Timing
Studying the root causes and recent developments of violent conflict enables third parties to estimate if the combatants are ready to commit to a negotiation process, or if the parties would rather continue the conflict through violent means. For a conflict to be ripe for resolution, several factors should be present. Fear and fatigue, escalation of violence, power shifts, mutually hurting stalemates or mutually enticing opportunities, changes in perceptions of power balance, or reappraisals of end goals, can all lead towards a window of opportunity for resolution. Such ripe moments allow a transformation from violence to peaceful means of conflict management. Escalation Understanding the nature of escalation gives us insight into the dynamics of violent conflict. Identifying the nature of escalation and breaking this tendency can help to bring violence to an end. Escalation occurs as opposing parties raise the stakes of the conflict, and can be attributed to: - Overreaction: A security dilemma occurs as one party's defensive measures are perceived as offensive to the other party, resulting in a repeated, tit-for-tat build-up of arms and agressions.
- Overcommitment: Leaders negotiating the interests of their party are faced with the difficult task of making the compromises necessary to advance the peace process, while having to answer to their home constituencies. Conflicts can escalate after agreements have been made without the support of hard-line constituents, who return to violence.
- Entrapment: Leaders sometimes pursue a hard line in order to maintain credibility at home.
- Bargaining chip: Leaders can introduce new elements to the conflict in order to improve their bargaining position.
- Lock in: Too deeply entrenched in their positions, leaders can become blind to potential alternatives to managing the conflict.
Ripeness Theory The term ripe for resolution is a conceptual term used to describe the phase when a conflict is more likely to be resolved through methods of conflict management. Coined by I. William Zartman, this term captures the idea that conflicts are an ongoing process, and that timing is of crucial importance. If parties have not yet reached a mutually hurting stalemate, then attempts at conflict management are almost certain to fail. Worse, becoming involved in conflict management when the conflict is not yet ripe can further exacerbate tensions and escalate the situation. It is only when parties are ready, due to any number or combination of security, political, social or economic developments, that peacemaking can be successful. Mutually Hurting Stalemate Either by their own conviction or through the influence of others, leaders can perceive themselves to have reached a hurting stalemate, where violence takes too great a levy without bringing sufficient gain. If both parties consider the continuation or escalation of violence to be more costly than peaceful alternatives, a mutually hurting stalemate has been reached. This mutually hurting stalemate creates a window of opportunity-- a ripe moment-- for negotiations. Mutually Enticing Opportunity Sometimes an event or opportunity occurs that can benefit both parties, thus encouraging them to come to the negotiation table. Because such an opportunity is unlikely to emerge spontaneously, it is the role of a third party mediator to create such an opportunity. Incentives or guarantees assured by the third party, or support that increases the perceived legitimacy of either or both sides, allows leaders who were previously entrenched in their positions to find a way out without losing the support of their relative constituencies. Formula With the support and assistance of a mediator, negotiating parties can reach an understanding of the nature and causes of conflict. By redefining the terms of the conflict to address its root causes, parties can more easily define the terms of an acceptable solution. If the terms of trade created are considered equitable, and if parties are able to find a common sense of justice, the likelihood of sustaining the negotiated peace settlement increases. The Toughness Dilemma
The Toughness (or Negotiator’s) Dilemma is one which faces all negotiators, at all stages of negotiation. Should a negotiator be “tough”, increasing the chances that he or she will get what he or she wants, but lessening the chances for an agreement (increasing the possibility for deadlock or stalemate)? Or, should a negotiator be “soft”, increasing the chances for an agreement, but decreasing the odds that he or she will get what he or she wants?
This is a true dilemma, to date no one has yet solved the problem as it is formulated above (Zartman 2005: 45). Authors from various analytical schools of thought have attempted to solve the dilemma by introducing an independent variable, which they postulate should determine the outcome. While this section does not propose the definitive answer to the problem, it does discuss what has been proposed in the past, present some empirical evidence, try to take apart the dilemma, and synthesize these diverse points of view in conclusion.
I. Structural Analysis
The school of structural analysis looks at the disposition of key elements, namely number of parties and power, as the causal factor of a negotiated outcome. The number of parties alone is insufficient, it is their power or how they use or borrow power which determines the outcome. There are considerable methodological difficulties in using this type of analysis, most seriously, that power is a slippery concept, which makes any analysis using power as an independent variable slippery as well.
