Conflict Management Toolkit | Issues in Practice | Small Arms

This section explores the complex link between small arms and light weapons (SALW) and violent conflict. What do we mean by the broad term “small arms and light weapons”? Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted definition. For all practical purposes, however, the United Nations General Assembly has devised the following definition:
“Small arms are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for individual use. They include, inter alia, revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine guns, assault rifles and light machine guns; […]Light weapons are, broadly speaking, weapons designed for use by two or three persons serving as a crew, although some may be carried and used by a single person. They include, inter alia, heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-tank guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a calibre of less than 100 millimetres.“ (UNGA, A/60/88).
Landmines should technically also be categorized as SALW. Their production and use is subject to a separate international convention, however, and they have thus been excluded from the definition of SALW for practical purposes. Logically, ammunition of SALW should also figure in this list. So far, however, ammunition control has not been part of international control efforts of SALW.
The consciousness that transfers of SALW are a concern in terms of security and ultimately state stability developed in the 1990s, when observers realized that SALW are the weapons of choice in most of today’s “new conflicts”. These conflicts, also termed “new wars”, evade neat categorization. They may best be described as being on a continuum of collective violence. Today’s violent (civil) conflict is not necessarily about formal control of the state, violence may rather be perpetrated for any mix of social, economic and political reasons (Garfield et al. 2002, 215). These “new wars” are also characterized by a mode of warfare different from that of conventional wars. They are fought by a variety of types of groups, from paramilitaries to organized criminals, employing guerrilla and counter-guerrilla techniques, avoiding battles of attrition, and disproportionately victimizing civilians (Kaldor 1999, 7/8). An oft-cited figure from the 1990s, more than 90% of victims in war were civilians as compared to only 5% in World War I and 50% in World War II. (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004, 2). Unfortunately, new wars also tend to last longer (Holsti 1996, 37/38). SALW are the weapons of choice in these new wars. As such they pose a formidable threat to human security. Depending on the conflict, SALW are responsible for 60-90% of direct conflict deaths, about 300.000 deaths per year (Small Arms Survey 2005, 232). This figure includes direct deaths and indirect deaths, i.e. deaths resulting from the living conditions brought about by conflict or violent crime fuelled by SALW.
The sheer scale of violence suggests that abuse of SALW has the potential to undermine even the stability and viability of states. And the past and recent examples of the conflict Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon and others bear witness to this. Analytically, the problem that SALW pose to states can be categorized as follows: The abuse of legally or illicitly held weapons by private individuals or non-state groups for criminal or political purposes erodes the monopoly of force of the state and undermines its ability to provide security to its citizens, thus detracting from its legitimacy. This is the particular link between SALW and weak states, and this makes illicit transfers of SALW to individuals/non-state groups a concern also of international security.
The “popularity” of SALW among combatants stems from certain attributes that render them well-suited for new wars:  They are relatively inexpensive compared to heavier weapons and thus more affordable to smaller non-state groups. The notorious Kalashnikov, for instance, sold for as little 140 USD on the black market of some African countries in 2005 (Killicoat 2006, 7). Many of them, especially automatic weapons, require little training or technical knowledge to achieve relatively high attritional effects. They are mostly highly durable and require little effort and skill in terms of maintenance. They are highly lethal but nonetheless easily transportable. Small arms and light weapons are also easy to conceal for both users and sellers and can thus be smuggled into conflict zones without detection (Boutwell/Klare 1999, 2, 13-14) In many places, where so-called “gun cultures” evolved, furthermore, SALW acquired symbolic status and their ownership and bearing is a cultural expression (Carr 2008, 2/3). This suggests that SALW are more than just “tools” of violence. Their presence transforms social behavior.

