for the various jobs required the signature of one of two people. If a work-team leader could not find one of these Project leaders with the authority to release funds, all work was brought to a halt. This frustrated volunteers to no end, and some volunteers even decided to circumvent the process by digging into

their own pockets to pay for the necessary materials (they sought reimbursement later).

In addition to a broken work-management process, neither the volunteers nor the Project managers had a forum for discussing obstacles and successes. This lack of communication led directly to low morale. For example, one volunteer had called the Project Director from overseas prior to his arrival to ask specifically about his participation in building houses. The Project’s director assured the volunteer that the organization had imminent plans to build more houses and that he would have a role in this process. One week after the volunteer’s arrival—and several weeks after the initial telephone discussion—the volunteer had yet to be given a house to build. The director simply never took the time to tell this volunteer that only a local Thai builder could build new houses, and that legal issues concerning land ownership had stalled the Project’s other building plans. Not knowing why they were assigned to debris cleanup, some volunteers lost confidence in the Project’s ability to deliver meaningful relief, and thus independently sought ways to help the community.

Successes also received little open discussion. One donor walked into the Project’s medical area and said, “Give me a list of everything you need. I will give it to you.” A few days later, the donor gave the Project \$25,000 in cash and all of the medical supplies on the list. Though many volunteers heard of this incident through other volunteers, the director never announced the donation as a credit to the volunteers and the work that they did for the community.

Important indicators that would demonstrate the success of the Project’s mission received a similar lack of attention. No one answered the questions: How many refrigerators and gas stoves had been given to families in need? How

many houses had been repaired? How many boats built? How many businesses reopened? What would the Project do next to improve the community? Unless a volunteer was fortunate enough to work on a specific case, he or she could spend the entire time cleaning debris or reopening a pizza parlor without knowing how his or her efforts with the Project reached and impacted the local community. Many walked away feeling as though they had done “something nice,” but could not give even a basic description of how the volunteers, donors, and wealthier local businesses worked to rebuild the lives of those affected by the tsunami. Despite calling occasional all-volunteer meetings, the management rarely used these gatherings to maintain morale and goodwill by discussing basic issues pertaining to the Project’s successes, obstacles, monitoring abilities, or evolving goals.

I believe that the biggest communication gap between management and the volunteers concerned the type of work that the Project needed to carry out to meet quickly-evolving needs within the community. After four weeks, the immediate crisis had passed, and the community did not need emergency relief; it needed temporary housing, fishing boats, re-opened businesses, and tourists. Thus, instead of manual or skilled laborers, the Project required managers and office workers. New volunteers, arriving under the impression that they would help the local Thais in direct rebuilding efforts, quickly learned that there was not much for them to do; much of the field work had been given to Thai workers, had already been completed, or was located elsewhere. Management had done little to manage the expectations of these prospective volunteers when discussing opportunities with the Project. The disparity between expectation and reality left some volunteers wondering

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Project Management

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what they could accomplish.

No single deficiency described above would have dramatically lowered morale on its own, but the combination of poor communication with the ineffective work-management process had a tangible impact. During my two-week period with the Project, about ten to fifteen of the forty to

and local donors to the Thai people who needed the most help. New homes *were* raised and old homes *were* rebuilt. Shops were reopened and new inventory was delivered. Boats and new appliances were replaced. Given these indicators, the Project met its goals.

Still, the Project primarily met its goals because the volunteers who arrived in Thailand came determined to help the local Thai community. The nature of the

organization to meet its goals in the most efficient manner, while being aware that this structure may change as the organization's activities evolve. A management system that suffices at one stage may become obsolete as the scope of the organization's work transforms over time. Stay attuned to such changes and adapt structure and processes to meet current and future demands.

Third, provide a forum for communication between workers and senior leadership. The forum should act as a vehicle to discuss worker concerns with senior leadership, recount work-related experiences, or simply report the successful completion of a project. Such a forum will allow the organization's leadership to evaluate the proximal impact of the organization's work, discuss potential problems, manage worker morale, and comprehend the future direction of the organization.

Finally, listen and act. Workers feel empowered—and thus more willing to work—when their recommendations appear to make a difference in how an organization operates. Leadership should consider what workers in the field have to say and address the issues that they raise. Building trust and respect between leaders and field workers can help an organization overcome obstacles and accomplish its broader goals.

The four preceding suggestions illustrate how simple, effective communication with workers and volunteers can greatly improve an organization's operations. In my experience in Thailand, the Project leadership could have accomplished more for the Thai people had it incorporated some basic management skills. In this manner, the Project could have tapped deeper into the volunteers' well of good will, achieving even greater successes in its operations.

Chris de Veer graduated from the University of Virginia in 1998 and worked five years for the Navy overseeing contractor-implemented information technology projects. Most recently he has been traveling throughout Asia.

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fifty longer-term volunteers left. Some of them had no more time to volunteer, but others felt uncertain about what the Project could do with its poor management structure and with emerging government regulations that slowed rebuilding efforts. They grew frustrated and thus abandoned the reconstruction efforts.

What was especially unfortunate about these circumstances is that negative impacts on the Project's achievements could have been substantially mitigated through simple discussions between the Project's management and volunteers. Such discussions would have permitted the volunteers to express frustrations, propose solutions to unproductive practices, or congratulate teams for successful work. The Project's volunteers knew they were entering a crisis situation; they came to work and were willing to cope with inefficiency and delay. Most understood that this type of work in Thailand would not be as straightforward and rapid as work at home. Nonetheless, the lack of formal and open discussion of the Project's efforts sapped the good will and patience of many of those who came to offer their services in the wake of the disaster.

Despite the many flaws that I observed in the way the Project communicated and managed its work, I cannot conclude that it was ultimately ineffective. The Project used volunteers to connect foreign

one-time disaster gave these individuals the energy and creativity to circumvent the Project's bureaucracy and accomplish their work. It was their desire to help the victims that overcame inefficiencies in the organization. This type of contextualized response, however, cannot sustain an organization indefinitely, nor can an organization expect this type of volunteer intensity to manifest itself again.

