Peace Agreements Spoiler Management
Potential spoilers are defined by Stedman as “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997: 5). When spoilers are party to negotiations they can strongly affect the negotiation dynamic and severely complicate the situation. Thus, not only is special care required when spoilers are at the table, but distinct strategies for negotiation are needed as well.
In a seminal 1997 article, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” Stedman analyzed how spoilers can derail peace processes after a ceasefire agreement is reached, often throwing the country back into conflict. But before that stage is reached, spoilers need to be confronted in pre-negotiation (in order to convince them to come to the table) and at the bargaining table, brought into the peace process and made to sign an agreement. Spoilers in the post-negotiation peace process are a moot point if spoilers cannot be convinced to come to the bargaining table and sign.
This analysis assesses strategies for “spoiler management” prior to and during negotiations. It begins with two case studies: the first of what was ultimately effective spoiler management – the handling of Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi during negotiations over the shape of the new South Africa; and the second of what is, to date, failed spoiler management – efforts to reach a settlement on the reunification of Cyprus. It then considers “what the experts say” on dealing with spoilers, based on advice from dozens of experienced negotiations. Finally, it offers a concise, original set of recommendations for convincing spoilers to come to the bargaining table and sign.
Case Study One: Dealing with Buthelezi and the IFP in South Africa
Buthelezi is the archetypical spoiler. A man of “strident personality” (M. Ottaway 1993: 64), according to Ottaway he “was probably the most unpleasant politician on the African continent – suspicious, unpredictable, touchy, and so easily offended that normal journalistic questions often provoked blasts of fury” (D. Ottaway 1993: 115). “His deep paranoia made him explode at slights where none were intended, and generally rendered him incapable of rational debate,” Waldmeir writes. “No one found it easy to talk to Buthelezi” (Waldemeir 1997: 243). Such behavior, according to Leon Wessels, the National Party’s chief negotiator in the early 1990s, comes about because Buthelezi: "is accustomed to being treated like a chief minister, like a boss, like a chief of his tribe. If he doesn’t get his way, he throws his toys out of the playpen. Buthelezi is not used to exchanging punches with people in the arena, and then making friend with them again…if Buthelezi doesn’t get his way he takes it as a personal affront and nurtures a grievance” (Sparks 1995: 185) .
His behavior is perceived by some to be borderline irrational, as “ambiguity seemed to be the hallmark of his thinking, one that he had honed to a fine art” (D. Ottaway 1993: 116). Making matters worse, because of his distant relation to the revered Zulu King Shaka, Buthelezi feels that he has a divine right to speak for all Zulus. “I have the right and duty to speak for the Zulu people which no power on earth will ever take away from me,” he once said. “I was born to lead, and I was also elected to lead” (Sparks 1995: 222).
Despite his unappealing features, in the immediate post-apartheid period Buthelezi had to be dealt with. He was the dominant black political figure of the 1970s and a major anti-apartheid activist (though, in a hint of the strange behavior to come, he opposed armed struggle and international sanctions on South Africa). More important, in the early 1990s he was the principal political representative of both Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini (an uneducated man who was essentially subsidiary to Buthelezi) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), which, according to Buthelezi, included more than two million Zulus. In negotiations with the African National Congress (ANC) and National Party (NP) over the shape of the new South Africa, specifically over the details of the new constitution and the workings of the 1994 elections, Buthelezi’s demands were extreme. He “challenged the idea of a unitary state of South Africa” (Mandela 1994: 575) and demanded that Zulus have the right to self-determination and be allowed to draft their own constitution, which meant that KwaZulu-Natal (the region inhabited primarily by Zulus) would have its own president, constitutional court, central bank and army Sparks 1995: 221). Buthelezi was essentially demanding an extreme version of a federal South Africa, which was an unworkable proposal in the eyes of the ANC and NP. But Buthelezi