Supply for SALW
The estimated global stock of SALW at the turn of the century was about 639 million (Small Arms Survey 2003, 57).  The estimated value of global SALW production in 2002 was about 7,4 billion USD (Kinsella 2006, 100). One can define the supply side of the SALW markets by identifying types of production activities and linking them to products and producers. It is useful to distinguish between a at least 4 types of production activities: repair/ artisanal production, brand weapons, long-range weapons, and high tech weapons. Table 1 displays the characteristics of these forms of production:

Table 1 SALW Production

(Source: Adapted from Bevan et al 2005)

The small arms production industry has been truly globalized over the last few decades, with well over 1000 companies in over 100 countries engaged in production today. Overall, between 1960 and 1999 the number of countries producing SALW has doubled (Abdel 2000, 84). This broadening of the supplier base increases the risk of uncontrolled proliferation of SALW.
Civilian-used brand weapons are no longer exclusively US or European-made. New companies, notably from Latin America, are capturing greater shares of the world market. Long- range weapons, including military assault and sniper rifles, are increasingly produced in the developing world, mostly under licensing agreements. Only the production of high-tech weapons, such as heat-seeking MANPADS, continues to be a domain of traditional developed-country producers (Small Arms Survey 2005, 46ff).
What is notable about the structure of the global SALW market today is that technology transfer increasingly supplants physical transfers of SALW, especially as concerns military weapons. For military weapons, the type of SALW most heavily used in new wars, 60 to 80 percent of the annual world supply is produced by secondary acquirers of the production technology, in licensed and sometimes unlicensed production (Small Arms Survey 2007, 8).

Demand for Small Arms and Light Weapons
Demand for SALW is a function of a variety of factors, from prices and income to the level of insecurity in a particular neighborhood. End-user SALW demand is conceptualized at the level of the individual market participant as a function of means and motivations (see Table 2). Means include resources and prices, which interact to determine the individual’s ability to acquire SALW. Motivations refer to the individual’s willingness to acquire SALW. This willingness, described in terms of preferences, is determined by subjective factors as much as by the social incentive structure. Importantly for SALW demand reduction efforts, motivations are malleable. In functioning societies the satisfaction of deep preferences for physical and (minimal) economic security are guaranteed by the state and civil society (Brauer and Muggah 2006).

Table 2: End-User Demand for SALW

(Source: Adapted from Atwood et al 2006 )

Note that the motivations depicted in Table 2 will change as we move back up along the supply chain of SALW, from end-users to dealers to brokers. The derived demand for SALW of arms dealers, for instance, will not be driven by the same incentives as that of end-users.

When motivations transcend deep preferences and SALW become symbols of individual status and social identity in a given society, one can speak of ‘gun enculturation’. ‘Gun culture’ describes a set of values and norms that render arms acquisition and possession acceptable in a given society (Schwandner-Sievers et al 2005) American adoration of their Second- Amendment right to bear arms is as much a sign of gun enculturation as the Pakistani saying that “a rifle is dearer than a son”. Still, gun cultures differ in the respect to which gun violence is socially accepted as a means of conflict resolution. In societies where gun cultures coincide with such ‘cultures of violence’, the presence of SALW may undermine the monopoly of violence that allows the state to maintain order and security. Examples of such ‘violent gun cultures’ abound among today’s weak or ‘failing states’ such as Afghanistan, Congo, Jamaica, Kosovo, Liberia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka or Yemen. The prevalence of violence in these societies tends to transform social relations and redefine societal hierarchies. While the features of these transformational processes of gun enculturation defy any clear taxonomy, some recurring traits have been identified (Carr 2008):