To minimize the reliance on volunteer zeal in the wake of a crisis, a few simple considerations might help leadership provide an effective organization for delivering aid that maximizes worker efficiency and community impact:

First, manage expectations. Maintain accurate assessments of the organization's current mission, current work, and future goals. Do not misrepresent the community's needs or the obstacles that the organization will face when delivering aid. Accurate information helps potential workers prepare for what they might encounter and helps donors understand how the organization will use their donations. If the picture that the donors and workers have differs vastly from the reality that they experience, they will lose faith and confidence in the organization.

Second, provide effective organizational structure and work-management tools that are flexible and sensitive to context. Early on, determine what type of structure enables your

Interview with Hope Simon Miller

In honor of her 80th birthday, friends and family of Hope Simon Miller (SAIS '46) created the Hope Simon Miller Internship Fund in International Development. This fund, which will allow I-Dev students to pursue summer internships with microenterprise NGO Trickle Up, is a tribute to Ms. Miller's lifelong commitment to international development. In between meetings and conferences, Ms. Miller sat down with Editor Jeremiah Grossman in April 2005.

Thank you for taking the time to talk with me today.

My pleasure.

Let's start at the beginning. What caused you to decide to pursue a career in International Development?

I decided to do that because I attended Barnard College during World War II, and I was very taken with the idea of the United Nations. Our student body was a very international one. The Dean of the College, Virginia Gildersleeve, was the

I do think Trickle Up gives people a marvelous opportunity. We don't believe in loans; we believe in grants. We feel that if you are earning less than \$1 per day, you should not have to carry the burden of a loan.

only woman on the US delegation to San Francisco in 1945, when the UN charter was written.

While at Barnard, I majored in International Affairs. At that time, a special major was created combining both language and area studies. As an area of concentration, I chose the Soviet Union and the Near East, and I studied Russian.

One day, I saw an article on the op-ed page of *The New York Times* talking about a new school that had been opened

in Washington, DC. I was so interested in their program that I discussed it with Virginia Gildersleeve, who urged me to apply. I decided that if I got a fellowship to the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), I would go. I did receive a fellowship and completed my Master's degree in one year in 1946.

How did you end up at the United Nations?

In those days, if a young woman was looking for a good job, that usually meant being someone's secretary. I was thinking of the Foreign Service or the State Department. Actually, an excellent job became available at the United Nations in the Human Rights section. All this happened by chance when, at a reception at the Wildenstein Art Gallery in New York, I met a professor of international law who was one of many scholars who had come to the United States to escape the war, and who had become involved with the UN. He was looking for someone with my background and with a working knowledge of a few languages. At

Barnard, I had studied French, Spanish, and Russian. In those days, SAIS required a working knowledge of 4 languages in order to qualify for a Master's degree.

I started working for him in September 1946, and I had the grand title of "Executive Director of the Institute of Comparative Government and Education." Our office was located at Teacher's College at Columbia University. We hired a research associate and a research assistant, and put together the

first few Yearbooks of Human Rights.

I married, had three sons, left my full-time job at the UN, and eventually went back to the UN part-time as a Professional Volunteer. I worked for the Hospitality Committee for United Nations Delegations.

Eventually, I became President of the Metropolitan New York Committee of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) (part of UNICEF's United States Committee). At the same time, I was elected to the Board of Directors of Barnard College.

Subsequently, I became President of the New York chapter of the United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA-NY). Following that, I became President of the US Committee for UNIFEM, the United Nations Development Fund for Women. In that capacity, I represented the United States at meetings in Turin, Paris, Manila, and London.

How are you involved with Trickle Up?

Some 25-odd years ago, Mildred Robbins Leet—and her husband Glen Leet, now deceased—started Trickle Up. I was head of the Development Committee for a number of years and am currently on the Board of Directors.

I had a big birthday last year, and my children decided to set up a fellowship in my name, which would help SAIS interns work with Trickle Up during the summer. They worked out the details with SAIS and Millie Leet.

Do you think that providing the poor with access to start-up capital for livelihood initiatives might be the most important way to help?

It certainly is one of the ways. I do think Trickle Up gives people a marvelous opportunity. We don't believe in loans; we believe in grants. We feel that if you are

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Miller

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earning less than \$1 per day, you should not have to carry the burden of a loan.

Could you tell us more about the Hope Simon Miller Internship Fund in International Development? What do you hope to achieve through this Fund?

The whole idea with the fellowship is that we want students to gain exposure to Trickle Up's work. We want the interns to see what entrepreneurs can accomplish with just \$100 and some technical assistance, which is enough to give them their first step up out of poverty. The interns will get a week's intensive training at Trickle Up, and then they will be sent out into the field. This will be very valuable, not only for the interns but also for Trickle Up.

This year, we are sending out our first intern, and next year we expect to have enough money for two interns. We hope that this will continue to grow!

How important is it for I-Dev students to gain actual overseas experience?

I think it's essential. I don't think you can be in the international development field if you haven't done that. Wherever I have traveled, I have seen Trickle Up projects,

UNICEF projects, and UNIFEM at work. You cannot imagine what it is like unless you go overseas.

What other recommendations do you have for the I-Dev program at SAIS and for I-Dev students?

Push the experience component. I think it is very good that SAIS wants potential students to gain experience, preferably overseas, between college and graduate school.

Do you believe that it is important to continue establishing similar internship funds at SAIS?

Absolutely. I think it's a splendid idea. These internships give students the opportunity to gain hands-on experience while in graduate school, which gives them a practical complement to their theory-based courses.

I still cannot get over the response to the Hope Simon Miller Internship Fund in International Development. So many friends and family came on board. It's just amazing to me.

How can we contribute?

Donations can be made payable to "SAIS/JHU" and sent to: SAIS/JHU; Attention Pascale Pritsios; 1740 Massachusetts

Avenue, N.W.; Washington, DC 20036 with a note indicating that the money is for the Hope Simon Miller Internship Fund in International Development.

What are your current activities?

Currently, I am a member of the Board of Directors of Trickle Up; a Development Consultant for UNIFEM; a member of the National Council of UNA-USA; and a Vice President of the Virginia Gildersleeve International Fund, which provides grants that help poor women and children who are seeking to develop their livelihoods, access educational opportunities, and improve their health.

Thank you very much for taking the time to talk with me.

Thank you!

The I-Dev program wishes to thank the following individuals for their support of I-Dev Summer Internship Project (SIP) internships:

Richard JJ Sullivan (SAIS '74) for donating two SIP internships per year for the next three years.

