From the matrix above, it is evident that the prisoners would both be better off if they both remained silent. However, both sides are rational, and both will try to unilaterally improve their own situation. As both parties move to their Nash solution (in which a move unilaterally improves their situation) by confessing (in the hope of not having to serve any time), both parties worsen their own situation. Both parties confess, and so both parties are forced to serve two years in prison. This end point is not ideal for either party, but it is the most rational solution: if the other happens to confess, then the one who remains silent faces four years in prison.

In the game theoretic analysis, it is the role of the peacemaker to move the parties from the Nash solution, where both parties confess, to the Nash point, where both parties remain silent and each serve only one year. It is here where the free flow of information, trust and relationships are especially useful in changing the endpoints of the game.

• Toughness Dilemma: In the Prisoners Dilemma game, parties should be soft to open. In repeated games, this will increase likelihood that the other party will open softly in the next iteration (tit for tat). If this soft opening is not reciprocated, the negotiator can be punished with a tough stance.

Chicken Dilemma

This dilemma is based on the game of chicken in which the chicken represents a lack of courage or a 'loss of face.' The 'chicken game' is known to be played between two rivals driving two cars towards each other on one road. The rivals speed towards each other in their cars. The first rival who veers the car in order to prevent a collision 'loses face' and is 'chicken.' The rival who did not veer is considered the courageous winner. If both rivals veer, there is no damage, but both sides lose face. If neither side veers, the worst possible outcome- both sides destroyed- occurs.

The role of the peacemaker in the chicken dilemma is to elucidate the consequences of actions. The parties are often compelled to the worst-case scenario in response to political pressure or their own unwillingness to be perceived as cowardly. A third party peacemaker can change the game by introducing incentives for both parties to "veer," or by threatening incentives, for example through the loss of international legitimacy, who parties who fail to "veer."

• Toughness Dilemma: In the chicken dilemma, parties should be tough to open, in order to the other party to make a concession- to veer. Once the other side makes concessions, the parties should be soft in their rewards.

Processual Analysis

The processual approach divides negotiations into separate stages. This approach isolates distinctive elements and chronological events in order to better understand the complexity of the negotiating process. While this division is a useful analytical tool, in practice, these phases can overlap and interact. According to the processual approach, negotiation is comprised of a series of concessions which signal intent while attempting to attract the other party towards one's position. These actions represent steps in the negotiation process, at which the parties have the option to agree, disagree or offer a counter argument.

Concepts key to the processual approach include:

• Bargaining Range: Upon entering into negotiations, each party has a bargaining range of possible options and acceptable outcomes. An overlap of the parties' bargaining ranges is needed to successfully initiate negotiations. If there is no overlap in the bargaining ranges then the ranges must be moved, if the range is too large, then alternatives must be limited.
• Critical Risk: The party with the greatest risk is the most likely to make the greatest concession.
• Security Point: This is based on strike costs, or that which the parties would receive if the negotiations broke down. There are several views on the function of security points:
• The party with the most to lose if the negotiations break down is the one to make the greatest concession.
• The party with the lower cost of concession is most likely to concede.
• The party with the higher cost of holding out is most likely to concede.
• The party with the higher time costs is more likely to concede. This is also known as the rotting rate. If the negotiation has a time limit, the party dependent on that limit is more likely to make larger concessions as the limit is reached.
  
• Toughness Dilemma: Processual anaylsis of the toughness dilemma shows that softness breeds softness, while toughness breeds toughness. In the negotiating process where both sides choose to be tough, there will be little chance to converge on a mutually accepted point.

Behavioral Theory

The behavorial approach analyzes negotiations through the behavior of personalities or groups of parties. The behavioral school focuses on the importance of individuals: how personalities influence cooperation and conflict. Expectations, perceptions and trust are all fundamental to this analysis. Rationality is key, as rational bargainers are able to interpret new information and to change expectations and perceptions in way which facilitate successful negotiations.

• Power: Behavioral analysis accounts for the personal possession of power. If power is the ability of one actor to move another through a desired range of outcomes, then power can bet he ability of a negotiating party to bring another to the negotiating table on terms which are mutually acceptable. Power is also held in the negotiators ability to moderate the extreme peripheries of their constituencies, maintaining their loyalty while also making the necessary concessions to continue the negotiation process.
• Trust: If both parties are to make the compromises necessary to reach a negotiated agreement, trust is a necessary factor. The history of conflict between the parties means that trust is a rare commodity. It is therefore the role of the third party mediator to provide incentives and assurances that agreements will be honored. This mediation will facilitate the development of a relationship between the parties, where trust can be learned and peace sustained.
• Relationships: Repeated interactions between parties in a negotiating process will lead to the development of relationships. Without a third party mediator, this relationship is likely to be negative and lacking in trust. It is thus the responsibility of the mediator to facilitate the development of a positive and constructive relationship. This can be done with incentives and support of legitimacy of the parties. It is hoped that the parties will learn how to interact with each other in the future, developing a relationship where the norms of conflict management to support a sustainable peace have been learned.
• Personal orientation: Negotiators are either competitive or cooperative. In order to get the most out of a negotiation, parties should match the orientation of the other. Two cooperative or two competitive parties will be much more likely to reach a mutually acceptable agreement.
  
