<< Return to Table of Contents By Shlomi Dinar When discussing the Middle East, oil often tops the agenda. Yet another critical resource, with perhaps greater regional consequences and relevance, is freshwater. Water is in high demand in this arid region—utilized at a much higher rate than it is replenished in underground aquifers and rivers. By 2050, the water deficit (difference between supply of water and demand) is estimated to be around 2,000 million cubic meters (MCM). The population of the region is predicted to more than double at that time. Actual per capita renewable water resources (corresponding to the maximum theoretical amount of water available for a country at a given moment) are even more telling. Between 1998 and 2002, the Middle East and North Africa averaged only 1,100 cubic meters a year. In stark comparison, North America boasted an average 20,300 cubic meters a year for that time period. In fact, almost all of the individual countries considered as part of the Middle East and North Africa normally have access to less than 1,000 cubic meters per capita in total renewable water resources. According to some global indices, these relatively small amounts of available water may limit economic development and impinge on human health. Even more concerning is that the Middle East and North Africa region has the highest estimates of total withdrawals of renewable water resources. In other words, countries in this region routinely extract significantly more water than is replenished from natural resources, according to the World Bank. Climate models also point to a hotter and drier Middle East in the years to come, given global warming. The availability of renewable water is thus likely to decrease. Complicating the region’s water scarcity is the shared nature of freshwater. The Mountain Aquifer, Jordan River and Tigris-Euphrates Rivers are only a few of the international water bodies shared among several riparians (states sharing a river or aquifer) in this part of the world. Since water availability is at the core of a developed, thriving and stable Middle East, efficient use of and cooperation over these transboundary resources are key. The region not only demands continued “hydrodiplomacy” but is likewise desperate for additional water supplies. In most of these cases, funds will have to be raised for such water augmentation infrastructure as desalination and wastewater reclamation. The onus therefore not only falls on the regional protagonists themselves but on the international donor community as well. Israel, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians Israel and the Palestinians
Despite the absence of a final status agreement as well as the spurts of violence and tense relations between the parties since their initial interim accords in 1993, water relations between Israelis and Palestinians remain relatively cordial. In fact, compared with other issues (Jerusalem, settlements, refugees and borders), the two water negotiating teams have come a long way. Water has actually managed to keep the parties talking through their joint water committee. The two riparians share several water sources, most notably the Mountain Aquifer. For the most part, the water that replenishes this aquifer falls on the West Bank in the form of rain but naturally flows into Israel, finding outlets in springs. Israel has been using the majority of these waters for some time, yet Palestinians complain they have been denied access to a fairer share. The parties negotiated an interim water allocation agreement in 1995, providing the Palestinians with additional water and drilling rights. The agreement also stipulated future Palestinian water needs in the West Bank. During the 2000 Camp David talks, the parties were close to finalizing a water agreement. Because the talks broke down, water allocations were never stipulated. A final agreement will likely codify additional water allocations to the Palestinians from existing sources. However, since the Mountain Aquifer is already overutilized, some of this water will likely come from Israel’s current allocations. Both Israel and the Palestinians will also have to augment their existing water supplies—through desalination and wastewater reclamation. Israel has already embarked on an ambitious desalination project to help meet its national water needs. Since the West Bank does not have access to the Mediterranean, any desalinated water for the Palestinians will have to come from plants on the Israeli coast. The international donor community’s assistance would be crucial in building a plant as a grant (thus also reducing the money the Palestinians would have to expend on desalinated water). Alternatively, Israel’s planned desalination plants along the coast could supply the West Bank. Desalination will also be needed to supply the Palestinian population of the Gaza Strip. Currently people there are consuming highly saline water with high concentrations of nitrate from an overly utilized Gaza Aquifer and uncontrolled sewage. While this process can be reversed to some degree with investment and establishing a modern sewage system, the Palestinian population requires at least an additional 30–40 MCM per year. This can only be obtained with desalination. The U.S. Agency for International Development has drawn plans for such a plant, but due to the political situation on the ground there has been no progress. The plant likely will have to be built as a grant to keep the price of water down. Sewage reclamation and recycling also are an important way to increase water supplies. Reclaimed wastewater can be used for agricultural purposes, which in turn frees up water for consumption. While Israel already has one of the most ambitious wastewater reclamation efforts in the world, the Palestinians will require the greatest assistance in this endeavor. Again, international aid will be paramount in building the physical plants and subsidizing operation and maintenance costs. Israel and Jordan
Israel and Jordan successfully negotiated a water agreement in 1994, but drought years have meant the agreement is not always followed to the letter. The parties are dealing with serious long-term water scarcity issues. By 2010, Jordan is set to experience a deficit of about 200 MCM per year, according to the World Bank. Jordan has launched a national campaign to yield additional water through wastewater reclamation, upgrading the country’s water distribution structures and reducing unaccounted-for water. The campaign is supported by the private sector and USAID, in conjunction with France and Germany. International investment in desalination capacities can be particularly useful. As in the Israeli-Palestinian arena, conduits can be further stretched into Jordan and supply needed water from desalination. Another option is the Red Sea-Dead Sea Peace Conduit and Desalination Project. The plan entails the transfer of seawater from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea via a 180-kilometer conveyance system. Given that the Dead Sea is 400 meters below sea level, the height difference can be utilized hydrostatically to desalinate the incoming seawater and supply Jordan, Israel and the Palestinians with freshwater. The project could also be used to reverse the declining levels of the Dead Sea due to evaporation and low water flows from the Jordan River. Israel and Syria