Sarah and Peter O'Hagan (SAIS '86 and '87) for donating two SIP internships per year for the next three years.

Thinking of Working for an NGO?

DON'T FORGET TO DO YOUR RESEARCH!

PHILIP WALKER

For those considering a move into the NGO sector, it is worth investing time doing research on potential employers and how they operate. NGOs vary widely according to core philosophies, size, mandates and operational strategies. Even the countries they originate from can introduce a range of cultural factors that you should consider. As a potential employee, you

will want to know the status of each NGO on a number of issues, some of which are mentioned in the table below. Consider in particular their core technical expertise and the type of operation they focus on, whether emergency relief, rehabilitation or development. It is hoped that this short article will help you to distinguish among the agencies before signing up.

It is useful to make some general comparisons between small/intermediate agencies and the larger ones. The

definition of size, however, is somewhat arbitrary, as some large NGOs share characteristics with smaller NGOs, and vice versa. Still, generalizations can help clarify the key distinctions between large and small NGOs (Figure 1).

LARGE NGOS

It is very difficult to measure efficiency vis à vis impact, because project reports,

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NGOs

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annual reports and web sites mostly offer glowing reports. Financial statistics rarely depict direct project costs and administration expenses accurately. Analyzing some of the aforementioned factors can help to explain why expenditures are so great in relation to impact. Many of the bigger NGOs experience dis-economies of scale—the bigger they grow, the less efficient they become. Waste also occurs because of a number of factors, including the following:

Flying In the Experts

Bringing in foreign experts is costly. Flights, hotel stays, per diem, ground transportation, and the added demands

on local staff add up, making outside consultants extremely expensive.

Relying on outside experts also fosters dependence, as they typically recommend more sophisticated and academic project guidelines, which often are neither appropriate for the local context nor capable of being implemented by an insufficiently trained local staff.

Because they typically do not have enough time to understand the culture and develop an in-depth appreciation of the local communities where projects are based, foreign experts encounter significant difficulties in analyzing field projects and measuring impact. Also, often they are taken only to those project sites that produce the best results! Paying for foreign expertise, furthermore, adds to the proportion of aid that remains in the US or Europe.

Neglecting Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

Conducting M&E is clearly critical to ensuring that projects: a) have a measurable impact in the target community, and b) are conducted in a cost-effective manner. Yet consultants rarely address these two aspects in the same project appraisal, despite the fact that transparency and accountability have become increasingly important as NGOs compete for donor funding. Unclear objectives at the beginning of a project make evaluation difficult—but many NGOs rely on ambiguity to conceal their inefficiency and lack of impact.

Even when NGOs recognize the importance of M&E, they often fail to devote enough attention to integrating

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FIGURE 1: A Comparison of Large and Small NGOs

Characteristics	Large NGOs (Over USD100 million annual budget)	Small/Middle-Sized NGOs (Under USD100 million annual budget)
Areas of Specialization	Often claim to be specialists in every area of humanitarian aid and development. In reality they are generalists in most fields, perhaps specializing in a few. Often have vague goals and employ generalists. Some larger NGOs, such as Médecins Sans Frontières, do specialize.	Specialize in one or a few related areas. Have expert knowledge in a technical area and in project implementation. Project goals are generally precise. They become an authority on the subject and gain a reputation for their expertise. The Heifer Foundation, for example, has been very effective.
Where are the Experts?	Large numbers of technical experts are often based at offices in the US or Europe. Experts fly to field periodically to offer advice and conduct training seminars. These NGOs tend to have a “top-down” approach.	Technical expertise is within the project area. Tend to be more practical and hands-on in implementation. The training of local counterparts will be “on the job” and community-based. These NGOs adopt a “bottom-up” approach.
Where are the Offices?	Large number of support offices in Europe and the US. Regional offices (in Africa, Asia, etc.) are not directly involved in program development.	Usually have one main hub in Europe or the US and maintain a field office in each country of operation.
Marketing Strategies	Highly sophisticated marketing campaigns in the mass media. Ten percent of the budget is typically invested in marketing. Interviews with journalists are sometimes “planned” and are general in theme.	Marketing is focused on the targeted communities. The project implementation methodology is used as a tool to generate funds. Interviews with journalists are often spontaneous and in the midst of the activity.
Human Resources	Employ a large number of expatriate “experts” who reside in their home countries, while local staff have few specialized skills. Can create dependence on outside expertise.	Depend more on voluntary status expatriate employees, who work with local staff. Experts tend to work in the field with the community.
Office Space	Sometimes maintain lavish offices in the US and Europe, often taking on corporate trappings.	Modest in terms of office space, employee expenses, etc.
Choice of Project	Projects tend to be “donor-driven” or “marketing-led.”	Projects are closely related to community needs, as links with the community are stronger.

NGOs

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lessons learned. One NGO that I worked for introduced a concept known as “transformation development indicators” because it realized that private funds were not being used efficiently. But when consultants carried out yet another series of field studies to measure these development indicators, the results were so academic that they were of little practical help to project managers.

Bloated Administrative Costs

A significant proportion of funds never leave the donor country because of distorted incentives. American NGOs receiving USAID grants, for example, are afforded up to 25% of the budget for headquarters costs in what is termed a Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement (NICRA). USAID grants are thus highly sought after to keep funds flowing into the organization. Even a wheat monetization program can be worth millions of dollars—a significant portion of which will go to headquarters.

In one “integrated development” program that I worked on, huge capital

project sustainable, the company had planned a cost-recovery system to pay for the service and had trained a team of local technicians to run it. Though the company is profit-making, its professional and technical skills—as well as its emphasis on efficiency—led to far superior performance. Aside from some post-implementation maintenance and training visits, the company did not need to remain in the region.

In my view, companies with profit motives and technical specialties enjoy an efficiency advantage over most large NGOs. Such companies keep overhead to a minimum and make decisions on hiring additional employees and purchasing more equipment based on the “incremental net benefit” of such additions. Operations that take a cost-effective approach to decision-making are inherently more efficient. But most NGOs do not operate this way—yet.

