Methods

When the parties to a conflict are unable to come to a resolution by themselves, the intervention of a third party is a possible means of breaking the deadlock and producing and acceptable solution. Mediators can play different roles. They can serve as hosts, observers, facilitators, formulators, educators, manipulators, or advocates. Mediators might be chosen for their reputation, skills, knowledge or resources. Mediators have their own motivations for participating in the negotiation process and sometimes come with their own agenda. Despite their biases, it is generally believed that mediators should be neutral to any of the conflicting parties. Their participation as intermediaries is based on the trust of all the conflicting parties. A mediator's participation can be terminated at any point during the negotiation process.

Conciliation is a form of negotiation that aims to settle disputes before they become conflicts. When a government or organization anticipates that a decision or a proposed course of action may cause harm, discussions with the affected party can provide a way of avoiding a dispute by creating opportunities for adjustment and accommodation. Conciliation therefore requires the willingness of the parties to compromise in order to avoid violence.

Arbitration functions in similar ways to a court system, yet it is less formal and more flexible than court proceedings. This form of adjudication is more conciliatory, at the same time its decisions are also final and binding. The proceedings and its outcome can be kept confidential. An arbitration panel is made up of an uneven number of judges. Each party chooses an equal number of judges and the last is expected to be impartial. The arbitrators selected by the parties have specialized knowledge of the issues involved. Before parties submit themselves to arbitration they have to agree on what procedures to adopt. This can lead to disputes about the laws applied, the choices between ad hoc and institutional arbitration, and the location of the proceedings. Arbitration lacks the power to conduct third-party inquiry and to subpoena witnesses. Arbitration can also be relatively expensive because the disputing parties will have to carry the entire cost of the litigation. Enforcement mechanisms are usually weak or ineffective, increasing the probability that the losing party will choose continued conflict over undesirable terms of compliance.

International judiciary and quasi-judiciary bodies apply international law between signatory states subject to the court's jurisdiction. Their decisions are final and legally binding. Enforcement is still problematic, as the concept of state sovereignty prevails over international law. The most important international courts are:

The threat or use of force can be a compelling method for advancing ones interests. International actors can also use force as a tool to pressure parties to the negotiating table. The importance of force is often overlooked as a tool for conflict management. Parties must use this technique cautiously as it can easily lead to the escalation of further violence.

The ultimate objective of formal negotiations is to create a mutually accepted outcome for the conflicting parties, thus ending the violence. Negotiation involves several integrated processes that can take place on different levels, between local institutions and international actors. Conflicting parties come to the table only when they perceive it to be in their own interests. Usually this is when the contending parties have reached a mutually hurting stalemate, where the costs of continued fighting are too high. A stalemate comes about because of the absence of change and negotiation becomes attractive as a way to pursue their aims through more peaceful, means. This window of opportunity, or ripe moment for resolution, must be recognized and acted upon. During negotiations, trust must develop between the conflicting parties through a functional working relationship that establishes good faith. Furthermore, negotiation is a creative process, adaptable to changing circumstances, and flexible to new alternatives.

Negotiations usually occur between first track diplomats. Track II diplomacy can be pursued by NGOs or intellectuals, for example, and often plays a vital role in preparing the negotiation. Getting the parties together, identifying key issues, distinguishing rational from emotional objectives, preparing the agenda and negotiating the peace agreement, are all key functions of peacemaking. Third parties are often necessary to facilitate and mediate the process. This third party can conduct direct to indirect negotiations, or can document and draft working plans and proposals. Mediators can also conduct shuttle diplomacy between two conflicting parties who will not or cannot negotiate face to face in order to advance the negotiation process.

During the early moments of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara vehemently argued against the Joint Chiefs’ of Staff plan to launch a surprise attack on Cuba. In 1978, in the Camp David negotiations, President Anwar Sadat of Egypt consistently disregarded his most trusted counsel, often acting alone on major decisions. In the midst of high profile nuclear negotiations with North Korea in 1994, the US lead negotiator Robert Gallucci engaged in “pizza diplomacy” with members of his negotiating team.

