Struggling for Democracy in Nigeria

Institutions, credibility and legitimacy—all were on the line in Nigeria’s 2007 elections. The results were far from encouraging.

By Peter Lewis

Nigeria’s April elections, the third since the country’s 1999 transition from military rule, presented a travesty of major proportions. The exercise was marred by administrative chaos, sweeping fraud and copious violence. Federal and state elections lacked basic credibility. Domestic and international observers judged the elections to be fundamentally flawed and without validity. The disorder and acrimony surrounding the polls raised a specter of instability in Africa’s most populous state. For the United States, Nigeria’s faulty elections pose a dilemma in relating to a strategic African country, raising broader questions about Washington’s efforts to promote democracy abroad.

Nigeria, with 147 million people, is a bellwether in West Africa and a leading presence on the continent. Nigerian peacekeepers have played crucial roles in Darfur, Liberia and Sierra Leone, and Nigerian leaders have mediated major conflicts across the region. Nigeria is also Africa’s leading oil producer, pumping about 2.4 million barrels of high-grade crude oil daily. The sixth-largest exporter in OPEC, Nigeria provides 10 percent of U.S. oil imports, a share that is likely to increase substantially over the next few years. With a Muslim population of about 70 million, Nigeria’s stability and moderation are also a matter of concern to the United States. Traditionally, Nigeria has maintained cordial relations with Washington, D.C., and the two countries have developed major economic ties.

The 2007 elections in Nigeria had pivotal significance for this fledgling democracy. The elections represented the first turnover of a civilian administration since independence. Like many other countries, Nigeria’s constitution has a two-term limit for the presidency, and President Olusegun Obasanjo had completed his tenure. The prospect of a new president, and perhaps a new party, in power heightened expectations among Nigerians.

Credibility of the Process
Obasanjo, a former military ruler of Nigeria, had a controversial presidency. He managed civil-military relations during a difficult transitional period and restored much of Nigeria’s standing on the world stage. The president was deeply involved in conflict resolution efforts throughout the continent and promoted goals of development and governance in Africa. Obasanjo also installed a capable economic reform team that successfully pursued economic stabilization and debt reduction, and he launched a surprisingly assertive anticorruption campaign. Yet he also was criticized for being arrogant and imperious, and he failed to manage important issues such as religious division and widening social violence.

Along with keen public interest in the elections, there was also concern about the credibility of the process. In 1999, transitional elections were held to inaugurate a civilian government after nearly 16 years of military rule. Although the polling was disorganized and sporadically marked by fraud, most Nigerians and international observers were willing to overlook such flaws in the interest of embarking on a democratic regime. Despite hopes that the quality of elections would improve in 2003, the second elections were no better, and in some areas worse, than the founding polls. Disarray, misconduct, intimidation and corruption were evident throughout much of the process. Once again, many chalked this up to the growing pains of a young democracy and looked toward 2007, when careful planning and public interest might allow for better polls.

Early on, the elections came under a cloud when advisers close to the president began pressing to allow Obasanjo to stand for a third term. The idea was rejected by a political reform conference convened by the presidency in mid-2005, but soon revived in the legislature. A package of amendments to the constitution, including the presidential term extension, was crafted in the early months of 2006. Obasanjo personally claimed no ambition to continue as president, but loyalists lobbied aggressively for the amendment, including reportedly paying $300,000 to each of several dozen legislators. Despite these efforts, the assembly killed the bill in May 2006, opening the door to a turnover of presidential power.

On the heels of this defeat, a long-simmering political feud between the president and his vice president, Atiku Abubakar, burst into public display. Abubakar, a prominent northern politician and wealthy businessman, aspired openly to succeed Obasanjo, who became determined to block the ambitions of his deputy. The presidency lodged allegations of corruption against the vice president and attempted to legally bar him from contesting the presidency. Abubakar left the ruling party to compete on another party ticket and waged a relentless legal battle to stay in the race. The machinery of the anticorruption commission, the higher courts and the electoral commission were embroiled for months in this confrontation.

Signs of Distress
Despite numerous prescriptions for election reform in the wake of the difficult 2003 polls, the government and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) largely ignored these concerns. The INEC chairman, Maurice Iwu, proposed a complex system that would use advanced electronic technology for registration, voting and tabulation of results. INEC’s capacity to procure the needed equipment and field sufficient staff was much in question, along with the possibility of operating an electronic system in a country with low levels of literacy and sparse electricity supply.

The independence of INEC was also in doubt. During the two preceding elections, there was much evidence that senior INEC administrators colluded with campaigns and parties to distort the results and that local INEC staff were often influenced by bribes or intimidation. Iwu proclaimed his integrity loudly and often, though he was installed by the president and reliant on the executive for the disbursal of his agency’s budget. There was serious malfeasance in his commission, as legislative committees uncovered huge cost overruns and inflated quotes for high-tech election equipment. During the contentious final weeks of the campaigns, INEC consistently acted in line with the concerns of the president and the ruling party, seeking to bar Abubakar from the polls and to ease procedures for incumbents.

The run-up to the elections raised serious questions about the possibilities for competitive elections or a smooth polling process. Nigeria has more than 50 registered political parties, but only a handful have a significant electoral base or potential to win office. The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and the principal opposition groups, the All Nigeria People’s Party and the Action Congress, held conventions in which candidates were selected by groups of notables, with little opportunity for rank-and-file delegates to influence the process. The PDP nominated a little-known northern governor, Umaru Yar’Adua, to contest the presidency.