SMALL NGOS

Small, well-organized NGOs, on the other hand, can produce significant results. These NGOs often have very focused goals. For example, a small Swiss NGO that I worked for paid its employees low

with low overhead cost structures and a complementary focus—water, food security, education, or primary health care. Using an integrated development approach that allowed each NGO to focus on its area of specialization, we worked together to draw up one proposal and budget, which we then presented to the donor. We selected one NGO to be the “lead agency” for two key reasons—to avoid duplicating administrative costs, and to present a united approach in assisting the host community.

CONCLUSION

Although larger organizations often operate very inefficiently, they tend to attract more donor funds simply because they can absorb a bigger budget and reduce the donor’s administrative costs. The trend for smaller NGOs to form consortia and pool their expertise is thus a positive development. Still, NGOs can no longer claim a monopoly in the business of development. A growing number of private firms are seeking their own share of national aid and development budgets. In the long run, this trend will be positive if it promotes efficiency and exposes longstanding problems in project design and implementation. I believe that there is no real conflict between for-profit and non-profit organizations. After all, non-profit NGOs that receive substantial funding from private sources have been able to spend wastefully—all to ensure that no profits are made! In the future, non-profit NGOs and for-profit companies may see the benefits of combining their technical skills and community development approaches to develop more effective projects.

Philip Walker has worked for 24 years with 5 NGO agencies in over 8 countries. His reflections are based on his perceptions and experience. He now works for a trainer provider for NGOs, and in between spends his time at home on his small farm in France.

A small Swiss NGO that I worked for paid its employees low salaries, but trained them extensively and promoted an atmosphere of teamwork and collaboration.

investments included 50 Land Cruisers and 60 computers. The NGO maintained layers of offices: an in-country headquarters in the capital, two base offices and ten field offices. But six of these offices were located within a 5-kilometer radius of each other. Not surprisingly, I found very little evidence of the annual multi-million dollar budget when I got to the field to evaluate the projects.

By contrast, in the same country, a private company was responsible for installing a town water supply system. They did a great job, and the regional impact was enormous. To make the

salaries, but it trained them extensively and promoted an atmosphere of teamwork and collaboration. The staff were highly motivated as a result. The NGO encouraged innovative project design, which usually resulted in tremendous impact at the implementation stage. As the organization’s reputation for good work spread, it attracted more national donors interested in contributing to its programs.

Some small NGOs form consortia in order to access donor funds. Following the peace agreement in Sudan, I worked to bring together four small NGOs

Problematizing Development Management in Rural Areas

NORMA B. CORREA ASTE

A recent three-month research experience in Marankiari Bajo, an Asháninka Indigenous Community located in the central Peruvian jungle, led me to reflect upon the practice of development in rural contexts, as well as the mismanagement and inefficiency of certain rural development projects among indigenous societies. The views below are based primarily on this experience, and contribute a qualitative perspective to the development business debate.

Marankiari's experience with Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) presents an interesting case study of the negative externalities that result from a hasty and superficial development agenda. The town lies in the Peruvian Province of Chanchamayo, State of Junín, and is one of the best-organized and most well-known communities of the Perené Valley. The community's proximity to the highway and the resulting supply of social services—education, health, and communications—have influenced Marankiari's growth over the last 15 years.

Since 1996, Marankiari has been plugged into the world of information and communications technology through the strategic introduction of internet and radio. At the time, ICT development was broadly advocated by development agencies and local media leaders as a culturally viable and democratic development model. Informed by such reports, the press itself—from the Washington Post and Wired News to CNN—touted its efficacy and promise.

Although ICTs were presented as a primary need for Marankiari by some native leaders and the development agencies working there, wide sectors of the local population did not perceive ICTs as their first priority. These sectors viewed agricultural innovation and education to

be of principal importance. However, the community's exposure to the media attracted a variety of projects, the control over which remained in few hands.

Over the course of the past nine years, Marankiari's success in incorporating the use of ICTs has been more assumed than verified. After some time in the community, I became aware that a discourse about ICT success found in the media was elaborated by a very limited group within the community. This group consisted of individuals who had the power—and had

the overall operation of a well-intentioned development agency? After all, such agencies—which rely upon fundraising campaigns for survival—need to justify their chosen interventions through visible successes. Was this situation also useful for the indigenous leaders involved in project promotion and management, as it helped them to strengthen their political agendas and increase their influence at the international level?

Although the colorful image of an Asháninka dressed in the traditional

In Marankiari, it seems that a commitment to development ideas overrode accountability to the beneficiaries of the project, leading to serious planning and management errors.

acquired a new virtual media platform—to control external perceptions of what was important to the local community. These same stakeholders were working in close coordination with the development workers involved in the ICT projects, who had also developed a unique vocabulary to describe Marankiari's technological success.

The advances made by native media leaders and their extended kin networks—who became the principal users and controllers of ICT—were presented as a measure of success not only for the whole Asháninka population of Marankiari but for all of the approximately 60,000 Asháninka inhabitants in Perú. This type of “project result marketing” contradicts the ethical principles that should guide development practice, since it vastly overstated the true number of beneficiaries.

It is important, however, to analyze why the results of the several ICT projects executed in Marankiari were grossly exaggerated. Was it necessary, for example, to promote Marankiari as a remarkable success story—an outstanding example of the ethno-development model—to support

cushma, surfing the web in the middle of the jungle can be very useful for advocating development projects and fundraising campaigns, it reflects neither a democratization of the technology nor a collective appropriation of it. In response to the continuous flow of different ICT development projects into Marankiari and the diversity of sources that financed these initiatives despite serious implementation errors, I asked myself the following question: To what extent had the project among the Asháninka of Marankiari—however well-intentioned—served as an experimental laboratory for the application of the new technologies in indigenous contexts?

In Marankiari, it seems that a commitment to development ideas overrode accountability to the beneficiaries of the project, leading to serious planning and management errors. The projects and interventions were not based upon detailed studies of the region, and they appeared insensitive to context. While projects predicated on “democratization” should encourage broad community-level partici-

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pation, ICT in Marankiari reinforced the voices of the few. Community members outside the local governing group believed that the ICT projects placed too much power in too few hands, and thus created a sort of technological and technical elite. The process and impact of the elite's work was difficult to audit, since they held almost all of the information about project management. As a result, the projects suffered from a lack of objective monitoring and impact reports. In some cases, local community leaders involved in project management were themselves conducting the monitoring and evaluation, posing a conflict of interest.