In each of these instances, the structure and dynamics of intra-team negotiations substantially affected the outcome of the inter-state negotiations. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara’s argument for a quarantine of Cuba carried the day and ultimately led to a peaceful resolution of the Cold War’s most dangerous moment. At Camp David, unlike his Israeli counterpart Prime Minister Menachem Begin, President Sadat acted alone and made a series of vital concessions on the future of the Palestinians in the West Bank. As will be described later in this paper, Gallucci’s efforts to cultivate team solidarity made it possible for the 1994 Agreed Framework to pass domestic muster within the US.

Despite the importance of intra-team negotiation in explaining outcomes of negotiations, only a few scholars have sought to understand what happens within a negotiating team. For the most part, theoretical analysis has focused more on why negotiating teams are formed and less on their internal dynamics. Can negotiating theories and concepts like the integrative approach, toughness dilemma, or the multilateral approach be applied to intra-team negotiations? Similarly, can we borrow from economic models like the principal-agent approach, organizational theory on boundary roles, or cognitive bias theories to explain intra-team negotiations? Or perhaps we need develop new analytical tools.

This paper begins by examining why negotiating teams are formed and finds that team based negotiating allows a party to deal with issues that have significant complexity, require specialized expertise, affect multiple internal constituencies, or are time dependent. Drawing on a number of case studies, this paper also finds that sending a negotiating team accrues processual benefits in terms of improved understanding of the opposing party and monitoring of communication flows. After determining the benefits of team-based negotiation, I explore how size of party’s negotiating team impact the team’s ability to accomplish its objectives efficiently and effectively. These dual demands of efficiency and effectiveness set up a problem similar to the one posed by the toughness dilemma. That is, if increasing the size of a negotiating team improves its effectiveness but decreases its efficiency, how many team members should a negotiating team have? Recognizing that size of a team is only one factor in determining efficiency and effectiveness, I take a closer look at how institutions’ and leaders’ preferences shape their negotiating teams’ organization structure, be it vertical or horizontal. I then analyze how vertically and horizontally organized negotiating teams deal with internal conflicts of interest. Lastly, from these insights into intra-team negotiation and their impact on inter-team negotiation, I conclude that additional research into intra-team negotiation could produce theoretical advancements in the study of international negotiation.

Why are negotiating teams formed?

Governments, businesses, community groups, or almost any conceivable party will enter a negotiation when they would like to resolve a conflict or issue in which another party could exercise a veto on the final decision. Often, a group will send a negotiating team if the issue has sufficient complexity, requires specialized expertise, affects multiple internal constituencies, or is time dependent. In turn, these characteristics influence intra-team dynamics and, more often than not, lead to intra-team negotiations over strategy, tactics, process, substance, or organizational structure. Furthermore, the size of a team can also noticeably impact its efficiency and effectiveness.

When a given issue (or issues) between two parties is sufficiently complex, the two parties will each likely form a negotiating team instead of sending single negotiators. There are many benefits to sending one negotiator to represent a party instead of sending of sending a team. These benefits include, but are not limited to, speaking with a single voice, making cross-issue tradeoffs easily, and speeding up the time necessary for negotiating. However, these benefits are relatively minor when faced with an issue, or issues, of great complexity. Even if highly competent, a single negotiator cannot understand, much less assign values to, more than a dozen nuanced issues at a given time. Overburdened with detail, a single negotiator will sacrifice granularity for simplicity. This may lead to bundling of issues or tabling of side issues (Zartman and Maureen 1982: 174). In many instances, expanding a negotiation team allows the party in question to avoid oversimplifying or tabling issues and, instead, reach a more Pareto optimal outcome. Furthermore, as will be addressed later, if the team is well-organized, the party will sacrifice little in terms of effectiveness.