• In violent gun cultures, high availability of weapons correlates with high demand for weapons. The supply is secured through steady weapons inflows or local production.  
• In all violent gun cultures, high levels of gun violence employed to solve conflict between individuals and societal groups lead to high levels of insecurity for the wider population. This prevalence of societal violence undermines the monopoly of force of the state and undermines its legitimacy in the eyes of the populace. The erosion of the state’s monopoly of force creates an internal security dilemma and triggers internal arms races.
• Widespread insecurity keeps supply and demand for SALW from balancing. Societal arms races foreclose market saturation.
• The very meaning of gun ownership is transformed. Gun ownership holds a symbolical, cultural value transcending the instrumental value of the gun. Gun ownership often becomes a pillar of (male) identity (Schwandner Sievers et al 2005). Frequently novel cultural and even religious practices or fetish evolve among gunmen, centering on the weapon or its bearer. (Carr 2008)
• In the climate of “lawlessness” that reigns in violent gun cultures, guns acquire an additional economic function as “means of production” rather than as a mere “consumption good”. Gunmanship, and participation in armed organized crime become “professions” especially among youth (cf. McCaskie 2008). A shadow economy, controlled by militias or gangs, emerges. Examples include the Afghan narco-economy, the Kosovar weapons and narcotics trade, or the Sierra Leonean trade in ‘blood diamonds’.
• These organized armed groups take advantage of the security vacuum and frequently seek to impose their control locally. Irrespective of whether their goals are power or merely profit, they challenge the authority of the government.
• This transformation of the economy often goes hand in hand with the highjacking of the political process. The Highlands of Papua New Guinea are an example of gunpoint democracy, where the electoral process is time and again taken hostage by well-armed politicians and their followers (Alpers 2005).
• Rule of law imposed by the state does rarely yield to anarchy, however, but is supplanted by codes of behavior enforced “horizontally” by actors from within civil society (Carr 2008).

Transfers of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Irresponsible SALW transfers feed violent gun cultures and undermine the stability of states.
Today cross-border transfers of SALW are a small but significant part of global commerce. Of the annual global supply of SALW worth about 7-8 billion USD, around 4 billion worth are exported. Not all of this trade in SALW is licit, however. An estimated 1 billion USD worth enters the global black market annually (Kinsella 2006, 100). A basic distinction is between three forms of arms transfers: In “licit” trade sellers of state A transfer weapons to the security forces or licensed private dealers in state B. Grey-market transfers involve the supply of weapons from state A to non-licensed non-state recipients, i.e. militias or rebel groups in state B. Black market transfers involve non-licensed trade between non-state actors of states A and B. Authorized cargo might also be “illicitly” diverted to unauthorized end-users somewhere along the transfer chain (Schroeder et al 2008). A transfer is “illicit” when it lacks authorization by one or both states parties to the transfer. This might be the case where the end-users are rebel groups, or where the risk of diversion is high, or where the buyers are regimes under UN embargo, or where sellers have misgivings about the buyer’s human rights record.
The fact that grey and black-market transfers are considered to be “illicit” does not mean that there is will on the part of the international community to “outlaw” these transfers. Most states do regulate the flows of arms to and from their territory by issuing export licenses for outgoing transfers and end-user certificates for incoming transfers, as well as licenses for transshipment. No international treaty harmonizing practices and imposing binding regulations on transfers in SALW (or ammunition) is in place, however.
Throughout the Cold War, in fact, both superpowers and – to a lesser extent – China used grey-market transfers of SALW as a tool of geopolitics. The United States supported conservative regimes and right-wing insurgents while the Soviet Union supported revisionist regimes and insurgent groups across the globe. Billions of dollars worth of weapons were poured by both sides into conflicts in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and elsewhere in the 1970s and 1980s. After the end of the Cold War the pace of politically motivated arms deliveries by states to non-state groups has slowed, but not subsided, as the highly publicized incidents of French support of the Rwandese Interahamwe, NATO support of the Kosovar KLA and Russian support to resistance groups in Georgia and elsewhere show. Many of the weapons transferred over the last three decades continue to circulate in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and South and South East Asia, flowing from one violent hotspot in the region to another. (Carr 2008, Mathiak and Lumpe 2000).
While the Cold-War game of surrogate warfare was mostly politically motivated, SALW export has grown and turned into a predominantly commercial enterprise over the last two decades. After the end of the Cold War, states started downsizing their armed forces, selling off large amounts of surplus stocks. At the same time the scale of industrial production of SALW outgrew weakened national demand and made the SALW-producing industry dependent on exports (Bauer et al 2004, 118, Amnesty International and Trans Arms 2006, 5). Significantly, surplus military weapons are usually transferred to the world’s poorest countries or absorbed by the black market, supplying many of today’s violent conflicts. This steady supply of surplus weapons is likely to persist as most countries modernize their arsenals cyclically  (Bevan 2006, 26).
In the 1990s the illicit trade in SALW and ammunition has come to prominence as the stories of rogue arms merchants, shipping and airlifting guns to embargoed states and rebel groups, surfaced in the Western media. This shifted attention to the mechanics of the illicit arms trade. Experience of the 1990s has shown that black market transfers rely on the services of middlemen between seller and buyer together, avoiding disruption by authorities. Brokers are at the center of these enterprises, bringing buyers, sellers, shippers and insurers together to arrange the transfer in return for a commission (Wood and Peleman 2000, 129). They usually also put up with the financing of the deal, being reimbursed by the buyer (Naylor 2000). Middlemen employ a variety of strategies to evade state control. They register their companies outside of their country of residence to avoid regulation. They often direct payments through series of bogus companies to avoid tracking. Arms shippers register their aircraft vessels or aircrafts in countries where regulations are lax and reregister them frequently. They forge cargo documentation and end-user certificates or bribe corrupt officials to acquire authentic end-user certificates. They manipulate flight plans to allow themselves to take detours to drop their cargo at their secret destinations (Carr 2008, Schroeder et al 2008).
The second major source of illicit supply of SALW & ammunition to non-state actors is diversion of lawfully held weapons from existing stocks. Criminals often arm themselves by stealing weapons from civilian households. Rebel groups and organized criminals acquire military-style weapons by raiding armories of the state’s security forces or by buying or even renting military-style arms from corrupt officials. The conflict in the Solomon Islands between two ethnic militias of the 1990s was primarily fuelled by diversion from legitimate stocks of security forces. Weapons diverted from civilian stock sometimes also enter the international black market. A good share of small arms used in criminal acts in Papua New Guinea turn out to be lawfully registered in New Zealand (Alpers and Twyford 2003). Table 3 summarizes the different forms of transfers of SALW.