While genuine efforts by honest and committed leaders rightfully should have been recognized and supported by development agencies, unconditional support of the local power structure can prove destructive. During my general field work experience in Perú, I have witnessed some cases of embezzlement by certain local leaders involved in project management that caused the development agency to retract its economic support. Unfortunately, those who suffer most in such situations are members of the excluded group, who had yet to participate in the program. It is unfortunate that poor strategy and planning on the part of the development agency leads to a premature exit instead of a restructuring of the program to incorporate the majority

of the community. In many cases, those responsible for the embezzlement do not assume responsibility, and they abandon their moral obligations toward the people that they claim to represent. Although the subsequent withdrawal by the development body is the easy solution to the problem—it ensures that no more funds and resources will be misappropriated and is a way to avoid confrontation with local leaders—it proves dangerous and destructive to the community. It legitimizes local corruption and engenders feelings of betrayal and unfairness, leading to internal division within the local population. Acknowledging these difficulties and managing such issues could certainly affect the development agency's image and negatively impact its fundraising efforts, but what about the expectations of the population that hoped for a better quality of life? What about the lost resources invested by the communities?

From its inception, the project's potential for sustainability was very weak due to the experimental nature of the ideas that characterized ICT in Marankiari. Today, all of the specific interventions considered in my research have already ended. The replicability and potential for scaling-up the positive results achieved by former leaders and some community members was very limited, since in most cases their knowledge was not shared with the community. The emerging leadership had a very limited contact network, and they lacked the practical know-how required to gain additional support from development

agencies. Ultimately, the short life span of the numerous ICT interventions has led the local population to lose contact with almost all of the development agents involved in this process. As a nearly decade-old laboratory, Marankiari's case must have been a valuable learning experience for both the indigenous and non-indigenous development workers involved. Yet many of the lessons learned in Marankiari have disappeared with the development agencies.

Like many native communities in Perú, Marankiari requires significant development assistance, as the community's needs are many but their resources are few. The local population—especially the youth—still want old promises to become a reality. Many have grown to link the achievement of a better quality of life with technology appropriation. After many years of ICT-related intervention in the community, several sectors are expressing what I consider to be a sincere interest in making effective use of this technology in their lives. In particular, these sectors advocate using the internet as a tool for developing a stronger presence in the public sphere and in civil society. Unfortunately, it seems that the Marankiari “ICT trend” is over now.

Norma Correa is currently a student at the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú (PUCP) in Lima. She is writing her graduate thesis on Marankiari Bajo's experience with the internet.

The New Development Paradigm

STRATEGIC FOCUS ON MONITORING & EVALUATION, RESULTS-BASED MANAGEMENT, AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECTIVENESS

MICHAEL CHIBBA

In recent years, the major players in international development—United Nations agencies, donors, and multilateral and bilateral organizations such as the World Bank Group, the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)—have been advocating a new development paradigm. Yet, among international development professionals and laypeople alike, there is an abysmal

lack of knowledge about this major initiative. The purpose of this paper is to demystify the new paradigm, introduce its key areas of strategic focus and the need for readiness assessment, and speculate on future prospects.

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A good point of departure is monitoring and evaluation (M&E), which has been intrinsic to development interventions since the outset of development assistance. Until recently, the purpose of M&E was relatively straightforward: given project objectives and an implementation plan, track progress, confirm resource utilization, and verify or assess the attainment of outputs—i.e. the results (such as services, products, disbursements, and capital goods) achieved by the end of an intervention. Measurement of development outcomes (medium-term results) and impact (long-term results) was seen as expensive, generally had little political or financial support, and was not a standard feature in evaluations. Recently, however, the emphasis on results has moved to center stage, and this has meant a broader perspective to development evaluation that includes, *inter alia*, consideration of outputs, outcomes, impact, and overall effectiveness of aid. These changes are unfolding within the new development paradigm, which focuses on: results-based management (RBM), M&E, development effectiveness (DE), the competing roles of public and private sectors, poverty alleviation and other Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); and, equally importantly, programs and projects, especially at the country, sector, and thematic levels.

Raison d'être of the New Paradigm

There are three main reasons that explain the move to a new paradigm and its strategic focus on RBM/M&E/DE. First, the flows of official development assistance (ODA) as a percentage of GNP have dropped to their lowest levels in 50 years (to around 0.22% in 2000), and the long-standing but regrettably unfulfilled pledge of donor nations to allocate 0.7% of their GNP to ODA is no longer a realistic target (only 2 to 4 donor nations have consistently met this target since 1969). This has put pressure on other means—including the strategic emphasis on RBM/M&E/DE—to measure and demonstrate results

and “stretch the aid dollar.” Second, there has been growing demand in donor nations for accountability, transparency, and effectiveness in the use of public funds, development assistance funding being no exception. Third, despite years of development assistance, the gap between the rich and the poor—both within nations and among nations—has persisted over the years, and about one-fifth of the world's population is still living in abject poverty.¹

With this background, it is understandable that the MDGs were adopted in 2000, and that the current core mission of multilateral and bilateral development institutions is to target poverty, achieve measurable poverty reduction results, and meet other MDG targets (for food, maternal and child health, education, HIV/AIDS

With its overarching focus on results orientation and strategic management of development assistance, RBM is all of the following: a philosophy, practice, management strategy, and management information system.

and other diseases, gender equality, and environmental sustainability) by 2015. This overall situation has led international organizations and donor nations to place strategic emphasis on RBM,² which in its fullest form includes M&E, and is viewed as being critical to achieving development effectiveness.

Results-Based Management

With its overarching focus on results orientation and strategic management of development assistance, RBM is all of the following: a philosophy, practice, management strategy, and management information system. Ideally, RBM involves results-based planning, implementation, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting at the project/program management and institutional levels.

Several OECD governments have embraced RBM as critical to DE, transparency, accountability, and M&E. At a bilateral development agency such as CIDA, RBM is pivotal to achieving results and to overall

development effectiveness.³ In addition, numerous multilateral aid agencies—including, notably, UNDP⁴—see RBM as a “best practice” approach to development effectiveness. Other international organizations, such as the Asian Development Bank, are also gradually accepting RBM.