Examples of complex negotiations that require a party to send a negotiating team include trade and multilateral negotiations. A bilateral trade negotiation team could consist of a dozen negotiators to address a range of relevant issues including, but not limited to, tariff barriers, non-tariff barriers (regulations, standards, subsidies), labor rights, investment, competition, and intellectual property. Multilateral negotiations focused on trade, the environment, or nuclear weapons may deal with just a many issues but also must contend with an even increasing number of negotiating dyads: Table 1: Multilateral Negotiation’s Impact on Negotiating Complexity

While multilateral negotiations often lead to coalition building as way to deal with complexity, consensus based decision making often means that a party seeking to further its interests must be aware of and negotiate with a huge number of parties (Zartman 2002).   By sending a team of negotiators, a party can better track shifts in position and changes in discourse between the many negotiating dyads.

On many issues, a negotiating party will perceive the need for specialized expertise and, as a result, expand the size of the negotiating team. Whether it is a lawyer, interpreter, or scientist, some members of a negotiation team fulfill a narrow but vital role for their party. Their services are a necessary but not sufficient condition for a deal. For example, in the lead up to the Oslo Accords in 1993, a few representatives from the Palestinian and the Israeli sides had met secretly about once a month for half a year. As it became clear that progress was being made, the Israelis brought in Joel Singer, a Washington based lawyer, to serve as chief negotiator because of his intimate understanding of international law. Knowing that any deal would have reverberating international legal consequences, the Israeli brought in Singer to supplement the political and cultural understanding of the academics that had, until that round, been representing Israel (Putnam and Carcasson 1997: 260).

Another type of specialized expertise that often forces a party to expand their international negotiating team is linguistic expertise. In the iterative, dynamic set of communications that make up most negotiations, nuance and mutually understood meanings are incredibly important. The language interpreter or interpreters must understand and communicate clearly in a multilayered dialogue that can shift unexpected through different cultural, political, and historical contexts (Kaufman 2006: 540).   Direct translation could do incredible harm so the interpreter must be active and not passive in their engagement. Of course, it is a difficult tightrope the interpreter walks. Too active and the interpreter is accused of intervening unnecessarily. This delicate balance will be further addressed in the section entitled “What happens during intra-team negotiations?”

A party might also bring in scientific expertise for negotiations in technical areas in which the generalist could make costly mistakes. For example, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) works for an average of five years to provide in-depth assessments of the human impact on climate change and our options for mitigation. The complicated models scientists used to track and predict climate change simply could not be developed by diplomats. At the same time, the political oriented members of a negotiating team on the environment can bridge the gap between the scientist’s suggestions and the domestic political processes. Without the political expertise to communicate budgetary needs, it is unlikely that scientists could turn their suggestions into concrete policy.

Similarly, a party interested in negotiation will send representatives from multiple internal constituencies to ensure that any potential deal has enough domestic political support. Richard Solomon, who represented the US in negotiations on ending the conflict in Cambodia in the 1990s, found that including Congressman Stephen Solarz in one of his delegations dramatically improved domestic traction for his efforts. By getting Congressman Solarz involved early, Solomon found that there was a greater understanding of the US strategic approach to the negotiations and a greater willingness to support that approach (Solomon 2006). Obviously, as in this case, the boundaries of a negotiation team are not necessarily consistent over time. Stakeholders may become negotiation team members. Negotiation team members may be pushed out as their role becomes unnecessary. However, a consistent point of a negotiating party’s strategy should to include members of constituencies that have a significant stake in the outcome of a given negotiation. Accordingly, on almost all negotiations involving national security matters, the Defense Department will send representation with the State Department’s chief negotiator. When working to solve criminal issues in a bilateral forum, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will send their representation with the State Department’s negotiator. With the presence of relevant stakeholders, a negotiating team is less like to concede on issues that may affect one internal constituency more than the constituency of the primary negotiator.