Table 3 SALW & Ammunition Transfers

(Source: Author’s depiction)

Control of SALW Proliferation
One measure of countering the threat that SALW pose to human security and weak states is to control transfers of SALW. The multilateral measures adopted to date are confined to the control of the illicit trade in SALW. They are termed “supply-sided” or “first-generation” measures (Krause 2007, 4). Licit trade in SALW, and even state transfers to non-state actors, as well as the related but somewhat different problem of the transfer of ammunition are not properly addressed. The only constraint of state-to-state transfers remains a UN arms embargo. Even though these problematic “holes” in the regime have long been identified, they still persist.
This global regime of small arms transfer control has its roots in the early 1990s when the UN General Assembly started speaking out against illicit trafficking in arms in a series of resolutions. At about the same time a growing epistemic community starting to research conventional weapons, including SALW, as issues of arms control and disarmament (Garcia 2006, 35). By 1998 a group of like- minded states encouraged by the governments of Canada and Norway and a network of interested governments and NGOs, called IANSA, had formed.
The first global instrument to control SALW proliferation was the 2001 UN Firearms Protocol (to the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime). This legally binding instrument (77 state and international organizations parties) focuses on illicit SALW trafficking by individuals and organized groups but ignores state-to-state transfers. The second and broadest global instrument is the UN Programme of Action to Curb the Illicit Trade in SALW (PoA), adopted at the first UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in SALW. Participants agreed to engender in a series of measures to prevent and disrupt the illicit trade in SALW at national, regional and international levels (cf. Wezeman 2002, 737). The PoA also features provisions for international “assistance and cooperation” to achieve its goals. It also introduced a reporting mechanism that is supposed to allow monitoring of the implementation of its provisions. The third major global instrument is the International Tracing Instrument. This political instrument was devised within the framework of the PoA. It specifies requirements for the marking of SALW and cooperation in tracing of SALW – but, crucially, not ammunition – and spells out an additional reporting requirement for implementation of its provisions under the PoA. (Batchelor and MacDonald 2006).
These global instruments of SALW transfer control are supplemented by a score of regional instruments. These instruments, some of which legal and some of which political, are tailored to varying regional needs (Kytömäki 2005). Measures to regulate the illicit trade spelled out in the various instruments at both regional and international levels include