seemed completely unwilling to compromise. Buthelezi’s most powerful bargaining chip was violence, and he was more than willing to use it. He “spent years coaxing the embers of Zulu nationalism into full flame,” Waldmeir 1997: 173) leaving many Zulus amenable to violent confrontations with their fellow South Africans. A low-level civil war raged in KwaZulu-Natal in the early 1990s, leaving thousands dead. Buthelezi didn’t hesitate to export violence to other regions of South Africa as well, once marching hundreds of spear-wielding Zulus through the streets of Johannesburg. Nelson Mandela and F.W. De Klerk, leaders of the ANC and NP, respectively, knew that an agreement on the constitution and elections would only be viewed as legitimate if Buthelezi and the IFP were party to it. Thus Mandela, and to a lesser extent De Klerk, went out of their way to bring Buthelezi into the process, to make him feel welcome. Mandela took the lead, his initial strategy being one of friendly appeasement. “On a personal level, my relations with Chief Buthelezi were close and respectful,” Mandela wrote in his autobiography, “My goal was to forge an independent relationship with the king, separate from my relationship with Chief Buthelezi. The king was the true hereditary leader of the Zulus, who loved and respected him. Fidelity to the kind was far more widespread in KwaZulu than allegiance to Inkatha” (Mandela 1994: 576). Buthelezi had consistently campaigned for Mandela’s release from prison, and for that he had earned Mandela’s respect. According to Waldmeir: "Mandela seems to have based his early approach to Buthelezi on this pop psychoanalysis of his character. He always understood that the way around the Zulu leader was to ‘stroke’ him, to give him the love and approval he craved from the world – and especially from Mandela himself. Mandela kept in touch with him from prison, writing respectful letters to the ANC’s worst enemy. When he left jail, Buthelezi was one of the first people he phoned, to thank the Zulu leader for his long campaign to secure his release" (Waldmeir 1997: 174). Mandela was uniquely positioned to deal with Buthelezi, because “with his tribal background, Mandela respected Buthelezi in a way his colleagues did not; and as a brilliant student of human nature, he also had a better intuitive understanding of how to deal with him” (Waldmeir 1997: 174). “Mandela wanted to deal with Buthelezi directly, chief to chief, and thereby bring an end to the fighting,” according to Ottaway. “Whether he was dealing with De Klerk or Buthelezi, he clearly preferred ‘personal diplomacy’" (D. Ottaway 1993: 96) But even Mandela, the brilliant negotiator, struggled mightily to crack Buthelezi. For months he tried and failed to convince Buthelezi to sit down with him to discuss their differences. Mandela’s affinity for Buthelezi and willingness to negotiate with him wasn’t shared by many of his ANC colleagues, who urged Mandela to take a harder line with Buthelezi. “ANC leaders chose frontal confrontation when dealing with Chief Buthelezi,” according to Waldmeir. “It was a strategy designed to fail, and it never disappointed” (Waldmeir 1997: 243). Meanwhile, the violence in KwaZulu Natal and elsewhere escalated, and the chances of coming to an agreement with Buthelezi seemed to diminish by the day. As the process dragged on and elections neared, “Buthelezi became increasingly intractable and belligerent, to the point where he loomed over the peace process as a calculated spoiler” (D. Ottaway 1993: 114). The primary issue became Buthelezi’s participation in the country’s first democratic elections, scheduled to start on April 26, 1994. No progress was made in the first two months of 1994, but:
Then, on March 1 – a scant eight weeks before the election – came the first tentative sign that disaster might be averted. Mandela promised to ‘go down on my knees to beg those who want to drag our country into bloodshed and persuade them not to do so,’ and that was what he did. He went to Durban and did what other ANC leaders could not bring themselves to try – he ‘stroked’ chief Buthelezi. ‘Buthelezi is very strange, he is like a child in front of Mandela,’ one participant in the meeting recalls. ‘And he was just overwhelmed’” (Waldmeir 1997: 245). This was the first sign of positive progress, but it didn’t secure Buthelezi’s participation. At this stage, as Mandela recalls, "Chief Buthelezi agreed to provisionally register for the elections in exchange for a promise to subject our differences over constitutional issues to international mediation. To this I gladly assented…But when Inkatha was informed that the election date was not subject to mediation, they refused to see the mediators, who left without talking to