The popular tautological definition of power, “the strongest side wins”, is insufficient. If side A wins, then it was necessarily stronger than side B. In terms of the Toughness Dilemma, the realist definition of power as force is does not instruct us in any way. If the strong (forceful) always open tough, and they always get what they want, and they always get an agreement, then there is no dilemma. The view of the neo-realist school is mildly more helpful, they see power as possession of some quantifiable resource. However, just because side A possesses a great amount of, say gold, this will not necessarily move side B to agree to sell them, say guns, at a favorable price. The neo-realists’ view of power dissociates possession, with skillful use of these possessions (Zartman 2000: 6 – 10). If the strong (rich) always open tough, and they always get what they want, and they always get an agreement, then again, there is no dilemma.
The more nuanced definitions of power, such as those suggested by Schelling, Zartman, Nye, Singer and Doran, give us a better understanding of the concept, but are unfortunately difficult to operationalize as causal variables. The idea of power as “the perceived capacity of one side to produce an intended effect on another through a move that may involve the use of resources” (Zartman 2000: 13 – 14) provides us with a several advantages. We see power through the eyes of the negotiators, registering the element that governs behavior – perception. The definition of power is no longer tautological, the causal element is now motivating perceptions. However, as outside observers, we face the problem of behavioral psychologists: the difficulty of knowing and analyzing perceptions in the moment of decision making. Nonetheless, with this definition of power, we may better understand the Structuralist school’s predictions and prescriptions of negotiated outcomes.
“In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party should and will act tough if it is strong and soft if it is weak” (Zartman 2005). This version of the toughness dilemma has played out in numerous social psychology experiments and cases of international negotiations. Commentators from Thucydides onwards have noted that the strong act tough because they can, the weak act soft because they must. Though, again, we must be careful about how we define power. Are the weak powerless? If so, then how is it that the weak may ever prevail? Yet there are notable cases where the weak do prevail over the strong.
However intuitive this proposition may be, it must be tempered with a dose of “it depends.” Zartman and Rubin suggest a caveat to this proposition: “Under conditions of perceived power inequality among negotiators, the party with high power tends to behave exploitatively, whereas the less powerful party tends to behave submissively – unless certain conditions prevail” (Zartman 2005: 16). These certain conditions refer to ideologies or organizations, the “weapons of the weak”, low power negotiators will seek to redress grievances if they can join forces with others, operate under the protective course of a third side, or borrow power from accepted norms or principles (Zartman 2000: 16 – 17). In the field of international relations we have also seen examples of parties who were perceived as weak, who acted tough, and in the end achieved a favorable agreement. One of the most obvious examples is that of the South African negotiations to end apartheid. By all measures of power, either as force, possession, or perception, the Afrikaaners were arguably stronger. Yet the anti-apartheid forces were able to successfully negotiate from a position of weakness, by effectively borrowing power from both internal and external sources, norms, and principles.
We can see then that this proposition from the Structuralist point of view is unable to stand alone, it must be qualified. Indeed, a counter-proposition has emerged: “In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party should and will act soft if it is strong and tough if it is weak” (Zartman 2005). While counter-intuitive, the rationale behind this idea is appealing: the strong can act soft and concessionary because it is strong, and the weak can act tough because it is weak and thus must be wilier in order to get what it wants. Although there seem to be less examples of cases in which this behavior is observed, they do exist nonetheless. When Malta bargained with Great Britain in the 1970s over the renewal of Britain’s naval base lease, the Maltese were able to secure favorable terms which were not in Britain’s original proposal. W. Howard Wriggens’ analysis of the negotiations show that the elements of power at the disposal of the two parties helped determine the outer limits of the agreement, but it was the ingenuity and skill with which these elements were used which shaped the outcome (Wriggens 1976: 208). Although Malta was able to make remarkable gains from this negotiation, it is doubtful that Britain perceived Malta as being stronger than itself. Indeed, Malta’s gains were large for the island, but Britain losses were relatively small. On the other hand, if Britain had not been able to secure a lease at all, in the geopolitical context, it would have been a great loss. Thus, this is an example where the strong effectively acted concessionary, and the weak acted tough.