1. The designation of an national point of contact for coordination of regulatory policy and a national programme of action to curb the illicit trade in SALW,
2. the set-up of a legal framework to control SALW including establishment of legislation regulating manufacturing, possession, sale, transfers of SALW; criminalization of illegal manufacturing, export or import of SALW,
3. provisions for marking and tracing of SALW, including the inscription of SALW with unique marks, and the cooperation regarding tracing requests from other states,
4. provisions for recordkeeping of SALW production and transfers and provisions for security of SALW stockpiles from theft and arms diversion,
5. voluntary collection and destruction of illicit and surplus weapons, including the development of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs, sensitive to the special needs of children,
6. the regulation of cross-border arms transfers through licensing and issuing of end-user certificates, and the regulation of brokering and arms dealing,
7. regional and international cooperation, including customs and border cooperation, police and intelligence cooperation, and information-sharing,
8. the provision of international financial and technical assistance and assistance in training of public officials on SALW-handling good practices in a variety of fields,
9. the conducting of research into the illicit trade in SALW
10. the conducting of public education and awareness-raising programs on the consequences of the illicit trade in SALW

Table 4 provides an overview of the major global and regional instruments and the breadth of their respective scopes. Most of these instruments, be they legal or political in nature, touch upon the majority of the topics identified above. The majority of instruments have been devised for two regions, Latin America and Africa. Especially African states have set up progressive legally binding instruments with provisions that, as is the case with the Nairobi Protocol for example, expand significantly on the provisions of the framework set out by the UN PoA (Biting the Bullet 2006, 85).

Table 4. Regional Instruments to Control the Illicit Trade in SALW

(Source: Author’s tabulation)

Implementation of the agreed measures has, however, been uneven at both global and regional levels. As the action network Biting the Bullet (2006, 265) concluded in a global survey in 2006, “there is no evidence that the overall scale or impact of the problems of SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse have reduced over the last five years” (Biting the Bullet 2006, 265). The report found a weak record of implementation for states’ commitments under the PoA. Only half of the states had set up national coordination mechanisms that link government departments with agencies responsible for implementation of the PoA. Only 37 states maintained brokering controls and just over half of the states claim to possess a regulatory framework for SALW transfers, while only 58 countries are capable of guaranteeing end-user controls (Biting the Bullet 2006). Implementation of course is resource-intensive and may be overburdening for many, especially the poorest countries that also tend to be disproportionately affected by the adverse consequences of illicit transfers. For this reason the PoA, the global framework instrument, calls for international assistance for the implementation of its provisions. During the first 5 years since the PoA was agreed global assistance to poorer countries for implementation of the tasks described above totaled 660 million USD, about 70% of which went to post-conflict DDR projects alone (Maze and Parker 2006). Due to this rather weak showing on part of the donor states, corruption among public officials in poor countries, and in some cases, unwillingness to proceed with implementation, it is unlikely that most vulnerable, poorer countries manage to build the capacity to control illicit transfers anytime soon.