In 2002, OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC), representing a broad range of member governments and multilateral and bilateral institutions, was instrumental in bringing about a modicum of harmonization in M&E and RBM terminology.⁵ In 2003, DAC announced—after a meeting of Development Cooperation Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies—that “aid agencies will [continue to] strengthen results-based management in the delivery

of aid . . . towards better collective effort for alignment around country-led strategies and towards harmonization of donor practices.”⁶ Indeed, cooperation at international fora—such as OECD and UN conferences—and cooperation between international aid agencies are expected to continue to forge greater harmonization of aid policies and programs, and also to produce innovative ways of funding development assistance that complement ODA.

Meanwhile, both development assistance and development evaluation continue to be increasingly and inextricably linked to RBM and development effectiveness. As a result, all traditional forms of evaluation (*ex ante*, mid-term, annual, *ex post*, and self evaluation) are viewed as being intrinsically part of RBM. The new paradigm has also generated a strong interest in—and increased the demand for—program evaluation (e.g. country programs), impact evaluation, thematic evaluation (e.g. poverty alleviation), process evaluation, portfolio evaluation,

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and sector-wide evaluations (e.g. M&E of sector-specific MDGs).

RBM Readiness Assessment

Under the new paradigm, RBM is viewed as being suitable for international organizations, developed countries, and developing countries. But how is RBM to be appropriately introduced in developing countries? As not all developing countries are at the same stage of readiness for RBM, a readiness assessment exercise is indispensable as a planning and programming tool.

Poorly planned interventions and guesswork are characteristic of RBM-focused technical assistance projects that do not employ readiness assessment as a prerequisite. For example, in the late 1990s, an externally funded project by a major multilateral agency attempted to introduce results monitoring and evaluation (RME) in the Philippines. In 2001, this author was asked to independently review that project and found that it was a failure, as alternative approaches to M&E and results orientation were already well entrenched in several government departments. The introduction of yet another results-oriented M&E approach within a relatively short span of time represented “M&E overload/overexposure.”⁷ One lesson learned was that a readiness assessment exercise—which should be conducted jointly with developing country partners—would have revealed the unfavorable conditions that prevailed at that time, at which point corrective measures—including advocacy and participatory planning—could have been taken before introducing RME.

Central to gauging the readiness of a developing country for RBM are eight key criteria: institutional environment, M&E capability, statistical capability, political/regulatory environment, Human Development Index rank, risk of M&E overload/overexposure, public budgetary support, and economic conditions. Beyond conducting a readiness assessment

exercise in cooperation with developing country partners, there are two complementary steps that need to be followed: conducting RBM training, and launching pilot projects.⁸

Development Effectiveness

Another strategic focus of the new development paradigm is DE, which also recently has received considerable attention in development circles. While the RBM/M&E/DE nexus has already been introduced above, DE entails much more than the nexus suggests. As a multifaceted concept, the notion of DE is perhaps most aptly captured in the following statement: “At development institutions, the apex of development effectiveness is reached when policies, strategies, operations, interventions and results are economically sound, socially responsible, environmentally sustainable and organizationally effective.”⁹

The pursuit of DE has produced its most tangible and pervasive gains within multilateral development institutions. Over the past few years, the scope of organizational change within these institutions that is attributable to the desire to achieve meaningful development effectiveness has touched all aspects of the business of development. Measures currently being implemented or those implemented in recent years at regional development banks and at the World Bank Group include one or more of the following: formation of DE committees, appointment of senior DE officers, creation of DE policy and planning units, establishment of an institutional integrity office, reassessment and reorientation of independent investigation mechanisms or “inspection panels,” and strengthening of social and environmental safeguard policies.

Precisely because it is all-encompassing, development effectiveness is indeed the most profoundly challenging aspect of the new paradigm that will contribute to the achievement of the MDGs. One likely result of increased emphasis on DE is that responsibility for “sensitive” aspects of development assistance—such as compliance

with social, cultural, and environmental safeguards—will likely shift primarily to developing countries, while ensuring that the donor’s standards continue to be upheld.

Conclusion and Future Prospects

First, RBM is likely to continue to be the preferred strategy in ensuring results orientation of development assistance.

Second, introducing RBM in developing countries requires undertaking a readiness assessment at the outset. This first step preferably should be implemented in collaboration with the developing country partner for capacity-building and ownership reasons.

Third, in the coming years, M&E is expected to gain increasing prominence, both as a specialized field of study and within the framework of RBM. Development evaluation in all of its forms—from *ex ante* to *ex post* and beyond—is likely to be increasingly viewed as being intrinsically part of RBM.

Fourth, initiatives to enhance development effectiveness—which have already made significant inroads at multilateral development institutions, especially at the organizational and policy levels—will likely emphasize entrusting greater responsibility to developing countries for “sensitive” aspects of development interventions, such as compliance with safeguard policies.

Fifth, cooperation at international venues—such as OECD and UN conferences—and cooperation between international aid agencies are expected to continue to forge greater harmonization of aid policies and programs, and also to result in innovative ways of funding development assistance that complement ODA.

Lastly, the new development paradigm’s strategic focus on M&E, RBM, and DE has led to solid advances towards accomplishing the Millennium Development Goals on several fronts, including planning, policy development, operational procedures, and mechanisms for ensuring responsible and effective development assistance. The new paradigm will continue to shape development cooperation in the years to come.

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Michael Chibba is Manager and Chief M&E/RBM/Development Effectiveness Officer for Canadian International Development Consultants, Inc. (CIDC, Toronto, Canada), and concurrently, Permanent Member, Independent Investigation Mechanism, Inter-American Development Bank (Washington, DC, USA).

Endnotes

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7. Chibba, Michael, *Results-Based Management Readiness Assessment in Developing Countries*, in *DEVELOPMENT REVIEW 2004* (2).
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9. Canadian International Development Consultants, Inc., *Current Definitions of Selected Terms and Concepts in Development, Monitoring & Evaluation, and Results-Based Management*, in *M&E COMMUNIQUE, Issue 04-01* (2004).

Alumni Updates

Chris Allen, SC&D 1988, is the Program Director for the Global Greengrants Fund in Boulder, Colorado. The Fund makes small grants to grassroots environmental groups in the Global South. Chris writes: "The work keeps me on the road around the world, where I meet amazing people who are having an enormous impact with virtually no resources."