As we can see, structural analysis is unable to resolve the Toughness Dilemma. Indeed, using the slippery concept of power as the key variable opens up a number of considerations, making the analysis of a negotiation just as slippery.
II. Process Analysis
In opposition to Structural analysis, Process analysis takes the focus away from the negotiators (the agents) and concentrates on the actual negotiation (the process). This approach is intuitively attractive because it reflects much of actual day-to-day negotiations, such as market bargaining, wage negotiations, or territorial concessions. Negotiation, in this point of view, is a process wherein parties learn from their opponent’s behavior, whether the negotiation is repeated once or several times (Zartman 1977: 73). Process analysis stems mainly from the study of concession and convergence, assuming that each party to the negotiation has a defined security point.
The position of a negotiator’s security point is thus the independent variable which should help us solve the Toughness Dilemma. “A party will and should act tough if its security point is higher than a given reference point (far less than what it can obtain by negotiation) and soft if it is lower than the reference point” (Zartman 2005). Meaning, if it costs more for a negotiator to give up or to concede, then he or she will be tough; whereas if it costs less for a negotiator to give up or concede, then he or she will be soft. This proposition is best illustrated by rug-buying examples, if you really want a rug, and the two or three dollars that the vendor is asking for is not worth that much to you, then you will concede and buy the rug for his asking price. Inversely, if the two or three dollars that the vendor is asking for is the difference between eating dinner tonight or having a nice rug, then you will be tough and demand a lower price or give up. A similar but more complex version of this proposition, depending on the other’s unilateral concessions, complicates the situation. “A party will and should act tough if its security point, measured as a critical risk factor, is higher than the others’ and softer if it is lower” (Zartman 2005). The critical risk factor here serves as a measure of power, bringing in structural considerations. This proposition begins to look strangely analogous to Structural analysis propositions, as the party with the lower relative critical risk factor (the weaker) will act softer.
The problem with the concession/convergence approach is that it depends on the quantifiable measures which are present in many bargaining situations, or negotiations involving the division of tangible goods (such as land), but are difficult to find in many multi-issue international negotiations. Other types of process analysis look at negotiating independent of structural considerations, and are more applicable in multi-issue negotiations or disputes over intangible goods. These types of process analysis shift the focus onto the different stages of negotiation: diagnosis of the problem, the discovery of an acceptable formula, and the hammering out of details. According to this view, “Parties will and should act tough when they are in the diagnosis or detailing phase of negotiation, and soft when they are in the formulation phase” (Zartman 2005). Parties should thus make their demands and needs strongly and clearly in the first phase, be more conciliatory when it comes to the general formula, but be firm when negotiating details.
The idea behind this approach is that in the general formula phase the parties should allow a margin of “fuzziness” in order to allow for the maximum needs to be met on both sides, but not allow “anything to be put over them” in the final details. The general formula is thus the heart of a negotiation, it must not only identify a shared perception, referent structure, and idea of justice, but it must also be comprehensive and relevant to the needs of all parties. According to this proposition, problem-solving behavior should be reserved for the critical formula phase, while opening with “non-cooperative behavior shows that the negotiator is nobody’s fool” (Zartman and Berman: 1982: 168). This kind of negotiating behavior has been seen in many international negotiations, such as in the SALT negotiations, or in nuclear negotiations with North Korea led by Chester Crocker in the 1990s (Zartman and Berman: 1982: 168; Crocker 2006).
On the opposing side, other analysts have suggested an inverse proposition: that “Parties will and should act soft in order to establish a bargaining zone, tough in order to frame an agreement within that zone, and soft to reach a final agreement” (Zartman and Berman: 1982: 168). The idea behind this is that parties should attract each other into a bargaining zone by their softness, and once they are within the bargaining zone they must be tough in order to ensure that their needs and interests are met, but soft to close in order to attract the other to an agreement.
This approach is realistic in that many negotiations are in fact, in rational choice terminology, repeated games: they happen over and over again. Thus, as in international negotiations where parties generally have to interact with each other on a regular basis, negotiators should be conciliatory in order to establish a relationship of trust and mutual gains, but firmly defend their interests in the formula phase. The negotiations over the autonomy of Tatarstan may have followed this route, as the negotiators who had known each other professionally and personally before the negotiations were able to establish an independence formula, but obscured the independence in the details to make the agreement acceptable to all (Hopmann: 2001: 153).