A party may also send a negotiating team in order to deal with time pressures or to employ a time based negotiating strategy. In the first instant, a party seeks to address a multifaceted issue in a relatively short period of time. Sending a team could allow the party to divide the issue into sub-issues and reach an agreement through simultaneous negotiations with members of the opposing party. In the second instant, a party seeking to drag out a negotiation may send a team of negotiators to create complexity where there is none. The team presents contradictory positions, disagrees with itself, and reneges on promises to push back a potential deal. This may be done when the party does not know what its true interests are or when it believes that the structural environment in which the negotiation is taking place is shifting in its favor. While it may seem counterintuitive that parties could deal with the time factor in such opposite ways, history proves this out. After September 11th, 2001, the US State Department sent a team led by Marisa Lino to negotiate with Turkey on basing and over flight rights to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. In an interview, she recalled that the need for a quick decision on numerous issues by the Turks played a role in increasing the size of her team Lino 2006). On the other hand, Joyce Neu led a Carter Center sponsored mediation between Uganda and Sudan in which Uganda employed a time based strategy. In reflecting on the experience, she suspects that Uganda sent a significantly larger team than necessary in part in order to complicate negotiations and stall a potential deal. This sent the intended message to Sudan that Uganda did not have much at stake in the negotiations (Neu 2006).

In addition to addressing complexity, furnishing needed expertise, representing internal constituencies, and dealing with time pressures, creating a negotiation team can bring additional processual benefits. Two processual benefits include helping the lead negotiator both understand the opposing party and monitor communication flows. In Olso in 1993, the presence of a negotiating team helped each party understand and interpret the actions of the other party. Entering the Oslo negotiations, the Palestinians and Israelis, although fairly knowledgeable about one another, maintained a set of hardened, negative stereotypes about the opposing party and its goals. Although the relative secrecy of the Oslo channel allowed the participants to speak freely, listen thoughtfully, and break down some of these stereotypes, having a negotiating team was particularly valuable in this respect. For instance, the Palestinians almost broke off negotiations because they believed that the Israeli academics with whom they were negotiating had little or no clout with the Israeli government. Having multiple negotiators allowed the Palestinians to debate and then eventually deduce that the Israelis were in fact taking negotiations seriously and slowly introducing more high profile negotiators. On the Israeli side, Joel Singer’s introduction as relatively hard-line, direct Israeli negotiator in the seventh round initially threatened the atmosphere that Hirschfeld and Pundak had carefully constructed. Fortunately, Hirschfeld and Pundak’s continued involvement as members of the Israeli delegation helped ease the switch to a more high profile, yet hard-line, negotiator (Putnam and Carcasson 1997: 260).

Another processual benefit of team negotiation is the improved ability to monitor communication flows more effectively. A single negotiator acting without assistance must convey ideas, track receptivity to those ideas, and probe for gaps in understanding. Organized well, a negotiating team can split these roles and more effectively communicate with the other party. For example, in North Korea in 1994, Robert Gallucci found that having one or two additional translators on hand improved communication flows and improved mutual understanding between North Korea and the US. Alternating translators ensured that the “working” interpreter could work in short, concentrated bursts. Given the intensive nature of simultaneous or near-simultaneous interpretation, this structure likely improved effectiveness. Furthermore, the “resting” interpreter could track and gauge the North Koreans’ specific understanding of the American communications. A daily debrief with Robert Gallucci, the two translators, and any other Korean speaking official in the delegation gave them a better understanding of how their messages were being conveyed to the North Koreans (Galucci 2006).

How Does a Negotiating Team’s Size Impact Efficiency and Effectiveness?