Betsy Tolley, SC&D 1990, will be defending her doctoral dissertation on April 21, 2005. The dissertation is entitled: "Predictors of Microbicide Acceptability in Pune, India: Development and Validation of Measures." Betsy will receive her PhD from the Department of Health Education and Health Behavior, School of Public Health, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill. She continues to work at Family Health International, with frequent travel to India and West Africa.

Victor Tanner, SC&D 1992, works as an independent consultant on humanitarian issues. Every other semester, he teaches a class at SAIS on aid and politics.

Stefan Nackuk, SC&D 1993, has been a Senior Poverty Specialist with the World Bank in Jakarta for 3 years and reflects that the "office is lousy with former SAIS people, as you might imagine." Stefan works mostly on poverty, governance, and representation issues within a multi-disciplinary (read: he is the only non-economist on the team!) team that does some of the Bank's analytical work in Indonesia and is funded by a United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) grant to improve the poverty focus of the Bank.

Kristin Schafer, SC&D 1993, continues to work for Pesticide Action Network (PAN)—North America, one of five regional centers of PAN International, a global network of citizen's groups and environmental health advocates promoting alternatives to pesticides worldwide. She lives in San Jose with her husband Jim, daughter Linnea, and son Connor.

Bruce Schlein, SC&D 1995, is a Sustainable Development Manager with Bechtel Corporation, looking at the long-term social and economic impacts of projects on communities, and developing programs to maximize benefits and mitigate potential negative impacts.



Chris Allen

Mara Galaty, SC&D 1996, is a Senior Democracy and Conflict Advisor for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), responsible for advising USAID Missions in the Europe and Eurasia (E&E) region on programming related to democracy building (independent media, civil society, local governance, rule of law, political processes, anticorruption) and the development of conflict-sensitive approaches. She conducts evaluations and assessments, comments on program design, contributes to the strategic planning of Democracy and Governance portfolios, coordinates with the State Department, and responds to Congressional inquiries.

Matthew Berman, SC&D 1997, and his wife, Rachel, are now settled in Cape Verde, where Matthew serves as the Peace Corps Country Director. Prior to this move, Matthew lived in Angola for seven years, traveling the globe and working on international preparedness and response assignments with Catholic Relief Services.

Phil Robertson, SC&D 1997, works as a Program Manager for the UN Inter-agency Project against Human Trafficking in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (UNIAP), which coordinates anti-trafficking responses in six countries: Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. UNIAP also serves as secretariat to an inter-governmental collaboration, the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking (COMMIT), which resulted in the first-ever comprehensive agreement at the sub-regional level in the Asia and Pacific region to combat human trafficking.

Chris Day, SC&D 2001, and his wife had a baby boy, Sam Day.

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Alumni CONTINUED FROM PAGE 21

Todd Eakin, SC&D 2001, works in media development promoting public health and HIV/AIDS journalism. He works with the British group Irving International and is based out of DC.

Maureen Flood, SC&D 2002, currently works as a Business Development Specialist with Catholic Relief Services in their Baltimore headquarters. She and fiancé Joseph Reinsel will be married in December 2005.

Genia Kostka, I-Dev 2003, will be starting a PhD program in International Development this September, after having worked for McKinsey & Company for nearly two years in Berlin.

Seth Miller, SC&D 2003, writes that this past June, in the mountains of southern Kyrgyzstan, he and Salamah Magnuson (Conflict Management '03) got engaged. Seth is working for Mercy Corps doing drinking water and irrigation systems rehabilitation, and Salamah is working for ACDI/VOCA on their conflict mitigation program. They plan to marry this May in Florida.

Denise Senmartin, I-Dev 2003, works at the Development Gateway Foundation, building partnerships and information systems that provide access to knowledge for development. She manages the Environment, Water Resources Management, Iraq Relief Recovery, and NGO portals. Denise is also the Vice-President of the DC chapter of the Argentine Alumni and Student Center



Andrew Wells-Dang, SC&D 1997, with wife and new-born daughter, Clara Vy, in Hanoi.

(CEGA), an NGO that aims to strengthen the Argentine community in the DC Metropolitan area and promote US-Argentine collaboration and exchange in academic, social, and cultural matters. She is getting married this December.

Rebecca Chiao, I-Dev 2004, works as the International Relations Officer at a local NGO in Cairo called The Egyptian Center for Women's Rights (www.ecwregypt.org).

Rebecca Coolidge, SC&D 2004, is working for DAI in Iraq.

Marie Ewens, I-Dev 2004, works at the International Affairs office of the U.S. Treasury Department, where she follows IMF programs in low-income countries, primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa. She also works on broader IMF policies affecting these countries, including work on debt relief, conditionality, trade issues, etc. She loves the work and runs into many SAIS colleagues as she goes between the Center for Global Development, the World Bank, and IMF events!

Christina Hannum, I-Dev 2004, serves as FINCA International's Foundations Relations Manager in Washington, DC.

Jennifer Pope, SC&D 2004, arrived in Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo this past February to head up Population Services International's family planning project, which is funded by USAID.

Spotlight on the Tsunami

The tsunami on December 26, 2004 wrought incredible devastation on Indonesia and the surrounding region. Many of our SC&D grads are working as part of the tsunami response; the following highlights the experiences of some of these graduates:

Ashvin Dayal, SC&D 1993, currently leads Oxfam's Tsunami Response for Indonesia—a \$22 million relief and recovery program for the first 12 months of operation. This involves providing strategic planning, program development, financial management, HR and communications support, and oversight of Oxfam's Aceh-based Senior Program Manager. We in the I-Dev Program were especially proud to see the *ECONOMIST* quote Ashvin in a February 5, 2005 article about the tsunami response. True to his SC&D roots, he cautioned that "governments and other aid agencies must be careful to consult survivors about their wishes, and not simply impose their pet reconstruction plans."



Lainie Thomas, SC&D 1996, and **Tracy Gerstle**, I-DEV 2004, on the Great Wall of China. Lainie and Tracy are currently working for Mercy Corps.

Jose Ravano, SC&D 1997, leads CARE International's recovery work in Sri Lanka.

Alex Causton, SC&D 2004, writes from her position with Catholic Relief Services in Sri Lanka:

"CRS has been working on transitional shelter through local Caritas partners that had presence on the ground pre-tsunami. This means that we have a pretty strong entry point and good contacts in the affected communities. Nonetheless, the event was so unprecedented and the magnitude of international relief aid so huge that it has dramatically altered local capacities to cope.

