Dilemmas: Organizational Lack of Accountability In the humanitarian and development industry as a whole there is very little accountability. In particular, there are no barriers to becoming an NGO, and no comprehensive or enforceable performance standards for NGOs. In response to this there have developed codes of conduct in recent years, for example the Red Cross Code of Conduct (1994), but compliance is voluntary. Lack of Institutional Memory Because of the high turnover of staff in humanitarian organizations, and the varying nature of conflicts in different countries, there is little institutional memory to build on when trying to improve the efficiency of aid operations. This makes it harder to implement lessons learned. Competition for "Humanitarian Market Share" The need to maintain a high profile to secure funding can influence NGOs' decision-making. Humanitarian agencies cannot afford not to be seen at a disaster, whether or not their help is really appropriate in the situation. This can even lead to recommendations from the ground to withdraw being overruled by headquarters. While not participating may be damaging for their fundraising activities, such a situation clearly means that the decision to assist may not always be based on the right reasons. This situation can be aggravated by the impact of media coverage of disasters, which in many disaster situations has had a significant effect on the international community's response both politically and in terms of humanitarian aid. The media does not report all stories proportionately, with factors such as practicalities and dramatic appeal influencing the extent of coverage. One of the most controversial examples of a humanitarian aid operation was in the case of Hutu refugee camps in Goma, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo) following the Rwandan genocide. Fearful of retaliation by the Tutsis, two million Hutus fled to neighboring countries for protection, where some of them would stay for the next two and a half years. In the camps in Goma, Zaire, Hutu militia members responsible for the genocide against the Tutsis continued to wield considerable power, terrorizing refugees, forbidding them to leave the camps, distributing anti-Tutsi propaganda, and recruiting and training troops from among them. Because of their position of authority, many aid agencies used them to facilitate distribution of food, thus reinforcing their power. Much aid was being diverted by the Hutu leadership in order to buy weapons, and attacks into Rwanda were being staged from the camps. Finally, in recognition of the fact that the camps were failing to protect refugees from the leadership of extremist Hutus, two high profile NGOs withdrew in early 1995. Medecins Sans Frontiers reported that, "The continued diversion of humanitarian aid by the same leaders who orchestrated the genocide, the lack of effective international action regarding impunity, and the fact that the refugee population was being held hostage, presented a situation contradictory with the principles of humanitarian assistance." The president of the International Rescue Committee said that "the whole aid community has been overtaken by a new reality. Humanitarianism has become a resource… and people are manipulating it as never before. Sometimes we just shouldn't show up for a disaster."
The Dilemma of Neutrality The 1994 Code of Conduct of the International Federation of the Red Cross explicitly states the neutrality of NGOs' work. "When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act" (Point 1). However, it is extremely difficult for the effects of aid to be neutral, even if the provision of it is. While aid's neutrality makes it so much easier to agree on than strategic or political ends, it also makes aid especially inadequate as a substitute for these. Interference With Local Economies An influx of aid and aid workers can create huge distortions in the local economy. Services such as restaurants, hotels, and brothels tend to spring up as soon as a humanitarian or development operation begins. Houses are built in anticipation of the high rents that foreign aid agencies will pay, and prices for commodities and rents inflate. Such distortions in the local economy result in winners and losers, as the poorest and most vulnerable members of society find themselves unable to afford the new cost of living. Local infrastructure such as roads and utilities are stretched to breaking point. Furthermore, this is an artificial economy sustained only by the presence of foreign aid workers, whose presence can mask a still faltering local economy. - In Sarajevo in the late 1990s, it was estimated that the international community spent £30 million a month in living expenses alone, with the benefits accruing mostly to apartment owners, restaurants and bars, many of the latter connected with the black economy. Such a situation distorts the incentives for local Bosnians, who rely on the continued presence of the international community for their livelihoods, rather than wanting to arrive at a situation that could facilitate the withdrawal of the international presence.
- In Cambodia, UNTAC's 1991-1993 20,000 person, multi-billion dollar mission affected the daily lives of Cambodians in multiple ways, including high inflation, social dislocation, and a large increase in prostitution and HIV/AIDS cases in Phnom Penh.
- In Afghanistan, Kabul rents have gone up by five times since the fall of the Taliban. The prices of staples such as rice have doubled, or even tripled, while most salaries have remained the same. Local people, even those in the middle class, note that, while life has generally improved since the Taliban fell, many aspects of life are getting harder.
Lifestyle and Budgeting Issues A lot of the money for aid programs, particularly with international organizations like the UN, goes into staff salaries and technical requirements rather than to the recipients of aid. This can create tensions in relief programs, particularly as local staff receive much smaller salaries. At the same time, however, aid workers often risk their lives in extremely difficult and stressful conditions, making it a difficult issue to resolve. Of $2 billion spent on the UNTAC mission in Cambodia, most of this money ended up outside Cambodia, spent on salaries for UN staff (an estimated $118.5 million) and their travel costs ($62 million). Almost 9,000 new vehicles were purchased for the mission at a cost of approximately $81 million, and all senior UN bureaucrats were given a daily hardship allowance of $145 to supplement their salaries. At the time, the average annual income in Cambodia was $130.
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