anyone. Now Chief Buthelezi knew the election would take place no matter what" (Mandela 1994: 615-616) Buthelezi wanted the election date moved back so that if he participated he would have more time to campaign. But it was made clear to him that the date was non-negotiable, and that the proverbial “train was leaving the station” (a negotiating strategy discussed in detail below). This proved to be a turning point, as “Buthelezi had now run out of options. The election was going ahead with or without him” (Sparks 1995: 225). Buthelezi sought the counsel of an old friend, a Kenyan lawyer named Washington Okumu, who advised him to “participate and fight his case from within the new system” (Sparks 1995: 225). One week before the start of elections, Buthelezi agreed to participate. Accounting for his decision is difficult, as “no one, even in Buthelezi’s inner circle, claims to understand the workings of his mind well enough to know what really happened. It seems likely that Buthelezi simply calculate his options and chose the least costly one” (Waldmeir 1997: 250). The elections, proceeded relatively smoothly, and South Africa entered a new era of democracy and equality. The IFP earned 6.7% of the vote and Buthelezi was named Minister of Home Affairs in the new government. Analysis In Stedman’s typology of spoilers, Buthelezi fits the description of the greedy spoiler, who “holds goals that expand or contract based on calculations of cost and risk” (Stedman 1997: 11). Early in the process Buthelezi’s goals were extraordinary and unworkable, but as elections neared those goals contracted to the point where he could be brought into the process. Spoiler management was only effective at the last minute, when it appeared destined to fail. In the months and weeks leading up the elections, it seemed increasingly apparent that the polls would have to go on without Buthelezi and the IFP, which would have considerably detracted from their credibility. But this is a testament to the utility of time in spoiler management, as the fact that time was running out clearly forced Buthelezi’s hand. Stedman argues that “mediation efforts should not be like buses that come along every fifteen minutes. Instead, they should be like the Lake Victoria ferry – one never knows if and when it is likely to pass by again” (Stedman 1996: 363). The same principle applies to spoiler management: spoilers shouldn’t have the luxury of knowing that they will have another chance to moderate their behavior and join the process – they should think that every chance may be the last. One of the reasons Buthelezi was forced to act was that he didn’t know if or when another opportunity to jump aboard the nation-shaping process would come, so he decided to take this opportunity. This is a fine example of the “departing train” strategy of spoiler management, which “combines a judgment that the spoiler’s demands and behavior are illegitimate with the assertion that the peace process will go irrevocably forward, regardless of whether the spoiler joins or not” (Stedman 1997: 14). Mandela made clear that elections and constitution-making would proceed with or without Buthelezi, who realized that if he missed this opportunity to participate he would likely be shut out of the process for some time to come, and may recede to only marginal political importance. Mandela’s behavior also fits Rubin’s observation that “effective negotiators tend to be flexible on means and firm on goals” (Rubin 2001: 104). His goal was elections and a new constitution and he was not willing to deviate from it, but Mandela was willing to get creative in strategies for reaching that goal, evidenced by his willingness to “go down on my knees” for Buthelezi.
When dealing with greedy spoilers, Stedman recommends “a long term strategy of socialization” (Stedman 1997: 15). Socialization, he says, “requires custodians to establish a set of norms for acceptable behavior by internal parties who commit to peace or external parties who seek to join a peace process” (Stedman 1997: 13). This was tried, to some extent, with Buthelezi, but the short term results were disappointing. He did not react well to the imposition of norms of behavior. Every time efforts were made to moderate his behavior, it seemed, he would lash out in response, which often meant an escalation in violence. This is why the long-term aspect is critical: in he short term socialization is likely to offend and upset the spoiler, as it did Buthelezi, but in the long term it can be effective in making clear to the spoiler what type of behavior will be acceptable. This was the end result with Buthelezi, as his behavior, in the end, did comply with the norms established by the custodians, Mandela and De Klerk.
