Dilemmas: Political
As well as the challenges of providing humanitarian aid, of equal importance are the political, economic and social side effects of aid, which have prompted much debate. These encompass broader difficulties relating to how effective and appropriate humanitarian responses are in conflict situations. The "Humanitarian Alibi" This has been defined by David Rieff as "the misuse of the humanitarian idea and humanitarian workers by governments eager to do as little as possible in economically unpromising regions like sub-Saharan Africa." In many cases of internal conflict, although it is accepted that providing humanitarian aid is not always an appropriate response, it provides the international community with the excuse that they are at least doing "something," and makes it harder to accuse them of not being interested in strategically unimportant areas. In reality, however, providing humanitarian aid can be an excuse for political action that could potentially end the conflict. In the case of Sudan relief efforts have been called "an excuse to do nothing", and a result of the fact that the West has "no great interest" in a political intervention to end the fighting. Describing Rwanda, William Shawcross wrote that, "Halfhearted and ineffectual intervention and the deliberate confusion of humanitarianism and politics kill." Or, as David Rieff puts it, "humanitarian intervention in the absence of a political solution solves nothing." This issue is compounded by the fact that in the decade following the end of the Cold War there was generally little understanding of how international affairs now worked, making countries cautious to intervene in conflicts that they had a poor understanding of. Sadako Ogata, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, crystallized the dilemma of the humanitarian alibi and of the UN when it is held responsible for solving humanitarian crises such as that in Rwanda: "No international humanitarian organization or NGO can solve political conflicts… We need political will, the involvement of government and their leaders, of the UN and regional organizations, to maintain and build peace."
An appraisal of US policy in Africa found that, in all cases where the US had given significant levels of assistance, far more could have been achieved with appropriate policy measures. "Although humanitarian aid certainly helped thousands survive in the short term, it does not address the root causes of conflict and poverty… Relief assistance may be technically successful and redress an immediate moral imperative, but relief assistance by itself is politically insufficient." The report notes that, while the US has invested more that $1.2 billion in humanitarian relief into Sudan, "this investment has had no effective linkage to a peace process". During the Liberian civil war, "massive US humanitarian assistance was critical to the survival of many war-affected Liberians but did not compensate for the US unwillingness to engage on the political and military front." Instead US policy resulted in the election victory of Charles Taylor, who "has extended his destabilizing actions beyond Liberia, to Sierra Leone and Guinea." In Sierra Leone "$300 million in US government humanitarian aid over the past eight years has not stemmed a steady deterioration of the humanitarian situation." The list goes on. The report recommends affording greater priority to a more focused humanitarian engagement in Africa; improving leadership and combating lack of accountability; measuring the political repercussions of relief programs and implementing do-no-harm strategies; strengthening human rights, ending the culture of impunity and giving greater protection to IDPs; and concentrating more on creating coherent strategies for humanitarian flash zones.
"Spectre of the Well-Fed Dead" Humanitarian aid that ensures non-combatants are fed, sheltered and healthy, without alleviating the violence that carries on around them, can lead to the well-known "spectre of the well-fed dead." Even more disturbing, the provision of humanitarian assistance can give non-combatants a mistaken sense of security, with tragic consequences. In the 'safe-area' of Srebrenica, for example, during the Bosnian War, continued provision of humanitarian aid gave civilians there the impression that the international community was committed to protecting them, encouraging them to remain there. In reality the international community was not prepared to take the measures necessary to ensure their safety, allowing an estimated 7,000 to be killed. The UN has come under much criticism for its failure to avert internal conflicts and mass killings, for example in Rwanda and Bosnia. Although the humanitarian aid that it provides saves lives, permitting such atrocities to happen in the first place is contradictory to its stated ideals. In large part this is due to the problematic juxtaposition between the ideals of the UN and the realpolitik governing Security Council decisions. This dilemma has lead to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan referring to two UNs. One, the Secretariat, represents the humanitarian ideals embodied in the UN. The second, consisting of the governments who give the orders, is concerned with realpolitik. There exist conflicting interests between these governments and a lack of resolve to overcome these differences.
Prolonging Conflict Humanitarian aid can prolong and fuel conflicts, thus undermining its ultimate goal of saving lives. For fighting parties aid can become a resource to be fought over, thus fuelling wars fought over resource allocation, or introducing this element into a conflict and thus changing the parameters of conflict. Aid leakage, or 'political taxation' of aid, refers to situations where a portion of the aid goes directly to the fighting parties who then use it themselves or sell it to buy weapons. In addition, aid is fungible: because populations and troops are being fed by aid, fighting parties no longer have to worry about providing for this need themselves, and are thus able to put more resources into fighting. A commonly cited example of aid perpetuating a conflict is that of Sudan, where civil war has lasted for well over a decade, and over $2 billion has been spent in humanitarian aid. Both rebel leaders and aid workers openly acknowledge that humanitarian aid, in addition to saving many lives, is also a large factor in making it possible for the belligerent groups to continue fighting.
Reinforcing Wartime Economies Aid can reinforce a wartime economy that creates private incentives for continuation of the war, for example by the relatively high wages for local staff employed by aid agencies, distorting the local labor market. Aid thereby creates an elite whose survival needs lie in the perpetuation of conflict and aid. To make the situation worse, importing food aid can undermine the local economy and make a normal peacetime activity like agriculture less profitable. If people stop farming as a result, this makes a wartime way of life even more entrenched. Reinforcing "Capacities for War" Another way in which aid can fuel conflicts is by operating in a way that reinforces what Mary B. Anderson calls 'capacities for war' - systems and institutions, attitudes and actions, different values and interests, different experiences, and symbols and occasions. This includes, for example, when aid helps only one side in a conflict, which fuels tensions and competition between the sides. Even ensuring equal distribution to different ethnic groups can reinforce divisions and 'labels' and make the groups less dependent on each other. Institutional and Political Shortcomings Critical shortcomings in political and institutional approaches also affect attempts to deal with humanitarian crises. For example, refugees are protected by international law, but internally displaced persons (IDPs) - those who have not crossed an internationally recognized border - have no legal protection. There are 25 million IDPs in the world, more than double the number of refugees, however no one international organization has a clear mandate to assist them, either with relief or protection. Assistance is given on an ad hoc basis, and usually only when mandated by the recipient governments - even though these governments often play a part in their persecution. Governments may not want assistance that attempts to alleviate inequalities between groups because, as the incumbent group, they benefit from a perpetuation of the status quo. Conditionality of Aid Conditionality of humanitarian aid is one way to attempt to alleviate some of the problems described above. However, withholding aid carries the risk of harming the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. 'Smart aid' responds to this dilemma by applying the principle of conditionality to aid that is of greatest benefit to warlords and political leaders, and the least benefit to vulnerable recipients. Given the enormous difficulties already faced by aid agencies, implementing such a strategy can be very difficult. National Sovereignty Incursions on national sovereignty is another issue that affects humanitarian aid. Governments may refuse to allow humanitarian agencies to assist their citizens, and may object to conditionality of aid and development assistance, citing defence of their national sovereignty. However, this argument has several weaknesses and is becoming increasingly difficult to defend. States are not unitary actors, and sovereignty that resides with whoever is in power, at the expense of minority groups, is not unquestionable. Sovereignty is not an ultimate end: there is a growing acceptance of the changing norm of sovereignty to 'sovereignty as responsibility', which implies a government's responsibility for the well being of citizens. | 