This however, does not resolve the contradictions between these two Process analysis propositions, which remain at odds with each other. Worse yet, what happens when two parties both follow the same proposition? If both parties open excessively tough, they may never get past the detail phase. If both parties become suddenly rigid when the time comes to creatively come up with a formula, then the negotiations may end there. By introducing a second independent variable, that of structure, we may bridge these two propositions: “In an asymmetrical negotiation, a party will and should act tough if it is strong and soft if it is weak while setting up the initial structure for agreement, and will act soft if it is strong and tough if it is weak while working out the details” (Zartman 2005). Underlying this proposition is the idea that strong parties, once they have attained their major objectives in the formula phase, will be softer in the details phase as they are distracted by other competing concerns. Whereas the weaker party will try to win back in the details, what they have lost in the formula phase. This seems logically consistent with the “perception of strength” definition of power. The strong will see that the perception of their strength has been preserved in the formula, so they can afford to be more magnanimous in the details. The weak, inversely, will say “well they are stronger, so they have won the overall framework, but we’ll salvage what we can in the details.”
Although intuitively very interesting, this proposal again comes up against the problem of the slippery nature of the underlying concept of power. We may say, well, if the weak won what they really wanted in the details, they must have skillfully applied what power they had, thus, are they really the weaker power? What happens then, if both negotiating parties consider themselves strong? Although in reality, equality of strength rarely truly exists, much of the Cold War could be considered an interesting example of deadlock (arms race). Above all, we can see that we have not solved the Toughness Dilemma. In the next section, we will explore some of the empirical evidence.
III. Reciprocity and Bullying in International Relations
The empirical work of Joshua S. Goldstein on reciprocity and bullying may help us better understand the dynamics of the Toughness Dilemma. While the events that he analyzes include violent actions taken or not taken against another, and not strictly negotiations, the evidence he presents may instruct us on the behavioral aspects of the Toughness Dilemma. In this paper we look at three studies conducted by Goldstein, in cooperation with Jon C Pevehouse and other researchers: relations between the two superpowers during the Cold War, relations in the Middle East between 1979 – 1997 and the Bosnia conflict of the early 1990s.
Reciprocity, in Goldstein’s studies, is equivalent to cooperative or “soft” behavior. However, it may also indicate hostile behavior in response to hostile behavior (the arms race, for example). Inverse reciprocity is taking advantage of cooperative actions but cooperating only in response to hostile or “hard-line” actions, in game-theory terminology this is called the “bully strategy” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 515 – 516). While it is unfortunate that this method of analysis really measures only responses while the Toughness Dilemma concerns both initiating actions and responses, we can still use his measurements of reality to inform our debate.
Goldstein uses an interesting combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology, using computers to read and evaluate relevant event data from a specific time period. Using Reuters newswire sources, the computers are programmed to code the first line of an article, the one which leads with “A did X to B”. For example, “Bosnian Serb forces began heavily bombarding the centre of a Moslem stronghold.” The dictionaries of the computers were adjusted until they reached 85 – 90% coding accuracy, which is the equivalent to human coders (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 518 – 519). Most sources of error in this type of data would tend to “wash out” – reduce the statistical significance of - response patterns such as reciprocity. Few errors inherent in this procedure would create the appearance of reciprocity if none existed. Thus, Goldstein’s test for reciprocity is very conservative by design. This data is then run through a time-series analysis, overlaying a number of “break points” at which significant events occurred.
In the case of superpowers, across all quasi-experiments the responses are reciprocal rather than inverse. With very few exceptions, the signs of all significant response coefficients in all-quasi experiments are positive. No inverse response was found, so at no time did a cooperative response engender a hostile response. Beyond these overall results, we also see that both countries’ use of reciprocity has changed over time. At the beginning of the forty-year period over which this analysis runs, the US reciprocated consistently in the beginning and less consistently towards the end. The inverse is true of the Soviet Union, which reciprocated inconsistently at first and then more consistently later on (Goldstein 1991: 206 – 207). In this “symmetrical” game, neither is induced to react tough in response to softness, and thus this would seem to underline the fallacy of “hard-line” approaches.