Case Study Two: Dealing with Denktash in Cyprus In contrast to Buthelezi, Rauf Denktash has not always fit the spoiler mold. A 79 year-old lawyer, Denktash has been leader of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” unrecognized internationally except by Turkey, for more than a quarter-century. Cyprus, located 40 miles from Turkey and 600 miles from Greece, won independence from Great Britain in 1960. Approximately 18% of Cypriots are Turkish (roughly 200,000 in all) and 80% Greek, yet Turkish-Cypriots have controlled 37% of the land since Turkey invaded in 1974 to “restore constitutional order” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993: 344) after a Greek-initiated coup attempt against President Archbishop Makarios. Since then the island has essentially been partitioned in two, and efforts to find a lasting reunification agreement between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have dragged on for decades to no avail. Negotiations have been interspersed with violence and terrorism – casualty estimates are difficult to find, but it is generally agreed that thousands have died in the conflict.
Denktash seems to have a visceral, thinly-veiled dislike for Greek-Cypriots. “If his conversation, casual or polite, is anything to go by, he loathes the Greeks,” according to The Economist. “Every fibre of his being is committed to fending off what he sees as the genetic impulse of greedy, unscrupulous Greeks to humiliate Turkish-Cypriots, turn them back into Cyprus’s underclass (as, he would say with some justice, they once were), and hound them off the island altogether if they could…the whole purpose of Mr. Denktash is to keep Greeks and Turks apart." (Economist 1998) His convictions are partially based on his reading of history; in 1999 Denktash wrote in a Turkish magazine: Turkey saved the Turkish Cypriot people together with the Turkish Cypriots’ land and share of the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus. Greek Cypriots succeeded in destroying the 1960 partnership, but they failed to destroy the Turkish Cypriot partner who safeguarded its rights and status at great loss of life and property. (Denktash 1999)
Denktash’s principal demand is for a loose federal arrangement in which the two states, Turkish Cyprus and Greek Cyprus, are nominally linked, but each has clear territorial boundaries in order to preserve homogeneity and security. He seems willing to cede some territory to Greek Cyprus, but has “held out for the ‘29%-plus’ that would leave the Turks the town of Morphou and its rich citrus-growing area” (Economist 1992). He has various other concerns that have hampered past negotiations, among them the return of refugees, the right of secession, and the role of Turkish troops, to name a few. Greek-Cypriot leaders, meanwhile, have through the years demanded a “’unitary’ federal state with a strong central government and no internal borders.” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993: 345). Given the massive demographic advantage of Greek-Cypriots on the island, this would imply a government dominated by Greek-Cypriots.
Prior to his recent spate of stubborn behavior, there were past indications of Denktash’s obstinacy. For example, at UN-sponsored talks in 1992 Denktash “refused to show at his scheduled meetings with the Secretary-General and Mr. Vassiliou [the Greek-Cypriot leader at the time] in protest for not being addressed as ‘President’ (as Mr. Vassiliou had been) in an internal U.N. appointment schedule” (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis and Trigeorgis 1993: 345). Another example is a journalist’s account of how: "In 1997, in response to the Greek Cypriots’ application to join the EU, Rauf Denktash, the septuagenarian president of the breakaway north, started to enforce a severe crackdown on all bicommunal events. ‘What’s the point of such contacts?’ Dengtash retorted when I put the question to him in his colonial-era sandstone office. ‘I’ve heard the only thing people do at these meeting is have sex'" (Smith 2001).
But it is only recently that Denktash has wholeheartedly assumed the role of spoiler. His recent actions and “truculent” (Economist 2003) behavior suggest that he is actively trying to stand in the way of a negotiated settlement to the Cyprus question.
Kofi Annan is the latest in a long line of prominent people who have tried to broker a lasting settlement in Cyprus; others include Henry Kissinger, Dean Acheson and Clark Clifford. Annan has devoted considerable time and energy to Cyprus, and has, to some degree, staked his credibility on the outcome. But his efforts have yielded few tangible results and produced little real progress. Last November, Annan unveiled a blueprint for cohabitation in Cyprus, under which a central government would administer the entire island except for the Karpas peninsula, which would remain under Turkish control (some areas would be transferred between Greek and Turkish control as well). He said the parties had until February 28 to sign on to his plan, which did not occur. In March, he called Denktash and Greek-Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos to The Hague in an apparent last-ditch effort to secure their signatures. The talks were an utter failure. “The Annan plan is not acceptable,” (The Guardian 2003). Denktash said. “We have reached the end of the road,” Annan lamented. According to The Guardian, “the talks stumbled over Turkish insistence that their breakaway Cypriot state win full recognition, and demands by the Greeks for the right of refugees to return to homes in northern Cyprus that they left 29 years ago.” Then in April 2003, adding insult to injury, Denktash announced that his party would not be represented at reunification talks called by the Greek prime minister (Tezgor 2003).