Of course, the above descriptions of the numerous benefits of team based negotiation should not be read as an unqualified endorsement that parties should always send a team. Having a negotiating team or increasing the size of a team can complicate negotiations and impact the negotiated outcome in both good and bad ways. Two metrics which can be used to assess a given negotiation are efficiency and effectiveness. “Efficiency” in negotiation means working in manner that makes the best use of a party’s limited time and resources. A business or a government accrues substantial opportunity costs whenever it engages in a negotiation. Furthermore, if a party devotes too many representatives to a single issue, it risks a situation in which issues are over diagnosed and debated. On the other hand, in this paper, “effectiveness” in negotiation should be taken as a stand in for what is elsewhere know as Pareto optimality: a situation in which gains are maximized and no one party can be made better off without the other party becoming worse off (Underdal 2006: 113 – 114). While this distinction may be initially a bit confusing to the reader, defining “efficiency” and “effectiveness” in this manner is closely aligned with Peter Drucker’s succinct quip that “efficiency is doing things right; effectiveness is doing the right things” (Drucker).

This linguistic clarification aside, the size of a negotiation team is a major factor in its ability to be efficient and effective and is depicted graphically in Table 2 below:



The left side of the y-axis tracks a hypothetical negotiating team’s declining efficiency with a solid black line. Generally, as a party adds members to its negotiating team, it becomes less and less efficient in using its time and resources. With additional team members, while there is some opportunity for gains from role specialization, more time is spent agreeing on the team’s strategy, organizing distinct roles for each member, and ensuring that the team speaks with a consistent voice.   However, the right side of the y-axis tracks the hypothetical negotiating team’s effectiveness with a dashed black curve. For this metric, as a party adds members to its negotiating team, it becomes more and more effective at accomplishing its objectives. Up to point C, an increase in the number of members of the negotiating team will lead to a corresponding increase in the team’s ability to address all of the relevant issues in a sophisticated manner. Here, the basic idea is that two heads are better than one and that the team will be more creative and better at problem solving. However, after point C, increasing the number of members of a negotiating team will minimize these benefits because of the difficulty of establishing an internal consensus. Each team member, as an individual, approaches the negotiation with a different set of assumptions and goals. Consequently, after reaching point C, the team increasingly seeks a lowest common denominator instead of the more Pareto optimal, more effective negotiated outcome.

Assuming that it will be relatively obvious when a team has reached point C and each additional team member decreases both efficiency and effectiveness, let us analyze the space between point A and point C.   Here, the hypothetical party faces a problem equivalent to the toughness dilemma (Zartman and Maureen 1982: 14). Moving from point A toward point C, adding team members decreased efficiency but increases effectiveness. In other words, it may take longer, but the team is more likely to reach a Pareto optimal deal that reflects each of the stakeholder’s primary concerns. For relatively minor negotiations in which the party has a decent Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) (Fischer and Ury 1991) and faces significant time pressures, the hypothesized party will likely add negotiation team members only until it reaches point A. The negotiated outcome derived from point A is not likely be Pareto optimal but it will make efficient use of the party’s resources. An example would be the Bush administration approach to the Danish cartoon controversy in 2006. This crisis was time dependent but the perceived impact on American national interest was relatively low. Any American delegation on this issue was probably relatively small and designed to make efficient use diplomatic resources stretched by the war in Iraq. On the other hand, for particularly important negotiations that do not take place under significant time pressures and are relatively resource inelastic, the party in question will try to reach point C. An example would be the Doha round of trade negotiations. Any deal would have a significant, long-term impact on the concerned party but the gains from striking a deal from one month to the next would be relatively minor. Consequently, each team consists of many members and is probably close to point C. In between each of these extremes is point B, where the party seeks to balance its competing needs for efficiency and effectiveness. An example would include the United Nations negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Lebanon crisis in the summer of 2006. Needing an effective solution that addressed significant national security issues yet an efficient one that stopped the bleeding, the Lebanese government likely made the implicit choice of sending a negotiating team that was at point B.