In the case of the multiple actors of the seemingly intractable conflict of the Middle East, Goldstein’s analysis became more complex as he took in account the possibility of triangularity, or how the actions of a third party will affect the behavior of a first towards a second party. Although we have not yet explicitly discussed triangularity in the context of the Toughness Dilemma, we have alluded to it in the section on structural analysis. When a weaker party appeals to a third party audience or observer in order to borrow power, a triangular interaction is formed. The idea behind a third-party intervention is generally that the outside power may help regional actors to overcome distrust, solve social dilemmas, and achieve Pareto-optimal, “win-win” outcomes that might never have developed from the self-help system alone (Goldstein et al. 2001: 598). In the case of the conflict of the Middle East, the outside third party in Goldstein’s analysis is the United States.
While reciprocity seems to be a widespread behavioral pattern in social relationships, some observers question whether or not reciprocity operates in the Arab-Isreali conflict. Certain authors remark that unilateral moves of cooperation, such as Anwar Sadat’s 1977 visit to Jerusalem, are rarely reciprocated. Others argue that both symbolic and substantive acts of cooperation generate equivalent responses (Goldstein 2001: 595 – 596). Social psychologists and sociologists have generally found that reciprocity develops more readily in relationships of approximate power balance than in imbalanced ones, and thus power symmetry is more conducive to agreement. Zartman broke with this conventional wisdom, noting that power asymmetry was more likely to produce agreements, while power balanced conflicts or negotiations encouraged deadlock or stalemate. Goldstein et al’s analysis tested whether power asymmetry, which characterizes most pairs of conflicting states within the Middle East, as well as their relationship with the United States, impedes or encourages the development of reciprocity (Goldstein et al. 2001: 596).
The results from Goldstein’s experiments show that bilateral reciprocity is quite widespread, furthermore most variables with positive or mildly negative net cooperation also showed significant reciprocity. It is also interesting to note that bilateral reciprocity occurred in both relatively power-balanced and power-imbalanced pairings, and both within region and between the US and individual states of the Middle East. Goldstein notes that bilateral reciprocity appears to be almost necessary, but not sufficient, for in increase in long term cooperation. Although nearly all the pairs of conflicting countries in sustained conflict developed predominantly reciprocal relationships, only half of them showed any sign of an increase in long-term cooperation. On the other hand, triangular responses were much rarer. Only in a few occasions among the US-Palestine-Isreal triangle did the actions of the external power affect the behavior of one towards the other (Goldstein et al. 2001: 207 – 208).
In the case of the Bosnia conflict, Goldstein again studied both bilateral responses involving the Bosnians and the Serbs, as well as triangular responses involving UN/European and NATO/US forces. Although it is evident that the US is part of the UN, as all the Western European countries are members of NATO, the UN peacekeeping initiative UNPROFOR troops came mainly from European countries, whereas actions by NATO typically involved US political initiatives and airplanes (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 526). Although the statistical significance is generally weak, the results of Goldstein’s experiments again demonstrate that bilateral reciprocity exists, though generally towards the end of the period tested (1992-1995) when violent conflict was at its worst. The most statistically significant result was Serbian triangular bullying, meaning that actions by the international community caused a reaction of the Serbians against Bosnians. Interestingly, when the authors of the study disaggregated the international actors, they found that Serb forces were far more responsive to American/NATO actions using military force. The results from this study reinforce the idea that robust NATO air strikes finally caused the Serb forces to cooperate with the Bosnian government (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 527).
The authors underline three results which may instruct our discussion of the Toughness Dilemma. First, bilateral reciprocity (tit-for-tat) becomes stronger as the conflict drags on. One interpretation for this is that the parties learned to reciprocate from repeated interaction (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 528) (supported by Process analysis). Another interpretation is that relative equality of power, which had developed in Bosnia by 1995, led to the emergence of bilateral reciprocity (supported by Structural analysis). Secondly, according to Goldstein, Axelrod’s “tit-for-tat or such ‘nice’ strategies” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 528)1 clearly do not work against bullies, or those who in receiving cooperative approaches choose to benefit from them while not reciprocating or responding non-cooperatively. In this point of view, “relatively cheap options of accommodation... such as mediation or peacekeeping” are ineffectual in trying to elicit cooperation from a bully (Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997: 528). Lastly, the role of a “strong” third party, who was “tough” towards one side seems to have made the difference in bringing the two parties to a cessation of hostilities.