The new twist to the latest round of negotiations is that there is growing disapproval of Denktash’s tactics and behavior within his own constituency, which is becoming increasingly vocal. In December, thousands of Turkish-Cypriots took to the streets to demand that Denktash sign a peace deal. Some called for his resignation. Then in January, about 70,000 Turkish Cypriots – roughly one-third of the total Turkish-Cypriot population – took to the streets to protest Denktash. They chanted “we can’t wait another 40 years,” waved olive branches and EU flags (in reference to the Cyprus’ EU candidacy), and carried banners reading “we no longer want to be prisoners” and “if you don’t have a pen, we have one” (Smith 2003). According to The New York Times, “an overwhelming majority of the island’s residents favor unification now” (Simons 2003). Furthermore, according to The Guardian, polls show that “as many as two in three Turkish Cypriots vehemently disagreed with the negative posture Mr. Denktash has maintained since UN-sponsored reunification talks began” (Smith 2002). The leader of the Turkish Republican Party, the main opposition to Denktash, claims that “Denktash has alienated himself from his people,” (Tezgor 2003) and Jim Hoagland reported that “there are hints that the Turkish Cypriot leader…is finding his own people increasingly hard to control.” Denktash is also under increasing pressure from the new government in Turkey to reach an agreement – while he was in Ankara for medical tests last December, Turkish ruling party members publicly snubbed Denktash by not visiting him in the hospital (Smith 2002).
Further complicating the situation is Cyprus’ entry into the EU. For the past several years Cyprus was being considered for admission to the EU, but the pressing question concerned which Cyprus would enter – a unified Cyprus or only Greek Cyprus? The answer seemed to hinge largely on Denktash, as did the candidacies of other potential EU members; in 2001 Smith argued that
Denktash is now widely seen as the man who could hold up the entire EU enlargement process. If he continues to resist unification talks and a divided Cyprus is rejected by the EU, Athens has promised to veto the access of the other candidates: Poland, Malta, Hungary and Estonia (Smith 2001).
Turkish Cypriots, perhaps based on their history and familiarity with Denktash, seemed to know what was coming: "Few places are as frequently disconsolate and despairing as the internationally isolated Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Few places are as angry. And no place is as gripped by a sense of impending doom at the prospect of missing out on membership to the EU "(Smith 2001).
Their fear was justified. After Denktash’s refusal to accept the UN plan, Greek Cyprus was granted admission into the EU in 2004 while Turkish Cyprus was shut out.
Consequently, Denktash has been severely criticized in the international media since the most recent failure to reach an agreement. “This time it is overwhelmingly Mr. Denktash’s fault that a settlement has been blocked,” The Economist opined (2003). “The defiance of one grumpy old man derailed peace plans put forward by diplomats from the United Nations and the European Union this week,” Hoagland wrote. “The stubborn, self-defeating unilateralist I have in mind is Rauf Denktash…[who] preferred to cling to personal power rather than accept the dislocation of change” (2003). Similar critiques appeared in other prominent publications.
Analysis
Recent attempts by mediators to find a solution to the Cyprus question have failed largely because of two rather basic mistakes: lack of a credible “departing train” threat and an inability to take advantage of Denktash’s splintered constituency.
Annan appears intent on using a “departing train” strategy, but has faltered in its execution. First he identified February 28 as the final deadline for signing on to his plan, but he failed to adhere to that commitment. Then in March, during the emergency meeting in The Hague, it was reported that “if stalemate prevails, as seems likely, Mr. Annan says he will abandon all further efforts to settle Cyprus during his time as UN boss.” (Economist 2003). But he failed to stick to this commitment as well: in April, after the March effort fizzled, Annan said “that he will stick by his reunification plan for Cyprus even if it has been rejected by Turkish-Cypriots.” Guardian 20 These repeated turnarounds make the threat that the train is leaving, never to return, not credible. They send the message to Denktash and others that there will always be another opportunity to come to the table, and that there is no urgency to reaching an agreement.