The failure of Israeli and Syrian talks regarding the Golan Heights over the years has largely been due to the two countries’ inability to agree on the location of the border. Access to water—Lake Tiberias, in particular—has been one of the main bones of contention. Syria has consistently called for Israel’s full withdrawal to the infamous June?4, 1967, line, in effect claiming access to the waters of Lake Tiberias. In turn, Israel considers Syrian access to the lake as potentially undermining Israel’s own water resources since it obtains about a third of its water from the lake. During the summit between Syrian President Hafez al-Assad and President Bill Clinton in Geneva in 2000, Israel’s position was communicated to the Syrians. Israel would keep a portion of 400 to 500 meters on the northeastern shore of the lake, which would suggest a final border beyond the 1967 line. Believing strongly that any negotiations on land likewise include the water resources, Asad rejected Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s offer. Indirect talks between Syria and Israel were launched with the help of Turkey earlier this summer, but Lake Tiberias—and the location of the border vis-à-vis this body of water—will continue to be a stumbling block. -Syria’s position, at least during the tenure of Hafez al-Assad, was non-negotiable. Syria’s position is that full withdrawal of Israel from the Golan Heights means that the associated natural resources would be returned to Syria as well. In turn, Israeli public opinion is largely against the return of the Golan and Syrian access to the lake. Several scenarios regarding a future water agreement are possible. Syria could soften its negotiation position regarding the lake. In this case, third parties could offer economic incentives to Syria, if Damascus drops its demands for access to the lake. A second scenario envisions Syria continuing to demand access to the lake and Israel softening its negotiating position. Perhaps more important, the international community, particularly the United States, can help in establishing an ironclad water agreement and in monitoring compliance. Finally, forming a joint water committee between the two states can provide a forum for discussions, treaty enforcement and conflict resolution mechanisms. Iraqi Reconstruction and the Turkish-Syrian Connection As the security situation in Iraq gradually improves, reconstruction and development can be pursued more rigorously. The Iraqi government’s future stability rests on its ability to provide basic public goods—water, food and electricity—and this ability is related directly to the country’s access to water resources, reports Neda Zawahri in Third World Quarterly in September 2006. While Iraq boasts an array of rivers and lakes that can be exploited, two major rivers that originate outside the country are of greatest relevance to its development. The Euphrates and Tigris rivers flow downstream from Turkey, then through Syria and eventually reach Iraq. Over the years, Turkey has utilized its superior geographic position and its military and economic power to dictate how the waters from the two rivers are shared with its downstream neighbors and has put into place extensive dam and irrigation projects on the headwaters of the rivers. The effects of this grand project have been felt downstream. Syria and Iraq claim that Turkey has monopolized this watercourse that needs to be equitably shared and negotiated under international water law. Turkey claims that, while oil belongs to the Arabs, water belongs to the Turks. Yet Turkey has maintained an overall steady flow downstream, holding that Syria and Iraq are entitled to what they need rather than what their rights might dictate. Syria and Iraq continue to argue for the latter. The political dispute and uncoordinated actions of the three states have sometimes escalated. In 1975, for example, Syria and Iraq were close to a miliary confrontation. Today, Iraq’s water works and much of the infrastructure for supplying water to Iraqi households are precarious. Any scenario involving a stable Iraq will require investment in water storage and distribution facilities. Population in urban areas is growing, and residents increasingly depend on surface water sources. Agriculture is also key to Iraqi development. Having the second-largest agricultural potential in the Middle East and North Africa, Iraq will require more water when the damage to her irrigation systems is addressed, as Arun Elhance discusses in Hydro-politics in the Third World. Additional sources of freshwater will also be needed to improve the arability of agricultural land, currently suffering a high deposit of salts. Much of this water will have to come from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. However, if Turkey’s, and to some extent Syria’s, water projects are completed as planned, the rivers’ flow into Iraq will be further reduced. Since the reconstruction and economic development of Iraq depends on access to a stable allocation of water, an agreement with Syria—but especially with Turkey over the Tigris-Euphrates basin—is crucial. Reports from the region indicate the context for an agreement may be ripening. Hydrodiplomacy and Investment While history demonstrates that water has sometimes led to armed conflict between states, the more valuable lesson of international water is its role as a resource whose characteristics tend to induce cooperation. Water is necessary for all aspects of national development, and states have found it more advantageous to consider collaboration, even with political adversaries. Although the Middle East exhibits a number of international water agreements, disputes over shared water resources persist. Hydrodiplomacy, therefore, is key to stable and efficient water allocations. The diplomatic channel, however, must be accompanied by an investment strategy as well. The region is suffering from relatively high water deficits, and therefore water augmentation projects are necessary. In particular, desalination and wastewater reclamation projects will require the assistance of international donors. Equally important are water-demand reforms in the various countries that go beyond fixing or maintaining aging infrastructure. In many countries, farming is the dominant user of -freshwater, but subsidies for farmers prevent the true price of water from being reflected in the agricultural sector. Also, reclaimed wastewater needs to be used in agriculture, freeing up freshwater for other sectors. Encouraging trends in the region point to higher use of reclaimed wastewater in agriculture, the introduction of water extraction levies on farmers and the reduction of freshwater quotas for the agricultural sector. SAIS alumnus Shlomi Dinar is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Florida International University in Miami. He is author of International Water Treaties: Negotiation and Cooperation Along Transboundary Rivers.
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