In addition to the lack of intraparty democracy, election preparations were chaotic. Voter registration was late, sporadic and marred by scarce information. Machinery was absent or broken, and millions of potential voters were disenfranchised by exclusion from the registry. The final voters’ lists were generally unavailable to the public, the parties or even officials on election day.

Critics suggested the disorder was not accidental, but a design of “calculated incompetence” that could obscure procedures, deny information and enable authorities to manipulate the process. The confused state of election administration increased uncertainty about schedules, rules and transparency. This was compounded by INEC’s delays in accrediting domestic or international observers who could provide independent oversight of the process.

An Election Travesty
Observers and participants consistently decried these problems and called for efforts to repair the process. The 2007 elections were a shambles of confusion, corruption, violence and fraud—possibly the worst Nigerians have witnessed and certainly among the most flawed elections in Africa in recent years. In many areas, people were chased from polling stations by armed gangs who stole ballot boxes or replaced empty boxes with stuffed containers. More than 200 people were killed in election-related violence nationwide. In other instances, especially known opposition districts, ballots were simply not delivered, and voters waited in vain under a hot sun for hours without any chance to participate.

In several states, especially in the contentious Niger Delta, officials did not risk manipulating the polling stations but simply fabricated results at the counting centers. While observers on the ground witnessed participation rates in the single digits, returns, delivered with lightning speed, showed participation above 80 percent, with equal margins for the winners.

These abuses were widely documented by Nigerian and foreign observers and by the media. Presidential results listed an implausible margin of 72 percent for the PDP’s Yar’Adua, the largest majority for an elected executive in Nigerian history and remarkable for a reclusive politician from an obscure state who had campaigned for fewer than four months. Witnesses to the polling also questioned the PDP’s widening control in the states and the legislature. Hundreds of complaints were filed with the judicial tribunals established to review electoral disputes.

Effects and Implications
There was much trepidation that the heavily rigged polls would seriously destabilize Nigeria. Tensions in the restive oil-producing Niger Delta region, religious antagonism in the central and northern states and localized rivalries among politicians, ethnic associations and vigilante groups all provided fuel for potential crises. The weeks after the elections offered some relief, as opposition candidates vowed to pursue their grievances through legal channels, and the new government promised to be inclusive and conciliatory. Yar’Adua’s inauguration did not spark dramatic protests or violence, and he quietly rolled out a series of policies and appointments that suggested continuity in the direction of Nigerian governance.

These fortunate developments cannot overshadow the deeper problems that arise from Nigeria’s chronically flawed elections. The 2007 polls sent a clear signal to Nigerians that democratic norms and institutions matter far less than the use of fraud, corruption or force to acquire power. A perennially unstable polity, Nigeria has achieved a rough equilibrium over the years through informal bargaining among the country’s fractious ethnic and regional groups. The prospect of a near-monopoly- by a dominant ruling party threatens to upset this accommodation, leaving open the possibility that important groups will become disaffected from the political process. Without a basic regard for democratic processes, Nigerians may turn increasingly to informal or illegal outlets of political expression, which can erode the foundations of legitimate government.

The elections also pose challenges for Yar’Adua’s ability to govern. Without a valid electoral base, the administration has weak legitimacy. The ruling PDP is not a unified or disciplined party but an assemblage of political factions and notables. Nigeria’s unruly federal system poses further difficulties, as many state governors control their own turf with little regard for national leaders or central laws. Yar’Adua faces much travail in asserting central authority and charting a policy agenda. An area of particular concern is electoral reform. The new president has named an impressive review commission to make recommendations for reform. It remains to be seen whether this will yield significant change in the 2011 election cycle.

Conundrum for U.S. Foreign Policy
Nigeria’s flawed elections pose difficulties for U.S. foreign policy. Nigeria has maintained a cordial relationship with the United States, valued as an economic partner and a positive influence on regional security in Africa. Yet Nigeria’s internal weakness and instability create potential hazards in regional and international affairs. The specter of disruption in global energy supplies, intractable social conflict, religious radicalism or failures of governance could have important consequences for regional security and world markets. The United States faces a difficult balancing act in managing the consequences of state weakness while pursuing a cooperative relationship with Nigerian leaders. Nigeria is not the only country to pose this conundrum for American policy.

The U.S. government was relatively passive throughout Nigeria’s turbulent election season. Aid for governance reform and electoral assistance was slashed, and senior officials in Washington were largely silent regarding the failed elections. The U.S. State Department’s Africa Bureau declared serious “disappointment” after the elections, followed by statements affirming the strategic value of our relationship with the Nigerian government. This offers troubling signals to Nigeria and other fragile democracies in the region. If a violent, flawed election can pass virtually unremarked by major international powers, African leaders have few external incentives to improve the quality of governance. This may serve the short-term interests of stable bilateral relations but at the cost of future instability and disorder. A longer-term view would suggest that investment in Nigerian democracy—including a more critical stance toward friendly leaders—will yield dividends for Nigeria, for Africa and for the United States.

Peter Lewis is associate professor and director of the African Studies Program.

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