Of course, size of a team is only one factor among many in determining efficiency and effectiveness. The above model is simplified and assumes that all other factors, such as team organization, chief negotiator’s leadership ability, and personality conflicts, are held constant. For example, a chief negotiator who is a particularly incompetent manager might experience a more rapid decrease in efficiency and minimal gains in effectiveness by adding additional team members. On the other hand, a well organized negotiating team, perhaps supported institutionally, might find that they can handle a larger number of team members before they experience significant decreases in efficiency or before they reach point C. Because we assume in Table 2 that all other factors are held constant, it behooves us to now relax the model and analyze some of the other determinants of efficiency and effectiveness.

How are negotiating teams organized? How does organization influence intra and inter-team negotiation?

Negotiating teams exhibit many different organizational structures depending on the institutional preferences of the institutions and leaders involved. Some, like Marisa Lino’s delegation to Turkey, are quite hierarchical, where junior negotiators are expected to tow the line and fill specific roles. Others, like the two student groups in the Negotiation Simulation in Professor Zartman’s Negotiation Practicum, are quite flat with relatively undefined roles that evolve over time. Where a negotiation team falls on the spectrum from vertical to horizontal organized often influences the process of both intra and inter team negotiation.

In a vertically organized negotiation team, power, empowerment, and mandate are delegated from the lead negotiator. This can be institutionally determined by the party forming the negotiating team or by the lead negotiator herself. In the case of Marisa Lino, the US lead negotiator to Turkey on basing, status of forces, and over flight rights, the vertical nature of her negotiation team seemed to be a function of both institutional pressure from Washington and her own personal preference. In an interview with Professor I. William Zartman’s Negotiation Practicum class, she spoke of the “get it done yesterday” (Lino 2006) attitude that came from Washington immediately after September 11, 2001 in preparation for Operation Enduring Freedom. This, in part, drove her efforts to run a tight ship. Asked if she had full authority of her multi-agency negotiating team, Lino cited an instance in which a Department of Defense representative began muttering under his breath during a negotiation as a way convey displeasure with the proceeding. Not opting to go with the less confrontational “pizza diplomacy” of Robert Gallucci, Lino immediately kicked the transgressor off of her negotiation team.

For these vertically organized negotiation teams, an appropriate model for analyzing incentives, processes, and eventual outcomes is the principal-agent model. In this model, the lead negotiator is the principal who delegates various responsibilities to his agent(s). The agent, who could be a junior negotiator, analyst, interpreter, scientist, or interagency representative, works to fulfill his role (Rubin 2002: 101). However, the difficulties arise when there is a misalignment between the goals of the negotiator and the incentives or beliefs of the agent. These problems can be particularly acute when the lead negotiator and the agent represent different agencies. For instance, in the case of negotiations on nuclear nonproliferation, the Secretary of Defense may be more skeptical of the opposing party’s willingness to follow through on its commitments and, as a result, empower his representative to express these beliefs within the negotiating team. In this instance, the lead negotiator has a difficult problem. Her agent may not act according to her instructions but she also has few options for removing an agent that is doing their job, as defined by the Secretary of Defense. Short of appealing directly to the Secretary of Defense to change his policy, the lead negotiator must adapt her approach to the given constraints. When negotiating with the North Koreans in the lead up the Agreed Framework in 1994, Robert Gallucci chose to deal with this very principal-agent problem through what he called “pizza diplomacy.” In this “pizza diplomacy,” Gallucci tried to check in with all of his team members regularly and informally over a cup of coffee or pizza. This gave his team members, in a low-profile setting, to air their disagreements with the process or substance of the negotiation. It also gave Gallucci a change to persuade them that a specific course of action or concession would achieve the their mutually held goals. This iterative and dynamic process improved intra-team and interagency buy-in and increased the chances of reaching a negotiated outcome that would be accepted domestically (Galucci 2006).

