By Jakub Grygiel
Don’t get me wrong: Elections are important in many ways. They give a voice to the people, make politicians accountable and impart new directions in domestic politics. Elections are certainly preferable to their absence because in the long run denying the majority of people the right to express their political opinions leads to upheavals, often violent and always highly destabilizing. Ask Louis XVI or the Soviet leaders or Saddam Hussein. There is therefore a lot to like in elections, and I, as anyone else who prefers democracy to the alternatives that dot the present and past political landscape, love elections.
But when it comes to foreign policy, it is premature (and perhaps it always will be) to ascribe revolutionary powers to elections. Indeed, I would argue that the impact of elections on the foreign policy of states is vastly exaggerated, and we are not well served by the belief that elections—whether in the United States or abroad—can improve (or worsen) our international situation.
To be clear, I refer here to recurrent, free elections rather than a change from an authoritarian regime to a system based on electoral power. Such a change is truly revolutionary, and it has often affected the geopolitical situation: Think of Central-Eastern Europe in 1989, when elections brought about a switch in the nature of the domestic regime, leading to the crumbling of the Soviet system in the region. But once the domestic regime has stabilized, recurrent elections are less important for the foreign policy of that state. In a nutshell, elections take place and leaders come and go, but states remain, with their interests, their geopolitical situation, their neighbors and on a larger level the international situation of which they are part. Elections alter the composition of governments and the political leadership of a state but rarely can change the overall impact of that state on international relations.
The Appeal of Elections
Elections attract attention and crowd the front pages of news media because they beget great hopes as well as fears of change. Let’s consider a few recent examples.
Very recently, the victory of the youthful and hyperenergetic Nicolas Sarkozy, replacing a stiff and haughty President Jacques Chirac, has generated marvel and hope that there will be some grand rapprochement between the United States and France—or even the European Union in general. After all, the hopeful point out, Sarkozy spent a long summer vacation in the United States, something that Chirac probably never entertained, and called the United States “the greatest democracy in the world.” Moreover, Sarkozy and his team seem certainly to have a greater appreciation of the security threats facing France, from a potentially nuclear Iran to the growing radicalization of Islamic minorities. So, yes, there is novelty in the political landscape of France, and we should thank elections for this.
A few years back in Ukraine, widely reported rigging of presidential elections spurred a vast popular unrest, the Orange Revolution, ending the rule of a corrupt and pro-Russian leader, Leonid Kuchma, and the presidential hopes of his protégé, Viktor Yanukovych. Ukraine had a new leader, Viktor Yushchenko, and with him, hopes of a new future, perhaps less dependent on the imperial whims of Moscow and closer to the EU. A momentous change of great geopolitical consequence, one was justified to believe at the time.
Similarly, recent elections in Poland resulted in a new government, led by a different set of personalities with new political priorities, diplomatic style and strategic focus. The new government led by Donald Tusk will be less antagonistic toward Germany, less pro-American and more devoted to building EU institutions. This would rearrange the political landscape within Europe, with important consequences for the United States.
A comparable analysis of the effects of elections can be applied to other countries, from Germany to Georgia, from Russia to the United States, from Turkey to Taiwan. Elections have an impact on the leadership of those countries and therefore on the image they present to the world.
But can we argue that elections alter in a fundamental way the geopolitical layout of the world? Or from a different point of view, do elections change the key strategic priorities of states, making them capable of seeking dramatically new directions in their foreign policies? I doubt it. The impact of elections ultimately stops at the borders of the state in question—in the case of the United States, at the water’s edge. There are multiple reasons for this limited effect of elections, but they can be summed up as (1) location trumps elections, and (2) the international system is indifferent to electoral changes.
Location Rules
First, and perhaps foremost, the geopolitical position of the state in question, not the results of its elections, shapes the security challenges it faces. The source and nature of the threats to a state, and often its very survival, are determined to a large degree—maybe mostly—by its neighborhood. Any leader who comes to power must take this reality into account and cannot simply wish it away.
For instance, the fact that Turkey is situated at the crossroads of the Middle East, Europe and Caucasus does not change, regardless of who is in power in Ankara. The foreign policy of this state will be shaped by the constraints imposed on it by this location.
Similarly, states from Georgia and Iran to Russia and the United States are all affected by their location, and their strategic vision is in large part determined by where they are rather than by who is in power. The style and focus of their foreign policies may vary slightly, but their fundamental strategic concerns are in a sense given to them by the world. After all, individuals have their own distinct personality and character, which they bring to their position of power. So do states, whose strategic position transcends the political lifespan of a leader and is determined by its geopolitical situation.
To use a previous example, a newly elected Ukrainian president may have had grand aspirations to seek a closer relationship with the EU, but Moscow’s proximity remains a constant factor, exercising pressures that will be hard to resist. It is utopian and dangerous, therefore, to argue that an electoral cycle can fundamentally revise the geopolitical environment a state faces. What we have to keep in mind is “location, location, location” rather than “elections, elections, elections.”
The World That Is
Second, along similar lines, it is important to keep in mind that foreign policy cannot mold the world to the liking of a leader, even if newly elected with what is often called a “mandate for change.” The features of the international system—from its distribution of power to the rules moderating state interactions—are outside the control of a single leader, or even a group of leaders, however popular in their respective countries.
For instance, several U.S. presidential candidates have proffered their desire and pledge to “reengage” with the world. In the post-elections age, diplomacy, many of them assert, will be back as the preeminent tool of U.S. foreign policy. This is a laudable proposal for sure, especially if one believes the security challenges vexing the United States have been somewhat exacerbated by unilaterally pursued policies. But it is worth asking whether there may be trends in international relations that are making diplomacy—the pursuit of political settlements through negotiations—less feasible and effective. After all, negotiations have achieved little with Iran, are of no use with groups like al Qaeda, and remain to prove their effectiveness with North Korea or between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. We may initiate a more energetic bout of diplomatic activity, reengaging with multilateral forums, and still achieve no results on our most pressing strategic concerns. The world has its own reasons that elections in a state cannot change. A new political leadership in the United States cannot alter this international reality, and it would do well to conduct policies in the world as it is rather than in the world it wishes to have.
There are several implications of such a skeptical perspective on elections and their influence in international relations. A key and simple policy prescription is that we, but also any other state, should not pin our hopes and strategies on a particular leader or group in another state. This group may or may not be elected, potentially undermining our strategy. Elections are fickle. Foreign policy should not be. A friendly leader may lose elections, but our interests in that country should remain the same. To put it in a different way, foreign policy should not be based on friendships but on interests.
We may be mildly thrilled that France’s Sarkozy and his maverick foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner, are in power. They may be more friendly to the United States. They may perceive their interests as being more congruent to ours. Unlike their predecessor, they even may cease to oppose us. But they still pursue France’s interests, not ours, and those interests are not fundamentally altered by the elections. Moreover, sooner or later, a new electoral cycle will bring new leaders there and our disappointment may grow.
So let us not rejoice too much when friends come into power, and let us not panic when less friendly individuals win elections. Serious constraints—from the location of their state to the nature of the international system—will be imposed on the winners, and we should pay attention more to these constraints than to the voting patterns of their societies.
I am therefore a skeptic of the influence of elections on international relations. I want to believe in the power of democracy or at least in the power of one tool of democratic regimes—elections—to change geopolitics, to alter alliances and, broadly speaking, to modify the international situation, preferably for the better. We can certainly hope this would be the case. But we also have to be cognizant of the serious limitations that states face in international relations—limitations that no popular majority can overcome.
Jakub Grygiel is the George H.W. Bush Assistant Professor of International Relations.
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