Part of the problem is the wide recognition that the stakes for Annan and the UN are high, particularly given the UN’s failure to play a meaningful role in Iraq and lingering questions concerning its relevance. Both Annan and the UN need a victory to boost morale and credibility, a fact recognized by Denktash and others. Denktash understands, therefore, that though Annan may threaten to abandon his efforts in Cyprus, given Annan’s need for good news and the amount of time and effort he has already invested in Cyprus, he is unlikely to give up on the project.
Also detracting from the credibility of the “departing train” strategy is the fact that negotiations have been ongoing for 27 years, so Denktash has every reason to believe that they will continue indefinitely. No doubt there have been threats in the past of a “departing train,” but they have never rung true. In part this is because there are only two critical parties involved, and both are needed for an agreement. In the South African case, Mandela and De Klerk could have, conceivably, proceeded without Buthelezi and the IFP, though it would have made their lives difficult and diluted the impact of the elections and new constitution. But in Cyprus, Turkish Cyprus must be party to any meaningful agreement. This places the Turkish-Cypriot leader in a strong position. Denktash knows that whenever solutions to the current stalemate are discussed, he has to be involved.
The second mistake on the part of mediators concerns their inability to use discontent among Turkish-Cypriots to pressure Denktash. Annan has made some effort at this, at one point in January warning Denktash, after the pro-unification rally, that “the people are speaking, and it is very difficult not to listen to the people when they come out in those numbers" (Smith 2003). But Denktash was able to brush off the criticism, and Annan hasn’t followed up. Mediators need to make much more out of Denktash’s waning support and the increasing Turkish-Cypriot hostility towards him. One strategy would be to threaten to negotiate with somebody other than Denktash if he continues to ignore the wishes of his constituents, though this would depend on whether a credible alternative negotiator could be found.
According to Stedman’s typology, Denktash is close to being a total spoiler, defined as those who “pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is their goals are not subject to change.” (Stedman 1997: 10). Stedman suggests that “total spoilers cannot be accommodated in a peace settlement; they must be defeated or so marginalized that they can do little damage.” (Stedman 1997: 14). It is unlikely that Denktash can be defeated but he probably can be marginalized, and the eroding support among his constituents may provide a means for marginalizing him. So far mediators have failed to use this asset to their advantage, but they would be wise to try to do so in the future.
What the Experts Say
Through both the SAIS Negotiation Practicum course and the Insights into Negotiating conference of 2002, dozens of experienced negotiators and mediators have been through SAIS. Each has offered a short, concise list of negotiating guidelines, spanning a variety of types of negotiations. Some of their tips relate directly to spoiler management, others more tangentially, and still others not at all. Presented below is a compilation of tips relevant to negotiations with spoilers, grouped into five categories: Who to bring to the table, Relations with spoilers, From the spoiler’s perspective, General strategies and Spoiler-specific strategies:
1. Who to bring to the table
“Those who are doing the fighting must be at the table to produce meaningful agreements.” (Wolpe)
“What has been achieved, or not achieved on the battlefield is relevant and cannot be ignored.” (Cohen)
“The third party intervener must make sure that the negotiators who come to the table are truly representative of the parties in conflict.” (Cohen)
2. Relations with spoilers
“Meet people personally, possibly in their ‘place’ first.” (Bartoli)
“Build personal relations with everyone with whom you are negotiating.” (Goodby)
“Feel free to conduct bilateral consultations with the parties both before, during and after the negotiations.” (Gambari)
“Promote a positive atmosphere for negotiation: Informal meetings on any occasion (birthdays, weddings) should be used to bring the belligerents together. However, no unnecessary familiarity, and sobriety is required.” (Ould-Abdallah)
3. From the spoiler’s perspective
“Face saving is crucial. One must avoid saying anything that is humiliating to the other side, and, where possible, it is advisable to show deference, provided that it is not cheap flattery.” (Deng)
“Sense of ownership in the process is the sina qua non of a sustainable agreement.” (Wolpe)
“Always think about how to solve the other party’s problem without compromising your own goals.” (Goodby)
4. General strategies