"With that said, the efforts to provide people with better shelter (just meeting minimum Sphere standards) are moving forward at a steady (if slow) pace. The number of people living in schools and public sites has drastically been reduced (though we can't quote figures at this point). We are also looking at integrated programming, not just shelter, so that all the needs of affected people are taken into account—especially livelihoods, which are key to restoring a somewhat 'normal' life. Other challenges, of course, are the divisions and tensions between the different religious and political groups (Muslims, Tamils, Sinhalese, etc.).

". . . On a personal note, the work is incredibly challenging, exhilarating, tiring and stressful yet rewarding—running on lots of adrenaline, coffee, and little sleep!

"Best regards, Alex"

Message from the Incoming Director, Francis Fukuyama

I am very pleased to be assuming the directorship of the International Development Program this summer and am looking forward to working with students and faculty in the program next academic year. For the past four years, the IDEV program has been capably led by Bill Douglas, to whom I would like to pay special thanks for his tireless efforts. I have asked Bill to stay on for another academic year in an advisory capacity so that the transition will be smooth, and so that we don't lose our institutional memory!

International development is a critically important issue, as attested to by the large number of students choosing IDEV as a concentration. We have seen the terrible consequences of poverty and stagnation in developing countries, and we need to train a new generation of leaders who will have both the intellectual and practical skills necessary to meet the challenges of 21st-century development. SAIS is the perfect place to do this, given its cross-cutting capabilities in economics, regional studies, public health, and environment,

as well as its location in Washington, D.C., home to much of the development policy community.

I am looking forward to meeting everyone in the program, and I hope to hear your comments and suggestions as we consider how best to reshape the program in the coming months and years.

Best wishes,

Frank Fukuyama

Program Updates

This year is a time of great transition for the International Development (I-Dev) Program; we welcome our new Director, **Francis Fukuyama**, the Bernard L. Schwartz Professor of International Political Economy. Professor Fukuyama will begin his new role as of July 1, 2005.

Comings and Goings

We are also pleased to welcome **Dr. Melissa Thomas** as the new Associate Professor of International Development. Dr. Thomas will join us from the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) at the University of Maryland. She specializes in the areas of anti-corruption, rule of law, judicial reform, capacity building for legislatures, and institutions of good governance. We look forward to her contribution and expertise in the political aspects of development.

Along with welcoming Professors Fukuyama and Thomas to the I-Dev Program, we would like to thank some very important people for all of their hard work over the years:

William Douglas, I-Dev's Interim Director from 2001–2005, will step down and revert to his prior role as an adjunct

professor at SAIS. An alumnus of SAIS, Bill began his teaching career for the school in 1992, teaching the Labor course for the past 13 years. In 1993, he substituted as Director of Social Change and Development (SC&D) for Grace Goodell while she was on her first sabbatical. He assumed the responsibility of Interim Director of I-Dev in 2001 and has worked tirelessly since then to improve the program.

Diana Picón, I-Dev's Program Coordinator from 2002–2005, recently moved on to a new role at the Pan-American Health Organization. Those of you who knew Diana can attest to the professionalism, creativity, and laughter that she brought to the office. Diana graduates with her Masters degree in International Development from George Washington University this spring and we are excited to see where her career leads! The search for a new Program Coordinator continues this spring.

Kristin Martin, I-Dev, December 2004, has been holding down the fort since Diana's departure. We are grateful to Kristin for making the transition seamless; she has been a lifesaver in a time of change and we wish her luck with her new job at Developing Radio Partners in May 2005!

Program Activities

During this academic year, I-Dev students have participated in a plethora of activities in addition to their SAIS coursework:

- The I-Dev Brown-Bag Lecture Series, coordinated this year by I-Dever Sunita Varada, continues to offer weekly presentations by experts on cutting-edge development issues, such as "Managing Risk In Microfinance," "The Crisis in Darfur," "The Rugmark Program," and "How Radio Builds Community In the Developing World."
- The Fall 2004 I-Dev Retreat, held at Catocin Mountain Park, gave new first-year I-Devers and arriving I-Dev Bolognese a chance to meet veteran second-year I-Dev students. Our Spring Retreat was held again at the West River Center, on the shores of the Chesapeake Bay, and attracted a large number of I-Devers who participated in discussions about the future direction of the I-Dev program, as well as representing I-Dev at a cross-cultural gathering at the cosmopolitan Swamp Circle Saloon on Muddy Creek Road.

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Program Activities

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- Professor Grace Goodell continued her series of SC&D tertulias, bringing in SC&D alumni to lead discussions on various development topics.
- Senior Administrator Aimee Breslow directed the Silent Auction in December, which raised well over \$7,000 for I-Dev's Summer Internship Fund. It was an elegant event where some very attractive items produced fierce bidding. Adding to the Internship Fund were the proceeds from a series of bake sales, the annual I-Dev Happy Hour, the second-annual Men Of I-Dev calendar, new I-Dev T-shirts, and our best-selling I-Dev cookbook, featuring students' favorite recipes collected from around the world (some T-shirts and cookbooks are still available for purchase).

Internships

The I-Dev Summer Internship Program, directed by Aimee Breslow, has negotiated partnerships with various development organizations to provide nine internships for Summer 2005—in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—with organizations as diverse as the American Federation of Teachers, Mercy Corps, and Trickle Up. The Program is happy to expand on last year's success in sending four interns to locations ranging from Cambodia to Cameroon.

We are always looking for new partners and internship opportunities—as well as additional funding. The I-Dev program typically pays for interns' airfare to the program destination. Our Partners pay for in-country transportation, accommodations, and an optional stipend. Internships run from eight to twelve weeks, and interns are expected to deliver a substantial product or service. For more information, please contact Aimee Breslow at abreslow@jhu.edu.

We would also welcome additional pledges to support SAIS I-Dev summer internships. If you are interested, please contact Pascale Pritsios at pritsios@jhu.edu or (202) 663-5640 for more information.

Web Site / Alumni Database

We are working to upgrade our alumni database to enable you to update your current information and seek out fellow classmates. This database will be password-protected, and will require you to opt-in to share your information with other SAIS graduates. Stay tuned for more details, both by e-mail and the I-Dev website.



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