• Toughness dilemma: The toughness dilemma manifests in the behavioral approach taken by the negotiating parties. Hard-liners, often described as "warriors" are especially sensitive to the dynamics of power. Conflicts and negotiation are perceived as having only zero-sum outcomes, thus asserting and achieving one's interests take precedence over reaching a negotiated outcome. Soft-liners, or "shopkeepers," on the other hand, approach conflict management with the desire for mutual accommodation, flexibility and compromise. Soft-liners view negotiations in positive-sum terms and are more willing to transform their positions to reach a negotiated outcome. For both positions, it is evident that attitudes and personality interact with and impact decision-making processes. To deal with the toughness dilemma, soft behavior calls for soft reactions, while tough behavior should be matched with behavior that is also tough.

Social Psychology

Negotiation can be a potent and effective tool for conflict de-escalation and peace-making, especially when undertaken in the social-psychological approach. In negotiations, the importance of perceptions in terms of power distribution or relative positioning are key. Three factors contribute to the commencement of negotiations; with each factor, perception is key.

1. The occurrence of a recent or incipient national crisis, or the perception of a mutually hurting stalemate. This situation is usually caused by a change in the military situation, or with the perception of a real and immediate threat of new or heightened violent conflict.
2. The perception that continued violence is more costly than the negotiations themselves.
3. The asymmetry that previously facilitated ends attained through conflict may have altered, leading to a symmetry which motivates movement to protect interests. If parties perceive that power is distributed more equitably, they are more likely to come to the negotiating table.

Parties naturally fear the compromises involved in attaining negotiated settlements. Fears of concessions threaten the sense of security for both sides, making parties less likely to enter into negotiations in the first place. The social psychological approach can assist in bringing contending parties to the peacemaking process. If each side is able to recognize the fears and perceptions of the other, thus accepting mutual legitimacy, negotiations can create positive change. Third party peacemakers can also support the process by providing reassurance in the form of acknowledgements and confidence building measures. Outside of negotiations, conflict resolution workshops are useful for changing negative perceptions, acknowledging history, and addressing destructive divisions in identity. By addressing the fears and perceptions of threats, these peacemaking initiatives can support the transition from conflict to sustainable peace.

For negotiations to be truly successful, a fundamental transformation needs to occur for both parties. Druckman (1980) maintains that mutual cognitive change- and not just mutual compromise- is necessary if negotiated agreements are to be sustained. Such changes become possible when history is acknowledged and empathy for the other party is allowed.

Power Theory

Power can be generally defined as the ability of one party to successfully impose its will on another. The realist school of international relations theory is based heavily on the conceptions and distributions of power. Nations hold power militarily, politically, geographically or economically. While power can be conceived in material terms, such as in the size of a military budget or in national economic indicators, power is also a function of perception. In the realist school, for example, perceptions of relative power positions are key to the relations between states and the outcomes of conflicts.

Violent conflict occurs when there is disharmony of power among either states or groups. This may occur when one group attempts to impose its will upon another and the other party resists; for example, when a government attempts to bring a minority group under unwanted control. In another instance, a weak or collapsed state may lose its power to constrain opposition or rebel movements, thus leading to violence as the opposition asserts their interests and the state attempts to contain them.

Tools for asserting power or to change the progression of the negotiation:

• Side payments or promises of financial rewards
• Military or political security guarantees
• Legitimizing parties through diplomatic recognition
• Diplomacy including the use of incentives and pressures
• Economic sanctions
• Military Force

Key concepts of the Power Theory approach include:

• Use of Power: Conflict management can utilize power and the perceptions of power as a tool for mitigating violence. While asymmetries of power usually facilitate success on the part of the more powerful party, there are tools in conflict management which can redistribute power, thus equalizing power between parties. "Borrowing power," as this redistribution is termed, can be especially useful in negotiations, where the use of timing by either stalling or pushing a deadline, politics in responding to one's constituency, or notions of justice by lauding equity and fairness as opposed to inequality or oppression, can all be skillfully manipulated to advance one's own best interests.
• BATNA: The Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement or BATNA, is an important tool when entering into negotiations. If a party knows their BATNA, it has the power to not compromise more than it desires. If the other party knows that there is a BATNA, it may be more willing to make concessions than when it believes the opposing party has no other alternatives.
  
• Toughness Dilemma: Power also plays into the toughness dilemma. While the stronger party may be more prone to enter into negotiations fully asserting its relative power, there may be more value in soft positioning, thus increasing the probability of reaching mutually satisfactory negotiated outcome.