Unlike the vertically organized negotiation team, the process in a horizontally organized negotiation team is more likely to be ad-hoc, informally determined, and take on some of the characteristics of a multilateral negotiation. A prime example of a vertically organized negotiation team was the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Ex Comm) set up by President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Engaged in a high stakes negotiation with the Soviet Union, Kennedy’s team of a dozen advisors debated and formed US policy. Some members of the team like Secretary of Justice Robert Kennedy served as key negotiators by conducting inter-team negotiating with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin. The Ex Comm team also experienced ferocious intra-team negotiation in the attempt to come to a consensus and present President Kennedy with good policy ideas. Robert Kennedy remembered the horizontal nature of the negotiating team writing: “during all these deliberations, we all spoke as equals. There was not rank, and, in fact, we did not even have a chairman” (Kennedy 46). Not unlike multilateral negotiations, the Ex Comm began to form loose coalitions as a way to aggregate positions and sway President Kennedy. In Thirteen Days, Robert Kennedy argues that this informal structuring of the Ex Comm “proved conclusively how important it is that the President have the recommendations and opinions of more than one individual, of more than one department, and of more than one point of view.” (Kennedy 1971: 46) Although he did not say it in so many words, Robert Kennedy implicitly argued that the horizontal structure of the team allowed the group to design a more effective, more Pareto optimal, foreign policy.

Of course, there are also drawbacks to the horizontally organized negotiating team. In the Negotiation Practicum class, Professor Zartman gave the members a good lesson in this by setting up a negotiation over the division of at least $500 between and within two teams of 8 people. As an added complication, each team member had paid a different amount of money as a lab fee. Formal decision making rules did not exist and had to be formed. On my team, consisting of Andy Kamons, Holger Wilms, and five others, the intra-team negotiating proved as challenging as the inter-team negotiating. In the beginning of the negotiation, as time was limited, the team quickly agreed to a simple division of “spoils” within the team. Each player would receive their original lab fee plus an even division of whatever additional money was left over. After negotiating with the opposing party and reaching what we thought was an agreement, the intra-team agreement feel apart. Andy Kamons, who had had a relatively low lab fee, argued for a switch to a different formula that would improve the amount of money he and two other negotiation partners received. This quickly pushed our intra-team negotiation into two coalitions with Andy and the two negotiation partners in one coalition and Holger Wilms and I, who had paid higher lab fees, into the other coalition. Eventually, we reached an agreement. However, the consensus based rules and horizontally structured negotiating team reduced the efficiency of our party in a way that a more vertical structured team would not have.

At the extreme of a horizontally organized negotiating team was Lazzaroni family in their negotiation to secure the release of kidnapping victim Paolo Lazzaroni. In this intra-team negotiation, Paolo, Luigi, Aurelio, and Giuseppe had little or ability to communication with one another while interacting with the kidnappers. In this sense, each had full decision making rights and a mandate to act however they saw fit. What made the negotiation successful was each team members’ trust of the other Lazzaronis and their ability to anticipate actions and demands that would further their negotiation without threatening Paolo’s life.

Conclusion

Reflecting on his experience as a negotiator, Richard Solomon calculated that 90% of his time working towards a deal was spent at home getting a mandate for his negotiation (Solomon 2006). This work preparing for inter-team negotiation consists of both getting buy-in from various stakeholders, structuring a negotiation team, and conducting intra-negotiations. Paradoxically, the vast majority of research and analysis of international negotiation focuses on the bilateral or multilateral interactions with scant attention paid to the influence of intra-team dynamics.

This essay attempted to rectify this paradox by analyzing in which situations a party appoints a negotiation, how the size of a negotiating team impact efficiency and effectiveness, and how the internal structure of a negotiating team influences inter-team relations. Through the application of theoretical approaches to negotiation and a brief review of case studies as varied as the Cuban Missile Crisis’ Ex Comm negotiations and Robert Gallucci’s “Pizza Diplomacy,” this essay found sufficient evidence for the proposition that intra-team negotiations do impact inter-team negotiations.