“Be as tough as you have to be…and only as tough as you have to be. A good negotiator requires fortitude and nerves of steel, but is never gratuitously harsh.” (Polaski)
“Never forget that there are many others who can affect the final result.” (Bartoli)
“Maintain dialogue, keep lines of communication open at all times, with all parties and with those how influence parties…maintain credibility at all times, also maintain civility, no matter how nasty the interlocutor (except on rare occasions when one may need to feign anger.” (Oakley)
“Try to co-opt the other side’s negotiator into joining with you in a common enterprise, reaching an agreement.” (Dean)
5. Spoiler-specific strategies
“Ice the would-be external spoilers; co-opt the internal ones” (Schear)
“Do not make an alliance with spoilers by using their violence as an excuse for breaking off your negotiations. When reconciliation is already in process, ceasefires can precede negotiations for a settlement, but in situations of violent conflict, parties have to know that they are going to get in a settlement before they can be expected to stop fighting for it.” (Zartman)
“Negotiation is not magic and is not separated from politics. Not even the greatest negotiator can succeed if a party is committed to fighting or if the negotiator’s own political leadership is indifferent about, conflicted over, or opposed to the solution the negotiator is using.” (O’Brien)
Several themes emerge from this compilation. One is that the decision concerning which spoilers a negotiator or mediator deals with is as important as how helvi deals with them. There can be lucrative benefits to being a spoiler in negotiations (as Buthelezi discovered), so there may be many individuals or groups vying to be considered spoilers. A good negotiator or mediator shouldn’t take all the bait; he should do his homework and know which parties are legitimate and needed for a meaningful agreement, and which parties are not. According to Rubin: "One should probably attempt to include in negotiations all parties who are in a position to disrupt whatever settlement is arrived at; it may be more difficult to reach agreement with many parties and many issues floating around, but if an agreement can be reached under these circumstances, it will have a greater chance of surviving" (Rubin 2001: 100)
Zartman present a similar argument: "It is in the interests of both negotiating parties to restrict participation to those susceptible of reaching an agreement, but it is also in the interest of each to bring in as many of their extremes as necessary to strengthen their bargaining positions (Z
In the South African case, Buthelezi and the IFP were critical to the process, were certainly positioned to disrupt any settlement to which they were not party, and were to be ignored only at the peril of the ANC and NP. But in that process there were potential spoilers who could be ignored, such as some of the white extremist groups with small followings. The main players did well by not getting bogged down trying to bring them into the process, and, as Zartman suggests, basically restricted participation to those who might reasonably be expected to cooperate. Then they continued to move forward while leaving the door open for the small fringe groups to join, and as it turned out, some of these groups recognized their weak position and joined the process with very little inducement at all. Cohen’s second point is also crucial – an effective negotiator or mediator must make sure that a potential spoiler actually represents the people and interest that he says he does, and that there is “solidarity of support”lix within that group. Based on the recent demonstrations in Turkish Cyprus, there are real questions as to whether such solidarity exists behind Denktash.
According to the experts, personal relations with spoilers are critical to bringing them into the process. Mandela recognized this and tried, to little avail, to take advantage of his warm relations with Buthelezi. Nonetheless, it is important to at least try to cultivate good relations with the spoiler, because if the effort is not made the spoiler can claim “you never even tried to talk to me!” Mandela actually tried to follow Bartoli’s advice and meet Buthelezi in “his place,” but the idea was vetoed by his ANC colleagues and a suitable alternative location could not be found. Nonetheless, this is a good idea, because a spoiler may feel more comfortable in his home environment and therefore be less likely to act out, and it shows that the negotiator is serious about bringing the spoiler into the process (keep in mind that the recent U.S.-North Korea negotiations were held in Beijing, and that negotiations between the two are rarely held in Pyongyang). Following Gambari’s advice, Mandela also engaged in bilateral negotiations with Buthelezi before other parties got involved. Given Buthelezi’s unpredictability, this was a good idea – if he was going to make a scene, better he do so with only one other party present.