In this last experiment toughness led to softness, but only in a specific context. In the other experiments toughness begat toughness, and softness induced softness. There is evidence that reciprocity facilitated, but did not necessarily lead to, learning and cooperation. Although these results are interesting because they demonstrate behaviors in real conflicts, there is evidence that is consistent with all interpretations of the Toughness Dilemma. In the last section, this paper will attempt to take apart the notions which underlie the Toughness Dilemma.
IV. What underlies the Toughness Dilemma?
The Toughness Dilemma stems from the difficulties of negotiation, namely facing off against an opponent with goals which are opposite, and possibly contradictory, to yours. In bargaining situations, for example where there is one piece of pie to be shared between two children, the dilemma is obvious. The more pie one wins, the more pie the other loses: a zero-sum competition. If they both declare that they want the whole piece (are tough), then it’s likely that they will fight each other for it, their mother will come and take the pie away, and neither will get any at all.
However, imagine that one of the children only wants a quarter of the pie, whereas the other child wants only half. If the children do not care who gets the bigger piece, but only want their bit, then the solution is obvious. The pie will be divided up, and a quarter of the piece will be left over for whoever wants it. In this situation, the Toughness Dilemma does not apply because the children’s interests do not contradict each other, and importantly, they tell each other honestly what they want. Lastly, the children in this situation are interested in relative, not absolute, gains.
Obviously this kind of outcome is not available in all situations. The children did not have conflicting interests, and there was a happy medium to be reached where although the pie did not get bigger, there was enough for everyone and even some left over. We can see this kind of outcome in some bargaining situations, even when there isn’t pie left over, like in buying rugs at the market: an agreement can be found because there is a bargaining zone where the price the seller asks is within the range of what the buyer is willing to pay. However, there are situations in which there simply isn’t a bargaining zone, or interests do not seem to overlap at all (for example, both children want the entire piece of pie).
The formulation of the Toughness Dilemma (should one be tough or soft?) implies that there are only two ways of approaching a situation: forceful or accommodating. However, when faced with an opponent with opposite or perhaps contradictory goals, an individual has more than two choices, he or she may also choose to compromise (some may see this as being “soft”) or to collaborate. Approaching a situation in a collaborative way is to look at it in a problem-solving way, to hold firmly to the issue in dispute, as well as to the relationship with the other side.
Indeed, the Toughness Dilemma as we have explored it thus far, is framed in a specific paradigm in which the outcome is expressed as winning (gaining a favorable agreement), or losing (gaining a relatively less favorable agreement). Although negotiating, as Zartman emphasizes, is a positive-sum exercise (why would one sign an agreement in which one is worse off afterwards?), the Dilemma only poses three possible outcomes. But if negotiation were a positive-sum exercise, then there should be four outcomes: one side wins- the other loses but is better off than without an agreement, one side loses but is better off than without the agreement-the other wins, both sides lose and are worse off without the agreement, both sides win and are better off than without the agreement. This is questionably a matter of degree or of semantics, someone might argue that the side that loses but is better off than without the agreement has actually won. However, in terms of perception, it is hard to deny that any layperson or journalist who read the Toughness Dilemma would immediately assume that “not getting what one wants” translates to “losing.”
It is important to recognize that how one approaches the Dilemma depends intimately on the paradigm through which one understands and interprets the negotiation process. Within the realist paradigm, acting soft is associated with flexibility and “converging” behavior. Flexibility in this sense includes initiating new proposals, making concessions, and refraining from rigid commitments or threats. Rigidity, in this paradigm, is associated with tough “diverging” behaviors. Examples of rigidity include retractions of previous offers and concessions, commitments to fixed positions, utilization of threats (Hopmann 1995: 40). This kind of negotiating makes sense when, as noted above, there is a tangible good to be divided up or bargained for.