DDR and Weapons Reduction
Disarmament and weapons reduction initiatives are characterized as demand-sided or „second-generation measures“ (Krause 2007). These measures face up to the conundrum on how to remove SALW from post-conflict communities and how to manipulate motivations and means for acquiring SALW (see section on SALW demand) to make sure those weapons removed are not replaced. The overarching objective here is to transform ‚violent gun cultures’ into cultures of peace. In contrast to measures of international transfer control this issue is not necessarily object of international cooperation and may well be pursued at the national level. In order to remove SALW from violent gun cultures, a society has to be able to redefine the major functions that guns acquire for those illicitly holding them. Incentives for disarmament and weapons reduction are the provision of individual and public security, the provision of viable alternative livelihoods, and the symbolic transformation of the culture of violence. Different disarmament or weapons reduction activities target different audiences and address different functions of gun ownership. They offer different incentives for relinquishing the gun. Experience shows that in situations were arms are available, forced disarmament that does not entail the right incentives, only leads to replacements (cf. Weiss 2004, 108). This problem is today addressed by conducting weapons searches at the community level, in tandem with community policing, making use of community pressure and reassuring individuals about public security (Muggah 2005, 281).

Disarmament Demobilization, Repatriation, Reinsertion and Reintegration is a process that seeks to disarm former combatants, remove, both physically and symbolically, their affiliation with armed groups and provide them an alternative peaceful livelihood in their community of origin or choice (IDDRS, 2). The extent to which the disarmament within DDR contributes to security can be measured by the consequences of failures of DDR programs. Experience shows that when conflicts come to an end and disarmament fails, SALW (and combatants) are likely to be transferred within the region or be misused by their holders. Disaffected former combatants are likely to resort to violent crime in order to sustain themselves economically, undermining public security (Collier 1994).
In the disarmament phase former combatants yield their SALW in return for economic incentives, be they lump sum cash payments, monthly allowances or in-kind transfers (Knight and Özerdem 2004, 505), which allows them to bridge the time between disarmament and repatriation and reinsertion in their communities. The symbolic function of disarmament lies in the demonstrational effect of the will to renounce the weapon and to seek peace (UN Security Council 2000). Some DDR programs, consciously incorporate such symbolic acts. One example of this is the Sierra Leonean Flames for Peace Ceremony that featured the destruction of collected weapons in a bonfire in 2002.

While DDR activities seek to disarm former combatants weapons reduction initiatives address civilian ownership of SALW. Weapons reduction is a broad concept encapsulating “everything from legislation and regional border agreements to practical activities designed to remove weapons and reduce incentives for possession“ (Muggah 2005, 280). Some of these measures target individuals, such as weapons-buy-back programs and campaigns of amnesties Weapons-buy-back programs have in the past had undesirable effects. As experience from Liberia in the 1990s shows, funds retrieved from turning in older weapons are often used for upgradings of the personal arsenal. Thus weapons-buy-back schemes often fuel SALW demand. Frequently amnesties from prosecution are granted in return for the relinquishment of illicitly held weapons. Amnesty, however, has proved too weak an incentive in post-conflict situations where the public security situation remained volatile.
Community-oriented measures on the other hand rely on incentives for the wider community.  Many of these initiatives count on the exercise of social pressure by the community on their members to relinquish their weapons. They operate on strong incentives for symbolic transformation of weapons ownership. Activities include government- or civil society sponsored sensitization programs on the adverse effects of small arms ownership on the community, the symbolic declaration of weapons-free zones within communities and various forms of weapons-in-exchange-for-development (WED) programs. WED programs, championed by the European Union and the United Nations Development Programme in Albania, Cambodia, the Solomon Islands and elsewhere combine economic with transformational incentives by offering community development projects in return for voluntary disarmament. Since WED programs do not involve cash payments they do not run the risk of indirectly fuelling SALW demand, as weapons-for-cash programs often do.
Unfortunately, while voluntary weapon collections, gun free zones initiatives, and WED campaigns have punctually increased public security they have not been found to reduce weapons demand substantially (see Muggah 2004 for the case of the WED program in the Solomon Islands).
Table 5 gives an overview of disarmament and weapons reduction measures.

Table 5 Selected Disarmament and Weapons Reduction Schemes

(Source: Author’s depiction)

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