Finally, the experts recognize that understanding the spoiler’s needs, and finding a way for him to satisfy his constituents, are important components in successful negotiations. “Face saving” and “ownership” are critical considerations when dealing with spoilers, thus the need for the negotiator or mediator to “put himself in the spoiler’s shoes.” Mandela made some effort to consider Buthelezi’s position and try to reach an agreement that could appease Buthelezi’s constituents. In the end, though, it wasn’t Buthelezi’s constituents but Buthelezi himself who presented the problem, just as Denktash’s constituents are not the problem, either. Mandela was able to reach an agreement with Buthelezi that satisfied him on a personal level (Buthelezi’s new job as minister of home affairs probably had something to do with this). The agreement assuaged Buthelezi’s ego, essentially allowing him to “save face” with himself. Furthermore, Buthelezi’s participation in elections gave him a sense of ownership in the process. Denktash seems to be a difficult man to satisfy, but it is important to consider how he can “save face” and develop a sense of ownership in any potential solution in Cyprus.
Conclusion: Guide to Dealing with Spoilers
Drawing from the case studies and experts’ advice, this analysis concludes with an original list of guidelines for negotiating with spoilers.
1. Err on the side of including too many parties, not too few, in negotiations It can be difficult to determine who to deal with, but it is better to talk with too many people rather than too few, because it is often easier to kick people out of the process rather than bring them in at a later date. In order to know the character of a spoiler, and gauge whether he can be dealt with, he needs to be involved in the process towards the beginning.
2. Get to know the spoiler According to Rubin, “the personality of the leader is a factor of great importance, as is his or her motivation to make decisions in favor of conflict settlement and negotiation” (Rubin 2001: 102). Even if the spoiler is an unpleasant individual, efforts should be made to understand the spoiler’s personality and character, which can provide important clues on how best to manage him. Mandela had prior familiarity with Buthelezi, which proved advantageous for him. Annan is less personally familiar with Denktash, which has probably hindered his efforts to convince Denktash to sign onto an agreement.
3. Be willing to move forward without the spoiler (or at least appear willing to)
This is what Mandela did right and Annan did wrong. Of course, it would have been difficult for Annan to move forward without one of the two essential parties, but by repeatedly promising to close the door but not really doing so, he severely damaged the credibility of his threats. Meanwhile, it seems likely that Mandela and De Klerk actually would have proceeded with elections and constitution-making without Buthelezi – or at least they made a good show of being willing to do so.
4. If the train leaves, delay its return
If pursuing a “departing train” strategy, and if negotiations are called off because a deadline passes, do not restart negotiations too quickly. Annan made this mistake as well: he called off negotiations in February but started again in March, then pronounced negotiations dead later in March but began anew in April. A more effective approach would have been to make Denktash and others “sweat it out” longer, perhaps leading them to believe that the last opportunity really was the last. Then, when the train comes back and negotiations resume, there may be more urgency to their efforts and they may be more willing to make concessions.
5. Appeasing spoilers rarely works and can backfire severely
According to Stedman, “in Angola, Cambodia, and Rwanda, appeasement was an ineffective and morally bankrupt policy. Appeasement cannot work if the target interprets appeasement as weakness.” (Stedman 1997: 370). Nor did appeasement worked in either of the two cases analyzed here (though Mandela’s “stroking” of Buthelezi appears to have had some positive effect). If appeasement is seen as weakness, then the spoiler is likely to push for more, especially if he is a greedy spoiler like Buthelezi. If he is a total spoiler like Denktash, appeasement won’t work unless the spoiler is offered everything he demands, which is tantamount to complete capitulation.
6. Educate yourself about the spoiler’s constituency and its view on the relevant issues
Ultimately, any spoiler has to be at least partially accountable to the constituents he represents; otherwise he would be of little concern in negotiations. An effective negotiator or mediator should acquaint himself with the spoiler’s constituents and their views – don’t let the spoiler put words in the mouths of his constituents. It may turn out that their views are a source of leverage in dealing with the spoiler. If possible, it may be wise to try to bypass the spoiler and communicate with the constituent directly, which can often be done through the media. To some extent, Annan has tried to do this with the Turkish-Cypriots. He should continue to do so in later rounds of negotiation. . |