In contrast, within the liberal or problem-solving paradigm, the most important goal is not so much to divide up a good, but to realize the needs and interests of the negotiating parties (Hopmann 1995: 41). Thus, negotiations are neither a contest between the weak and the powerful (structuralist), nor a series of moves toward or away from one another (process), but a “collective effort to solve a common problem in a way that all parties perceive as beneficial” (Hopmann 1995: 41). Flexibility, in this approach, is typically seen as a “search and discovery process rather than movement back and forth along an issue dimension – concessions and retractions – within the bargaining paradigm” (Hopmann 1995: 41).
Of the approaches we have discussed above, only one version of the process school would allow for the creative process. Zartman and Berman have observed that negotiations occur in phases, beginning with a joint diagnosis of a common problem, followed by an attempt to identify a problem-solving formula, and ending with the details that will close the agreement (Hopmann 1995: 41). Likewise, authors such as Roger Fisher and William Ury, suggest that instead of playing a zero-sum game, the actors should try to change the game altogether. In situations where the disputed object is not an object at all but, for example an idea or an ideal such as identity, one way to solve the Toughness Dilemma is to reformulate it.
One way Ury suggests changing the game is by bringing in a “third side,” to play one of a number of roles including mediator, adjudicator, peacekeeper, and/or observer. The role of mediator may be particularly useful, as Zartman has noted, in acting as a catalyst to produce effects which the parties are unable or unwilling to do on their own. The mediator may carry messages from one party to another, breaking a communications barrier. He or she may formulate a new solution, or even manipulate the situation generally by providing attractive inducements to one or both of the parties. This third party, as we have seen in Goldstein’s triangularity experiments, can make a significant difference in breaking a deadlock or tipping the balance towards an agreement.
While the problem-solving approach may be an attractive prescriptive advice, it does not solve the Toughness Dilemma, it simply reformulates it. In addition to skirting the question as opposed to answering it, there are obviously moments at which the problem-solving or collaborating approach would be inappropriate. In the empirical evidence we have seen of the Bosnian conflict, Serbian forces exhibited bullying behavior whereby they acted exploitatively when presented by cooperative behavior, and were only induced to cooperate through force.
Conclusion
By taking apart the Toughness Dilemma, we have not solved it, merely presented different lenses through which to approach the difficulties of facing someone with either opposing or contradictory goals. If the goal of this section is to solve the Toughness Dilemma, we may try by taking the different forms of analysis and reconciling them in one proposition:
(Assuming both parties are better off with a negotiated agreement, then without)
In the diagnosis phase, if a party is perceived as strong, then it will open tough, but not so tough as to repel the other party and not so tough as to raise a sense of injustice on the other side. The other party, perceived as weak, will also open soft to attract the other into an agreement, but not so soft as to give the impression that they can be “walked over”, just firm enough to demonstrate its needs and interests. In the formula phase, the stronger party will be more conciliatory because it opened tough and realizes that it should enter into a more creative problem-solving phase. The weaker party will be a little tougher, because it opened soft and now wants to really demonstrate its mettle, but not too tough because it realizes that it needs to remain flexible and creative. During the details phase, the strong party will get tougher again, but not too tough because it is distracted by other concerns and wants to reach an agreement. The weaker party also toughens up, in order to get the most out of the agreement, but not too much because it too wants to reach an agreement.
We can see that this proposition has lost most if not all of its operational and predictive power because the concept of tough and soft has become completely relative and all independent variables have been combined. However, by reconciling all propositions, we have covered most of the reasons why decisions concerning tough or soft behavior would be taken. By this proposition, we would like to suggest that, indeed, there is no solution to the Toughness Dilemma. Whether or not a negotiator opens tough or soft depends, not only on perceptions, power, and personal belief, but also situation, relative histories of the parties, and most likely, other reasons which are not listed here. Because human beings are not rational actors, they will not all, at all times, follow the equation “if X, then Y” (if I am weaker, then I will act softer). They oftentimes do not have enough of a view of the bigger picture to see what step of the process they are in. It is for this reason, that any attempt to solve the Toughness Dilemma will remain either descriptive, or prescriptive. However, we may suppose that this uncertainty in the inability to predict an opponent’s actions is all the fun of negotiating. |
